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when Solutions emerge in Problem Solving
Frank Lösche
At some point during a creative action something clicks, suddenly the prospec-
tive problem solver just knows the solution to a problem, and a feeling of joy
and relief arises. This phenomenon, called Eureka experience, insight, Aha moment,
hunch, epiphany, illumination, or serendipity, has been part of human narrations
for thousands of years. It is the moment of a subjective experience, a surprising,
and sometimes a life-changing event. In this thesis, I narrow down this moment
1. conceptually, 2. experientially, and 3. temporally. The concept of emerging
solutions has a multidisciplinary background in Cognitive Science, Arts, Design,
and Engineering. Through the discussion of previous terminology and compara-
tive reviews of historical literature, I identify sources of ambiguity surrounding
this phenomenon and suggest unifying terms as the basis for interdisciplinary
exploration. Tracking the experience based on qualitative data from 11 creative
practitioners, I identify conflicting aspects of existing models of creative pro-
duction. To bridge this theoretical and disciplinary divide between iterative de-
sign thinking and sequential models of creativity, I suggest a novel multi-layered
model. Empirical support for this proposal comes from Dira, a computer-based
open-ended experimental paradigm. As part of this thesis I developed the task
and 40 unique sets of stimuli and response items to collect dynamic measures of
the creative process and evade known problems of insightful tasks. Using Dira,
I identify the moment when solutions emerge from the number and duration
of mouse-interactions with the on-screen elements and the 124 participants’
self-reports. I provide an argument for the multi-layered model to explain a
discrepancy between the timing observed in Dira and existing sequential models.
Furthermore, I suggest that Eureka moments can be assessed on more than a di-
chotomous scale, as the empirical data from interviews and Dira demonstrates
for this rich human experience. I conclude that the research on insight benefits
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1 Introduction
It starts with a thought. The essence or the core of everything humans create is
the moment when someone first thinks about it. It is the moment when people’s
mind passes from a state of not-knowing to knowing, or from a foreshadow to
a notion; it brings clarity to a vague situation. Often, people had been engaged
in this particular creation long before the pivotal moment moment, and having
the idea or finding the solution is rarely the end. We humans, as thinkers, artists,
and scientists, know and value the moment when an answer falls into its place,
when a particular piece ‘clicks’, and when a solution emerges. In these moments
some of us feel as if we were expected to call out ‘Aha’ or ‘Eureka’. In this project,
I set out to understand more about this ‘Eureka moment’.
The defining Eureka experience was first mentioned about 2000 years ago in a
textbook for students of Architecture. Much later eminent individuals described
their scientific process through sudden Aha! moments, artists felt kissed by the
muses, and authors broke their writer’s block. From the 1920s on, psychologists
situated ‘illumination’ at the centre of the creative process, biologists found ge-
netic predisposition for creativity, and neuroscientists identified temporal corre-
lates to insights. Yet, little is known about the exact timing of this moment and its
interaction with the environment, the creator, or the created thought. I started
this project with the aim to observe these sparse and fleeting moments and help
creative partitioners to create advantageous environments for increasing these
experiences, but I soon identified a lack of instruments and clarity of concepts.
Often the creative process surrounding the ‘illumination’ is assessed through the
created product and the creative person. This is a limitation derived from the
conceptual framing of the insight phenomenon within creativity as discussed in
Psychology. Phenomenologically similar concepts have been discussed before
the psychological terms were established and are part of research in Engineering,
Humanities, and the Arts. In chapter 2 I discuss the imprecise and ever-changing
definition of central terms. Specifically, I identify a potential cause for this ambi-
guity even within the literature of Psychology through a comparative linguistic
review reaching back as far as 90 years. Since the resulting vagueness of terms
has negative effects on tools, measurements, and results, I suggest a consistent
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definition of the core terms related to the emerging phenomena. As I argue in
chapter 2, this is a necessary step to rely on and compare tools, measurements,
and results. Furthermore and as mentioned before, humans had known about
these moments before creativity became a research object, and even before the
term ‘creativity’ was coined.
I situate my research within the framework of ‘Cognitive Innovation’. The re-
search questions I tackle with my work starts before the term ‘creativity’ was
coined and considers ideas currently not part of the creativity literature, which
is predominantly related to Psychology. Framing my work within the psycho-
logical creativity research would, in conclusion, have limited the conceptual ap-
proach. The idea of ‘Cognitive Innovation’ is broader and was the initial multiple-
disciplinary questions addressed through the CogNovo doctoral training centre
at the University of Plymouth (Maranan et al., 2015). Relying on the initial con-
ceptualisation by Denham (2014), I discussed the implications with my colleagues
Kristensen et al. (2017). There we explained the recursive model introduced by
Denham and Punt (2017), but add technology as an additional factor to the equa-
tion. Therefore, ‘Cognitive Innovation’ is best described as a drive to iterate over
processes, knowledge, and perception on individual and group levels. This larger
framework allows capturing the phenomenon of interest with fewer limitations
in greater breadth and depth.
As part of my thesis, I follow the original trajectory of the term ‘Eureka’. In chap-
ter 3 I go back to architects to interview them about their creative process and
‘Eureka moments’. In doing so, I identify a conflict between my collected data
and the predominant theoretical models in Architecture and Cognitive Science.
Furthermore, I worked with dancers and developed a tool to observe temporal
patterns in dance improvisation (Łucznik & Loesche, 2017). With my colleagues,
we identified moments of ‘spontaneous synchronisation’ that emerged during
free dance improvisation (Łucznik, Loesche, Redding, & May, 2016, page 180).
The results of both lines of work are discussed outside the field of creativity; in
particular, the architects in chapter 3 distance themselves from the term ‘creativ-
ity’, even though their data suggests emerging phenomena similar to ‘Eureka’.
This links to the discussion in chapter 2 about several related terms used in the
literature. Here I am concerned with the question if there are conceptual differ-
ences between the various emergent phenomena, or if they should be treated as
terminological imprecision. This links to the discussion I had with a colleague
regarding the relationship between bistable perception and convergent thinking
tasks (Taranu & Loesche, 2017). By analysing a corpus of everyday phone con-
versations, another colleague and I looked at the timing of overcoming silent
episodes in spontaneous conversation (Torre & Loesche, 2016). We develop a
2
1 Introduction
model of decision making that gives a better explanation for the observed re-
sponse times.
The conflicts between observed behaviour in my studies and theoretical mod-
els discussed in the Cognitive Sciences became more and more apparent over
time. Some of the underlying experimental work and discussions with my peers
is documented in the publications mentioned above. My development and utili-
sation of ‘Cognitive Innovation’ provide additional theoretical support for the
idea that there is more to the ‘Eureka’ phenomenon than meets the eye. In part,
this is also captured in the multi-layered model introduced in section 3.5.2. From
my observations and the literature discussed in chapter 2, the temporal aspects
seem promising to address terminological imprecision and conceptual differ-
ences within the creative process and ‘Eureka’ phenomenon. However, I was not
able to find an instrument to capture the temporal aspects of ‘Eureka’ free from
assumptions based on disciplinary confinements of the existing literature.
Based on the findings from interviews with architects, I developed a novel ex-
perimental paradigm to observe the temporal aspects of the creative process. In
chapter 4 I narrow down the moment when solutions emerge through a combi-
nation of behavioural and self-reported data from a series of experiments using
‘Dira’. Some of these results have also been published in Loesche et al. (2018). In
chapter 5 I link the interviews with architects and the resulting multi-layered
model of creativity with the behavioural data from ‘Dira’ by observing how the
data of one contributes to explaining the data of the other. Finally, in chapter 6 I
provide a summary of my findings and my contribution to knowledge.
3
2 Staking a claim: An excavation in
the literature
This chapter is dedicated to identifying existing knowledge about the moment
when solutions emerge, the Eureka moments or, if you prefer other names, on the
subject of insight, Aha! experience, serendipity, breakthrough thinking, vipassanā,
tip-of-the-tongue, flash, penny dropping moment, anagnorisis, hunch, cognitive
leap, revelation, intuition, epiphany… I analyse the underlying concept and the
most important terms in part through a literature review, where I discuss how
previous findings from different disciplines are connected. I also approach the
topic through meta-analytic comparative reviews, where I actively draw infer-
ences from cues such as gaps in the literature, terminology inconsistencies, and
language ambiguity.
2.1 Methodology
For the narrative literature review, I report the methodological and theoretical
findings on the topic of Eureka moments. The body of literature considered is not
limited to a certain field; instead, I aim at providing an overview of different as-
pects of this instant, as seen from different perspectives. When I rediscover some
original text on the phenomenon, the review gains an almost media archaeolog-
ical aspect. A further expansion of this chapter beyond the scope a literature
review is a comparative review of the origin of some of the terminology used on
the topic today. Most notably I have done this in section 2.2.2.
The sheer length of the list of names given to the moment when solutions emerge
demonstrates the interest in the topic. It also shows that the observations within
different environments, disciplines, and from different perspectives did not con-
verge to a commonly used term. While these terms have arguably different con-
notations in everyday language, the technical terms in various disciplines and
the meaning of some words changes depending on the context they are used in.
The study of the concept of ‘Eureka moments’ requires to take into account these
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different aspects and consider the attached ideas. In this thesis I rely on and
relate to the concept of ‘Cognitive Innovation’ as a broad framework to capture
these different aspects.
2.1.1 The relationship to Cognitive Innovation
To understand the different aspects of the work within the thesis it helps to be
aware of the environment it was developed, namely CogNovo and ‘Cognitive In-
novation’. ‘Cognitive Innovation’ was introduced by Denham (2014, page 202)
to highlight that “creativity or innovation does not occur in a vacuum. What is
critically important for social and technological progress is innovation within ap-
propriate constraints”. Here she introduces the doctoral training centre CogNovo
as a mean to link scientific research with social and technological innovation.
Gummerum and Denham (2014) discusses the societal and distributed aspects of
creativity and innovation in more detail, introducing the method of addressing
interdisciplinary research questions in multidisciplinary teams with the expecta-
tion of some projects reaching transdisciplinary answers. Some of these projects
have been explained in more detail by Maranan et al. (2015). In the same year,
CogNovo invited to a first conference on ‘Cognitive Innovation’ and published the
proceedings with contributions from different projects and therefore disciplines
(Punt & Denham, 2015). The ‘Off the Lip’ conferences became an annual event
to discuss the interdisciplinary aspects of the different lines of research within
CogNovo. I edited one of the later proceedings and contributed the editorial for
the published special edition of the AVANT Journal (Loesche & Łucznik, 2017).
Throughout the CogNovo programme, the theory behind ‘Cognitive Innovation’
was discussed and advanced, most notably by Denham and Punt (2016) introduc-
ing the ‘Cognitive Innovation Function’. In our contribution, Kristensen et al.
(2017) provided a brader perspective on the history of the term and suggested to
add technology as another aspect to the function. At the same time Punt and Den-
ham (2017) highlighted collaboration as a necessity and irony as a useful addition
to ‘Cognitive Innovation’.
To grasp the breadth of the work associated with ‘Cognitive Innovation’ and
realise how it goes beyond existing terminology and frameworks, it is useful
to look at the other projects conducted within CogNovo, the hub of ‘Cognitive
Innovation’. Some of the published work is grounded within a single discipline
and contributes for example to the literature of Linguistics (Torre, Goslin, &
White, 2015; Torre, White, & Goslin, 2016), Human Robot Interaction (Melidis &
Marocco, 2015), Machine Learning (Colin, Belpaeme, Cangelosi, & Hemion, 2016),
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Media Philosophy (Stamboliev, 2017), Somatics (Maranan, 2015), Neuro Imaging
(Battaglini, Casco, Isaacs, Bridges, & Ganis, 2017; Ganis, Bridges, Hsu, & Schendan,
2016), (social) psychology (Briazu, Walsh, Deeprose, & Ganis, 2017; Kizilirmak,
da Silva, Imamoglu, & Richardson-Klavehn, 2015; Tyagi, Hanoch, Hall, Runco, &
Denham, 2017), Perception (Denham et al., 2018), Associative Learning (P. M. Jones
& Zaksaite, 2017), Neural Systems (Fletcher & Wennekers, 2018), Alarm Design
(Edworthy, Schlesinger, McNeer, Kristensen, & Bennett, 2017), Media Archeology
(Catanese, Edmonds, & Lameris, 2015), and Artificial Intelligence (Lemarchand,
2018). Others bridge two or more disciplines, for example Psychology and Dance
(Łucznik, 2015), Psychology and Artificial Intelligence (Kajić, Gosmann, Stewart,
Wennekers, & Eliasmith, 2017; Kajic & Wennekers, 2015), Sound and medical
care (Kristensen, Edworthy, & Özcan, 2016), or Philosophy and Play (Straeubig,
2015). Yet another set of publications discusses their work in a interdisciplinary
context, for example when talking about virtual morality (K. B. Francis et al.,
2017; Kathryn B. Francis, Gummerum, Ganis, Howard, & Terbeck, 2017; Kathryn
B. Francis et al., 2016), playful soundscapes (Straeubig & Quack, 2016), or the
rewards and challenges of interdiscplinary work (Briazu, 2017, 103; Torre et al.,
forthcoming).
My work towards this thesis was embedded in CogNovo and inspired by the
discussion with my peers. In addition, the supervisory team that helped me
to develop the methodology, consisted of a principal investigator interested in
neural computations and robotics, a psycholinguist, and an architect. Adding
my own background in computer science to the mix, the team was as ‘multidis-
ciplinary’ as intended and discussed by Gummerum and Denham (2014). The
phenomenon of interest is related to these different disciplines and the resulting
research questions relating to the temporal aspects of ‘Eureka’ can be understood
as interdisciplinary. Time and further discussions will tell how transdisciplinary
the results, presented in this thesis and by Loesche et al. (2018) are. Nevertheless,
this section hints towards the necessity of discussing the content of the thesis
within ‘Cognitive Innovation’ and therefore outside the terminology and method-
ology of a single discipline. In the following sections I introduce the terminology
related to the phenomemon of interest.
2.2 Terminology
Different names have been used to describe the moment when solutions emerge.
One of the oldest preserved accounts of this moment uses the word Eureka, but
depending on the context in which it is used, and the cultural, linguistic, or
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disciplinary background and personal preference of the writer, the exact term
differs. Different names carry different connotations and, even if they aim to
describe the same phenomenon, these meanings might have diverged over time.
Other words that are closely related to the phenomenon of interest are insight,
illumination, aha, and epiphany, and they will be discussed below. Often these
words are used as compounds. For example, in the original text, the word Eureka
is attached to moment and describes an experience that Archimedes had while
solving a problem (Pollio, 15/1914). Consequently, in the scientific literature,
Eureka is not only referred to as Eureka moment, but also in combination with
other words such as process and problem. table 2.1 illustrates a few examples of
the combinations known in the scientific literature. In the subsequent sections, I
will follow some of these terms and their compounds. Based on the results of this
examination, I summarise in section 2.2.8 how these terms are used within this
thesis. By tracing their origin, their distinctively different uses, and by identifying
their compounds, I converge towards the phenomenon itself.
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moment process experience problem
Eureka Holman (2012) Shaw (1989) Gruber (1981) Lorge and Solomon (1955)
Aha Kang et al. (2017),
Kounios and Beeman
(2009)
Danek et al. (2018), Jung-Beeman
et al. (2004), Thagard and Stewart
(2011), Topolinski and Reber (2010a)
Insight Hill and Kemp (2016),
Tian et al. (2017),
Wiltschnig et al.
(2010)
Wangbing Shen et al. (2013),
Wangbing Shen et al. (2017), Sheth
et al. (2009), Sprugnoli et al. (2017),
Yeh et al. (2014)
Danek et al. (2012), Ellen (1982),
Jarman (2014, 2016), Wu et al. (2013),
YUAN et al. (2016)
Weisberg and Alba (1981)
Epiphany Dufwenberg et al.
(2010)
Bowen (1982) McDonald (2007)
Table 2.1: The relationship between different names for emerging solutions and the related description.
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2.2.1 Eureka
A Eureka moment is “an instant in which a scientific discovery is made,
or a breakthrough occurs; a moment of inspiration; (in extended use)
an exciting or significant experience”, at least according to a dictionary
(“Eureka moment”, 2018). Relying on the term Eureka moment, it is also
rather easy to communicate the topic of my research to colleagues and
friends. Often I add ‘the moment when it clicks, and you suddenly find
the solution to a problem’ as an additional description. Interestingly,
the definition in the dictionary mentions scientific discoveries as the
context. Furthermore, breakthroughs, inspiration and exciting experiences are
mentioned. I will come back to these later in the chapter when I write
about alternative names, associated phenomena, and related concepts.
But first I want to introduce the Eureka moment in more detail, starting
with the origin of the term.
Etymologically eureka (/ju"ôik@/) derives from the ancient Greek word
ευρηκα (/heú<.rE:.ka/) meaning I have found (it). People are have report-
edly been using this word for more than 2000 years as an interjection
to celebrate discoveries and inventions. Its first documented use is at-
tributed to the Syracusian mathematician Archimedes after discovering
a solution to a problem he had been pondering on for some time: how
to measure the volume of a crown, a body with an irregular shape. The
story about the discovery of water displacement, made by chance in a
bathtub in 250 BCE, was written down about 200 years after it happened
by the Roman architect Pollio (15/1914). Since then the word has been
used by other scientists to mark discoveries or express the feeling of joy
originating from them. Another famous example is from Carl Friedrich
Gauss’ diary, where he wrote “ευρηκα ! num = △ +△ +△” when he
discovered that any positive number could be represented as the sum of
three triangular numbers (Klein, 1903).
Similar to these anecdotes, the term Eureka moment describes the moment
when people solve a problem. More precisely, it describes the moment
when they transition from the state of not knowing the answer to being
aware of a solution. In this combination, the word Eureka refers to the
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experiential aspect, while the moment connects it with the environment,
with a potentially observable time when this happens. Before the Eureka
moment, the prospective problem solver does not understand the solution.
This implies that they do not know the answer, but they also do not know
how they can reach the required answer. Once the transition has happened,
they know the solution. This does not necessarily mean that they have
found the exact answer yet, but they know a way to reach the solution. For
example, Pollio (15/1914, Book IX, Paragraph 11) states that Archimedes
had been “taking this [the Eurekamoment] as the beginning of his discovery”
before Pollio explains the details on how Archimedes found out that gold
was missing. In the defining Eureka moment Archimedes, therefore, did not
find the answer to the problem, but a solution on how to solve it.
Within the primary literature, there is no shared agreement on the exact
definition of Eureka moments. Many texts contain descriptions, but it is
up to the reader to find an exact interpretation. For example, K. S. Smith,
Smith, and Stanford (2013, page 165) defines Eureka as “the moment that
everything makes sense and a cohesive approach is made clear”. Here they
leave open what ‘everything’ is and to whom it makes sense. Other sources
such as Sprugnoli et al. (2017, page 99), define these moments through
insight as “Insight processes that peak in ‘unpredictable moments of ex-
ceptional thinking’.”. I will discuss the overlap between these terms and
concepts in more detail in section 2.2.2. Interestingly many authors like
Sprugnoli et al. (2017) use Eureka moment, insight, and Aha synonymously
or provide circular definitions of one of the terms through the others.
The original account of the Eureka moment does not only describe what
happened but also where and how. Besides the location in the bath and
therefore away from the usual working environment, Pollio (15/1914,
Book IX, Paragraph 10) reported that the solution arrived “without a mo-
ment’s delay, and transported with joy”. According to this description, the
solution came suddenly and was accompanied by positive affect. A formal
definition is missing in Rogers’s (1954, page 256) publication, but here the
Eureka feeling is one of three by-products of the creative act and seems
to be a euphoric moment. It is also unexpected. Later definitions build
on this accompanying phenomena by calling Eureka moments “moments
of sudden, unexpected discovery” (Anderson, 2011). In addition to the
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suddenness, this author goes one step further by calling it unexpected, but
without specifying to whom it is unexpected. This illustrates the different
dimension of the phenomenon which I will discuss further in section 2.4.
Different aspects are behind the different compounds Eureka is used in and
that are meant to highlight its different aspects. In table 2.1 I had already
mentioned the Eureka process, a term coined by Shaw (1989, page 297) to
highlight that “creativity is far from simply a cognitive process. It is a
human process that has deep feelings […] associated with it”. Here the
Eureka process surrounds the creative process for scientific problem solving,
but contains itself a moment or phase of illumination. Another compound,
the Eureka experience as used by Gruber (1981) refers to the subjective
phenomenology. Gruber (1981, page 44) explicitly references the anecdote
with Archimedes, but “reject[s] the idea, that sudden illuminations —
‘Eureka experiences’ — happen in a millisecond flash” which might have
led him to use the term experience rather than moment. Rarely used in
the contemporary literature, Lorge and Solomon (1955) have referred
to puzzle-like problems as Eureka-type problems. In their study, Lorge and
Solomon (1955) compare individual versus group performance in tasks like
the Tower of Hanoi as well as rowing missionaries and cannibals across a
river with only a small boat. The reference to Eureka problems arises when
they discuss how solutions are found through a stage-wise model.
In addition to the terms already mentioned in table 2.1, Eureka cry is an-
other example of a compound use of Eureka. Just like the Eureka moment,
this term is directly derived from the original Greek story. Undoubtedly
it was initially inspired by Pollio’s (15/1914, Book IX, paragraph 10) text
of Archimedes “crying with a loud voice that he had found what he was
seeking”. Besides the striking mental imagery, the term Eureka cry high-
lights the temporal facet of a little shout and the emotional aspect of a
positive surprise (Koestler, 1964). In his book and when introducing the
idea of bisociation, he equally used the terms Eureka process and Eureka act.
Arguably these last two terms refer more to the process in which the Eu-
reka cry and the Eureka moment are embedded. The almost synonymous use
of the three terms in Koestler’s (1964) book highlights an issue in the sci-
entific literature: terms that potentially describe separate and dissimilar
phenomena might be used interchangeably.
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The term Eureka has been used for almost 2000 years in the literature to
describe moments of sudden understanding. The term and the associated
anecdote are intuitively understandable, grounded in everyday language
and experience, and are similarly used across languages. Eureka acts as
a conversation starter, but even a quick gaze at the dictionary and some
of the scientific literature illustrates its ambiguous use, multiple mean-
ings, and unclear definition. Intrigued by the phenomena behind these
experiences, I am using the term Eurekawhen referring to the experiential
aspects as summarised in definition 1. I will use the following sections
to explain the phenomenon through related and sometimes alternative
terms, to further narrow down what I am interested in.
2.2.2 Insight: a case for linguistics investigators
The word insight is frequently used in everyday language to describe that
someone understands a causality within a given context or to gain “an
accurate and deep understanding” (“Insight”, 2018). The word is conse-
quently used in the scientific literature across all disciplines, suggesting
correct and profound findings. A technical term at least in Psychology
and Psychiatry, insight has also one or more specific meanings there. In
the literature related to creativity, innovation, and problem solving, many
different and sometimes competing definitions have been offered. In this
section, I trace back the history of the term and offer a novel view on the
origin of the word for creativity research. Furthermore, I distinguish be-
tween existing definitions of insight.
In addition to having different meanings between disciplines, the term
insight is ambiguous within the Cognitive Sciences. It is not only used
to describe traits, abilities, and states; insight also describes them in an
epistemological as well as a phenomenological sense (Kühle, 2015). For
example, the moment a solution is found is called insight, but the found
solution is called insight as well.
The scientific literature related to problem solving, creativity, and inno-
vation often refers to Köhler (1925/1976) as the origin of the term insight
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(Bautista, Roth, & Thom, 2011; Birch, 1945; Bowden, 1997; Bowden & Jung-
Beeman, 2007; Clark, 2015; Danek et al., 2012; R. L. Dominowski, 1995;
Epstein, Kirshnit, Lanza, & Rubin, 1984; Fioratou & Cowley, 2009; Fleck &
Weisberg, 2004; Kaplan & Simon, 1990; Knoblich, Ohlsson, Haider, & Rhe-
nius, 1999; Knoblich, Öllinger, & Spivey, 2005; Luo & Knoblich, 2007; Luo,
Knoblich, & Lin, 2009; Ohlsson, 1984, 1992; WangBing Shen, Luo, Liu, &
Yuan, 2012; Sternberg & Davidson, 1983; Weisberg, 2015). Interestingly I
found a notable difference regarding the term insight between the original
publication by Köhler (1921/1963) and the first translation, even though
the “terminology used in this translation was agreed upon after detailed
discussion between author and translator” (Köhler, 1925/1976, page vi).
Here I will discuss these difference in more detail.
Reading the original German publication (Köhler, 1921/1963) and the first
English translation (Köhler, 1925/1976) I came to notice that the term
insight has been used differently. In the German original, Köhler (1921/
1963, page 2) translates an English sentence by Thorndike (1911, page 75)
literally as “Nothing in their behaviour ever seemed insightful”1. The
original English sentence by Thorndike (1911, page 75) reads “I …failed to
find any act that even seemed due to reasoning” (italics in the original). The
next sentence goes on “To someone who formulates his results like that,
another behaviour must have appeared as insightful…”2. In the English
version Köhler (1925/1976, page 3) states “To anyone who can formulate
his results thus, other behaviour must have seemed to be intelligent”. As
the two examples illustrate, the Köhler uses the German word ‘einsichtig’
(English: ‘insightful’) as synonyms for ‘intelligent’ and ‘reasoning’. In
the translation to English four years later, the occurrences of ‘Einsicht’
(English: ‘insight’) is translated as ‘intelligence’ until in the first chapter,
Köhler’s (1921/1963, page 9) ‘Einsicht’ becomes ‘insight’ (Köhler, 1925/
1976, page 13). Much later in the book, the translator explains this in a
footnote: “The German word Einsicht is rendered by both “intelligence”
and “insight” throughout this book. The lack of an adjective derived from
1Author’s literal translation from the original: “Nichts an ihrem Verhalten erscheint
jemals einsichtig”
2Author’s literal translation from the original: “Wer seine Ergebnisse so formuliert, dem
muß anderes Verhalten schon als einsichtig erschienen sein…”
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the noun “insight,” apart from other considerations, makes this procedure
necessary” (Köhler, 1925/1976, page 219).
Köhler (1921/1963) supposedly used the term ‘Einsicht’ primarily as a mat-
ter of style and as a non-technical term approximately 90 times through-
out the book. Nevertheless, he seems to have a technical term in mind as
well since at one point he identifies a “criterion of insight: the appearance
of a complete solution with reference to the whole lay-out of the field” (page 190
Köhler, 1925/1976, emphasis in original). This translation is consistent
with the original text 3. Since Köhler (1925/1976, page 190) explicitly
refers to Selz, the use of the termmight have been inspired by the wording
used by Selz (1913, page 160)4 to describe the insight into the structure of
knowledge as a mean to comprehend the knowledge itself5. Conceptually
this is building on earlier publications in which other names were used to
describe the ‘appearing thought’ (Watt, 1906, Pt 3). This difficulty in trans-
lation could be found for many other terms, but it is beyond the discussion
of this section.
In the year after Köhler’s (1921/1963) original publication, Selz (1922) used
the word insight6 extensively and as a technical term, in particular, in the
chapters where he expands on Köhler’s (1921/1963) findings. Here he
defines insightful as “the application of a solution method, as far as the
circumstances, on which their application relies, acknowledge or abstract,
and this finding the application entails”7.
In Köhler’s (1925/1976) English version of the book, published three years
after Selz’s (1922) response to Köhler’s (1921/1963) German publication,
3Original: “Danach ist dieses Merkmal: Entstehen der Gesamtlösung in Rücksicht auf die
Feldstruktur als Kriterium der Einsicht anzusetzen” (Köhler, 1921/1963, page 137)
4For a discussion of the relationship between Selz and Köhler see ter Hark (2010)
5Original: “Allein die Einsicht in die Struktur der auf diese Weise entstandenen Wissens-
disposition ermöglicht uns gleichzeitig das Verständnis der Struktur der Wissensdis-
position überhaupt”
6Original: Einsicht
7Author’s literal translation of “Als einsichtig bezeichnen wir die Anwendung einer
Lösungsmethode, soweit die Sachverhältnisse, auf denen ihre Anwendbarkeit beruht,
erkannt, d.h. abstrahiert sind, und diese Erkenntnis die Anwendung bedingt” (Selz,
1922, page 591)
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the use of insight appears different from the original. There is a quanti-
tative difference between fewer uses of insight in the English version as
compared to the German one. Not only occurrences of ‘Einsicht’ have been
replaced by other words, but also the word insight has been used in places
where it was not used in the original. In particular, one occasion seems
important for the discussion of the meaning and the origin of the word:
Köhler (1921/1963, page 140) writes about one of the problem solving ap-
proaches “and this coincidence …immediately leads to ‘comprehension’8”.
In the English translation instead, Köhler (1925/1976, page 194) states:
“and the accident […] led at once to “insight”. Sentences like this, the
translator’s footnote later in the text, and the less than 30 distinct uses
in the English translation seem to emphasise the importance of the term
and might have given the impression that it was supposed to serve as a
technical term. To some extent, this could be seen as the adaption of the
technical term introduced by Selz (1922), and the attempt to establish it in
the English literature. Unsurprisingly, and with no English translation of
Selz (1922) available, early reactions to Köhler’s (1925/1976) publication
seemed to have interpreted insight as a distinct process or an enabler for
understanding a solution.
Other authors went on to provide definitions of the term in English, and I
will come back to this. A hint towards the confusion that surrounded the
introduction of the term is apparent in a later text: Evenmore than twenty
years later Köhler (1947, page 341) feels the need to clarify his understand-
ing of the term. He writes “the direct awareness of determination […] may
also be called insight”. In this publication, he previously introduced the
idea of ‘experienced determination’ as the “dynamic relations between the
self and certain objects”. According to Koestler (1964, page 583), the ‘expe-
rienced determination’ is synonymous with the ‘intrinsic connection’ or
the “between the attitude and its sensory basis”. In any case, Köhler (1947)
clearly rejects the idea of insight as a ‘mental agent’. For other Gestalt
Psychologists this seems clear. For example Maier (1931, page 337) in the
attempt to define insight within the context of learning states that “insight
may be defined as the experience an organism has when two or more iso-
8Author’s literal translation from the original: “und jener Zufall scheint …sofort zum
‘Verstehen’ [zu führen].”
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lated experiences come together. Thus insight is the sudden experiencing
of new relations.” In a later publication, he emphasises the experiential
part by stating “old familiar objects in new organizations become new
things. This is a jolt, and gives us the experience we call insight.” (Maier,
1937, page 375). Earlier in the same publication, he had discussed “at best
[insight] can be regarded as an experience which accompanies problem
solving in humans. As an experience, it is worthy of consideration even if
it plays no causal role in the process” (Maier, 1937, page 373).
Following the trajectory of Köhler further, he later realises that early ac-
counts of insight were misunderstood and not written very clearly in the
first place. Another twelve years later, during his presidential address to
the American Psychology Association, Köhler (1959, page 729) clarified:
“What is insight? In its strict sense, the term refers to the fact that, when
we are aware of a relation, of any relation, this relation is not experienced
as a fact by itself, but rather as something that follows from the character-
istics of the objects under consideration. […] should this achievement be
called a solution by insight?. No — it is by no means clear that it was also
insight which made that particular relation emerge. […] Consequently, it
is misleading to call the whole process a ‘solution by insight’.” (italics in
the original). This text echoes what his colleague Duncker had written the
year after Köhler’s (1925/1976) English publication. He defines “Due to
insight (‘einsichtig’) is a phenomenal or physiological content in as much
as its relevant traits are immediately, that is, without an intermediating
third-factor, determined (suggested) by intrinsic traits of the stimulating
content” (Duncker, 1926, page 701). Later Duncker identifies an ambiguity
of the term and tries to resolve it by introducing “insight of the first de-
gree” and “insight of the second degree” (Duncker, 1945, page 65). This
suggests that the term was not yet settled in the 1940s.
Within the English speaking community Ruger (1910) reports “Hewas then
given the puzzle and solved it at once. […] Of course, there is nomechanical
way for the production of insights”. Hartmann (1931) also noted that the
term was frequently used by Ruger in his lectures to distinguish between
human and animal learning. Amore general usewasmentioned around the
same time in the dictionary where insight was the “immediate cognition
of an object; intuition [Rare]” (“insight”, 1911). This is consistent with
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Hartmann’s (1931) mention that the term insight was not used before
Köhler’s (1925/1976) publication, but was quickly adapted afterwards even
though the meaning was ambiguous. He ends with a list of questions
that need to be addressed before a theory of insight could be developed.
This ambiguity is also a topic for Bulbrook (1932), who lists 16 different
meanings of the word insight and attempts to identify a distinct underlying
process but ultimately fails in doing so.
Following this reading of the literature, I argue that insight entered the
scientific literature from two distinct sources: in the Anglophone litera-
ture Ruger (1910) used it early on to describe ideas that were suddenly
perceived in a non-analytical way. In German, Selz (1913) might have intro-
duced the term to the Gestalt psychologists. Gestalt Psychology attempts
to interpret how information is acquired employing the percept’s reality,
which is independent of the contributing parts. While the German ver-
sion of Köhler’s (1921/1963) seminal work uses ‘Einsicht’ in a mixture of
everyday language and adoption of Selz’s (1913) definition, the English
translation uses insight quite differently and seemingly ambiguously. Nev-
ertheless, the term made an impression and was widely used for different
aspects and features across the field of Psychology in the early 1930s. This
comparative review suggests that the term insightmight have entered or
been popularised as a technical term by the translation itself, and not nec-
essarily as intended by Köhler (1925/1976). This ambiguity of the termwas
addressed several times in the 1930s and 1940s and seems to be retained
in the current literature. However, the linguistic difference between the
original work and the initial translation of Köhler’s (1921/1963) book went
previously unnoticed. I will revive this aspect in section 2.4 when I discuss
contemporary components and theories in more detail. Consequently I
contribute to the definition of the term insight through this analysis.
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2.2.3 Aha
Supposedly Bühler coined the termAha experience9 in the German-speaking
research community with his professorial dissertation in 190710. One
year later, Bühler (1908) published a study about understanding riddles.
In this analysis of verbal protocols, he identified moments of surprise and
comprehension. Bühler (1908) does not define Aha but suggests that Aha
completes comprehension11. Furthermore, he asks, can a thought process
be completed before it is understood12. Almost twenty years later on,
Duncker (1926, page 661) defines Aha as the “sudden drop in the learning
curve”.
Duncker (1935/1963) uses the term Aha for the moment of sudden real-
isation and adds a new dimension to it by explicitly linking it to the re-
organisation of thoughts. In section 2.4 I discuss temporal aspects and
restructuring as markers of this moment, and in this context a small dif-
ference between the text written in his native language and the English
translation might be of interest. The English translations mention that
Aha! “are always and at the same time moments in which such a restruc-
turing […] takes place” (Duncker, 1945, page 29), highlighting the temporal
connectivity between the moment solutions emerge and the restructur-
ing. The original German text uses the word ‘zugleich’ which could be
translated ‘at the same time’, but also as ‘similarly’. Given that the Ger-
man word ‘zeitgleich’ could be used for a temporal link and the rest of
Duncker’s sentence uses spatial (‘wo’) instead of temporal adverbs (‘wenn’),
it is at least possible that the English translation adds an emphasis on
the temporal connection that is not in the original text. The preface writ-
ten by his former colleague Wolfgang Köhler emphasises that Duncker
“hated any compromise with vague terms” and that the translation was a
9orig: Aha Erlebnis
10I was not able to access this thesis to confirm.
11orig: “Eintritt des charakteristischen Aha, mit dem das Verstehen vollendet ist” (Bühler,
1908, page 17)
12orig: “Kann man sich denn denken, daß ein Gedanke zu Ende gedacht und dann erst
verstandenwird? Das führt uns auf die allgemeinere Frage, was denn eigentlich vorgeht
bis zum Eintritt des charakteristischen Aha, mit dem das Verstehen vollended ist.”
(Bühler, 1908, page 17)
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difficult task (Duncker, 1945, page iv). This indirectly supports the idea
that Duncker did not intend to write about the temporal link between Aha
and restructuring thought. My primary interest in this project is in the
moment solutions emerge, and not on restructuring as one of many po-
tentially correlated features. Estimating the influence of this imprecise
translation on later research, potentially overstating the importance of
restructuring as a temporal marker for Aha, was therefore outside of the
scope of this thesis.
Aha Erlebnis, Aha moment and Aha experience have been used in other lan-
guages since Bühler’s (1908) text and are closely related to the Eureka ex-
perience. For example, both, the Aha experience and the Eureka experience
emphasise the psychological aspects of the moment when ideas come into
existence. This psychological aspect is highlighted in more recent publica-
tions. For example, Bowden (1997, page 545) states that a “characteristic
of insight solutions […] is the unique subjective experience of insight (the
Eureka! or Aha! experience)”. While this is a description rather than a defi-
nition, Bowden (1997, page 569) also states that “a satisfactory operational
definition of the Aha! experience remains elusive”. In his paper, Bowden
(1997) mentions different aspects of insight which are further discussed in
section 2.4 and uses Aha and Eureka synonymously. Other authors rely on
insight in their definition of Aha as well, for example, Kaplan and Simon
(1990, page 375) state that they “use insight to refer to a subjective AHA!
experience during problem solving”.
In his German textbook, Betsch, Funke, and Plessner (2011, page 163)
argues that “the Aha Experience is a special case of insight and correlates
with distinct brain activities”13. A similar definition was used by Kounios
et al. (2008, page 282) for measuring brain activities related to insight. For
them the Aha! phenomenon is “the sudden awareness of the solution to
a problem” and the same as insight. In a later publication, Kounios and
Beeman (2014, page 71) suggest that the ahamoment is an insightwithin the
context of problem solving, but not for understanding a joke, metaphor, or
ambiguous concept. Indeed, Koestler (1981, page 7) had coined the term
13Authors translation from the original: “Das Aha-Erlebnis ist ein Sonderfall von Einsicht
und geht mit ganz bestimmten Hirnaktivitäten einher”
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haha reaction for understanding humour (and ah reaction to appreciate
beauty) to distinguish between these aspects as well.
For Topolinski and Reber (2010a, page 402) an Aha effect is “the sudden
appearance of a solution through insight”. Here suddenness is attributed
to the Aha, but not necessarily to the insight. This suggests that Ahamight
be a part of a longer insight. Earlier Gruber (1981, page 41) used sudden
insights to define the Aha Erlebnis. Yet the definition “sudden moments of
insight, dramatic reorganisation of [an] idea” emphasises the reorganisa-
tion of ideas as a defining factor. Yet another interpretation highlights the
emotional or affective component: “One of the most distinctive compo-
nents of an experience of insight is the aha experience. The aha experience
has been used as a synonymous term for insight; it is generally described
as sudden, accompanied by strong emotional arousal that may be either
positive or negative” (Webb, Little, & Cropper, 2017, page 3). Even though
they do not distinguish between the creative product and the creative process,
Aziz-Zadeh, Kaplan, and Iacoboni (2009, page 908) use Aha and insight syn-
onymously when they claim that “insight solutions [are] also commonly
called aha moments”. While aha is often associated with positive affect, Hill
and Kemp (2016, page 2) coin the term Uh-oh moment for negative affect
that could be “considered as an antonym to the Aha moment” and relates
it to Homer Simpson’s D’oh from a popular culture cartoon.
In the argument above, Aha and insight are strongly linked or even con-
sidered to be synonyms. In contrast, Danek and Wiley (2017, page 1) re-
cently disconnect Aha and insight by suggesting that their results “cast
some doubt on the assumption that the occurrence of an Aha! experience
can serve as a definitive signal that a true insight has taken place”. They
suggest compounds of the Aha! experiencewhen they conclude that “strong
Aha! experiences are clearly, but not exclusively linked to correct solu-
tions, and consist of three key components: joy of discovery, confidence in
being correct and a feeling that the solution appears all at once” (Danek
& Wiley, 2017, page 12). Interestingly, this links back to insight, and I will
discuss these factors in more detail in section 2.4.
I have shown that part of the scientific literature uses either Aha and insight
or Aha and Eureka as synonymous terms (Betsch et al., 2011; Bowden, 1997;
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Gruber, 1981; Kounios & Beeman, 2014; Sprugnoli et al., 2017; Webb, Little,
& Cropper, 2017). The use of Aha or Eureka appears to reflect cultural and
personal preferences, or atmost a difference between individual subjective
experiences and historic subjective experience. If anything, and based
on the original use, a distinction could be made between a first-person
perspective for the Aha of Bühler’s (1908) students and a third-person
perspective for Pollio’s (15/1914) Eureka. On the other hand, the difference
between Aha and insight seems more profound: at the core, an Aha is
the moment of comprehension and similar to how I discussed the Eureka
moment. Depending on their perspective, authors add affective or temporal
aspects to the Aha. Here, and similarly for Eureka, this facet is reflected
in the second compound word, as for the affective Aha experience and Aha
effect, or the temporal Aha moment. Yet within the 110 years of literature,
I could not identify a coherent distinction from other phenomena and
terms, nor a consistent use.
2.2.4 Hunch
A hunch is defined as “novel recombination of knowledge and informa-
tion precipitated out of memory by clues to coherence” (Bowers, Regehr,
Balthazard, & Parker, 1990, page 94). The difference to an Aha, according
to these authors, is a continuity in the process leading up to the hunch,
while an Aha is the result of a discontinuous, discrete, and surprising step.
Both hunch and Aha are called insight by Bowers et al. (1990). They further
suggest that subjective reports of a warmth rating and other self-reports
are not an adequate measure to support the claim of a discrete switch in
the cognitive process.
Brock (2015), in his discussion of the difference between insight and intu-
ition, uses hunch as a synonym for a feeling, often a tacit or an unjustifiable
one. He provides examples of scientistswhohad a feeling aboutwhatmight
be the solution before they found and proved the correct answer. His exam-
ples of hunches include Watson’s idea of DNA as a double helix model. The
distinction to insight is not very clear, even though the discussion by Brock
(2015) suggests that hunch represents the affective dimension of insight.
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Similarly, Simonton (2016) positions hunches on a dimension of certainty
between intuition and feeling of knowing. This is comparable to the use Platt
and Baker (1931) more than 80 years earlier when he quotes Wallas (1926)
model as an example of how scientific research progresses. More specifi-
cally, Platt and Baker (1931, page 1973) explicitly state that “illumination
[is] corresponding to our ‘hunch”’. Platt and Baker (1931, page 1975) also
provide a lengthy definition of a hunch as follows: “A scientific hunch is a
unifying or clarifying idea which springs into consciousness suddenly as
a solution to a problem in which we are intensely interested. In typical
cases, it follows a long study but comes into consciousness at a time when
we are not consciously working on the problem. A hunch springs from
a wide knowledge of facts but is essentially a leap of the imagination, in
that it goes beyond a mere necessary conclusion which any reasonable
man must draw from the data at hand. It is a process of creative thought.”
In this case, a hunch builds on the imagination of the problem solver and
is essentially described as a combination of previous knowledge. At one
point in his text, Platt and Baker (1931, page 1975) admit “possibly Wallas’
term ‘illumination’ is better than ‘scientific hunch’ since the former has
no extraneous implications”. This might have changed since the original
publication, and I will discuss this in more detail in section 2.2.6 on the
topic of illumination. Platt and Baker (1931) continue “If I were to coin a
new word for it we should […] go back to Archimedes’ explanation and call
it a ‘eureka”’.
From the reading of the literature, the term hunch or scientific hunch seems
to have enjoyed wider recognition in the early 20th century. With the pub-
lication of Wallas (1926) the termmight have been replaced by illumination,
and potentially some authors followed the suggestion of calling the ob-
served phenomenon a Eureka moment. More recently, the usage of the term
hunch is not consistent: a popular science book refers to ‘Darwin’s hunch’
as his anecdotal Eureka moment, others use hunch to refer to the cognitive
processes involved in restructuring problems, and others use it to high-
light the affective dimension of insight (Bowers et al., 1990; Brock, 2015;
Kuljian, 2017).
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2.2.5 Epiphany
The word epiphany is based on the ancient Greek term for manifestation
that described “a sort of luminosity through which the divine signifies
its presence” (Paris, 1997, page 87). In later Christian interpretations,
epiphany became a striking appearance of divine powers. This is in the
tradition of older texts where epiphany is often described as a result of
intervention from a third party or even through the divine (Pucci, 1994,
for an analysis of Sophocles’ texts see). In fact, in literary texts, the word
has primarily been used in a spiritual and supernatural context. For the
Western culture, this is derived from the celebration of Christian miracles.
These miracles include the visit of the three Magi and, particularly for
Eastern Christians, the baptism of Jesus Christ (McDonald, 2007, page 91).
Besides the religious meaning, the dictionary provides a secular definition
as “a moment of sudden and great revelation or realization” (“Epiphany”,
2018). This adoption shows some resemblance with definitions of Eureka
moments and Aha, most notably the ones given by Anderson (2011) and
Topolinski and Reber (2010a). The moment of epiphany seems to appear
suddenly, and it leads to something new, to a revelation. While Aha and
Eureka are depicted as surprising, the realisation in epiphany seems to be
great. This needs a bit of unpacking.
The term epiphany has been used in different fields and McDonald (2007,
page 91) traces the term through a different disciplines “including so-
cial theory, literary criticism, humanistic education, narrative psychology,
clinical psychology, and gay and lesbian studies”. Epiphanies have been
referred to in literature and the arts as the presentation of elements and
ideas out-of-context. Examples are Marcel Duchamp’s Fountain or René
Magritte’s La trahison des images (The Treachery of Images) (see fig. 2.1). In
James Joyce’s ‘Dubliners’, a collection of short stories published in 1914,
epiphanies are recurring metaphors (Bowen, 1982, page 106). They are de-
scribed as surprising life-changing events, often perceived out of context
but nevertheless as turning points in the stories. In scientific and casual
narratives, an example of a prominent author who wrote about epiphanies
is Sacks. In the preface to one of his books, he explicitly links occasions in
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poetry to Newton seeing an apple drop and Archimedes’ Eureka, and he
goes on that “every such occasion is a eureka or epiphany” Sacks (1994,
page ix). As another example, Chen and Krajbich (2017, page 1) uses the
term ‘epiphany learning’ to describe a computational model for the type
of learning that humans describe as an “unexpected moment of insight”.
Similarly, Berkun (2010) uses epiphany synonymously with Eureka experi-
ences and insight. Berkun (2010) stresses the importance of the preparation
prior to the epiphany, and he draws on ancient mythologies as well as mod-
ern narratives such as the often repeated myth of Newton realising the
universality of gravitation after seeing an apple fall.
Figure 2.1: Duchamp’s Fountain (left) and René Magritte’s La trahison des
images (right) as examples for epiphanies in art
Epiphanies are described as the feeling at the end of the process of gener-
ating new knowledge or arriving at a new understanding. This is similar
to how Bühler (1908) understood the Aha. This feeling is fulfilling but
also surprising, as supposedly unconscious or subconscious processes con-
tribute to the solution and their result, or even the moment of a solution,
cannot be predicted. The solutions are also often the result of a lengthy
and laborious process. McDonald (2007, page 97–100) identifies or rather
suggests a number of characteristics for epiphanies, such as a epiphanies
being preceded by some negativemental states, a sudden appearance or in-
creased awareness of something that a person is previously blind to, which
results in a personal and long-lasting transformation. For example Sacks
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(2012) described his drug-induced experience of reading a book which in-
spired him to start writing about his observations of patient experiences.
Specifically, he reported hearing a “very loud internal voice” that spoke to
him. While he had been taking different hallucinogenic drugs for some
time, this experience had a long-lasting effect on him. He started writing a
number of books about his experiences, and he apparently stopped taking
amphetamines after this.
The same idea of a life-changing event is behind the epiphany in talent
recognition (Feist, 2014, page 66). According to him, epiphanies are also
called crystallising experiences in the talent development literature. As there
is little connection to cognitive processes and the exact moment when
lives are changed through epiphany, I am refraining from discussing this
body of literature in more detail.
Contrary to the previous definitions of epiphany as a discrete step at a given
time, van Iterson (2017, page 21) takes a different position. Understanding
complete epiphanies as multisensory experiences that include all five senses,
he states “epiphany should be seen as a series of small steps – a series
of creative synthesis”. Van Iterson (2017) further suggests that epiphany
is an intrinsically social enterprise and at the centre of three stages of
the creative process, preceded by the preparation and followed by sense-
making and communication. He also suggests four qualities of epiphanies,
1. the preparation leading up to it, 2. they can be positive or negative
(disgust), 3. they can be tied to certain times in retrospection, and 4. they
are inherently relational.
2.2.6 Illumination
Illumination is one of the stages mentioned in the classical sequential model
of creativity as introduced by Wallas (1926, page 80, 93) when the ‘happy
idea’ ‘clicks’. For Liljedahl (2005) a moment of illumination, a flash of insight,
and AHA! experience are synonyms. In his study of mathematical problem
solving of undergraduate students, he uses these terms interchangeably
to describe the moment when a solution is found. Similarly, R. W. Smith
and Kounios (1996) introduce the moment when participants experience
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an Aha as discrete illumination but do not provide a further distinction. Sim-
ilarly, Metcalfe and Wiebe (1987, page 238) refer to the literature of “re-
structuring, intuition, illumination, or insight” as if they were synonyms,
and reports results from their experiment as either involving sudden il-
lumination or not. More specifically Metcalfe (1986, page 288) concludes
that “insight problems involve a sudden illumination”. Earlier, Gruber
(1981) had also used illumination and Eureka experiences synonymously.
Drawing on Wallas’s (1926) sequential model of creativity and anecdotal
accounts, Thrash and Elliot (2004, page 959) refer to illumination as “this
epistemic event in which one comes to see better possibilities”. Here illumi-
nation is the experience of something “deeply important”. This definition
shows great conceptual overlap with other concepts mentioned in this
chapter, for example the affective aspects of epiphany, but no distinction
from insight, Aha, or Eureka. More generally, McKerracher (2016) refers
to illumination as a metaphor for creativity. Drawing on recent anecdotal
reports, illumination is discussed as the transition between the metaphor-
ically dark unconscious thoughts and conscious engagement. This transi-
tion would result in potentially seeing problems from a different point of
view and new light.
Interesting is Ohlsson’s (1992) use of illumination as a distinct technical
term. According to his interpretation, illumination is the simultaneous
recall of a problem previously set aside and the full insight into the solu-
tion. The change to this problem happens involuntarily and therefore
without any deliberate effort to recall it. Despite anecdotal evidence from
eminent scientists, Ohlsson (1992) concludes that illumination is virtually
non-existing and should not be confused with insight and incubation.
2.2.7 Serendipity
Van Andel (1994, page 643) defines serendipity as “the art of making an ‘un-
sought finding”’ and goes on defining finding similar to creativity, as new
and valuable – with the value being true for science, useful for technology,
and fascinating for the arts. Similarly, van Iterson (2017, page 19) defines
serendipity as “the unsought but valuable discovery of a solution to a given
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problem while looking for the answer for a different problem”. The word
itself goes back to a fairy tale about the princes of Sri Lanka, which was
called Serendip with the Old Persian name. These princes travelled the
world making discoveries they did not search for. The word serendipity
was first used in an 18th-century letter but eventually and around the
mid-20th century it spread from Medicine as an explanation of how peni-
cillin was discovered to more common usage. Van Andel (1994) argues
that abductive reasoning is the only form of logical inference that allows
the generation of new knowledge and sees serendipity as a precursor of
abduction. Van Andel (1994) describes 17 different patterns of serendipity,
each supported by an example from the literature and all of them having
an element of surprise in it. He also describes different appearances of
surprise as a necessary element of serendipity, such as the positive serendip-
ity where the correct abduction is drawn, negative serendipity followed
by a wrong or incomplete abduction, and pseudo-serendipity when the in-
tended invention or discovery happens in an unexpected way. While for
pseudo-serendipity the process is surprising, for the other two appearances
also the result itself is surprising and possibly even unintended. In a way,
serendipity produces a solution or a finding before the question or prob-
lem is known. Following the argument of van Andel (1994), it is therefore
rather a process of problem finding than problem solving. He stresses
the point that only prepared minds are able to recognise these seemingly
coincidental solutions, and he argues that in hindsight many occurrences
of serendipity are rationalised and brought into a logical order, even though
many discoveries and inventions might originate in serendipitous coinci-
dences. In his conclusion, he denies that serendipity can be algorithmically
understood by a computer, as it cannot operationalise improvisation and
as soon as something is planned, it is not unforeseen anymore – and there-
fore cannot be serendipity. Arguably this argument is born from a rather
computer-sceptical belief of the author14.
Agreeingwith van Andel’s (1994) general definition, Boden (2004, page 234)
defines serendipity as finding something valuable without having searched
for it. She also draws on the notion of surprise and combinatorial creativity,
but she explicitly sketches a computational process in which analogical
14Van Andel (1994, page 644) statesWhen our computer is master, we reach disaster faster
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pattern-matching surprisingly verifies a spontaneous result from pattern-
completion.
A slightly different use can be seen in Holland (1998, page 13). Here the
author claims that serendipitous novelty and emergent phenomena share
similarities to an extent which makes it difficult to identify elements of
emergence in systems.
2.2.8 Terminology in this thesis
In this section, I have identified and discussed seven different terms that
are often used to describe aspects of the moment when solutions emerge:
Eureka, insight, Aha, hunch, epiphany, illumination, and serendipity. The dif-
ferences are subtle, and the descriptions and definitions used across the
literature leave enough room for ambiguity, equivocation, and vagueness.
Consequently the terminology in the literature on creativity, problem solv-
ing, insight, and related phenomena is not consistent. In the previous
paragraphs I demonstrated these problems in a detailed analysis of the
literature. Here I conclude on the use of terms within this thesis.
Aha and Eureka primarily seem to refer to moments in time or to the
affective dimension of the actor or audience. Illumination refers to the
process leading up to understanding the solution, possibly encapsulating
Aha and Eureka moments. A hunch seems to be a historic name for a concept
close to illumination, which was apparently used regularly in the context of
scientific discoveries. Finally, serendipity is similar to an insight, but without
the intention to find a solution from the actors’ or problem solvers’ side.
Insight is used in everyday language as well as academic language. Even
within the formal academic writing, insight is ambiguous as it is used to
describe any outstanding finding as well as cognitive processes and the
products of these processes. Nevertheless and used as a technical term,
insight seems to be the most generic and most widely adopted term. Poten-
tially influenced by its unclear history, the current adaption in the scien-
tific literature carries little more than the imprecise meaning known from
everyday language. Furthermore, the term is vague in its demarcation
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from illumination and any of the other terms previously mentioned. Within
scientific publications the use of insight is often an equivocation, inter-
changeably referring to the actor, action, affordance, audience, or the artefact.
In this section, I presented evidence that the reason for the imprecision
dates back to the original sources of insight when it was introduced to the
academic language.
Without further definition, the term insight refers to nothing more than
the vague idea of an emerging solution. Within the context of this thesis,
this is desired, and insight and the other terms will consequently be used in
the sense specified in the following definition 1. Addressing the ambiguity
in literature, I contribute an explanation how different terms used for the
phenomenon of interest are linked to each other.
Definition 1: Terminology
When referring to the phenomenon of interest, I will use the term
insight or refer to it as the moment when solutions emerge. I will
use Aha and Eureka for experiential aspects and further specify it
through a second compound. I will use illumination to describe
the stage in Wallas (1926) model. I refrain from using epiphany,
serendipity, and hunch which can be seen as a manifestation of a
difficult solution out of context, finding an unsought solution, and
a term not currently used in research respectively.
2.3 Related concepts
Some terms are often used in the context of insight but describe a different
concept such as the following intuition, Einstellung, inspiration, and imagina-
tion. On the other hand, Satori and Kenshōmight be conceptually related,
but the field of study is too far removed from the discussion in this thesis.
In this section I discriminate them from the topic of this work.
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2.3.1 Intuition
Theword intuition is used in everyday language aswell as being a distinctive
term in Cognitive Science. This section explores the concept stemming
from the use in everyday life as well as the discussion in scientific contexts,
in order to show its connection to Eureka moments.
According to Gregory (2004, page 485–486) intuition is “arriving at decisions
or conclusions without explicit or conscious processes of reasoned think-
ing”. The entry continues explaining that almost all human behaviour
and judgement is intuitive as it is rarely based on formal terms and “steps
as prescribed by logicians”. Although declining in importance, the term
also appears to be used to describe perceiving self-evident truths. Often
described as ‘seeing’ the truth, this process might yield a time component.
In general the broad and inclusive description provided in this psycholog-
ical companion does not allow a distinction between intuition and other
terms. Could it be that everyday language provides a better understanding
of the concept described by the term intuition?
In British English, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, intuition
is the “ability to understand something instinctively, without the need
for conscious reasoning”; instinctively is “without conscious thought; by
natural instinct”; finally, instinct is a “natural or intuitive way of acting
or thinking” (“Instinct”, 2018; “instinctively”, 2018; “Intuition”, 2018).
Resolving this circular definition, intuition appears to be the ability to
understand something without conscious thought or reasoning.
The US American Merriam-Webster dictionary describes intuition as “the
power or faculty of attaining to direct knowledge or cognition without
evident rational thought and inference”. Interestingly, this dictionary also
adds a time aspect to it by defining intuition as “immediate apprehension
or cognition”. In a third definition, the dictionary mentions an additional
direct link to insight by calling it a “quick and ready insight” (“Intuition”,
2018).
The MacMillan English Dictionary brings in emotions and affect as other
dimensions by stating that intuition is “an ability to know or understand
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something through your feelings, rather than by considering facts or
evidence” (“intuition”, 2018).
The Cambridge Advanced Learner’s Dictionary mentions a number of
dimensions intuition can refer to, by defining intuition as “(knowledge
from) an ability to understand or know something immediately based on
your feelings rather than facts” (“Intuition”, 2018).
Considering the commonalities of these definitions, intuition involves the
“ability to know or understand something”. It is also apparent that intu-
ition can be used to either describe the process of retrieving knowledge,
or to describe the product — the acquired understanding.
The usage of words such as know and understand implies correctness and
therefore some process of verification. Even though it is not clear if verifi-
cation can be seen as part of the intuition, or rather a timely and spatially
detached activity, having access to the knowledge through intuition sug-
gests that at least some kind of (unconscious) verification can be consid-
ered as part of the intuition. The terms knowledge and understanding also
imply appropriateness, at least concerning the something. The reference
of something to be understood or known gives the notion of a problem that
is solved without any claims about the type or quality of the questions to
be answered. The root or source for intuition appears as an unconscious
thought in some definitions, as an emotion or even as an instinct in others.
In any case, these origins conceptualise a root outside conscious access or
manipulation, therefore the absence of consciousness while acquiring the
knowledge is a commonality within the explored definitions of intuition.
Also, the features discussed so far show a great overlap with Eureka mo-
ments, and in fact the term intuition has been used almost as a synonym
of insight, for example by Metcalfe and Wiebe (1987).
More recently Brock (2015, page 2) argues that insight and intuition are in
fact distinct phenomena. While an “insight is an explicit awareness of novel
relations that arrive with apparent suddenness but with little conscious
awareness of processing”, he defines intuitions as “tacit hunches or feelings
that come to mind with little conscious awareness of processing”. One
of the main differences is that people are aware of insight, but intuition
seems to denote a less conscious and tacit experience. Besides, there is no
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mention of novelty as a criteria for intuition while it seems imperative for
insight. Nevertheless, in both cases tacit and conscious thought interact
leading up to the phenomenon.
The definitions of intuition also have a temporal dimension, by being de-
scribed as the immediate and quick perception of knowledge. This timing
can be understood in two different ways, either in absolute terms or as
relative to other potential processes of gaining knowledge. If considered
as an absolute measurement, then the distinctive feature of immediate
intuition is that the solution is available the moment a given problem is
perceived or (fully) understood. If measured with respect to perceiving
the problem, this is clearly a different process from insight in creative
problem solving as used by Metcalfe and Wiebe (1987): intuition is missing
preparation and incubation before finding a solution. Intuition, in this case,
is rather a way of retrieving memory, albeit phenomenologically different
from an active search, in the sense that it does not provide conscious recall
of the search process itself. Even though the intuitive product is discon-
nected from the observed problem, the intuitive process of getting to the
solution is not consciously accessible.
If the quickness is meant in respect to understanding a problem however,
then other phases of a potentially creative process have happened before
the problem was understood; this type of delayed intuition, in comparison
to the whole problem, shows some similarities with the restructuring
process that happens during insights. Nevertheless, it implies a meta-
cognitive unawareness of the problem as a whole. Another interpretation
of the time component of intuition allows a comparison to other processes
of arriving at a similar solution. Intuition is often used as a synonym for
system–1 in dual-process theories, possibly going back to Bergson (1911,
page 154) distinction between intellectual and intuitive modes of thinking.
This theory was later popularly described by Kahneman (2012) and Usher,
Russo, Weyers, Brauner, and Zakay (2011), who contrasted intuition with
deliberation. Intuition is also described as parallel, holistic, and resulting in
affective states. One of the properties of this system is conscious access to
the results while their operation (or stages) remain inaccessible. Deliberation
or system–2, on the other hand, is sequential and rule-based with access
to the process. In this view, intuition includes the intuitive process and the
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intuitive product, it also accounts for immediate and delayed intuition. It is
important to note that Usher et al. (2011) assumes the two systems not
to be isolated from each other during the decision making process, but
rather as interacting with one another.
Within the context of creative problem solving, intuitionmight also have a
negative connotation. When people engage with a problem, they might
form one or more intuitions about plausible solutions. This intuitive prod-
uct is not necessarily a final and communicable item, but rather an initial
approach to the problem solving process. In this the intuitive process
shares some properties with the Einstellung described in section 2.3.2, but
has a less rigorous definition. If this initial intuitive product is correct, or at
least a step towards the correct solution, then intuition is potentially help-
ful in this case. If it remains the only unconscious part within the problem
solving process, then people might perceive this intuitive process as a Eureka
moment. Instead, if the intuitive process is leading the train of thought to
an impasse and people get stuck, then the initial bias is actually difficult
to overcome. Resolving this blockage will be possible either through a
conscious and analytical process, or through another unconscious leap.
The latter needs to be stronger to overcome the fixedness of the initial
intuitive solution, and it is also later in the process and might therefore
mask the memory of the initial intuition. When asked to report on Eureka
moments, people will more likely remember this later cognitive leap.
Kenneth J. Gilhooly (2016) refers to the idea of intuition, but appears to be
using it in two different ways, either as a synonym for Aha-insight solutions
and later as a synonym to “unconscious, or intuitive processing” in his
unconscious work theory. The former refers to the intuitive product, while
the latter one can be understood as an intuitive process. In both cases the
use of the term remains fuzzy as it does not explicitly contrast immediate
intuition even though the processes described in Kenneth J. Gilhooly (2016)
are relying on an incubation stage prior to finding the solution.
Another distinction is made by Dörfler and Ackermann (2012): Based
on their literature review in the management field, they identify two
types of intuition, the intuitive judgement and the intuitive insight. Intuitive
judgement is described as a kind of decision taking, particularly under
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time pressure, and appears to be what most management literature refers
to as intuition. They identify intuitive insight as a distinct process which is
primarily observed in creative problem solving. While they acknowledge
that intuitive judgement is part of creative processes, for example when
deciding which solution to emphasise, they also mention that intuitive
insight generates novel solutions.
This section attempts to provide a description of intuition and how it is
used within this thesis. The process of how to come up with a solution, as
well as the solution itself, can both be referred to as intuition and will be
referenced either as intuitive process or intuitive product. Stemming from
this, a distinction between intuitive insight and intuitive judgement is also
useful, particularly within the domain of creative problem solving. Time
is another dimension to be considered, and a distinction has been made
between immediate intuition and delayed intuition. Furthermore, it has been
noted that intuitions can be wrong, even though the solution appears to
be correct in the subjective evaluation during the process. These different
dimensions of intuition will help clarifying and distinguish the Eureka
moment as a unique entity throughout this thesis.
2.3.2 Einstellung
Einstellung is “the habituation to the repeatedly used procedure” as de-
scribed by Luchins (1942, page 3). In his paper he shows experimentally
that people are biased towards a certain way of approaching a problem by
their previous experience in comparable or perceived similar situations.
Therefore it appears that Einstellung is formed during or through previous
problems, and is accessible as early as people engage with a problem. In
fact it appears to influence the type of engagement from the beginning.
Luchins (1942, page 3) also refers to an even earlier definition by Warren
(1934) which apparently states that Einstellung is “the set which imme-
diately predisposes an organism to one type of motor or conscious act”.
This definition does not just include the temporary dimension, but also
makes a reference to the conscious act, which implies that the Einstellung
is outside the conscious access.
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More contemporary definitions describe Einstellung as a “temporary atti-
tude, expectation, or state of readiness, especially in relation to a stimulus
that is about to be experienced” (Colman, 2015). This definition stresses
the temporal aspects by stating that Einstellung is a state of mind before
people engage with a stimulus or problem, but it also highlights a connec-
tion between the Einstellung and the stimulus. In a repeated experiment
with similar stimuli the connection is obvious and the origin of the Ein-
stellung effect can be explained through the previous iterations of the
trial, but for the initial engagement with a type of tasks there might be an
attitude and expectation towards the stimulus, but since there is no ex-
plicit relation, this predisposition appears to be random or unexplainable
at best. As a result the intuition might have a stronger influence in this
case.
Bilalić, McLeod, and Gobet (2008) explore the connection between Ein-
stellung and problem solving by giving chess tasks to players of different
proficiencies. They reduce the Einstellung effect to the “negative impact
of previous knowledge” and make a theoretical distinction between the
influence of Einstellung on expert and non-expert performance (Bilalić
et al., 2008, page 653). Through their experiments they show that peo-
ple are fixated on a certain set of potential solutions which also blocks
them from achieving better results, which is particularly interesting for
self-reports: participants report to be working on something else. In this
case the Einstellung effect has been demonstrated to work outside the
conscious access of participants in the experiment.
2.3.3 Inspiration
Inspiration is a concept used across disciplines and conceptualised by
Thrash and Elliot (2003) as implyingmotivation, being evoked, and involving
transcendence. The motivation appears to be a directed process to pursue
an outcome, in most cases towards a positive result rather than to disprove
an existing idea. As suggested by the Thrash and Elliot (2003) this directed
process is initially not steered by a conscious process. Instead inspiration
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can be evoked by external environmental sources or by unconscious in-
trapsychic sources, in both cases suggesting little control over the process
and its direction. And finally the transcendence reveals novel and more
appropriate ideas or potential to the people being inspired. Supported
by these conceptualizations, Belzak, Thrash, Sim, and Wadsworth (2017,
page 118) describes inspiration as an “episode that unfolds across time”,
emphasising the temporal aspects of inspiration. Thrash and Elliot (2003,
page 871) show that this is in compliancewith definitions fromdictionaries
and a body of literature from the domains of “psychology, anthropology,
theology, education, art and literature, management, and engineering”.
They suggest viewing inspiration as a process, a trigger object evoking this
process, and a target towards which the process is directed. This notion
is extended by a component analysis of inspiration in Thrash and Elliot
(2004), concluding that the directional inspiration can either be triggered
by something or aiming at a target.
Other authors stress the importance of triggers as well, for example Ma-
linin (2015) provides examples from individualswith great creative achieve-
ments such as contemporary painters, Rudyard Kipling, and Immanuel
Kant. Triggers in this case include architectural elements, pieces of fur-
niture, writing equipment, music, and views. From the perspective of
creative cognition, an exploration of realistic ideas with creative potential
and creative ideas targeting real problems is based on inspirational qualities
of ideas (Finke, 1995, page 304–305). These qualities excite the imagination
and lead to meaningful explorations and this whole process of imaginative di-
vergence plays a role in distinguishing between appropriate and unrealistic
ideas.
Finke (1995) places inspiration within a sequence followed by imagination
and exploration. More general, time plays an important role in inspiration,
from the moment the inspirational trigger is perceived, throughout the
whole process of being inspired, until the moment the target is under-
stood. Interestingly for the context of this work, Thrash and Elliot (2003)
also mention an explicit connection to the Eureka moments by relating
the evocation to the unconscious processes throughout the incubation
stage, leading up to the illumination phase described by Wallas (1926).
On the other hand Thrash and Elliot (2003) claim that the unconscious
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stages in sequential models neglect the idea of energisation through inspi-
ration. Thrash and Elliot (2003) suggest that autobiographical memories
of feverishly working on solutions are contrasted by the stage theories as
incubation can not, at least not consciously, be energised. A solution to the
apparent conflict offered by Thrash and Elliot (2003) by conceptualising
inspiration as a motivational state, triggered by illumination targeted to-
wards the realisation of the idea. Within Wallas’s (1926) model, inspiration
would then be situated within the verification stage.
The contextualisation of inspiration in relation to insight is ambiguous
and depends on the interpretation of any of these terms. Specifically and
considering the temporal localisation of inspiration as a state, Thrash
and Elliot (2003) situates it within the verification phase, but also draw
a connection to the incubation phase. Considering the motivational as-
pects often reported to follow an inspiration, it can just as well be situated
early within a creative process. Consequently, I could not identify a direct
connection between existing literature on inspiration and the temporal
localisation in relation to the emergent solution within the creative pro-
cess.
2.3.4 Imagination
According to Gregory (2004, page 443) imagination has a number of differ-
ent meanings in everyday language, including states of mind of fluidity
of thoughts, daydreaming, and novelty generation. The entry explicitly
mentions the anecdote of the chemist Dmitri Ivanovich Mendeleev dream-
ing up the Periodic Table in an intuitive ‘leap in the dark’ after attempting to
solve the problem of organising the chemical elements through analytical
approaches for a long time. The same anecdote has also been coined as an
example of insight in different other occasions (Cunningham, MacGregor,
Gibb, & Haar, 2009). In the discussion of imagination in the psychological
theory, Gregory (2004) emphasise the difficulty to measure imagination
in behaviouristic experiments, and see it as a ‘primary process thinking’
from a psychodynamic perspective. The author concludes that imagina-
tion has not been identified and defined within the psychological theory.
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Nevertheless Gregory (2004) identifies five components of imagination:
mental imagery as the capacity to see or hear things with the mind’s eye and
ear, counterfactual thinking as the capacity to think about events disen-
gaged from reality, symbolic representations of using images and entities
to evoke others, cognitive fluidity to operate these representations, and
emotions as facilitators. In the discussion of cognitive fluidity Gregory
(2004, page 444) raises the question of how imagination differs from cre-
ativity. One possible answer considers imagination as a universal human
attribute, while creativity is reserved to a small number of exceptional and
talented people, thus marking imagination as small creativity. The other
option offered by Gregory (2004) is that imagination and creativity are
indistinguishable. The entry continues to differentiate through the out-
puts: while imagination is confined to the individual experience, creative
output has the potential to being shared with other people. Finally the
definition continues into a recollection of the sequential model of problem
solving as an example of what is happening during imagination, providing
Martindale (2009) as a source for these claims. The fact that Martindale
(2009) does not refer to imagination, but exclusively to creativity, is not so
much intended to discuss the quality of the entry in Gregory (2004) but
should rather illustrated the difficulty of keeping imagination and creativ-
ity apart as two distinct concepts.
2.3.5 Satori and Kenshō
In this section I refer to a few concepts relating to insight in Zen Buddhism.
Zen is chosen as an example for spiritual Buddhist enlightenment following
from the practice of dhyāna because of the accessibility from a Western
perspective, not only for the number of available translations but also
for its popularity in the popular culture (Watts, 1958). Other forms of
Buddhism seem to be following similar ideas, even though subtle ideas
and differences might not be reflected in this section. All three schools of
Buddhism — Theravada, Vajrayāna, and Mahāyāna — relate to spiritual
insight. The example chosen for this section is Zen from the Mahāyāna
school since it has an active community in the Western world, which
also provides accessible documentation. Other Buddhist schools seem to
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refer to similar concepts as the awakening to the true nature of things
(bodhi), which is one of the central ideas of Buddhism. Other religions have
related spiritual concepts and practices, in particular the Vedic religion
and Hinduism.
Satori is the Japanese term used in Zen Buddhism for awakening in the
sense of understanding, and it refers to the experience of Kenshō. Kenshō
consists of the terms seeing and nature and describes initial insights in
the Zen tradition. In this case the nature in Kenshō relates to one’s own
Buddha nature; therefore, the whole term relates to series of realisations,
all of which reveal the same knowledge and therefore the true character to
different degrees of clarity. Originally, Kenshō referred to the non-duality
of observer and observed, but the influence ofWestern culture transformed
the term into a more experiential understanding (for an example see Low
& Purser, 2012). While Zen-texts rarely refer to Kenshō as an experience,
personal accounts of Zen practitioners describe individual occurrences
which are often taken into account for translations intoWestern languages.
Satori and Kenshō are often used interchangeably, but Kensho can also be
used for brief glimpses on the nature, while Satori can refer to a longer
lasting realisation. The final enlightenment Daigo-tettei, on the other hand,
is an absolute experience that contrasts with the temporary realisations
of Satori and Kenshō.
The Zen literature provides two different approaches to Kenshō, even
though the amount to which they differ has been debated for a long time.
Kenshō can be approached gradually through training and teaching, or it
can appear spontaneously. The gradual approach is through studying so-
called Kōan, short stories or statements that pose unanswered questions
or ambiguous meanings. In Western culture these Kōan are sometimes
understood or translated as meaningless statements or riddles, although
Zen scholars oppose this view. Different curricula of Kōans are used to
guide the students to realise their own self, in order to approach Kenshō
gradually. These sets of phrases include a hossi, which has the function of
triggering and verifying the breakthrough in thinking — the kenshō. For
example, Low and Purser (2012, page 348) has explicitly stated that kenshō
“is very similar to the ‘Aha! phenomenon’ or ‘Eureka moment”’. Teachers
can also probe their students by asking sassho, the so-called checking
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questions. The answers to these questions inform the teachers on how far
the Satori has progressed; they are also supposed to help students deepen
their insight. Besides the gradual approach, spontaneous insights are well
known in Zen literature. This sudden enlightenment, generally known as
subitism, is also related to the term mushi-dokugo, which literally means
without teacher independently enlightened. The last character in this term is
the same as in Satori.
The Buddhist tradition of enlightenment is interesting for the study of
insight, because it differentiates between types of gradual and sudden
enlightenment. This is reflected in the discussion of gradualism versus
subitism. It also emphasises the possibility of teaching the unteachable
through the practice of kōan, by inducing great doubt in the student. In
Buddhism there is also a way of checking if students have reached the
state of enlightenment, even though the practice is highly dependent on
subjective evaluations from the teacher. Finally, Buddhism emphasises
that insight is only the first step, and that enlightenment requires repeated
practice. In Buddhism, enlightenment originates within the practitioner
and it is not induced by some external force. At the same time, it is a social
practice, as it requires in-depth partnership between the teacher acting as
a proxy to their lineage of teachers, and the student.
2.3.6 Divinity
In our modern world, the idea of a divine illumination seems to be anti-
quated if not a remnant containing a mix of ancient story telling, religious
fabrications, and exaggerated self-appraisal. Going back to Socrates who
claimed to have a voice “[turning him] away from something [he is] about
to do”, he was considered worthy of having a divine or spiritual cogni-
tive guidance (Pasnau, 2015). Later philosophers and influential thinkers
across different cultures and religions either based their trustworthiness
on claims of external divine sources or were later attributed to have had
support from the spiritual world in their decisions and idea generation.
Within the Christian narrative the early theologian Augustine wrote “The
mind needs to be enlightened by light from outside itself, so that it can
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participate in truth, because it is not itself the nature of truth.” (cited after
Pasnau, 2015).
In his speech addressing Goethe’s presentiment of future ideas in natural
science, von Helmholtz (1892) talks about the apperception or beholding
(orig: Anschauung) of artists and scientists. While the term creativity (or
Kreativität) was not commonly used by the time in any Western language
(see Weiner, 2000), von Helmholtz follows Kant in using the term in a
similar sense. Focusing on the example of poetic writing, von Helmholtz
(1892, page 348) describes the spark of an idea also as wit (orig: Witz)
and something that is “always a sudden insight, not reachable through
reasoning, but like a sudden joy”. He reasons that therefore the term for
poet and seer are identical in Latin and he connects the sudden insight
to the term of Divination, a kind of divine inspiration15. The whole speech in
honour of Goethe’s contribution to science draws connections between
artistic work and scientific discoveries within the process of generating
novel and appropriate contributions.
Interesting by itself, it becomes even more compelling in the light of a
speech Helmholtz gave for his 70th birthday. Throughout his life as a re-
searcher he had been interested in his ownprocess of creation. An acknowl-
edged and productive scientist by the time, von Helmholtz (1896) used the
speech at his birthday to reflect on it and share some of his thoughts with
colleagues and friends. Even though he reports to have preferred work
that can be solved through reasoning and does not rely on fortunate acci-
dents and insights, he acknowledges that many inventions and discoveries
relied on lucky incidents, some of them appearing suddenly and without
effort. Other solutions were silently perceivedwithout acknowledging their
usefulness, but then through processing without conscious involvement,
they suddenly appeared. Before this incubation phase and the potential
15The original passage reads: Das Vermögen, bisher ungeahnte Aehnlichkeiten zu entdecken,
nennen wir Witz. Unsere Altvordern brauchten dieses Wort auch im ernsten Sinne. Immer beze-
ichnet es eine plötzlich auftauchende Einsicht, die man nicht methodisch durch Nachdenken
erreichen kann, sondern die wie ein plötzliches Glück erscheint. In ältester lateinischer Bezeich-
nung ist deshalb der Name des Dichters mit dem des Sehers identisch. Die plötzlich auftauchende
Einsicht wird als Divination, als eine Art göttlicher Eingebung bezeichnet. (von Helmholtz,
1892, page 348)
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illumination, he mentions that he always had to observe the problem from
all possible perspectives, he had to prepare his mind and memory for the
problem. He assumes that this preparation phase allowed a high process-
ing fluency later in the process which in return contributed to finding the
solution. Helmholtz reports also prerequisites that he observed in his own
problem solving approaches, for example not being tired, away from the
desk, and not having consumed alcohol (von Helmholtz, 1896, page 15–16).
In his reflection on his own creative process, he still has the idea that sci-
entists and artists who have more ideas are favoured by some entity he
calls nature, but which seems to have divine attributes.
The twodifferent speeches delivered byHelmholtz appear to be be grounded
in the idea of external cognitive processes and divine illumination (von
Helmholtz, 1892, 1896). Thirty years later the three stages of creative prob-
lem solving are extended by a fourth one and popularized in the English
literature (Wallas, 1926). The terminology used in this influential book
draws on the early mythological ideas of creativity.
2.3.7 Psychiatry
The psychiatric use of insight is prominently mentioned in the dictionary
as the “awareness by a mentally ill person that their mental experiences
are not based in external reality” (“Insight”, 2018). On a side note, Nęcka’s
(1999/2011, page 667) prototypical definition of insight as “a sudden real-
ization of the essence of a complex, paradoxical, or not well-understood
situation, particularly the essence of a problem at hand” seems almost
contrary. In this case, insight connects the internal problem solvers’ repre-
sentation with a potentially externally defined problem. At the same time,
it could be argued that insight is the realisation of the internal represen-
tation not matching the (external) problem (overcoming the impasse or
breaking through).
Sometimes the boundaries between different meanings of insight are not
quite clear, for example Friston et al. (2017) references Dresler et al. (2015)
as a supposed review on the neural correlates between insight in different
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mental states, even though the latter refer to insight in the psychiatric
meaning of gaining insight into the mental illness.
2.4 Operationalisation
The moment when solutions emerge is an intangible concept and, judg-
ing by the loose terminology illustrated in section 2.2, difficult to grasp
through the terminology adapted in the scientific literature. In this sec-
tion I am discussing existing attempts to operationalise the underlying
concept. I start with existing theories for how insight come into existence
before I discuss different aspects, components, and dimensions of the phe-
nomenon.
2.4.1 Theories for the phenomenon
Several theories to explain insight have been proposed in the literature.
Here I introduce five commonly used theories, namely the representational
change theory, the progress-monitoring theory, the three-process theory, bisocia-
tion, and the impasse-insight sequence.
Two different variants of the ‘representational change theory’ have been
proposed over the years. In both cases, people hit an impasse while at-
tempting to solve a problem. An incomplete internal representation of the
problem is the reason for experiencing the impasse according to Kaplan
and Simon (1990). Alternatively, the prospective problem solvers might
put toomany constraints on a task (Knoblich et al., 1999; Knoblich, Ohlsson,
& Raney, 2001). Through two different processes, constraint relaxation
and chunk decomposition, a change of activation across the working mem-
ory leads to a sudden experience of understanding the solution. Breaking
out of the initial and inappropriate representation of the problem is the
moment of insight. Part of Knoblich, Ohlsson, Haider, and Rhenius’s (1999)
discussion around insight and breaking impasses referred to the partici-
pants’ knowledge and was touching on individual differences.
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In the progress-monitoring heuristics introduced by MacGregor, Ormerod,
and Chronicle (2001), impasses play an important role as well. In this
theory, people perceive the distance from their current solution to the
anticipated goal state. If their current solution path is blocked by an
impasse, they attempt to solve it through another route and experience an
insight. Particularly, MacGregor et al. (2001, page 176) defines insight as
“the recognition or restructuring of a key feature of a problem that allows
a solution to be found”. According to this theory, and tested further by
Chronicle, MacGregor, and Ormerod (2004), there can be more than one
insight involved in solving a problem.
Sternberg and Davidson (1983, page 53) suggest a three-process theory of
insight which consists of selective encoding, selective combination, and
selective comparison. It is their attempt to provide a testable theory to
the descriptions they have extracted from the Gestalt literature, such as
“short-circuit of normal reasoning” and “unconscious leap in thinking”.
In their theory, people distinguish between relevant and irrelevant infor-
mation during the selective encoding. During the selective combination,
previously unconnected and isolated information are united. A compar-
ison between new and previously acquired information is done during
the selective comparison. In a later study, Davidson and Sternberg (1984)
supports this theory with empirical data.
Koestler (1964, page 45) contrasts rational thinking with dream-like states
and “escape[s] in the opposite direction”, the “spontaneous flash of insight
which shows a familiar situation or event in a new light, and elicits a new
response to it”. In his idea of ‘bisociation’, the ability to change between
different planes of existence and switch between two of them at the same
time, a dream would be situated on a more primitive plane. During an
insight, on the other hand, a person would change to a more complex
level.
Ohlsson (1992) introduces the term impasse-insight sequence to provide a
theory of insights. In Ohlsson’s (1992) text, insightmeans breaking an im-
passe. Based on his reading of the previously existing literature, Ohlsson
(1992, page 5) suggests that insight is “initial failure followed by eventual
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success”. Not every failure or impasse necessarily leads to an insight. In-
stead, Ohlsson emphasises that the problem solver needs to be competent
to find the solution. He also distinguishes between two different types of
insights following Koffka’s (1936, page 641) terminology: partial insight for
overcoming an impasse but not quite solving a problem, and full insight for
breaking an impasse and solving a problem. At one point, when explaining
a case study, Koffka (1936, page 631) writes: “In this case, one single step
would have led to insight, whereas the other possibilities would have re-
quired two or more steps for its development, although each step in itself
would have been a case of partial insight. Therefore insightful behaviour
is not necessarily a behaviour in which the full solution occurs at once.” In
their proposed theory, Ohlsson (1992, page 6) addresses three questions:
1. “Why do people encounter impasses for problems they are competent
to solve?” 2. “How are impasses broken?” and 3. “what happens after the
impasse is broken?”. Referring to the language of information processing,
he suggests that impasses are encountered if the initial encoding or struc-
ture of the problem does not activate the operator needed to solve the
problem. They are overcome by adding more information to the problem,
here called elaboration, by re-encoding the problem, or by relaxing the con-
straints on the sought solution. Contrary to previous theories that people
gain access to a previously and unconsciously constructed solution during
the moment of insight, Ohlsson (1992, page 17) hypothesises that the so-
lution is constructed in this moment and the perceived appearance is an
illusion, due to the lack of introspection of the problem solver. Further-
more, according to this theory, the difference between partial insight and
full insight depends on the distance of the broken impasse to the solution.
2.4.2 The processes of insight
Insight is often contrasted with analysis as another approach to solve
complex or difficult problems. Aziz-Zadeh et al. (2009) also highlight
memory retrieval as a third potential alternative to finding a solution,
and they argue, that this is fundamentally different from insight as well as
analytical processes.
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In the literature two fundamentally different ideas are known regarding
the underlying cognitive processes related to insight phenomena. They are
referred to as the Special-Process and the Business-as-usual. In section 2.2.2
I mentioned, that, even though he reportedly did not subscribe to that
idea, Köhler’s (1925/1976) book was interpreted by others as if insight
was a distinct process. R. L. Dominowski (1981, page 194) argues that
Gestalt psychologists “view insight not as an exotic precursor of problem
solving but as a possible accompaniment to problem solving”. This is
emphasised by Ellen (1982) as well, opposing other views that claim Gestalt
psychologists had identified insight as a process. Instead, Ellen reiterates
that the process might be similar to what is experienced during the figure-
ground reversal.
Nevertheless the Special-Process theory plays an important role in the con-
temporary literature. For example, it is the underlying assumption for
current neuroimaging studies, some of which aim at identifying neural cor-
relates to the insight process (Dietrich & Kanso, 2010; Jung-Beeman et al.,
2004; Kounios & Beeman, 2014; Sandkühler & Bhattacharya, 2008; Subra-
maniam, Kounios, Parrish, & Jung-Beeman, 2009). Others develop theories
that rely on special processes or extrodinary observations (Knoblich et al.,
1999; Ohlsson, 2011).
In the Business-as-usual camp, D. N. Perkins (1981) discusses well known
anecdotes such as Poincaré’s development of the Fuchsian function and
Kekulé’s discovery of the benzene ring in the context of special-process
theories published at this time. He concludes, that all the anecdotes can
be explained without the need for a special insight process.
Similarly, Sternberg and Davidson (1983) reject the special-process theory
of insight and hypothesises that insight consist of three testable psycholog-
ical processes: selective coding, selective combination, and selective comparison.
At the same time, they warn against the conclusion that there is no special
cognitive process on the basis that it cannot be measured with current
instruments. They conclude that giftedness as a personal trait might be
related to an insight skill.
For a car-parking puzzle, G. Jones (2003) demonstrates that participants
in this study accompany analytical approaches with occasional insights.
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Weisberg (2015) formalises this into a integrated theory, building on aspects
og the business-as-usual and the special-process theories.
Independent of the discussion between these two camps and regarding the
dynamics of insight, Wallace (1991, page 48) suggests that insight is not a
momentary flash. Instead she refers to as a “microgenetic developmental
process”. She argues that an investigation of insights as process rather
than a moment could afford new results for the phases of the creative
process preceding and following the insight moment. A few years earlier,
Gruber (1981, page 54) had already challenged the view, that insights can
be reduced to or understood as moments. Drawing on the examples from
Archimedes and Poincaré, he suggested that a “continuously working,
evolving system of thought […] produces important insights from time
to time”. Currently, most studies assume insight to be dichotomous, they
either happen or not (Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 2003; Kenneth J. Gilhooly
& Murphy, 2005; Hedne, Norman, & Metcalfe, 2016). In other studies
different types of self-reports have been used to assess the intensity of
the Eureka experience. For example, Bowden and Jung-Beeman (2007) asked
participants to choose on a five item Likert scale between ‘strong non-
insight’, ‘neutral’, and strong insight. Other studies asked participants to
report the strength by adjusting the brightness of a lightbulb (MacGregor&
Cunningham, 2008), or rate how surprising their Aha experiencewas (Danek,
Fraps, von Müller, Grothe, & Öllinger, 2014a) on scales between 0 and 100.
Following from the discussion in this paragraph and the gradual experience
of Satori mentioned in section 2.3.5 I wonder, if the more differential
view provides a better description of the phenomena. Chapter 4 provides
empirical support for this theory.
2.4.3 Numerous features of insight
Authors often describe or define insights through associated phenomena.
They are used to test theories, verify tasks, and compare individual per-
formances, yet there is no overarching agreement within the literature
on the number or type of features. This section provides some examples,
without the claim of completeness.
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Newell, Shaw, and Simon (1958) use two components to define insight. Re-
ferring to “the psychological literature” they name suddenness of discov-
ery and grasp of the structure of a problem to contrast insights against trial-
and-error behaviour. The two features of insight identified by Schooler,
Ohlsson, and Brooks (1993) are different. They see the surprise or unex-
pectedness of the solution and overcoming an impasse as the defining
phenomena. Ansburg and Dominowski (2000, page 31), in the tradition
of Gestalt theorists, suggests restructuring as the underlying cognitive
process for insight. The sudden awareness of a solution is an insight or Aha!
phenomenon for Kounios et al. (2008, page 282). They also add that people
have “little or no access to the processing leading up to that solution”. In
an attempt to map the emotional correlates of insight, Wangbing Shen,
Yuan, Liu, and Luo (2015) explore 98 different emotional states on psycho-
logical and motivational dimensions. Results from their study show that
people associate Aha experiences with positive affect and certainty.
On the other hand, three aspects are named by Bowden, Jung-Beeman,
Fleck, and Kounios (2005) as defining features of insight. In their work
on developing the compound remote associates, they assume that insight
refers to clear understanding of a solution, its sudden realisation, and is
thought to happen after breaking free from previous assumptions. Simi-
larly, Chein and Weisberg (2013) name the feeling of knowing, suddenness,
and overcoming an impasse as markers for insight. Instead, Wallace (1991)
identifies three different features of insight, called facets in her work. They
are the organisational, the developmental, and the modality. In her de-
scription, the organisational facet is responsible for the reorganisation
and restructuring of existing thoughts. Secondly, the developmental facet
describes the process and is often experienced as a sudden flash of insight.
In her paper, Wallace (1991) discusses the rapid succession of different
stages within a single instance of insight on the example of two literary
insights but explicitly suggests that the same applies to scientific insight.
Finally, in the modality facet, she raises the question how unimodality or
multimodality influence the other facets. Bowden (1997) also identifies
three different features of insight: the experience of an impasse, the af-
fective dimension of an Aha experience, and the inability to report on the
processes leading to a solution. Instead, the three approaches Chronicle
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et al. (2004) identify to define insight problems are through phenomenol-
ogy, through the required conceptual change, or through the involved
processes. They suggest that a restructuring of the initial problem repre-
sentation is common across all of these three approaches and therefore
they identify restructuring as the insight. According to Chronicle et al.
(2004), the difference to traditional Gestalt theory is that an insight can be
the result of a solution and is not necessarily happening before finding an
answer to a problem. Ovington, Saliba, and Goldring (2016) also mention
three features for the moment of insight: the solution arrives suddenly, it
is complete, and people have the feeling that the solution is correct. For
the development of their self-reported scale, they provide a definition to
their participants that insight happens suddenly and unexpectedly. In a
more recent publication Ovington, Saliba, and Goldring (2017, page 585)
reduce the definition of insight to “the moment a solution to an unsolved
problem suddenly pops into consciousness”. In this case, they mention
Aha as an affective response to the suddenness of the solution.
R. L. Dominowski (1995, page 75) gives an overview of the commonalities
and differences between the understanding of insight by some of Gestalt’s
most influential thinkers. He goes on by also identifying three features
that insight problems seem to share: “no specialized knowledge is required
[…], some form of new response is required, […and] a change in view
of the problem” is required. He further acknowledges that a problem
can only be considered as insightful for typical problem solvers at most,
not for everyone. Referring to the psychology of breakthrough thinking,
D. Perkins (2001) mentions three aspects necessary for insight: active
knowledge, pattern priming, and breakingmental sets. He emphasises that
the knowledge necessary to solve a problem does not only need to exist,
but it also needs to be accessible by the time it is required. Pattern priming
is a readiness for the problems, something D. Perkins (2001, page 223) calls
‘mental watchdogs that are likely to barkwhen a relevant clue comes along’.
This priming would provide an explanation for how people come back to a
problem they have worked on before and while trying to solve another one.
Finally, the mental set describes some fixedness on a promising solution.
This needs to be broken if it leads to an impasse.
Gathering different interpretations of the phenomenon, Öllinger and
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Knoblich (2009, page 276) suggest that the existing definitions of insight
vary on three different dimensions: task, phenomenology, and process.
For the task dimension Webb, Little, and Cropper (2016), who use the same
distinctive dimensions, discusses the problem space and extension thereof
as a potential feature of insightful problems. Both publications list exam-
ples and compare it to non-insight problems, but suggest that there is no
definition for insightful problems. The phenomenology is discussedwithin
the features of the Aha experience, suddenness, confidence, and other sub-
jective experiences. The process dimension discusses the assumption of
a sudden switch or restructuring of the problem. Öllinger and Knoblich
(2009) relate this mainly to impasses, while Webb et al. (2016) emphasise
that people have no recollection or access to the steps in the insightful
process, while they are able to recall analytical processes. Hedne, Norman,
and Metcalfe’s (2016) study on magic tricks, problems solved via insight
were rated with higher confidence than problems solved without insight.
Previously Danek, Fraps, von Müller, Grothe, and Öllinger (2014b) had as-
sessed a higher confidence rating for insight solutions as well, but they had
used confidence in the definition of insight given to the participants, so
this could have been a potential confound in their results. Hedne et al.
(2016) also explicitly link confidence with the correctness of the solution,
and Steele, Johnson, and Medeiros (2018) highlight that confidence pre-
dicts a creative outcome. Further support for the link between confidence,
correctness, and insight comes from Topolinski and Reber (2010b), who
identified a higher probability to be correct for insight solutions in ana-
gram tasks. Chein and Weisberg (2013, page 67) highlight an affective di-
mension by describing insight as “a sudden feeling of knowing, or insight”.
In the context of problem solving and creative thinking, the same authors
define it in the cognitive dimension as “the sudden realization of the solu-
tion to a problem after a period of impasse, the sudden movement from
befuddlement to understanding” (Chein & Weisberg, 2013, page 67).
Other authors identify insight experiences on one more dimension. For
example, Jung-Beeman et al. (2004, page 4) identify four features to char-
acterise problem solving with insight: “1. Solvers first come to an impasse,
no longer progressing towards a solution […] 2. Solvers usually cannot
report the processing that enables them to reinterpret the problem and
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overcome the impasse […] 3. Solvers experience their solution as arising
suddenly […] and immediately recognize the correctness of the solution
[…] 4. Performance on insight problems is associatedwith creative thinking
and other cognitive abilities different from those associated with per-
formance on noninsight problems”. Topolinski and Reber (2010a) also
suggest four distinct features: suddenness, ease of processing the solution,
positive affect, and the feeling of correctness. In a review of the previous
literature, Topolinski and Reber (2010a) identify a change of processing
fluency as a results of having an insight. After having found the solution,
they conclude that the problem appears to be easier than it was during the
attempt to solve it. As a result, the difficulty of problematic tasks change
in hindsight, independent of how difficult the task appears to be while
working on it. For Salvi, Bricolo, Franconeri, Kounios, and Beeman (2015,
page 1814) problems are solved by insight when “the solutions to a prob-
lem suddenly emerges into consciousness in a Eureka! or Aha! moment”. In
this, the mental representation of a problem has been restructured. This
reorganisation happens suddenly and is often surprising for the problem
solvers. Furthermore, they cannot access how they arrived at the solution
but are confident in their solution.
In their list of four distinct features, restructuring is the central aspect
of an insight according to Kounios and Beeman (2014, page 73). This reor-
ganisation is often accompanied by an emotional burst: problem solvers
are thought to be surprised by the solution or the process, and they also
overcome an impasse. With a reference to the variety of definitions in
the literature, Kounios and Beeman (2014, page 73) suggest a narrow and
a broad definition of insight. “Very narrowly defined, insight could be
thought of as a sudden solution to a problem preceded by an impasse and
problem restructuring and followed by a positive emotional response”.
This gives a clear description of the process: first, an impasse is broken by
restructuring, then an insight happens, and this is followed by a positive
affect. In contrast, the ‘broadest’ and ‘non-scientific’ definition of insight
is “any deep realization, whether sudden or not”.
The selection of publications discussed here highlights the fact that cur-
rently no systematic way of studying the phenomenon of insight exists.
Thus, this selection itself could not follow a systematic procedure either,
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hence the different weights applied to different sections of the literature.
It also highlights how diverse the current definitions are and how little
agreement exists between authors and studies. Some name two, other
four features, and the majority settles with the narratively convenient
rule of three. In the selected works, suddenness has been named most
fequently, followed by impasse, surprise, and restructuring. However, this
list does not suggest that these are the most likely candidates to identify
insight. In fact, Danek, Wiley, and Öllinger (2016) have shown that not ev-
ery insightful problem solved relies on restructuring and, in a follow up
study, that not every subjective experience of insight and postive affect re-
sults in a solved problem. Instead of relying on a theoretical definition to
operationalise insight, the following section highlights another approach
currently used.
2.4.4 Problems as indicator
Instead of using experimental observations as indivators for insight, some
authors suggest that certain types of problems can only be solved through
insight. Consequently, finding a solution to a problem means that par-
ticipants had an insight. For example, Metcalfe (1986, page 292) defines
insight problems as “those kinds of problems that provoke a subjective aha
response upon solution”. In the following year, Metcalfe and Wiebe (1987)
suggest to define insight through the experienced phenomenology and
monitored via metacognitive assessments. Here they also imply that re-
structuring, intuition, illumination, and insight are different names for
direct apperception. Later they question if novelty and restructuring are
necessary for insight.
Some insight tasks created for one study are later used by other authors.
For example DeYoung, Flanders, and Peterson’s (2008) tasks are used by
others. These authors define insight as the moment of overcoming an
impasse and finding a new and more effective solution. DeYoung et al.
(2008) assume that the problems are ill-defined and restructuring of the
dominant interpretation is required to solve these type of problems. This
resonates in K. J. Gilhooly and E. Fioratou’s (2009, page 356) definition,
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where it is an insight problem if “within the typically derived initial problem
representation, the goal cannot be reached and a restructured goal rep-
resentation […] is required for solution”. To explain the origin of insight
tasks, DeYoung et al. (2008) summarise previous literature by linking the
ability to solve insightful problems with intelligence, forming remote asso-
ciations, and pattern recognition. Presumably the task development and
task selection is based on these explicit and implicit definitions. Authors
using their tasks indirectly subscribe to DeYoung, Flanders, and Peterson’s
(2008) definition of insight.
This relates to Beaty, Nusbaum, and Silvia’s (2014) study on personality
traits where they also build on the assumption that insightful problems elicit
insights. In their study they administer some of the tasks developed by
DeYoung et al. (2008). Even without an explicit definition of insight, they
therefore expect their participants to break an impasse, find a more effec-
tive solution, and restructure the internal representation. Building on this
assumption, they find no link between insightful problem solving and per-
sonality traits or creative achievement. Also building on the assumption
that the task type can be used to distinguish between insight and analyti-
cal problem solving, Salvi, Bricolo, Kounios, Bowden, and Beeman (2016)
are able to demonstrate that insightful solutions are more often correct
than non-insightful ones. Based on previous results from neuroimaging
studies, Salvi et al. (2016, page 3) assume that “insight and analytical solu-
tions are produced by different cognitive strategies” within the context of
their study.
2.5 Measures
There is no single accepted metric of insight. On the one hand, this is a
direct consequence from the numerous features of insight discussed in
section 2.4.3. Even if ‘surprise’, ‘restructuring’, ‘positive affect’, ‘overcom-
ing impasses’, and any of the other previously mentioned features could
be measured with a single instrument, insightwould require an instrument
tailored to each of the combinations. While each of these hypothetical
measures taps into different aspects of the phenomenon, insight, as defined
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in section 2.2.8, can not be measured in this bottom-up approach. Conse-
quently, studies following this approach are referred to in section 2.4.3,
but the detailed discussion of each of these combinations is outside the
scope of this work.
On the other hand, insight is considered to be part of the creative process.
According to this alternative top-down operationalisation, measures of the
creative process and creativity necessarily include insight. In this section
I give a short overview of the different tasks used to assess creativity,
and how they relate to the assessment of insight. Specifically I discuss
divergent thinking and convergent thinking tasks, as well as classical insight
problems. I also touch on the different ways of presenting the task and
in particular the stimulus for experiments used to study Eureka moments.
Since this study is concerned with the moment when solutions emerge,
it is essential for me to be able to track temporal aspects of the creative
process, so I also speculate on the implications of time and time constraints
on the process. I also outline the main methodologies used to trace the
creative process. In particular, I discuss themethods of verbal protocols, eye-
tracking and mouse-tracing and identify their strengths and weaknesses
for the research on insight.
2.5.1 Divergent thinking tasks
Divergent thinking tasks are designed to assess the ability of an individual
to generate many different ideas for a single stimulus (Runco, Abdulla,
Paek, Al-Jasim, & Alsuwaidi, 2016; Torrance, 1966). Divergent production is
one of the components in Joy Paul Guilford’s (1967) ‘Structure-of-Intellect’
model and is conceptualised as a contributing factor to creative production.
A huge number of divergent thinking tasks have been developed, with as
much as 53 different tasks analysed in a single publication (Wilson, Guilford,
Christensen, & Lewis, 1954). They are commonly administered are unusual
uses tasks, and tests drawing on the ability to complete figures, think
counterfactually, and interpret ambiguous stimuli. One example for an
unusual use task is to name alternative uses for a ‘brick’ (Wilson et al., 1954).
In the ‘Torrance Test of Creative Thinking’, people are asked to complete
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a number of drawings, or describe what would happen if everyone could
suddenly walk in thin air (Torrance, 1966). Or, the pattern meaning task
by Wallach and Kogan (1965) is an example for ambiguity interpretation.
The results of this task are scored on several dimensions, most commonly:
1. originality; the uniqueness of a solution within a sample, 2. fluency;
the number of solutions produced by one participant, 3. flexibility; the
ability to switch between different domains, and 4. elaboration; the detail
in which ideas are described. These tasks are difficult to score, in fact
Silvia (2008) have evaluated different scoring methods and their reliability.
Runco et al. (2016) have evaluated different tasks to see which ones are
good predictors of creative production, and conclude that studies relying
on only one measure do not provide generalisable results. For different
tasks, responses have been linked to intelligence (Nusbaum & Silvia, 2011),
professional and domain specific training (Dow&Mayer, 2004; Scott, Leritz,
& Mumford, 2004), mood (Baas, Dreu, & Nijstad, 2008), language fluency
(Silvia, Beaty, & Nusbaum, 2013), as well as the modalities of collecting
ideas such as audio recording and typing speed (Forthmann, Holling, Çelik,
Storme, & Lubart, 2017). Furthermore, the instructions play an important
role in the number and originality of answers (Forthmann et al., 2016;
Taranu & Loesche, 2017).
Traditionally, divergent thinking tasks are thought to mimic early parts of
the creative process, to happen in the preparataion phase of Wallas’s (1926)
model. But assuming, that people mentally produce more solutions than
they actually communicate, this would assume that a convergent selection
of the most promising answer happens. Essentially, this is happening
in the top-two scoring method suggested by (Silvia et al., 2008), where
participants are asked to select their top two answers for future scoring.
During this phase, either internally before communicating an answer or
post-hoc, an insight can occur. Of course, the nature of insight relies on the
theoretical grounding discussed in section 2.4.3. If, for example, insight
is understood as an affect, breaking an imprasse, or changed processing
fluency, then it can occur independently of finding a ‘correct’ solution.
Consequently, Eureka experiencesmight occur during divergent thinking
tasks, but not as intense as for convergent thinking tasks (Webb, Little,
Cropper, & Roze, 2017).
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2.5.2 Convergent thinking tasks
Convergent thinking tasks are problems that have one correct solution,
but the solution path is not obvious and often requires another approach
than following steps of an algorithm. Examples for these tasks are the
‘Remote Associates Task’ and ‘CompoundRemote Associates’, where people
are asked to find the fourth word matching three known ones (Bowden
& Jung-Beeman, 2003; Mednick, 1962). While the tasks are designed to
have only one solution, this might not necessarily be the case. Taking the
normed data from Bowden and Jung-Beeman (2003) as an example, the top
question requires a fourth word that matches ‘cottage/swiss/cake’. The
task only allows the answer ‘cheese’ as in ‘cottage cheese’, ‘swiss cheese’
and ‘cheese cake’. Yet another possible answer might be ‘mountain’ as
in ‘mountain cottage’, ‘swiss mountain’ and ‘mountain cake’; ‘mountain
cakes’ seem to be certain type of cakes – a web search and recipe search
delivers many examples and a proficient baker might find this answer
more quickly than cheese. The other, more commonly compounds are the
Alps as ‘Swiss mountains’, which also have quite a few ‘mountain cottages’.
Nevertheless, the answer ‘mountain’ would not be considered a correct
answer for this task. As this example demonstrates, it is not only language
fluency to influence the results (Silvia et al., 2013), but also participants’
proficiency in the topics the stimuli are taken from.
Convergent thinking tasks are commonly used as insightful tasks (Dietrich
& Kanso, 2010; Kounios & Beeman, 2009; Zmigrod, Colzato, & Hommel,
2015). To find the correct solution, participants are required to generate
many ideas, similarly to divergent thinking tasks. In fact, Bowers et al.
(1990) classifies between different types of stimuli ‘triads’, some of which
are semantically divergent and require an explicitly divergent production
to understand the stimulus. Nevertheless, the ability to generate these
ideas is not assessed in convergent thinking tasks and might happen at
any time. The metrics for these tasks are typically time-related: can a
participant find the solution within a given period? And how long does
it take them to find it? In some cases these tasks are administered with a
maximum time per task, in others participants have a certain amount of
time towork on several tasks simultaneously, and yet in others participants
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are in control of the time. The scoring system requires less subjective
judgement of the results by the conductors than for divergent thinking
tasks.
In summary and besides these administrative problems, it remains unclear
what the convergent tasks measure, i.e. what the contributing factors are,
and how the quantification of the results and the single time measure
until participants arrive at the solution relates to the underlying creative
process. Even with a post-hoc assessment of the subjective experience
of an insight, these tasks do not allow a detailed analysis of the dynamics
leading up to an emerging solution and the processes afterwards.
2.5.3 Insightful tasks
Finally, classical insight tasks typically ask participants to come up with a
single solution to a riddle or visual puzzle (Duncker, 1935/1963; Gardner,
1978; MacGregor et al., 2001). To reach this goal, the potential problem
solvers have to restructure the initial question (Fleck & Weisberg, 2004;
Knoblich et al., 1999) or perceive what the original author called the Gestalt
in an insight (Duncker, 1935/1963; Köhler, 1947; Wertheimer, 1945). Fol-
lowing this argument, the focus regarding the problem solving process
for this type of tasks shifts towards process knowledge and away from
the qualities of the stimulus. Understanding how to solve the problem is
more important than the exact features of the involved stimuli. As a result,
most of the insightful tasks cannot be repeated with the same person even
if the stimuli were exchanged. These training effects between tasks of
the same class can be observed for verbal insight tasks (Ansburg & Domi-
nowski, 2000) and visual problems (Weisberg & Alba, 1981). Furthermore
and as Bowden et al. (2005, page 323) demonstrate, some of the problems
“can be solved without insight if the solver habitually uses a ‘What if…’
rather than a mathematical strategy’. Similarly, Danek et al. (2016) showed
that insight problems, despite their name, can be solved without having an
Aha experience.
For their wit, a number of insightful tasks have by now entered popular
culture, so that it is difficult to control for previous exposure of the partic-
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ipants to this or a similar question. While Lung and Dominowski (1985)
have demonstrated that solving one task influences the process of solving
similar ones, it remains elusive how to identify similarity between differ-
ent insightful tasks. This includes the modality of the problem. Some tasks
are presented in the form of a physical puzzle. This includes problem solv-
ing observed in animals Foerder, Galloway, Barthel, III, and Reiss (2011),
Köhler (1921/1963), but also human participants are often given tasks in
which they have tomanipulate physical objects to understand the problem
and demonstrate their solution (Adamson, 1952; Ionescu et al., 2017). This
type of presentation allows participants to change their own perspective
in relationship to the stimulus. The change of spatial orientation of the
stimulus from the problem solver’s perspective is thought to provoke an
adaptation of the mental representation of the problem as well (Ormerod,
MacGregor, & Chronicle, 2002). According to embodied cognition theory,
the physical engagement with the task supports problem solving and the
activation of previous and potentially semantically distant knowledge and
memories.
For many tasks the variable of interest is whether participants were able
to solve the problem, the time it took to solve it, and to some extent the
quality of the solution. In some cases participants are observed or asked to
provide a verbal protocol of their thought processes. The tasks can range
across a large problem space, fromvisual or verbal stimuli, to problems that
require mathematical knowledge or manipulation of the physical world.
Depending on the context of the task, participants’ culture, education, and
personality traits can influence the measured results. This adds to the
conceptual and theoretical problems surrounding the definition of insight
discussed earlier.
2.5.4 Other tasks and measurements
The Obscure Figures Test as described by Acker and McReynolds (1965)
consists of 40 hand drawn figures for which participants are asked to think
of something that each figure might represent. According to its authors,
some of the figures are draws in a rather obvious way while others are
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ambiguous and unstructured. Participants are encouraged to respond
in “clever, unusual, and imaginative ways, being told that they get ex-
tra credits for being creative” (Acker & McReynolds, 1965, page 816). In
the 10 minute administration for all 40 stimuli, one response per stimu-
lus is allowed. Responses are scored by the task administrators on a scale
between 0 for inappropriate or missing responses to 3 for highly imagi-
native responses. The study shows a high reliability and correlates well
with measures of intelligence. The study relates the Obscure Figures Test
to a principle they call cognitive innovation16, the restructuring of internal
representations and novelty seeking. According to the authors the novel
conception of stimuli is sometimes seen as clever or surprising and, as a
results might have “a particularly “good fit”, to lead to an “ah-ha!” ex-
perience” (Acker & McReynolds, 1965, page 816). Interestingly this early
study shows a correlation with intelligence measures, and also suggest the
test as an instrument for studies concerning creativity, curiosity, and reac-
tions. While this task resembles many elements of the Pattern Meaning
task published in the same year by Wallach and Kogan (1965), the authors
emphasise two years later, that this only represents one of many aspects
of the need for novelty (Acker & McReynolds, 1967). Consequently and after
comparing six different tasks from divergent thinking to stimulus seeking,
they call for more caution in generalising results from a single test. In a
later study, the Obscures Figure Test has been compared to Unusual Uses
Task, the Torrance Test of Creative Thinking, and the Pattern Meaning
Task confirming a correlation between these instruments and thus sug-
gesting similar underlying processes (Voss & Keller, 1977). Nevertheless
and while the connection between the Obscures Figure Test and the sub-
jective Eureka experience has been hypothesised, the rudimentary scoring
system does not provide any measures that could help understand the
dynamics of the process or observe the moment of interest any better.
Another approach to Eureka experiences provide jokes and humour. Gick
and Lockhart (1995) open their chapter on Eurekamoments with a joke.
They claim, that the sudden understanding of the punch line is an insight,
often with an affective component. Jokes are often told in certain social sit-
16not to be confused with Cognitive Innovation as defined 50 years later within the context
of CogNovo, also see Kristensen et al. (2017)
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uations and with the listeners expectation to hear something funny. This
environment can be used in the narrative to strengthen the effect. One
well-known example is the ‘yellow sheep joke’, a longer form of a humor-
ous story playing with several elements of classical jokes. Interestingly it
also resembles elements from ‘serendipity’ as discussed in section 2.2.7
by telling the story of three brothers sent out to the world by their fa-
ther to find and rescue a lost valuable item, in this case a ‘yellow sheep’.
With the classical structure, the listeners expect a solution or joke for
the third brother, but the joke ends with nothing extraordinary and the
‘yellow sheep’ has not been found. At this point, the expectation of the
listener is violated and they are often disappointed. Some time later the
story teller offers a compensation for the failed joke by offering another
story. This part of the joke is on a very different topic, but at some point
the leading character in this second story finds the ‘yellow sheep’ in an
unexpected situation. Considering the initial story as an unsolved prob-
lem, the unexpected and surprising solution offered in the second part can
be considered a triggered Eureka experience. In their encyclopedic entry
on humour and creativity, O’Quin and Derks (1999/2011) suggest that the
strength of insight in jokes relates to the humour appreciation. They also
emphasise that the vast amount of research on humour production and
humour appreciation is often not recognised, the “interface between the
fields of humo[u]r and creativity is thus clouded by these perplexities”
(O’Quin & Derks, 1999/2011, page 634). Humour and jokes seem to be re-
lated to Eureka experiences through creativity, but following the discussion
on the already ambiguous relationship between creativity and insight in
section 2.5 they were not considered for the further work in this thesis.
2.5.5 Temporal aspects of task administration
The Eureka moment is a point in time. Consequently, tasks related to in-
sights should be linked to temporal aspects, and many tasks described in
this section are indeed administered with different degrees of time con-
straints. One group of tasks is administered with a defined time per task
that cannot be altered during the experiment. For example, participants
have exactly one minute to generate as many answers as possible for one
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stimulus. Other tasks are administered with a maximum time per task, for
example giving participants up to two minutes to answer the question,
but they can advance to the next item at any time before that. In other
set-ups, participants are given either a total time or a maximum time for a
group of stimuli. Alternatively, another group of experiments allows par-
ticipants to advance at their own pace, not putting any time constraints on
them, but potentially measuring the switching times. This approach can
be distinguished into two subgroups: either participants can only advance
to the next stimuli, or they can switch back and forth between the given
stimuli. In these paragraphs I want to discuss implications of these differ-
ent types of task administration. Eventually, this informs my decision for
methods used in this thesis.
Experiments administered with predefined times allow to observe a time
slice of the creative process of participants — independent of task diffi-
culty and individual differences. In some of these tasks the researchers
assume that the probability of generating one or more solutions after the
maximum time is low. Other studies use the cut-off time to distinguish
the individual difference in processing speed through the assessment of
task progress within the given time. Yet another set of studies appears to
be using a predefined time for convenience, as it allows easier task admin-
istration and simpler data analysis. In any case, and assuming that Eureka
moments happen as a function of time, participants experience the Eureka
moment either within the defined time period or after the assessment time
ends. If participants have the Eureka experience within the task time and
are forced to stay with the task until the time runs out, they may spend
the remaining time verifying the solution. The longer verification phase
influences the confidence in the solution and potentially even the solution
itself. The predefined task time either lets participants experience the
Eureka moment, or it does not. This depends on task difficulty, individual
differences, motivation, environment, and a number of additional factors.
For people who experienced an Eureka moment, the time between this ex-
perience and the end of the predefined task time has a modifying effect
on the result, either weakening or strengthening it. A way of reducing one
of the modifiers is to introduce a maximum task time instead of a fixed
time. The given answers within the task time presumably still depend
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on the same factors as for the fixed time condition, but the verification
phase is reduced, at least in most of the cases. In particular if participants
are encouraged to answer as quickly as possible, their verification is most
likely reduced. There will still be a number of participants who will spend
time on verifying the solution or solutions, but people don’t have idle time.
This is particularly true for convergent thinking tasks or in general tasks
which require one single answer.
In another group of experiments, participants are not given a set task
time, but rather a total time for all experiments or at least a group of tasks.
There are two possible subgroups for this. In the first group, participants
can freely switch between the individual tasks. In the second group they
strictly progress from one task to the next, but without constraints on
individual tasks. In both cases they can either be encouraged to solve
as many tasks as possible or rather to focus on the quality of individual
solutions. This difference in instructions will likely lead to differing results.
Here I discuss the influence of the task group time on given answers.
If participants encounter one stimulus at a time, but without time con-
straints on this single task, they might generate as many answers as possi-
ble for as long as they feel confident about the quality of their answers. If
the task is a divergent thinking task they will communicate these answers
while generating them and move on to the next task once this initial set is
generated. In a convergent task these answers might be generated inter-
nally before converging to a single answer and continuing to the next task.
In insightful tasks they might test all generated ideas and give an answer if
they found a working solution, before continuing to the next task. If they
have not found a solution, they might return to the idea generation part
for a second or third time, and advance without giving a solution after a
number of unsuccessful iterations. The size of the generated set of ideas in
the divergent part of the task, the depth of verification in the convergent
part, and the number of iterations for the insightful task, all depend on
a number of factors. These components include motivation, individual
differences in capacity of working memory, individual domain knowledge,
and other factors difficult to control for. If participants are free to go back
and forth between individual tasks, then they might advance earlier to
the next task knowing they can return the current task at any time. While
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already working on the next task and depending on the required cognitive
load for this one, they might continue incubating on one of the previous
tasks and generate a solution for the initial problem. According to the im-
mediate incubation described in Kenneth J. Gilhooly, Georgiou, Garrison,
Reston, and Sirota (2012), participants might even work on all tasks at the
same time if they are given the chance to look at them early on. Since I
am interested in the time when participants have a Eureka experience, this
might be a result of incubation rather than focussing on a single problem.
On the other hand, the number of solved problems and the reported in-
sights within a given task group time is less dependent on a single task.
One prominent example for a task group time are the Torrance Test of
Creative Thinking (TTCT), which gives participants 10 minutes to respond
to a group of stimuli. In a sense and on a more abstract level, tasks that
are run in a lab generally fall under this category as well: participants
are given either a certain time for the whole experiment, either explic-
itly by rewarding them with course points or money per given time spent
on an experiment. For example, participants know in advance that they
are rewarded for 30 minutes of their time, even though the experiment
itself might consist of smaller timed subparts. Even without this extrinsic
limitation, any participant might be driven by their own intrinsic desire
to finishe the experiment as soon as possible. The consequence for any
experiment is to create the task as an enjoyable experience that moti-
vates participants and counters or neutralises the previously described
effects.
Participants spending as much time as they want on tasks are constrained
by different implicit and explicit factors. Asmentioned before, one of these
moderating factors is the motivation to solve the task, which can be either
intrinsic or extrinsic. According to Prabhu, Sutton, and Sauser (2008), it
appears that intrinsic motivation fosters creativity, while extrinsic moti-
vation hinders it. However, other studies arrive at contrasting conclusions
(Amabile & Pratt, 2016). On amore fundamental level, an increase in either
type of motivation will result in an increased time that participants spend
on the task. From the outside it is not possible to distinguish whether par-
ticipants spend all or just parts of the allocated task time actively solving
the problem. In fact Seli, Risko, Smilek, and Schacter (2016) show that
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unintentional mind-wandering happens in most tasks — in addition to the
participant-initiated intentional drift away from the task. Nevertheless,
from a merely statistical point of view, it seems plausible that an increase
in task time also increases the time participants actually spend focusing
on the task. With regards to the experimental design, the task time can
be increased through motivation. It is possible that there is a correlation
between task time and the probability of solving a problem and generat-
ing more answers, possibly mediated through motivation. If this is the
case, then the results of tasks administered without a time limit will re-
flect the time and motivation of participants to a certain extent, possibly
to a greater extent than their individual creative ability. Given that early
phases of problem solving have a time component as well, the ability to
process all necessary information and potentially overcome an impasse to
reach a Eureka moment will depend on the task time and on the motivation
of the participants.
If participants have little motivation to complete the task giving them a
maximum time for a task or group of tasks, or no time constraints at all, it
is likely that they will answer as quickly as possible, without giving the task
itself much thought. Participants who have a higher motivation will spend
more time and, as a result, advance to different phases of their problem
solving process. To overcome this initial difference, a minimum time per
task or per group of tasks can be introduced. In this case participants know
they have to spend at least a certain amount of time on the experiment.
Since they cannot use their time for anything else, they might just as
well spend the time in the attempt to solve the given problem. As for
the intrinsic motivation, there are strategies than can be introduced to
increase it as well, for example through gamification (Sailer, Hense, Mayr,
& Mandl, 2017).
In summary, time constraints are of vital importance for any task related
to insight. Each task with a single answer that potentially elicits a Eureka
experience should have their own time constraint, preferrably a maximum
time instead of a fixed time per task. A minimum time has the potential of
extrinsically motivating additional participants that feel otherwise forced,
but this time needs to be carefully chosen. In addition to these extrinsict
factors, the intrinsic motivation plays an important role in the task time.
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Theoretically, an enjoyable task will motivate participants to think about
the problem as long as they need to find a solution. Generally, longer on-
task time increases the probability of finding a solution through insight,
but needs to be distinguished from time spent with the task while actually
attending to other problems ormind-wandering. Once again, the task type
and intrinsic motivation have a positive effect on the temporal aspects of
the task administration.
2.5.6 Verbal protocols
Verbal and think-aloudprotocols have beenoftenused in insightful tasks (Fleck
& Weisberg, 2004), divergent thinking tasks (Kenneth J. Gilhooly, Fioratou,
Anthony, & Wynn, 2007), convergent thinking tasks (Cranford & Moss,
2012), and also in real-world problem solving (Kozbelt, Dexter, Dolese,
Meredith, & Ostrofsky, 2015; Newell & Simon, 1972). While Schooler et al.
(1993) suggested that these protocols might produce an overshadowing
effect for insight problem solving, Kenneth J. Gilhooly et al. (2007) did not
find any effect on fluency and novelty production in a divergent thinking
task. In a meta-study, Fox, Ericsson, and Best (2011) did not see an effect of
verbalisation on the results of tasks, but they did notice an increase in the
time required. These results suggest that think-aloud protocols might or
might not change the solutions provided for a task, but theymost certainly
change the process. Furthermore Beeftink, van Eerde, and Rutte (2008)
have shown, that self-initiated breaks were benefitial for Eureka experiences
while imposed interruptions led to fewer insights. Verbal protocols can be
argued to be self-initiated but also forced. With my interest in narrowing
down the time of emerging solutions within a process, it seems that these
protocols might not be appropriate for the task at hand.
2.5.7 Eye tracking and mouse tracing
Besides the verbal protocols discussed in section 2.5.6, eye-tracking (Thomas
& Lleras, 2007) and mouse-tracing (Freeman & Ambady, 2010) are com-
monly used techniques to study the behaviour that leads to problem solv-
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ing. However, these techniques require computer-based tasks, and they
are based on the fundamental assumption that psychological processes
can be traced through observable behaviour (Skinner, 1984). Of particular
interest for the emerging solutions is the participants’ behaviour during a
task when they engage in a creative problem solving process. In order to
solve a task, people have to engage with elements that can provide them
with the knowledge needed for the solution. The order and duration of
engagement with these elements shows the information aquisition pro-
cess.
In a direct comparison between eye-tracking and mouse-tracking, Lohse
and Johnson (1996, page 37) conclude that mouse interactions “predispose
people to use a more systematic search and process more information
than they normally would”. To maximise the effect of the mouse tracking
technique, Ullrich, Wallach, and Melis (2003) suggested to blur elements
not directly under the mouse pointer. This prevents people from accessing
information away from themouse pointer and gives better control over the
supposed focus of attention. Uncovering elements on screen implies that
information acquisition and information processing is possible throughout
the whole hover time. Indeed, participants will not necessarily direct their
full attention to the currently unblurred text or image. While this appears
as a disadvantage of mouse-tracking, Ferreira, Apel, and Henderson (2008)
have observed the same issue for eye-tracking. People are also known to
not always perceive visual input when generating ideas (Walcher, Körner,
& Benedek, 2017). Furthermore, other processes such as memory access
are related to eyemovements as well (Johansson & Johansson, 2013; Scholz,
von Helversen, & Rieskamp, 2015). Finally, Freeman and Ambady (2010)
have shown that mouse-tracking provides reliable insight into mental
processes. Consequently, for computer-based tasks and with areas outside
the mouse pointer’s position being inaccessible, mouse-tracking provides
a similarly robust measure as eye-tracking, and it has the advantage of
being easier to administer.
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2.6 Problem Solving
As part of their effort to study human behaviour and artificial intelligence,
Newell et al. (1958) described the elements that a theory of problem solving
should address: specifically, it should predict the performance, explain the
processes andmechanisms involved, and specify the phenomena accompa-
nying problem solving as well as their relation to the process. According
to this list, a theory of problem solving should not just show how a change
of the problem alters the behaviour but also what has been learned after
finding the solution. The language Newell et al. (1958) use is informed by
their previous work and education in computer science, and particular
information processing theory.
The information processing theory is based on the mathematical works
by Shannon and Weaver (1963) concerning technical communication be-
tween devices and, in a wider sense, how information can be processes
in machines. The information processing theory in cognitive psychology
builds on the idea that humans in their attempt to solve problems, fol-
low a similar approach as computers. In this view the human brain has
units that function as short time, long time, and working memory; as
connections to the different sensory inputs and motor effectors, and as a
central processing unit that computes information by manipulating con-
tent of the working memory. In their book Newell and Simon (1972) aim
at understanding how these cognitive systems can interact and how this
interaction solves problems.
2.6.1 Concept Analysis of the term problem solving
In information processing terms a problem is defined by a problem space,
a search space, and a representation of the problem itself. The problem
space is the internal representation, which differs from the stimulus and
environment, but represents aspects of it. Problem solving is then the
path on how to come from the problem to the solution.
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The term problem solving consists of two words. Problem, the first one,
describes a situation or a state that should be changed or overcome. States,
in a very abstract sense, represent positions in a space. The dimensions
of this space can represent knowledge, spatial, temporal domains, or a
combination of any of these. A problem is then the acknowledgement of
the discrepancy between two states, one representing the start and the
other one the more desirable goal state. Solving, the second part of the
term, is a verb describing the process of finding a solution. Therefore
Problem solving describes the process of moving through the defined space
towards the goal state, reaching the goal solves the problem. From this
description, a number of observations and implications can be inferred.
1. The existence of the goal state, which has to be different from the current
one, needs to be identified, and 2. the there is some way of judging if
the goal state has been reached. 3. There needs to be some kind of drive
or desire to leave the current position and strive towards the goal which
requires 4. the current state and the goal to be part of the same knowledge
or problem space. Besides the drive there also needs to be 5. actions
that implies planned movement. In short, problem solving describes the
transition from one state to having reached a goal. The following section
discusses the difference in language.
2.6.2 Goals and Problem Definition
Looking at the goal more specifically, problems can be classified into two
categories: they are either well-defined or ill-defined. Whenever the
expected outcome is clear and known from the beginning, then the goal is
said to be well-defined. Herbert A. Simon (1973) argues that ill-structured
problems can only be understood as a residual concept, as a definition
of what it is not. In this case ill-defined problems are not a well-defined
problems. Examples for well-defined problems could either be a single
expected solution, or criteria defining the goal more vaguely. One example
for a concrete goal would be to find the shortest way on a map from one
point to another or the remote associates task (Mednick, 1962) previously
mentioned in section 2.5.2. There is only one solution for each task. A
more vague goal definition would be to find any word that starts with the
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same letter as two other words. The transition or action to reach the goal
can be just as well-define or ill-defined. For example in a number of simple
mathematical problems the solution path is well known and finding the
answer to the problem is merely following this set of rules. For the ill-
defined solution path there is no known way between the current position
and the goal.
To identify if a problem is solved, the process requires someway to evaluate
the current state. This judge could either be an external entity informing
the problem solver about the success, or some internal judge, potentially
aided by the intrinsic properties of the task. After each state change, this
judge would need to very the current position in the space in relation to
the desired goal state. If the problem space and position of the goal is
known to the judge, then it is possible to identify the current distance to
the solution. This resembles the idea of a gradual and analytical process
and is represented by the ‘global judge’ in fig. 2.2. On the other hand, if the
space is unknown or the goal is only defined through constraints but has no
position associated, then the judgewill only be able to report if the solution
was found or not (‘local judge’ in fig. 2.2). This shows some parallels to
features of insightmentioned in section 2.4.3, such as suddenness, surprise,
or inability to report the solution process.
Looking at the problem solving process as a whole, Herbert A. Simon
(1973) concluded that the boundaries between well-defined and ill-defined
problems are rather vague. He defines an ill-defined problem by stating
that both, the goal and path have to be ill-defined. This definition accounts
for four different categories of problems: the goal to be reached is either
ill-defined or well-defined and the path or reaching it is ill-defined or well-
defined. I suggest to call the types of problems that have a well-defined
goal and a well-defined path the ’truly well-defined problems’ as they
comply without question with Herbert A. Simon’s (1973) suggestion of a
well-defined problem. If the knowledge of the judge is considered as well,
then problems using judges with global knowledge could be considered
well-defined. Hence problemswith ‘global knowledge’, ‘well-defined goals’,
and ‘well-defined paths’ could be considered well-defined. I have marked
these problems in fig. 2.2 with a filled circle. Similarly I have marked
the ’truly ill-defined problems’. While there might be more aspects to
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consider, this current example illustrates that Herbert A. Simon’s (1973)
classification is ambiguous regarding certain problems, namely those with
amix of well-defined and ill-defined aspects. These problems, in fig. 2.2 left








(a) Categorisation of problems
considering goals and paths,

















(b) Categorisation of problems considering the
knowledge of judges, goals, and paths, result-
ing in eight different types of problems.
Figure 2.2: Comparison of problem categorisations for well-defined and
ill-defined goals and paths (left). If the knowledge of the judge
is considered as well, then this would result in a larger number
of possible problem types.
2.6.3 Types of problem solving
According toNovick and Sherman (2003), solutions found through a variety
of problem solving methods fall into one of three classes: pop-out, search,
or memory retrieval.
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Pop-out solutions as mentioned by Novick and Sherman (2003), refer to the
class of solutions retrieved through insight “while still avoiding the extra
connotations inherent in the Gestalt view of insight” (Novick & Sherman,
2003, page 352). This is contrasted to the search going back to the use
by Newell and Simon (1972) who have described problem solving in set-
theoretical terms. For them, finding a solution is identifying a subset in
the problem space that has specific properties of the goal-set. This means,
that the solution is part of the internal representation of the problem space
since the beginning of the task. Problem solving is then a set or sequence of
manipulations within the search space that helps identifying these subsets.
In this setting, task difficulty is a results of size of the problem space,
the sparsity and distribution of solutions across the space, and the cost of
manipulations. This search can also be represented throughmanipulations
on spanning trees. Newell and Simon (1972) discuss this theory in the
context and analysis of verbal protocols with humans trying to solve a
number of problem such as cryptoarithmetic puzzles and chess problems.
The term ‘search’ is used by Novick and Sherman (2003) in a broader sense,
as a strategy to deliberately and incrementally transition from the start to
the goal state. Intermediate results stored in working memory allows to
revisit the path towards the solution, which requires distinguishable ideas
and concepts (Feist, 1991). While Metcalfe and Wiebe (1987, page 240)
referred to them very descriptively as grind-out-the-solution, Salvi et al.
(2016) referred to this strategy simply as analysis.
Interestingly the theory by Newell and Simon (1972) includes moments of
“functional fixity, the Einstellung effect, insight, incubation” (Newell & Si-
mon, 1972, page 872). They explain this phenomenon as working-backwards:
In some cases problem solvers who have hit an impasse, apply transforma-
tive steps away from the goal state to reach branch in the spanning tree
representation from which the goal is easier to reach. They account this
as a potential double function of an expression and a related functional
fixity, but provide no speculation on why some of the participants are able
to resolve the situation while other can not. Interestingly the verbal pro-
tocols of some of the participants in the experiment suggest affective Aha
moments for the working-backwards episodes: “No, how can I get that? Ah,
probably by using two lines.” Newell and Simon (1972, page 578).
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2.6.4 Behaviouristic problem solving
In Psychology, the behaviourist approach to problem solving builds on the
idea of trial-and-error and behavioural conditioning. Here a temporary
solution is generated and then checked against the goal constraints. If
the solution is not found, the attempt is repeated with variations of the
temporary solution. Actions that lead to positive feedback and successful
solutions are strengthened and more likely repeated in a similar task. An
experimental approach to study this type of problem solving was intro-
duced by Thorndike (1911). He observed the duration it would take cats
and dogs to escape puzzle boxes to the food placed outside. He developed a
model for the observed times which suggests that the animals initially trig-
gered the opening mechanism by accident. Thorndike explained shorter
times observed for repeated experiments by strengthened associations
between a learned interaction and the received award, and longer times
by weakened associations of experiments in which the test subjects did
not solve the problem. Interestingly Thorndike (1911, page 239) mentions
the “general function of having free ideas”, a phenomenon similar to in-
sight, by referencing an experiment with apes and also relates it to human
problem solving. He hypothesises that a certain state of mind or develop-
ment is needed to experience this phenomenon, a far greater number of
associations than in other mammals and something he seems to equate
with consciousness. Furthermore he explains the generation of these as-
sociations in humans through their “curiosity, and satisfaction at activity,
bodily or mental, for its own sake” (Thorndike, 1911, page 281). While
the satisfaction seems to refer to intrinsic motivation, the exact connota-
tion of curiosity remains unclear. He refers to it as an emotion and names
the useful curiosity as the reason human “discoveries, such as the use of
tools, the art of makeing fire” (Thorndike, 1911, page 151). So while he
is opposing the idea of insight, there are still some aspects of his theory
that he seems to take for granted and does not see a need to explain it in
more detail. Potentially either free will as an emerging phenomenon or
good curiosity could have a notion of the topic of this thesis, the emerging
solution.
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2.7 Creativity
Another concept which is tightly related to insight, and which, just like
insights, has been puzzling researchers for decades, is that of creativity.
As we have seen, insights are inherently associated with creative problem
solving, so let me dedicate some pages to this concept as well.
“Creativity requires both originality and effectiveness”, conclude Runco
and Jaeger (2012) in their ‘Standard Definition of Creativity’ after a read-
ing of the scientific literature back to the 1930s. These two dimensions,
sometimes also labelled novel, unique, or unusual and useful, appropri-
ate, or valuable respectively, are mentioned an repeated throughout the
literature when referring to creativity. Languages in the western world
only started adding the word creativity to the dictionaries in the late 19th
or early 20th century (Weiner, 2000). In fact, most ancient cultures did not
know the concept of creativity. Instead they had concepts such as that of
the muses, inspirational goddesses who would visit eminent people from
time to time and provide them with knowledge and inspiration. Others,
like Plato, heard voices that would hold him back when he was about to
make a mistake. From this occasional visit to selected people, the inspir-
ing divine entity developed into a personal guardian, the genius. Every
person had one, a female Juno or a male Jupiter, that would follow them
from cradle to grave. Developed around the same time as Christianity, this
idea was closely related to the idea of a soul. These geniuses had different
abilities, some of them were stronger, some weaker, but there was noth-
ing humans could do about it. From the 14th century on, the word was
only used for people who had a strong genius, while weaker ones were not
referred to any more. Eminent people like kings and queens, and later
also outstanding clergy, painter, and merchant, would be referred to as
geniuses. By the time of the Renaissance, genius was defined as “the faculty
of invention; by means of which a man is qualified for making new dis-
coveries in sciences, or for producing original works of art” (Gerard, 1774,
page 8), thus apparently unlinking the concept from a purely divine inter-
vention. Shortly afterwards, Kant (1790) situated genius entirely in the
individual, but genius was still considered unteachable knowledge. Con-
sequently, genius defined eminent people, mostly man. Galton’s (1869)
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qualitative study of eminent contemporaries assumed that genius was
hereditary, with intelligence as a necessary prerequisite. This research
shifted the attention from the artefact that geniuses created to the actor
who created it. Historiometric studies have since then found correlates
between perceived genius and intelligence (Batey & Furnham, 2006; Cat-
tell, 1903), mental illness (J. C. Kaufman, 2014), personality (Eysenck, 1993),
talent (Ackerman, 2014), genes (Reuter, Roth, Holve, & Hennig, 2006) and
other traits. In addition, and through the writing of eminent creators such
as Helmholtz, Kekulé, Einstein, Freud, and Picasso, cognitive processes
and the actions generating the artefacts have become of interest. Here the
psychological study of insight as part of productive thinking began in the
Gestalt School, but other psychologists became interested as well. This is
also the time when the term creativity was coined as an interdisciplinary
term to describe similarities between artistic and scientific creation. A
pivotal moment for creativity research was the presidential address of
J. P. Guilford (1950) to the American Psychological Association, where he
inspired his colleagues to systematically research creativity. In the follow-
ing two decades, the ratio of literature on creativity increased from less
than 2‰to up to 7‰(J. P. Guilford, 1970).
2.7.1 Classification of creativity
About five years after J. P. Guilford’s presidential address to focus on the
research of creativity, Rhodes set out to find a definition of creativity.
From about 300 articles he collected 40 definitions. After further analysis
of their content, he identified four different strands, which he called the
“four P’s of creativity”: person, process, press, and product. He notes that
“each strand has unique identity academically, but only in unity do the
four strands operate functionally” (Rhodes, 1961, page 307).
The first strand on the person observes personality traits, attitudes, phys-
iological, and psychological factors’ influence on creativity. It discusses
intelligence as an enabler, the identification of gifted people, the ability
to be puzzled and think critically and the will to persistently stay with
a problem. The second strand on the processmentions the descriptions
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of thought processes mentioned by von Helmholtz and Wallas, but at the
same time it implicitly references the historical dimensions. This leads
to the research on the relationship between individuals and their envi-
ronment, which is grouped into the third strand, what Rhodes calls press.
He mentions that creativity can be seen as a response to social needs, but
at the same it builds on previous cultural and technological advances. In
addition to the cultural dimension and its Zeitgeist, the press potentially
also refers to the broader evolutionary aspects as well as the influence of
the very local place. In fact, in some later literature, press was replaced
with place. Finally, research on the product refers to materialised ideas and
tangible outcomes. Rhodes (1961) hypothesises that objective research
on the creative process proceeds in one direction, from the product to
person, to process, to press. In this framework, research about the Eureka
moment might be considered to be part of the strand about the product,
the process, and possibly the press: the product has come into existence at
some time, possibly through a Eureka moment. Research on the process of
creativity potentially also looks at Eureka moments. Finally, as broadly as
Rhodes conceptualises the press, cues and changes of and in the environ-
ment relate to Eureka moments. However, their nature is such that each of
the threementioned strands could also be argued to have no connection to
the Eureka moment: the product as the materialisaton of an idea does not
necessarily need to depend on a Eureka moment, in fact judges might not
be able to distinguish between Eureka and non-Eureka products. Similarly
concrete implementations of the process might or might not rely on a
Studies on the Eureka moment, for example some assessments of the Re-
mote Associate Task (Mednick, 1962), rely on self-reports whether or not
Eureka moments were part of the process. Finally, the press can be seen
primarily as either a rather static place, or as an interactive environment
potentially triggering a Eureka moment. Thus, the distinction offered by
Rhodes (1961), even though helpful and influential for research on creativ-
ity, is not particularly useful for a discussion of Eureka moments.
Simonton (1988), without directly referencing Rhodes (1961), identifies
four ‘P’ in research on creativity as well, namely process, product, person,
and persuasion. While the first three categories show a great overlap with
the strands identified by Rhodes (1961), Simonton as a social psychologist
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focuses primarily on the influence of creative achievement on other people.
Persuation, the influence on other people, suggests that some results
trigger ideas in other cases of creativity. While this seems to suggest a
stronger focus on Eureka moments, persuasion remains ambiguous and
Simonton’s distinction is not much more helpful for research on Eureka
moments.
Runco (2007)mentions creative potential as yet another distinguishable ‘P’.
Consequently he argues that the model by Rhodes (1961) is too simplistic
to account for the increasingly complex research on creativity. Runco
suggests a hierarchywith at least three levels to reflect the state of research.
Following this idea, themost basic distinction is between creative potential
and creative performance. In this setup ‘person’, ‘process’, and ‘press’ are
part of the potential, while ‘products’, ‘persuation’ and ‘interactions’ —
for example between person and environment — are suggested to be part
of the performance side of creativity. Within the educational context of
this article, Runco (2007) suggests that this hierarchy helps to identify
what facilitates everyone’s creativity. Instead, elements that are part of
the creative performance manifests creativity that is already there. The
top level distinction between potential and performance as suggested
by Runco (2007) separates seemingly static categories from the dynamic
aspects. In this classification, the ‘interaction’ can be understood as the
influence between person and process, or process and press at a certain
time, hence it separates the research of an applied and dynamic process
from the static idea of how a process could influence creativity. As a result,
the meaning of ‘process’ changes as compared to the use of Rhodes (1961),
and press gets further divided into the possibility a place and environment
offers versus the research on the actual ‘interaction’. The distinction
suggested by Runco (2007) offers more possibilities to classify research on
Eureka moments: from his interpretation, they are primarily related to
the performance part.
In an attempt to “incorporate insights from a series of emerging inter- or
multidisciplinary areas”, Glăveanu (2013, page 70) suggests a framework
of five A” instead: actor, action, artifact, audience, and affordances. This
model is different from Rhodes’s (1961) P models. First of all, it shifts
the focus on the individual from traits of a single person to attributes
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within a societal context, and from the attempt to describe the features
of a product to its appreciation in a cultural context. Also, instead of
cognitive processes, Glăveanu (2013) suggests a focus on psychological
and behavioural manifestation of actions, and distinguishes between the
audience and the affordances of the press: while the interaction with
an audience can be dynamic and unexpected by nature, affordances as a
property of the physical world are predictable by nature. The changed
emphasis on aspects of creativity also shifts the attention towards Eureka
moments: while research on actors, artifacts, and affordances because of
their static nature are less likely to yield results regarding Eurekamoments,
the emphasis of behavioural action and the audience interaction indicates
a stronger emphasis on temporal aspects, and hence the potential to be
interesting for research on the Eureka moment.
2.7.2 The Democratisation of Creativity
Not every creative process or creative product is the same, some are novel
and useful just for a single person, others might change the world. Boden
(1994) uses the terms P-creativity and H-creativity to distinguish between
the two. She defines the psychological or personal P-creativity as “new
to the person who comes up with it” (emphasis in original) and writes “if a
new idea is H-creative, that means that (so far as we know) no one else
had it before” (Boden, 2004, page 2). This is related to the distinction be-
tween originality as a psychological concept and novelty as a historical fact,
as discussed by Koestler (1964). Taking into account that the attribution
of discoveries changes over time and based on new discoveries by science
historians, she concludes that there “can be no systematic explanation of
H-creativity, no theory that explains all and only H-creative ideas” (Boden,
1994, page 521). In addition to that and taking into account that other
worlds like ours might exist in the universe, there will never be any cer-
tainty, if not that another life form on another planet might have had the
same ideas millennia ago. Nevertheless, each H-creative idea is P-creative
as well. Hence the exploration of P-creativity will also account for the
processes responsible for H-creativity. Consequently, the Eureka moments
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that have been preserved as anecdotal reports might have changed sci-
ence or the arts, but foremost they are also psychological and personal
experiences of an individual. Therefore these moments of discovery are
similarly part of the creative process of a child in Kindergarten discover-
ing cohesion of wet sand and consequently using it to build castles, of a
restaurant chef trying a new combination of spices for a dish, as well as of
Archimedes’ discovery of the specific gravity of things or law of Buoyancy
(Hidetaka, 2010).
A similar distinction has been made between the study of extraordinary
creative accomplishments and everyday creativity, called Big-C and little-c.
Big-C is often seen as the result of an ability to create that has been build
up over years of practice and devotion. This line of research on eminent
creativity is closely connected to the idea of genius, further discussed in
section 2.7. Little-c, or mundane creativity, on the other hand focuses
on everyday creativity, on the ability to creatively solve problems, the
potential of nurturing creativity in educational settings, and the impact
of creativity on today’s society. The category of little-c allows to account
for artistic artwork that cannot compete with Salvador Dalí or Cormac
McCarthy, it allows to define work environments that foster higher quality
design output, and contributes to solving increasingly complex real world
problems.
With the argument that little-c captures too broad a range of creative pro-
cesses, Beghetto and Kaufman (2007) suggested mini-c as a third category
related to the construction of personal knowledge and learning. J. C. Kauf-
man and Beghetto (2009) suggested a fourth category of pro-c, the kind
of creativity people are trained to use in a certain discipline throughout
their work. Building on the componential framework by Amabile (1983),
who mentions domain-relevant skills as one of three necessary compo-
nents, they argue that a long and in-depth training in a certain discipline
results in a distinguishable creativity. This fourth C of the “four C model
of creativity” is not as eminent as the Big-C, but the laypeople’s everyday
little-c and developmental mini-c are still significantly different. J. C. Kauf-
man and Beghetto (2009) argue, that some of the factors that differentiate
between pro-c and Big-C are acknowledgement by peers and gatekeep-
ers. Even though evidence has been found for the hypothesis that long
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training and engagement increases the production of artistic output (S. B.
Kaufman & Kaufman, 2007), J. C. Kaufman and Beghetto (2013) failed to
show that laypeople recognise the difference between little-c and pro-c.
In the four c model of creativity, each of the three or four types of cre-
ativity have the same personal or psychological moment when they solve
the problem at hand, have an idea, or understand the solution. For the
child having a mini-c in the sandbox at the kindergarten this moment
happens when they realise that the difference between the sticking sand
and the non-sticking one is the amount of water. In little-c any time a
problem is solved creatively, someone didn’t know how to solve it at one
moment and suddenly understood the solution at another one. For pro-
c the professional working on an assignment suddenly finds a solution
that works. And even if one solution turns out to be considered Big-C at
some point, someone must have had the same idea previously, at a lower
level. The argument is very similar to the one that every historic creativity
(h-creativity) relies on a personal creativity (p-creativity). Even if there
are different types of creativity and people might or might not be able
to distinguish between them, they all have this moment of creation, the
Eureka moment, at its core.
2.7.3 Innovation
Innovation is the implementation of creative ideas. The term is primarily
used to describe the creative processes in organisations (Amabile, 1988)
or creative artefacts (Weisberg, 2006). Further, the term is starting to
gain exposure in STEAM research groups, in the compound term Cognitive
Innovation. Cognitive Innovation describes a transdisciplinary approach to
research and is being researched through this process itself (Kristensen
et al., 2017). However, in the context of this work I refer to innovation as
“implemented creativity”.
79
2 Staking a claim: An excavation in the literature
2.7.4 Linear creative processes: Sequential models of
creativity
Todescribe the creative process and its components, psychologists predom-
inantly use a linear sequence of predefined stages. One of the oldest and
best known models was published by Wallas (1926). Inspired by the writ-
ings of von Helmholtz (1896) and Poincaré (1910), he developed a model of
creativity that consists of five consecutive stages. He referred to them as
preparation, incubation, intimation, illumination, and verification. Often only
four stages are referred to and intimation is dropped, even though the rea-
son is not apparent from the original text (Sadler-Smith, 2015). Once a
problem is defined, the process starts with the initial stage, preparation.
Here the prospective problem solver investigates the problem in all direc-
tions and accumulates as much intellectual ressources as possible that will
help to solve the problem. At some point, and if the problem is not solved,
then the person enters the second stage coined incubation. During this
time no conscious effort is directed towards the problem. Moreover peo-
ple might work on other problems or focus on different tasks altogether.
During this stage, thoughts connected to the initial problem might invol-
untary pop up at unforseen times, but progress is not discernible. At some
point, a feeling of a rising thought starts and becomes stronger over time,
which corresponds to the intimation phase. Then, and often described as
sudden, a solution to the problem appears during the phase of illumination.
Here, some elements from the preparation ‘click’ together and create the
insight that was previously defined in section 2.2.2 and is in the center of
interest for this thesis. At this point the problem solver might have the
feeling that the solution is correct, but the phase of insight is too short to
verify potentially complex problems. This is done in the verification phase,
which is the last part in Wallas’s (1926) model.
Many other sequential models have been developed to highlight different
aspects of the process or explain experimental data. In some cases the
model starts earlier in the process with the problem finding phase, in other
cases an additional phase of communication is added after the verification
(Csikszentmihalyi, 2009). In yet other cases the process is subdivided into
different parts and different numbers of parts. Howard, Culley, and Dekon-
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Preparation Incubation Intimation Illumination Verification
time
Figure 2.3: Example for a sequential model of creativity, based on Wallas
(1926)
inck (2008) provides an overview of 19 different sequential models. The
majority of these models have a phase or transition in which the prospec-
tive problem solver passes from not knowing to knowing the answer to a
problem. For the discussion of the phenomenon of emerging solutions it
does therefore not matter which model to use. Becaues Wallas’s (1926) is
probably the best known one and the description of the phases are intu-
itive to understand, I use this model as a placeholder for other sequential
models throughout this work.
2.7.5 Design thinking
There is another angle to look at the story about Archimedes and his
Eureka moment: the oldest known source for this anecdote is a book about
Architecture, written about 200 years after Archimedes had lived(Pollio,
15/1914). This implies that Architects have been interested in the problem
solving process for a long time. Given the nature of their work, they
seemmore interested in understanding the creative process for pragmatic
reasons: the ability to influence the quality of solutions, as well as the
timing of solving a problem, is crucial to their work. Not surprisingly,
the theory of creative problem solving and how to foster solutions in
time have been part of the education of Architects for a long time. Other
professions that have been facing similar problems, such as Designers and
Engineers, have developed a similar understanding and integrated certain
techniques in their practice, which are often grounded in experience and
taught through anecdotes.
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Figure 2.4: rational design process by Herbert Alexander Simon (1969) and
action-centred design process taken fromMeinel, Leifer, and
Plattner (2011)
Since the 1960s, more theoretical approaches have been developed. Simon
andNewell, two cognitive scientists, developed a theory of human problem
solving which shows many connections, in theory, and in regards to the
general approach, with Artificial Intelligence (AI) (Newell et al., 1958;
Newell & Simon, 1972). In 1969, Simon proposed an interactive approach
to problem solving called Design Thinking, which consisted of the seven
phases define, research, ideate, prototype, choose, implement, and learn (Herbert
Alexander Simon, 1969). In thismodel problem solvers attempt to optimize
a solution towards a set of given constraints by iterating through these
stages and until the problem is solved. This plan-driven and incremental
process is distinguished from the sequential model by its iterative approach
– the problem is not necessarily solved after the first cycle but is being
worked out by repeating the cycle several times. However, this model,
called the rational model, lacks empirical support and has been criticised
for not providing an explanation for how people creatively solve problems,
for example in design (Ralph, 2010). In order to solve this problem, a
number of variations to this model have been developed fewer or more
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steps. Another approach to the design process is known as an action-
centric model, which (Meinel, Leifer, & Plattner, 2011) describes. In this
model the order of stages is undefined and the process is regarded as
improvised and unforeseeable. This assumption is based on the empirical
and anecdotal evidence that participants report actions that can be tied
to one of the stages in a seemingly random order.
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The oldest surviving text about Eureka moments, the famous story with
Archimedes jumping out of a bath, is from an Architecture textbook (Pollio,
15/1914). In a time when book space was rare and expensive, the Roman
Architect who wrote down the story gave the anecdote a fair amount of
space in his seminal work. The book itself is concerned with many aspects
of Architecture, including the technical ones. So why did Pollio dedicate
so much space to a Mathematician pondering about the volume of an irreg-
ular shape? Especially since Archimedes had lived about 200 years earlier?
While we cannot know the reason behind Pollio’s lengthy account, the
fact stands that this anecdote illustrates the process of creative problem-
solving. It includes the original preparation for the problem and mentions
that at a certain point Archimedes hit an impasse which he did not know
how to overcome. Suddenly and unexpectedly, Archimedes found the solu-
tion. His joy at this discovery is described in so much detail 200 years after
its occurrence, that most likely the author of the book was no stranger
to the phenomenon himself. Since Galileo Galilei, scientists have been
discussing whether Archimedes could have solved the problem in the de-
scribed way (Hidetaka, 2016). However, Pollio’s (15/1914) detailed descrip-
tion and the amount of space in his book dedicated to the anecdote sug-
gests that he studied creative problem-solving as a vital part of architects’
skills. The story is written in an encouraging and memorable way and
gives confidence to prospective problem solvers to stay motivated even
if a solution is not found at first. In short, this text might not depict the
insight of Archimedes, but instead intends to teach Architecture students
how to solve problems. Since then, pedagogy in general and the education
of Architects has evolved, but it still draws from Archimedes’ anecdote as
an analogy (K. S. Smith et al., 2013). More than 2000 years later, I want to
learn how Architecture students solve problems nowadays. If emerging
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solutions or insightswere an accepted or even suggested way to solve prob-
lems a long time ago, is that still the case with today’s education? How do
architects solve problems?
Architects are an interesting cohort to study insight and the Eureka experi-
ence. Besides the historic account mentioned above, their problems are
‘truly ill-defined’ according to the classification mentioned in section 2.6.2:
The goal they want to reach, often some kind of building, is unknown to
them at the beginning. A set of constraints might be given to them or they
define them early on during the task, but the finals solution is unknown
to them at the beginning. During their education, they receive training
on how to reach these ill-defined solutions, but the path itself is often ill-
defined as well. Since Herbert Alexander Simon (1969)design thinking is
used as a description of the process, but in their introduction Meinel et al.
(2011, page xiv) suggest, that an ill-defined model of the process is closer
to reality. Finally, the architects themselves can not judge how close to
the solution they are, there is no metric to describe the distance between
the current suggestion and the ideal product – they are local judges. In-
terestingly, the work of architects is considered to be somewhere at the
boundary between natural sciences, arts, and social sciences. Neverthe-
less, approaching the Architects work with the terminology of Psychology
introduced by Joy Paul Guilford (1967), their process could possibly be
described with the terms divergent and convergent thinking: they create
many potential solutions but end up at one single product. This product is
also ‘creative’ as defined in section 2.7: it is novel within the context the
building was designed, and it is useful by providing some kind of function.
In summary, this suggests that the architects’ process of creating might
include some insights, and the architects potentially experience Eureka.
To gain a better understanding of the creative process of architects, I
conducted 14 interviewswith Architecture students, one group in 2015 and
a second one in 2017. I asked them to tell me about their process when they
engage in their task. From reviewing the literature, I already knew that
the rare and fleeting subjective experience I am interested in comes with
different names. In section 2.2 I discuss some of the names previously used
in the scientific literature, such as Eureka experience, insight, and illumination.
Even though the term Eureka originated in the Architecture literature, I was
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mostly aware of uses within the Cognitive Sciences. I could have based my
research on one of the existing terms, but the theoretical underpinning,
as well as accompanying phenomena are not well defined, as highlighted
in section 2.4. Measures of surprise, restructuring, correctness, or any of the
other elements discussed earlier in section 2.4.3 might or might not be
directly related to the moment when solutions emerge. To avoid bias, for
example through an availability cascade, I was interested in accounts of
these experiences without defining them first. The observation of creative
practitioners such as architects seemed to be a feasible approach to collect
this kind of information.
Architecture, as “the art or practice of designing and constructing build-
ings” (“Architecture”, 2018), often starts with a task to provide some utility
or function. This function could be a shelter for a number of people, safety
for certain activities, or any other function a human-made structure can
provide. In this case, the initial question or task does not imply conver-
gence towards a single solution. Rather, defining the problem and identi-
fying a potential set of solutions are characteristics of these ill-structured
problems, as discussed in section 2.6.2. For instance, even from a purely
experiential point of view, we know that there are many different solu-
tions to the problem of providing shelter for a family. While there is not a
single answer, there are also many different ways to approach the prob-
lem, for example talking to the client, examining the local surroundings,
assessing the financial backing of the project, and so on. Herbert A. Simon
(1973, page 187) in his definition of well-structured and ill-structured prob-
lems, stated that the activities of “Designing a house […] lie towards the
ill-structured end of the problem continuum”. These types of ambiguous
problems often require greater cognitive effort (Hocking & Vernon, 2017).
The mentioned anecdotal reports, as well as the theoretical features of the
task thus suggest that practitioners of Architecture experience moments
when solutions emerge.
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3.1 Background
The moment solutions emerge is considered to be a non-repeatable, rare,
and fleeting phenomenon. To capture and analyse these events I consid-
ered several types of analysis. To minimize the intervention during the
process, I decided to start with qualitative interviews with students of
Architecture at the University of Plymouth. I did not want to bias the
interviewees with preconceptions about the nature of insights or Eureka
moments but was instead interested in the validity of the answers based on
their personal experience, and the depth of answers. Therefore, I decided
to use unstructured interviews.
To analyse this data, I intended to borrow from Grounded Theory, which
was developed to analyse interviewswith dyingpeople, also a non-repeatable
event (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). As opposed to the original method, which
is based on the experience of the researcher in the environment, I audio
recorded all conversations. The intention was to reduce possible listening
errors to a minimum. The full transcriptions of these recordings can be
found in appendix 1.
After I had conducted the initial interviews with the Architecture students,
Sawyer gave a presentation at a CogNovo research seminar in May 2015,
where he talked about the creative process of artists. During the talk and
the following conversation, it became clear that Sawyer had used a similar
approach to develop a model of the creative process. He later published
a slightly different analysis (Sawyer, 2016). Following the talk, I decided
to analyse my data in the same way, to obtain comparable results. In this
section, I introduce the emergent model Sawyer developed, as I will use it
as a basis for my analysis.
3.1.1 Keith Sawyer’s emergent model of creative
problem-solving
In his talk How Artists Create, as well as his paper, Sawyer (2016) referred
to two different models to explain the creative process. He introduced
87
3 Real World Creativity
Wallas’s (1926) sequential model of creativity and compared it with design
thinking (Herbert Alexander Simon, 1996). These models have previously
been introduced in section 2.7.4 and section 2.7.5. Based on the interviews
he had conducted with 9 Master of Fine Art (MFA) students from two
different universities, he wanted to test which of the two models would
better represent the long-term creativity of Art students during the course
of a year.
In his paper, Sawyer (2016, page 6) provides four prompts he used in the
interviews: “• Where did you get your idea to do this kind of work? • How
did you come to this line of work? How did you come to be doing the work
you are doing now? • Did you have the idea before you started the MFA
program? • Is there a theory behind your work?”. Sawyer recorded the in-
terviews and later transcribed them. The parts of the text referring to the
same content were then grouped into meaning units of a length between
one and five sentences. In an initial round of reading all the interviews, he
assigned short descriptions to eachmeaning unit and created a narrative
from these descriptions. Based on the extracted descriptions and narra-
tives, Sawyer (2016, page 7) developed a “set of theoretical categories that
appeared in at least two of the interviews”, about 22% of his sample size.
In the next step, he assigned these emergent categories to the meaning units
of each interview. At the same time, he tested whether the categories
could be collapsed, and he changed them again. The talk he gave at Cog-
Novo must have taken place before this change because the categories he
presented there were different. He then counted how many interviewees
mentioned each of the categories.
Emergent categories for MFA students
The following list shows the emergent categories used in Sawyer (2016),
followed by the number of artists who mentioned them. The numbers in
red show the count presented in Plymouth, presumably before the final
changes in categories. Also, the category Changewas not part of the earlier
analysis, while Thesis was. The somewhat blurry boundary between Thesis
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and Body of work might have been Sawyer’s (2016, page ) motivation to
“collapse [them] into a single category”.
1. Materials — when students talked about the materials used in their
creations. (8/9 mentions)
2. Experimentation — talking about artworks no one has ever seen,
which are only part of the creation process (9/9)
3. Accidents — events that happened in the extended environment
(6/9 4/9)
4. Intuition — description of how artists decide to pursue a creative
path (8/9)
5. Originality — when artists talked about the absence of novelty and
creativity (5/9 7/9)
6. Emergence — when students talked about work that unfolded from
the process (7/9)
7. Iteration — description of a cyclic process moving forward in small
steps (9/9)
8. Mismatch — differences between ideas and work (8/9)
9. Exploration — when students did not really know why they were
doing certain things (8/9)
10. Body of work — creating a series of artworks that are somehow
related (6/9 7/9)
11. Change — evolution of work over time (8/9)
12. Thesis — the outcome of their work (7/9)
Connections between categories for MFA students
In addition to these categories, Sawyer discovered connections between
categories by looking at which categories werementioned within the same
meaning unit. There are two different versions of these connections, one
from the talk given at Plymouth and one from the publication.
In the Plymouth presentation, at least eight of the categories were con-
nected. These connections are visualised in fig. 3.1. A connection between
two categories means that at least one person was mentioning them next
to each other. For example, one artist might have talked about the iterative
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Figure 3.1: Connections between emergent categories as presented by
Sawyer during his talk at Plymouth
process right after he talked about a mismatch; another one might have
talked about themismatch after shementioned something in regards to the
exploration category, and so on. Even more of interest could be the missing
connections, for example between materials and emergence.
The connections presented in Sawyer’s (2016) publication are slightly dif-
ferent, as shown in fig. 3.2. The additional step in the analysis changed
which of the emergent categories are connected. For example, the previ-
ously unconnected materials and emergence are now linked, but mismatch
and iteration are not anymore. Without discussing these changes too much
in detail, it is interesting to note how the change of one category resulted
in a different model regarding the connections. This suggests that the con-
nections between emergent categories are not very stable. This further
suggests that these connections are not a strong parameter to describe
the created model.
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Figure 3.2: Connections between emergent categories as shown in Sawyer
(2016)
The role of insight in Keith Sawyer’s model
In his talk, Sawyer claimed that the categories could not be matched on
the sequential model of creativity, but rather they have to follow the design
thinking approach. This core finding is also reflected in Sawyer’s (2016,
page 16) publication, specificallywhere he states “there is no evidence for a
linear sequence of stages”. Secondly, Sawyer (2016, page 17) rejects the idea
of insight based on the observation that none of his interviewees reported
a single moment that “lead to the thesis body of work”. Thirdly, the
emergent category originality in his study relates to meaning units in which
the artists mentioned the absence of creativity. Consequently, Sawyer
suggests that the artists are not concerned with creativity.
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3.2 Method
Sawyer (2016) identified three different aspects of an emergent theory: the
number of emergent categories per participant, the connections between
the emergent categories, and the number of participants per emergent
category across the whole sample.
The analysis of the interviews follows the emergent model developed by
Sawyer and previously explained in section 3.1.1. To verify the model I use
coding, a technique developed for the Grounded Theory, but independent
of this approach, as summarised by Gläser and Laudel (2013).
To have a comparable dataset, interviews of the same duration as those
conducted by Sawyer (2016) would be required. The interviews I con-
ducted with architects lasted between 20minutes and 70minutes, notably
shorter than the 60minutes to 120minutes interviews by Sawyer (2016).
However, the exact length of his interviews is not known, it is therefore
not possible to assess the categories per time unit or number of words. It
would not take into account the order in which questions were asked, in
which interviewees structured their answers in general, and other differ-
ences between the two studies. Consequently, a comparison between the
total number of meaning units containing an emergent category would not
provide meaningful information.
I have previously presented the nature of the connections before and after
the final step of Sawyer’s (2016) analysis. While the exact difference in the
analytic step is missing, the description suggests only minimal changes
regarding one or two emergent categories. The changes that can be ob-
served in the connections in fig. 3.1 and fig. 3.2 instead show significant
differences. Some connections that had existed before vanished, while
new links appeared. This suggests that the connections are not a very
stable or distinctive feature of the model. Comparing it to the connections
drawn from yet another sample would most likely not be useful. Further-
more, an interpretation of these changes would be elusive.
Finally, the number of participants that mention an emergent category
can be extracted from both data sets. None of the studies had a time limit,
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which suggests that the conversations went on until the interviewees
said everything they wanted or the posed questions prompted them to
respond. For example, if they mentioned iteration in both cases, this would
suggest that it plays an important role in these cases. If something was not
mentioned during the interview, it might have been of lower importance
for the creative process. The number of participants, or rather the number
of participants who mentioned a certain category, should provide some
ideas about which categories were less or more important.
3.2.1 Participants
Fourteen interviews were conducted in the years 2015 and 2017 with
second and third-year students from an Architecture project-based tu-
torial. The first six interviewees in 2015 were selected by the tutor of
the course. The tutor selected the students based on their performance,
identifying the ones who could reflect on their creative process better.
Three of the students were second-year students; three were third-year
students. The interviews took place right after I introduced myself to the
group of selected students. During each interview, the student, myself,
and Katharine, a lecturer in Architecture from my supervisory team, were
present. Katharine’s role was to facilitate the interview by providing a
common language, for example by explaining the design process and de-
scribing technical terms.
The recruitment process for the interviews that took place in 2017 was dif-
ferent: I went to the tutorial, introduced myself as a researcher interested
in the process of creative production, and asked students to volunteer to
participate in some interviews by giving me their email address. Over
the following weeks, I contacted the ones who gave it to me and arranged
meetings. In these interviews only the student and I were present. Out of
the 38 initial contacts, seven interviews were conducted.
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3.2.2 Interviews
The interviews were conducted as unstructured interviews. This form in-
tended to mimic everyday conversations and therefore reduce any power
imbalance between the interviewer and the interviewee. Besides, the in-
terviews were conducted in settings that were meant to make the students
feel comfortable. With the consent of the interviewees, the conversations
were recorded onmobile audio recorders. In 2015 the interviews took place
in a visually separated space in the studio as this was familiar and comfort-
able for them. As a result of the interviews taking place in a more natural
environment, only four of the seven recordings could be transcribed due
to technical issues and noise levels. As a consequence, the interviews in
2017 were moved to a quiet place in an on-campus cafeteria, which still
provided a natural and comfortable environment for the students.
The questions were posed in an open-ended form. The opening question
was intended to frame the whole conversation by asking the students
“how do you create?” Subsequent probes were used to encourage the
interviewees to talk about their processes without biasing them towards
answers. During the conversations, I encouraged them with minimal
feedback, such as nodding, ‘mhm’, and ‘m’kay’.
Unstructured interviews have several advantages; however, the following
should also be kept in mind: when they are intended to make the intervie-
wee reflect on a long process, ethnographic interviews are not capable of
collecting all the information about it, nor do they reveal its exact order.
Therefore, not everything the artists and architects experienced might
have been mentioned in the interviews. Looking back at a long period, not
everything might have been mentioned in the right context. Also, men-
tioning something in close approximation to another topic does not nec-
essarily reveal temporal or experiential proximity. All interviews are also
biased by social desirability. In both professions, Arts and Architecture,
the design process is often part of the curriculum and taught as a technique
to be creative. Since more creative practitioners are considered to be more
successful in Arts and Architecture, this creates an attentional bias during
the process, but also a confirmatory bias when reporting the results. Since
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the participants in the study by Sawyer (2016) were able to get their name
and professional websites published in the study, the interviews could be
seen part of the oeuvre itself, as the artists were given a chance to present
themselves desirably.
3.2.3 Architectural terminology
The architects frequently use terms that are familiar to them, but not
necessarily to the reader of the transcripts. The students are part of a
project-based tutorial running over the length of a whole semester. They
have 24-hour access to the studio, which acts as their workspace and often
also as their social space during this time. The tutors are available for ques-
tions during work days and give presentations and conduct exercises about
twice a week. The tutorial consists of several projects or tasks, typically
running for two to three months. At the beginning of each project, the tu-
tors give the students a brief. This brief is given as a talk and students also
receive a print-out. This brief contains information about a location and
a goal to achieve. In 2015 these locations were a neighbourhood around
Exeter Quayside and a harbourside at Plymouth Devonport. In 2017 all stu-
dents worked in a neighbourhood around Plymouth Derry’s Cross. Within
that larger area, students then identify a site they were going to work on.
Some students referred to the whole area introduced in the brief as a site,
others used it specifically for the location of their projects. Within the
tutorial, students work in groups. At the end of the tutorial, each group has
to present their work, consisting of amaster plan for the whole area as well
as individual projects within the area. They are graded for the group work
as well as for individual contributions. For the master plan as well as the
individual sites, students have to develop a programme, which represents
some idea on how the space is going to be used. These programmes need to
answer the questions posed in the brief.
To complete the project, students use different styles of architectural
drawings. Site plans and floor plans show the whole context a building
is situated in or an individual level of a building from above. Often stu-
dents refer to these drawings as plans. Cross sections or sections are vertical
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cuts through a building or site. Elevations are drawings of the façades or
walls of a building, showing, for example, the west elevation of a building. A
projection is a three-dimensional representation of the building, for exam-
ple from an isometric, axiometric, or, in one case, 35 degrees perspective.
In addition, students use models. Physical models are either built from 3D-
printed objects, paper, wood, or cardboard and can be touched and moved
around. Virtual models or digital models are computer-based models using
Computer-aided design (CAD) software such as ArchiCAD, SketchUp, or others.
The students are encouraged to use sketchbooks to communicate visual
aspects with the tutors, clients, and colleagues.
3.2.4 Interviewed architects analysed
From the conducted interviews, I intended to find evidence for the similar-
ity between the creative process of artists (as reported in Sawyer’s (2016)
study) and architects. In the analysis, I followed a similar approach: from
the recorded and transcribed interviews I markedmeaning units. Since I
did not intend to create a new theory but instead wanted to confirm an
existing one, I adapted the emergent categories from Sawyer (2016) and as-
signed them to the meaning units. Since the length of interviews between
the two studies differed, the total number of meaning units were not com-
pared.
3.3 Interview summary
This section examines the conducted interviews individually. In accor-
dance with the ethical guidelines for the study, the names of the partici-
pants have been changed to protect their privacy.
3.3.1 Joshua Watts
Joshua was interviewed first. I started by asking him how he solved prob-
lems. This led to a discussion on how to identify the problem in the first
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place. Starting from an illustrative example, I led him to identify the exact
part that turned this description into a problem, but he could only de-
scribe it as a ‘personal analysis’. Later in the interview, he named the form
of the final presentation as the only constraint. Part of that analysis in-
volves getting a feeling of the site, based on personal experience as well as
studying the history of the site. Following a description of how to get this
feeling, Joshua proceeded to talk about the changes he had planned for the
site and the motivations behind them. I then asked him to elaborate on
these motivations, and he described the goal of the architecture training
to be to test ideas that might not actually ‘be viable in a real world’, but
rather to learn how the ‘design process’ works. He described the whole
process incrementally, as a continuous work developing throughout the
year. Nevertheless, part of this incremental process are occasional ‘clicks’
that spark an idea.
After an initial idea, he described the process as very steadily flowing,
from ‘sketchy designs’ to refined drawings, until the building is complete.
From this point on, the scaling down allows to design some details that
help put different parts together and to understand how all these parts
work in unison. As opposed to a model, drawings are used to describe the
functionality of a house, while the model gives an understanding of how it
will look at the end. Even though he personally disliked models in the past,
he admitted that they work better for communicating an idea to others.
He even got to consider models as useful tools for his work, comparing
them to ‘still frames’.
3.3.2 Ewan Palmer
Ewan quickly identified the problems he had to solve as the ones assigned
during the tutorial. He gave the example of a ‘1500 square metre building
that has to have at least two floors. Starting from this, he tried to inter-
nalise the problem (‘try to think’) before he started drawing everything
out on paper. This was followed by an iterative process of refining the
drawings and plans. Asked about the initial inspiration, he talked about
the surroundings and the initial visit to the site, but also about how other
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memories seemed to play an important role. The older the memories were,
the less likely he was to quote them as an inspirational source.
Ewan had been working on the Exeter quay. His main idea was to assess
safety concerns and to integrate the site into the city. He was looking
at the positive and negative aspects of ‘stitching things back together’
and its implications for gentrification and other social issues. Rather than
designing the building itself, he tried to face the problem on the social level
by enabling residents of that area to amplify their agency and influence on
the architects and designers who were physically shaping their city. The
main problem he identified was that the city was not verbalised in a way
that was focused on the inhabitants; instead of buildings, he was trying to
foster connections between people in different roles.
He admitted that the process was not a smooth experience. He described
it as progressing in jumps and plateaus. On a plateau, he would try to sort
things out in details but then, all of a sudden, a jump to the next ‘plateau’
would happen. He recognised the plateaus as a necessary aspect of the
‘making process’ to ease ideas out of his mind and into the physical world.
He also believed that he had to find the rightmedium to be able tomake the
next jump. The most important step in solving a specific, smaller problem
in his work seemed to be identifying the right medium. He claimed that
the right medium could only be identified afterwards, once he found the
solution using it. When the right solution appeared, it was accompanied
by a feeling. He recognised that a solution might be different for everyone
trying to solve the problem. So the solution is not inherent, it is rather its
perception that makes it the right solution at the right time. Even though
the process was described as a crucial part of the solution, Ewan always
tried to use the medium which he thought would be most likely to reveal
the solution.
When asked about working in groups, he answered that for himworking in
bigger groups was more interesting, although the smaller the groups are,
the easier it is to solve problems; stemming from this, working individually
made it easiest to solve problems.
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3.3.3 Alex Wells
Asked what might be a problem in architecture, Alex answered that he
did not recognise a problem at the beginning of a project. He described
this very subjective process as looking for ‘a quality which is uncertain’, as
identifying and highlighting a potential problem. This uncertain quality
could be anything in a community or landscape, something that is almost
intuitively recognised by the architect. According to Alex, this recognition
could present itself in two ways, which he calls ‘through inspection’ and
‘back to nothing’. ‘Through inspection’ seemed to relate to an incremental,
analytical approach, which he called ‘juggling’.
Asked about the second approach, the ‘back to nothing’, he elaborated
that it involved him being stuck and then ‘accidentally’ receiving external
input that would showhim a different perspective on the project. He called
it ‘pure coincidence’, an example of which could be talking to someone.
He admitted that this happened rarely and only if he got trapped in a dead
end. His normal process seemed to be the juggling one, where he played
around with different ideas and processes until the problems were solved.
During this juggling, an accident might still occur – in which case he would
exclusively work on the accidental idea.
The juggling process seemed to be quite frustrating and not as rewarding
as the accidental approach. But since he knew the nature of that process,
he accepted it. He would change the medium and the object of his work
frequently, and each of these switches would lead to something new and
unexpected. Working on only one medium or object was quite frustrating
for him, since he was conscious about the discursiveness of his current
work as well as the amount of time and effort it took; instead, changes to
thework processwerewelcomed, since thesemeant a change in the project
and medium as well. Overall, this process was described as progressive
and iterative.
Accidents were more rewarding, but they only happened a few times a
year. These accidents weremostly triggered by outside events, like reading
or watching something unexpected. He gave an example for this from
the previous year, when he went to a lecture that was not connected to
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his current work but that allowed him to see, all of a sudden, the solution
for one of the problems he was engaged with. He ‘saw all the floors in
my design at the same moment’, but it took him a few months to get
back to the idea and verify it. However, he considered this example to be
rather small. As a large scale example, he described a coincidence that
happened to some architects and a big company. In this anecdote, the
architects designed a building that was by accident formed like an Asian
letter symbol.
Alex described the change of medium as a helpful tool, similar to translat-
ing something between different languages. Each of these ‘translations’
might help to find or identify a problem. Besides models, drawings, and
computer tools hementioned ‘writing about the space’ as anothermedium.
Whenever he did not have a clear vision of where to go, he would start
‘working’ by making drawings, models, and talk to people. However, he
was not certain about the ‘hierarchy’ of the flow of work. This flow or
process was the real knowledge that he acquired through practice. He
believed that education and upbringing would influence the work as well.
Regarding inspiration, he would try to get it from other people – not nec-
essarily professionals in the field, also people coming from outside the
area, who would sometimes be even more efficient and enjoyable.
At this point, Katharine shifted the conversation back to the process and
the skills required to complete a full process. She alsomentioned that there
are differences between individuals and the processes they go through.
Alex agreed. According to Alex, the tutors played the same role as the
laypeople he could potentially speak to. He also acknowledged that they
pushed himoutside of his comfort zone andmade him think in newways.
3.3.4 Kiera Stanley
Asked about the problem-solving process, Kiera described it as follows:
since the problem is not tangible, shewould build on an inspiration that she
got from somewhere else. She described this inspiration as a motivation
to work on the project for a while until she hit ‘the next wall’. Then
she entered a phase of constantly thinking about the project, which led
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to generating a large number of ideas. Once she had these ideas, she
concentrated on expressing them on paper. The idea generation could be
accelerated by working out, by running somewhere random or even by
visiting the site she was working on – but without consciously thinking
about the problem. Regarding the site, she was working on bringing some
meaning into it. Therefore, Kiera thought that a good idea was worthmore
than having just a good design.
Kiera considered the ‘meaning’ she wanted to bring back to the site as
something personal, which would give another reason for people to visit
the site other than its pure functionality, something that would spark local
interest. History was another inspirational source for her, and she tried to
reconnect the space with its past. She also drew from ideas she developed
in previous years and saw the problems as a possibility to increase her
own skill set. Regarding her skills, she talked about different stages that
she could reach.
Kiera assumed that building her skill set would also help her generating
ideas since she would eventually become quicker at presenting concepts
and taking notes of ideas that would emerge during conversations. This
was especially helpful since she considered time and deadlines to be the
main constraint within the tutorial. On the other hand, she claimed that
deadlines helped her to generate more ideas: with a deadline approaching,
shewould prototype several ideas and select one to followup. The selection
of the best idea was made with the help of other people and by taking
different perspectives. Therefore, working in a group helped her to arrive
faster at the results since she was quicker in selecting better ideas. Groups
of professionals seemed to be more helpful for her than laypeople.
3.3.5 Lewis Vaughan
The interview with Lewis started by asking him about his creative process,
but he immediately responded that he might be one of the worst exam-
ples of it. He explained that he suffered from anxiety and stress at the
early stages of the process, that he would often jump between different
suggested stages of the design process, and he would finish the work just
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before the deadline. With a background in Graphic Communication and
Art, he emphasised the creative aspect of his work, as opposed to having a
neatly organised sketchbook that communicated it. He depicted himself
as a ‘Mad-Hatter’ regarding his work style, scribbling and drafting many
ideas and understanding the problem through this process. He could not
identify the source of his ideas but used the metaphor of bubbles that grow
until they suddenly burst. Lewis thought that, particularly during abstract
work, supposed accidents are often and at distinct moments identified as
useful contributions to a design. Good and bad ideas are identified through
a feeling rather than a defined test.
He believed that understanding a site and a problem relies on personal
experience and individual engagement with the task. As an example,
he suggested that his parents’ house would probably be the best site for
him since he had experienced it quite extensively. This also reflected in
his work, where he considered social, ecological, and economic factors.
He applied his knowledge and influences from the environment in new
combinations to his work. However, external time constraints define the
end of the work, albeit he could produce a much more detailed project if
given more time.
3.3.6 Bailey Watson
Asked about his creative process, Bailey provided a basic timeline of how
he approached a task or ‘architectural problem’. Through communication
with his peers and immersion in the site, he identified elements which he
considered to be working or not working. He also drew on external knowl-
edge and, by doing so, reported surprising and sudden re-combinations of
concepts he found in different places. In particular, he mentioned ‘happy
accidents’ and elaborated on how they could help in the design process.
Bailey worked on several media in parallel, as he believed this to help
him overcome impasses. For example, he would do physical and virtual
modelling while drawing at the same time. Similarly, communicating with
colleagues and laypeople, and taking the perspective of non-Architects,
helped him solve the problems at hand. To understand the problems,
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he would draw on personal experience of the sites, but also on his work
experience outside the academic setting. He described how, in one of his
previous projects, he was working as if in the flow, with answers being
‘there’, ready to grab and apply to the project. He tried to recreate a similar
environment for his current group but ultimately failed in doing so.
3.3.7 Charles White
Charles started by talking about his process of creation, mostly in terms
of deadlines and external pressure. He would scribble and draft ideas for a
very long time until finally the time to submit his work came. Then, at a
certain moment in time, when he could clearly visualise the end product,
he started producing visible output.
He approached his current task from an experiential point of view, spend-
ing time on the site and doing research on its history and current usage.
Drawing from visual imagery such as the Wild West and buildings crum-
bling away in the back, he developed the idea of a walled garden. This idea
led to further developments, which were multimodal, strongly relying on
sound as well as vision. His project space was developed as a journey.
3.3.8 Zak Walker
Zak explained the development of his current working style in detail.
Drawing on experiences from the previous years, he argued for a very
structured and almost algorithmic approach to generate the final design.
He stated that six iterations seemed to be a good number for him; if during
the problem-solving process he had not tried six different approaches,
he would try once more; if he had tried more than six, he would test it
and only then proceed to the next iteration. This clear approach means
that the moments when he switched between different scales and media
was predictable. He even explained the order of scales and media he used.
From his explanation, it seemed that he had developed the order and
working plan himself, possibly driven and influenced by the tutor, but
seemingly based on his own experiences. Interestingly, he mentioned that,
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while the use of automated processes to produce models would reduce his
workload, it would also alienate him from the current iteration. Therefore,
for him working on drawings or models by hand might seem slower at
first, but could be beneficial in the long run.
In his work, Zak considered the task as a constraint, in particular, the
constraint was identified in finding the task from the ill-defined question
posed in the brief. Another constraint he mentioned was the technical re-
quirements, although this is introduced at a later stage, possibly triggered
by the looming project deadline. Again, he worked on these problems in a
very structured and defined manner. These requirements also extended
to requirements from the course as well as his career ambitions. Interac-
tions with other people were not very fruitful for him: neither communi-
cation with non-Architects nor with his colleagues in the group seemed
to help him advance. On the contrary, they seemed to be ‘a little bit of a
hindrance’.
3.3.9 Peter Kemp
Peter started explaining his project by referring to the history of Plymouth
and the setting the project was situated in — who was the client, who
were the beneficiaries, etc. The problems he had observed and wanted to
address were a direct experiential result from this. The group developed
through many iterations, and this seemed to be an ongoing process. The
individual process was being developed in clearly defined steps, from
initial sketching to building different types of models. Each of these steps
was tested individually, but the feeling towards these temporary solutions
played a role on which step to take next as well. Which medium or scale
he uses seemed to rely on his feeling and experience.
Peter’s ideas were based on previous attempts, on curiosity, and on identi-
fying several candidates for the solution. For example, the previous night
he had been working to create a few models that he knew would not make
it into the design, but that might lead him to generate a whole new idea.
Peter appreciated the external constraints of a deadline since any project
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could bemademore andmore optimal over a very long time andmany iter-
ations. Yet, at some point, the output does not improve noticeably. Finding
that sweet spot is the difficulty of the creative process. When working on
a problem, he was aware of the difference between him as a designer and
the audience for his project. Even more, he took into account societal and
ecological aspects as constraints and suggestions for the development of
projects.
3.3.10 Amelia Gardiner
Amelia had a very structured approach to solving Architecture problems.
She started spatially far away and then, during the process, zoomed in.
Once she solved the problems that could be solved on a certain scale, she
moved in closer. After finalising the details and assuming to have finished,
she would run one final test on the largest scale, one more time. Within
each scale she would use different techniques, starting with drawings,
then computer models, then physical models. To move from one tech-
nique to the next, she would need to be ‘certain’, and she would need to
understand the experience of people interacting with the space, and to
have an idea about how to progress. Accidents and chance were regarded
as a disturbance in her process rather than a help.
The ideas Amelia used in her designwere grounded in personal experiences
at the site. With those experiences, her group started a discussion to find
a theme and a solution. She was aware of the role each person had within
her group, and she would use their experience to bring further the group
design and consequently her work.
3.3.11 Spencer Barnett
For Spencer, any aspect of the project was about the personal experience.
It started with an understanding of the site with which Spencer had in-
teracted before the project. In a subsequent step, his group visited the
site and talked to the locals or even just observed them infer what their
intention and requirements were. While working on a project to design a
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library, Spencer was guided by his own requirements: cosy sofas for novels
with a coffee in hand, hard chairs and hard tables for essay writing. Finally,
the whole creative process seemed to be inspired by his previous experi-
ences and interactions with his peers. Problems were identified through
personal experiences, such as the light shining through the car park and
the dead space.
The ideas Spencer used for his design were largely based on a mental
image of existing ‘libraries in America’, but enriched by elements and ideas
seemingly taken from other sources such as books and films. Furthermore,
errors and faults introduced for example by hand drawings were utilised as
part of the process to generate ideas. In another example, he relied on the
material available from a tool, in particular, the order in which material
was available in a piece of software. The selection process seemed to be
based on personal preference and perspective taking. He attributed the
selection process to tacit knowledge and to the experience accumulated
through training and exposure. This was also the reason he chose to take
part in the study.
3.4 Results
The following paragraphs report one link per participants from an emer-
gent category to ameaning unit in the transcripts of the interviews. Because
of the different length and other differences between the interviews of
art students and architecture students, the numbers of meaning units per
students were not comparable. As argued before, the number of partici-
pants that mentioned one of the emergent categories in their meaning units,
remained a comparable measure. Hence at least one link per student is
reported here.
Nine of the students explicitly name paper or cardboard as material (see
appendix 1.2 line 12, appendix 1.4 line 13, appendix 1.5 line 93, appendix 1.7
line 18, appendix 1.8 line 219, appendix 1.9 line 119, appendix 1.10 line 114,
appendix 1.11 line 103), all of themmention some kind of material for their
sketches, (virtual) models, or other forms they are working with (other
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materials see appendix 1.1 line 76, appendix 1.3 line 95, appendix 1.6
line 84). Material: 11/11
All of the students talk extensively about Experimentation they are taking
to reach the final product: 11/11 (see appendix 1.1 line 38, appendix 1.2
line 17, appendix 1.3 line 33, appendix 1.4 line 109, appendix 1.6 line 36, ap-
pendix 1.5 line 94, appendix 1.7 line 221, appendix 1.8 line 38, appendix 1.9
line 218, appendix 1.10 line 16, appendix 1.11 line 109).
Accidents were an important part of the interview with Alex, but Bailey,
Amelia, and Spencer talked about it as well (see appendix 1.3 line 22, ap-
pendix 1.6 line 81, appendix 1.10 line 191, appendix 1.11 line 395). Acci-
dents: 4/11
When it comes to decisions on what to do next, whichmedium to choose or
how to approach a problem, most students students agree that they have
not a logical, but rather a intuitive approach to it (see appendix 1.2 line 15,
appendix 1.3 line 10, appendix 1.4 line 9, appendix 1.5 line 97, appendix 1.6
line 78, appendix 1.7 line 127, appendix 1.8 line 262, appendix 1.9 line 311,
appendix 1.11 line 339) Intuition: 10/11. For Amelia, who did not explicitly
talk about intuition, the change of material seems to follow a predefined
order, but she did not comment on the time or the condition when this
happens.
Originality was mentioned only by Spencer (appendix 1.11 line 32). Lewis
in his interview talked about creativity instead, referring to originality of
the work as well (appendix 1.5 line 23) and Charles explicitly mentions
being inventive (appendix 1.7 line 183). Interestingly, the three students
talk positively about originality, as opposed to the artists in Sawyer’s (2016)
interviews. Originality: 3/11
All approaches were driven or had influences that were coming to the
work from the process itself. Some mentioned the change in scale (see
appendix 1.1 line 60, appendix 1.3 line 84, appendix 1.4 line 51, appendix 1.9
line 323, appendix 1.10 line 123) others onlyt the change in medium (see
appendix 1.2 line 106, appendix 1.6 line 78, appendix 1.8 line 49) from
which solutions emerged. Even others did not connect it to any changes,
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but acknowledged the emergence of a solution (see appendix 1.5 line 168,
appendix 1.7 line 185, appendix 1.11 line 116) Emergence: 11/11
The architectural way of solving problems seems to involve increments,
at least in the way it is taught in Plymouth. Therefore all students men-
tioned Iterations: 11/11 (see appendix 1.1 line 59, appendix 1.2 line 18, ap-
pendix 1.3 line 49, appendix 1.4 line 11, appendix 1.5 line 164, appendix 1.6
line 77, appendix 1.7 line 257, appendix 1.8 line 58, appendix 1.9 line 96,
appendix 1.10 line 136, appendix 1.11 line 126).
Alex talked about an idea he had during a previous project or stage of a
project that he couldn’t include in his previous work (see appendix 1.3
line 79). Also Kiera (see appendix 1.4 line 80) talked about a mismatch
between things she wanted to achieve in the previous year and that she
used that knowledge to create some elements in this years project. Other
examples are appendix 1.5 line 156, appendix 1.6 line 128, appendix 1.8
line 206, appendix 1.9 line 61, appendix 1.10 line 8, and appendix 1.11
line 318. Mismatch: 8/11
When Ewan chooses a medium, he is rarely sure that it is the right one
(see appendix 1.2 line 15). He will only know afterwards (see appendix 1.2
line 109). Most of the other students report similar explorative steps: (see
appendix 1.3 line 46, appendix 1.4 line 17, appendix 1.5 line 94, appendix 1.7
line 19, appendix 1.8 line 20, appendix 1.9 line 218, appendix 1.10 line 61,
appendix 1.11 line 159). Exploration: 9/11
Almost all students talked about their body of work (see appendix 1.1
line 39, appendix 1.3 line 74, appendix 1.4 line 81)(appendix 1.5 line 78, ap-
pendix 1.6 line 116, appendix 1.7 line 47, appendix 1.8 line 92, appendix 1.9
line 207, appendix 1.10 line 51, appendix 1.11 line 363) Body ofwork: 4/11
Less than half of the Architects talked about the current work as a result of
the changes in the past, or were projecting their work into the future (ap-
pendix 1.5 line 96, , appendix 1.6 line 23, appendix 1.8 line 95, appendix 1.9
line 125, appendix 1.11 line 334). Change: 5/11
The final presentations and the constraints that go along with them were
named by less than half of the students (appendix 1.1 line 127, appendix 1.4
line 80, appendix 1.6 line 259 appendix 1.10 line 67, appendix 1.8 line 441).
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This emergent category was only part of the talk, not of the published pa-
per, it represents an earlier stage of the emergent model by Sawyer. The-
sis: 5/11
During the assignment of emergent categories on themeaning units, onemore
category emerged from the text: insight. It is not only the center of my
interest within this thesis, but was alsomentioned by three interviewees of
my sample and therefore complies with the rule imposed by Sawyer (2016)
on when to include an emergent category. Insight is considered a discrete
step as opposed to a continuous process and sometimes referred to as a
cognitive leap (also see section 2.2.2). Lewis in his interview talked about
jumping between steps of the process (appendix 1.5 line 95), which could be
a weak support for a non-continuous process happening. He further talks
about “bubbles, which burst” (appendix 1.5 line 160). Bailey talks about the
best decisions made away from the task, “doing random stuff” as he puts
it (appendix 1.6 line 47). Later he talks about another moment of potential
insight when he identified an idea he could transfer from a Barcelona fish
market to his current project (appendix 1.6 line 53). Potentially this and
another accident that happened later in the interview could be considered
a serendipity as well, in any case they seem to be discrete cognitive leaps
(appendix 1.6 line 86). Charles, when he talks about how they developed
the idea of the walled gardens, explicitly mentions having and Aha moment
(appendix 1.7 line 74). Zak, on the other hand, mentions that ideas “began
to click” with him, another figure of speech sometimes used for insights.
Insight: 3/11
Category MFA talk MFA paper architects
Material 89% 89% 100%
Experimentation 100% 100% 100%
Accidents 67% 44% 36%
Intuition 89% 89% 91%
Originality 56% 78% 27%1
Emergence 78% 78% 100%
Iterations 100% 100% 100%
1Originality was mentioned in different context: Sawyer’s (2016) students mentioned
the absence, while students in my study referred to creativity in a postive way
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Category MFA talk MFA paper architects
Mismatch 89% 89% 73%
Exploration 89% 89% 82%




Table 3.1: The ratio of students that mentioned one of the emergent cate-
gories in the data set presented in Sawyer’s talk, Sawyer’s (2016)
paper about MFA artists, and my interviews with architects. The
text marked in red were only part of Sawyer’s talk, but not of
the publication. Insight is the twelveth emergent category that
was mentioned regularly in my interviews. It was not part of
Sawyer’s (2016) analysis, but he concludes that insight is not
part of the creative process.
3.5 Discussion
Bearing in mind the different methodology, the different sample group,
and the different aim of the study, it is striking to see the similarities in
the results as shown in table 3.1. In both studies, accidents are mentioned
by only a few interviewees. Conceptually similar to serendipity, they might
not be considered as part of the problem-solving process, but rather as
a precursor. As discussed in section 2.2.7, a serendipitous moment is often
perceived as part of the problem finding process. Another explanation
is, that these ‘happy accidents’, as one of my interviewees called them,
happen rarely. Even though the interview I conducted aimed at discussing
the creative process as a whole, many of the interviewees drew on their
recent experiences. Some of the projects had just started a few weeks
prior to the interview and accidentsmight not have happened in that time
window. This would also explain a similarly low number of interviewees
110
3 Real World Creativity
who mentioned insights in their explanation of the creative process in my
interviews.
Initially, the number of students who mentioned originality was similarly,
with just about half of the students as presented in Sawyer’s talk. In the
later analysis in Sawyer’s (2016) publication, the ratio increased. Never-
theless, it is interesting to note that the participants in Sawyer’s (2016)
study referred to their work as not being original, while the architects in
my study referred to originality and creativity as positive features. Overall
none of the artists from Sawyer’s (2016) cohort mentioned originality as
a contributing factor and only a low number of participants in my inter-
views. It is interesting to follow Sawyer’s (2016, page 17) thought that
“originality is a defining element of creativity. And yet, these artists are
not concerned with originality”. This goes back to the discussion of where
novelty and originality are defined, as discussed in the context of historic
and personal creativity in section 2.7. A creator does not necessarily need
to identify them or aim for novelty; it is rather for the audience to decide
this. Since the participants in my study often take the position of future
users of the building or immerse themselves in the context of the site, this
would explain why more architects identify originality in their work than
artists, for whom the audience is maybe less defined and may be of less
importance for the work itself.
The difference between the ratio of students mentioning the categories
body of work and change is notable as well. Fewer architects are concerned
about how their current project fits into their whole body of work. Poten-
tially this difference can be explained by the participants in both studies.
The artists interviewed by Sawyer (2016) were working on their final pre-
sentation for a Masterclass. To be accepted in the course, they needed at
least four years of art education with a Bachelor degree and were selected
based on a previously submitted portfolio. Most of them had profession-
ally been working as artists, had worked in the field for several years, and
intended to keep working as artists. This explains a strong focus on the
changes they had experienced during the past years of creative practice,
but also their interest in creating a consistent and outstanding oeuvre.
On the other hand, the Architecture students interviewed for my study
were participating in a Bachelor course. For second-year students, it was
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potentially the first project-based work, while third-year students had
more formal experience, and some of them were already working as ar-
chitects. With less background, there was also less focus on the learning
experience from previous work. One way to assess the work of an architect
is through their realised plans. The plans of these tutorials, on the other
hand, were only aiming at getting grades from the school of Architecture.
Good marks were, therefore, presumably more important than how the
current plan fits into their previous work. Asked about their future plans,
some of the students mentioned planning going on to Master and PhD
studies. It would be interesting to interview students and practitioners at
that more advanced level. Possibly these results could show an emphasis
on the body of work and change, similar to the results show by Sawyer (2016)
for Masterclass artists.
Interesting, especially in the context of this work, is the absence of insight
in the interviews by Sawyer (2016), while at least some I interviewed
mentioned these Aha moments. This could have two causes. Firstly, for
Sawyer (2016, page 17) an insight is one single step leading to the solution.
He writes: “These aspiring painters never report a moment where they
have a single major insight that leads to their thesis body of work.” This
reflects the definition of full insight but does not take into account partial
insight as introduced in section 2.4.1. He further states that “rather, they
report an extended process of working, during which small ideas that may
or may not lead toward the final work emerge unpredictably” (Sawyer,
2016, page 17). He classifies these small ideas as part of iterative design
process. Nevertheless, these small steps could very well represent partial
insights, as previously discussed in section 2.4.1 and section 2.7. Secondly,
the absence of a phenomenon in the interviews do not equate to the
phenomenon not taking place. It could either be essential as breathing,
happening sparsely over the whole process, or not being considered as
part of the process, as previously discussed for the accidents. Overall, a
conceptual difference and the missing reports from the interviews does
not provide a strong argument to conclude that there is “little support for
the theory that the essence of creativity is an original insight” (Sawyer,
2016, page 18).
The following paragraphs discuss the content of the interviews by taking
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themethodology into consideration. A novel multi-layeredmodel emerges
from this discussion. Finally, a conclusion is drawn.
3.5.1 Keith Sawyer’s emergent model as sequence or
cycle
From thedata Sawyer collected in the interviews of Art students, he created
a theoretical model of their creative process.
It is easy to connect this emergent model to the design process: All intervie-
wees mention iteration, one of the fundamental principles of the design
process. Closely related is the category of experimentation, when they try
new techniques or ideas, potentially as one of the iterative phases. The
selection of the materials for the next iterative phase might be intuitive or
through random exploration. Later in each phase, solutions or ideas might
emerge, potentially showing a mismatch during testing. Based on these in-
termediate results, interviewees choose their next iteration based on their
past experience (change) or with the body of work in mind. In this iterative
cycle of predefined steps, there is little room for originality or accidents as a
productive input. The emergent model is, therefore, consistent with the
design process. How about the sequential model of creativity?
In the context of a sequential model, the emergent model by Sawyer (2016)
could bemapped as follows: During the initial preparation for the problem,
artists choose thematerial and start experimentation and random exploration.
During the incubation phase, intuition and accidents help to break the im-
passe, possibly through a mismatch that results in restructuring the prob-
lem. The solution emerges during the intimation and illumination phases
and is potentially original and an insight. During the verification phase,
the artists contextualise the new solution within their past experience
(change) and the whole body of work. The only category missing so far is
iteration. The interviews cover a time of several months. Within that time,
the artists were most likely creative for more than one goal. Naturally, the
steps they took to create new output is similar to the ones they did before.
Therefore the subjective experience of the artists might be reported as
iteration. Even more, if each bigger task, such as creating a new painting,
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is broken down into smaller subtasks, such as creating a background or
the overall composition, then the artists repeat the sequential model regu-
larly. Finally, the Master’s course or even the generation of the body of work
could be seen as overarching sequential tasks by themselves. It is therefore
possible to map the emergent model from Sawyer (2016) onto the sequen-
tial model. In the next section, I discuss some implications of observing
several sequences.
3.5.2 Towards a multi-layered model of creative
problem-solving
In the previous section, I introduced the idea of several sequential models of
the creative problem-solving process contributing to the work discussed
in the interviews. Here the assumption is that architects work on more
than one topic and more than one problem within the same observed time
period. These problems might be connected or in some cases seemingly
disconnected. These several problems are a result of the interviewees deal-
ing with the complexity of a substantial problem, given during the brief of
the tutorial. At any moment in time, the architects might consider only
aspects of this task, for example, the context surrounding the building, the
intended function, the aesthetics, sound, or measurements. They address
these partial problems in sketches, models, 3D visualisations, writing, or
by talking about it. Through the representation of partial problems and
their neighbouring issues in the same medium, for example by sketching
an acoustic and social aspect within a single scope, two previously dis-
junct approaches overlap. This recombination might solve one of their
sub-tasks or create new problems. The media, such as sketching paper
or models, act as externalisations of the cognitive processes (Pearson &
Logie, 2014). While the architects focus their attention on one specific
aspect of the task, other elements are often close by or part of the same
medium. For example, when tracing the path of a piece of paper through
a printing house, the architect becomes aware of spatial requirements for
machines and potentially the soundscape. This awareness, which comes
with the acknowledgement of constraints and requirements of other sub-
tasks, might not be the primary focus but rather unconscious. If they can
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integrate different perspectives into one medium, this might solve an um-
brella task, and they might be able to continue to another aspect of their
overall work. Otherwise, a change of medium, material, or scale appar-
ently helps in overcoming this type of impasses.
The change of medium, material, or scale can be seen as approaching the
problem on a different hierarchy, possibly either a higher or a lower level
of abstraction. By changing the medium, architects are required to rethink
the current issue in different terms. By changing from a two-dimensional
sketch to three-dimensionalmodelling, another spatial dimension is added.
This requires new constraints to be taken into account and, as a result,
generates a higher order generalisation of some of the problems. At the
same time, some of the thoughts are materialised and do not need to be
added each time the architect looks at the idea, therefore potentially free-
ing some cognitive capacities. While producing the model, some problems
are solved through the process itself. Arguably the model serves as an ex-
ternal cognitive device expanding the architects’ capacities of processing
all available information, in particular regarding the transition between
dimensions. The change of material, for example, if the architect decides
to exchange a wooden wall with a brick wall, is another way to generalise.
This change of material as a technique results in rethinking a certain area
in the building. Here the conception alters from having a structure of a
certain type of wood to a more general idea of what the purpose a wall,
staircase, or floor might serve at this position. It shifts the architects’ at-
tention to higher level abstract thinking, from which they can potentially
traverse down to a number of concrete implementations of the abstract
idea. Finally, the change of scale, for example by zooming out, reduces the
details on each of the elements, therefore forcing architects to simplify
concepts. This enables them to shift their thoughts to a higher-level of ab-
stract thinking as well. Conversely, the zooming in requires specification
of formerly abstract ideas into concrete implementations.
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Figure 3.3: Multi-layered sequential problem solving, in this example with three layers. Each problem solving process is sequential in itself, but some lower
level processes contribute to a higher task (eg. preparation of the 2nd problem in layer 2 to the incubation of the task in layer 1) and people switch
between tasks. If people remember their work at example times t1 and t2, it is unclear what they will report: They might report the starting
intimation on a layer 3 problem, the preparation they are doing for a layer 2 problem, or even reflect on the incubation in one of the other problems
at time t1.
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In fig. 3.3 I suggest amodel where the architects’ task is divided into several
sequential models. With this model I contribute to knowledge by filling a
gap in the literature between the creativity models discussed in Cognitive
Sciences and practitioners models of Design Thinking. For the discussion
in this thesis, I am using Wallas’s (1926) model simply because it is proba-
bly best known. Any other sequential model mentioned in section 2.7.4
would work just as well. In this abstract representation, the problem on
layer 1 could be the task given to the architects in the brief of the tutorial.
For the groups of the 2017 tutorial, the task was to develop the area around
Derry’s Cross in Plymouth. Conceptually, the development of a coherent
master plan could be the overarching problem. This would include the
position and development of individual sites and their relationship. The
programme of a specific site could be seen as a level 2 problem and archi-
tects talked about it concerning process optimisation in a printing house
or the requirements of a music school. Tasks on the third layer would
address issues regarding material selection for walls or the placement of
staircases. This idea has some interesting implications. In this case, the
problem on layer 1 starts with the brief and gets verified with the grading
of the project by the tutors. In many cases, the group prepares for this
problem by reading about the history of the place, visiting the site, and
discussing potential ideas in the group. At the same time t1, they might
start working on ideas for their sites. Results from these projects might
feed back into the discussion of the master plan or not. Conceptually this
means the top layer task remains in the preparation phase or advances to
the incubation. At some point, for example during the group discussion
at time t2, the idea of a shared theme slowly develops and finally bursts
into existence. This development would be reflected in the intimation
and illumination phases. During all this time, the students might have
improved their project to different stages; some might still be preparing,
others might have a verified and working idea they need to paste into the
master plan. Through the production of individual projects and the feed-
back from tutors, the main idea on layer 1 then gets verified.
This abstract example demonstrates that the specific sequential models
form organisational and temporal relationships. In the following section,
I introduce several possibilities for their conceptual organisation in the
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multi-layered model.
3.6 A multi-layered model of creative
problem-solving
In this section, I am going to speculate on a few configurations of how
two sequential models can relate to each other. For simplicity, I am only
discussing the relationship of two processes at a time and further assume,
that each person solely focuses on one thought at a time. This assumption
is only for demonstration purposes; in theory, it is a simple process to
extrapolate from the relationship of two models to adding a third, fourth,
or fifth. Similarly, expanding themodel to anynumber of parallel processes
leads to similar models.
Even though the problems in the first case are not on different layers, the
sequence is part of the multi-layered model to explain the succession of
two tasks on the same layer. Unrelated parallel and inspiration can either
be situated within the same layer or different layers, and subtasks are
necessarily on different layers.
3.6.1 Sequence
P1 I1 C1 E1 V1 P2 I2 C2 E2 V2
Figure 3.4: Two creative problem-solving processes in a sequence, each
with a [P]reparation, [I]ncubation, Intimation ([C]ue), Illumina-
tion ([E]ureka), and [V]erification phase. The focus of attention
(red line) is attending to something else during the incubation
phases, as defined in the original model by Wallas (1926).
In the easiest case, the two problems are solved strictly one after another:
people first solve a problem by going through all the five stages. Once the
solution to problem 1 is verified, they start solving the next question by
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preparing it. There is no temporal overlap between the two problems, but
they are both within the observed time frame. If the problem solver is
asked before the beginning of the first preparation and again after the end
of the second verification, then both problems are solved within this same
period in sequence.
The knowledge transfer between the two problems only works in one
way: all knowledge gathered within the first task is also available in the
second task. Potentially the solution verified at the end of 1 could even
generate problem 2. There is no transfer of knowledge possible from task 2
to task 1.
The architects I interviewed referred to sequential processes regularly.
For example, while working on a subtask (see section 3.6.4), Joshua keeps
trying different approaches in a sequence (appendix 1.1 line 59). At the
beginning of a project, Ewan draws everything out that comes to his mind,
one problem after another (appendix 1.2 line 11). Similarly, Alex draws
one sketch after another to solve a problem, progressively advancing
(appendix 1.3 line 55). Kiera calls it ‘evolving’, butmeans the same repeated
process (appendix 1.4 line 121). Using themetaphors of bubbles for tasks he
finishes off, Lewis is popping one after another (appendix 1.5 line 162). To
address a problem, Bailey creates many different temporary solutions, one
after the other, but potentially using different media (appendix 1.6 line 76).
For the development of his music school idea, Charles solved one problem
after the other in a sequence, starting with the acoustic qualities, then
adding visuals to it, and finally a temporal and experiential component
(appendix 1.7 line 220). Peter creates artefacts and then leaves them. After
some time he then picks them up again and continues to work on that
sequence (appendix 1.9 line 124).
Sequences, as hypothesised by themulti-layeredmodel, are reported in the
interviews. Students refer to them in different meanings such as iterative
evolutions, incubation-like breaks between tasks, or just as a description
of getting things done quickly.
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P1 I1 C1 E1 V1
P2 I2 C2 E2 V2
Figure 3.5: Two creative problem-solving processes happening at the same
time. The red line marks the times when people consciously
attend to one of the processes: [P]reparation, [I]ncubation,
Intimation ([C]ue), Illumination ([E]ureka), [V]erification
3.6.2 Unrelated parallel
In another case, people start working on a problem at some point, and
before they finish with a verification phase, they also start working on
another problem. This second problem might or might not be finished
earlier. If these two problems do not directly interact, then the creative
problem-solving process is happening in parallel or pseudo-parallel.
In the interviews, the architects repeatedly referred to these type of pro-
cesses. When Ewan is on what he calls a plateau, during which he only
progresses little, he is working on several media in parallel. These pro-
cesses seem to not influence each other, but one of them will eventually
help Ewan to reach a solution. Within each medium he is also working
in sequences (appendix 1.2 line 107). When Alex is stuck, he sometimes
experiences what he calls ‘back to nothing’. It seems to suggest that he
has no idea where he is heading to, but just trying different things in
parallel, and then one of the ideas might work out of pure coincidence
(appendix 1.3 line 24). He also talks about the idea of ‘juggling’ as work-
ing on many unrelated problems at the same time (appendix 1.3 line 34).
Kiera uses unrelated parallel processes to ‘clear [her] head’ (appendix 1.4
line 18). By thinking about his process of creating, Lewis seems to work on
a meta-level at the same time, yet he does not report that this will directly
influence his current problem (appendix 1.5 line 40). He also considers
himself a ‘Mad-Hatter’ regarding his process, and by this he means that
he is jumping between different processes he is working on in parallel
(appendix 1.5 line 95). When Amelia talks about jumping between trac-
120
3 Real World Creativity
ing historical Plymouth and working on her own site, it is, at least at the
time of the interview, unclear how these tasks are related (appendix 1.10
line 96). Similarly, Spencer was talking about taking unrelated bits and
pieces from different problems (appendix 1.11 line 86). Since the projects
were not finished when I interviewed them, these seemingly unrelated
processes might become subtasks in the future, when they inspire an over-
arching problem.
As demonstrated in the extracts, the interviewees refer to these pseudo-
parallel tasks regularly. Interestingly, some students are using several
parallel tasks to achieve a goal, while for others, these situations just seem
to happen. In any case, the theorised pseudo-parallel processes from the
multi-layered model can be observed in human creative processes.
3.6.3 Inspiration
P1 I1 C1 E1 V1
P2 I2 C2 E2 V2
Figure 3.6: Two creative problem-solving processes happening within the
same time period, the second being inspired by something
during the preparation phase of the first problem but without
any further interaction. The red horizontal line marks the
times when people consciously attend to one of the processes,
the vertical line represents transfer of knowledge between the
tasks.
Another possible case is when working on one task inspires another one.
This inspiration can happen during any phase of the initial task, and the
inspirationmight be perceived differently for each origin of the inspiration.
As long as there is no knowledge or information consciously transferred
back to the initial task, all of these different instances of inspiration are
considered to be similar. The interaction between two potential tasks of
which one inspires the other is depicted in Figure 3.6.
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For Joshua, the work at the architecture school itself branches out and
inspires real-world projects (appendix 1.1 line 35). When engaging with a
landscape architect, this encouraged Alex to solve problems on his current
project (appendix 1.3 line 78). Kiera explicitly mentions that she gets in-
spired by ‘something’ to work on a new problem until this project is over
without feeding back any knowledge (appendix 1.4 line 10). During lec-
tures, but not necessarily based on their content, Charles gets sometimes
inspired for one of his projects (appendix 1.7 line 102). This then develops
an idea in its own right. When Zak talks about his last year’s project, he ex-
plains that initially the tutor would inspire him to do a task (appendix 1.8
line 11). After it ‘clicked’ with him, he would then be able to define his own
sequence in a next step. The material or medium in which a problem is
addressed helps inspiring new processes for Peter (appendix 1.9 line 176).
Interestingly, the inspiration seems to work over long time difference as
well when Peter gets inspired by problems from his sketchbook finished
long ago (appendix 1.9 line 184).
The majority of inspirations seem to happen involuntarily. Depending on
the perspective and the priorisation of each of the tasks, the same process
is not only ‘inspiring’ in regards for the novel problem, but also ‘distracting’
from the initial one. In a broader sense, Peter voices that concern saying
that finding something new to work with is good and bad at the same time
(appendix 1.9 line 196). While the frustrating effect of being distracted
is easily comprehensible, the positive effect of focussing on another task
is known in Psychology as ‘incubation’ and discussed in more detail in
section 2.5.5. While the underlying effects are still not well explored, a
theory for this positive contribution is merely speculation, and phases
similar to ‘incubation’ are missing or reduced in other frameworks such
as design thinking and Cognitive Innovation, this aspect of involuntary
switching and the effect of inspiration on the initial and secondary task
seems interesting, but a detailed discussion is outside the focus of this the-
sis. Notably, these inspirations (and distractions), as hypothesised in the
multi-layered model, were observed in the interviews with architects.
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3.6.4 Subtasks
If some of the knowledge required to solve a task is not available to the
potential problem solver, it can be generated by solving a second problem,
a sub-task. Once this second task is solved, the result can be used in the
first task. This integration of knowledge generated in the second task is
the distinction between the cases mentioned in section 3.6.3.
P1 I1 C1 E1 V1
P2 I2 C2 E2 V2
Figure 3.7: Two creative problem-solving processes happening within the
same time period. The second one is inspired by something
during the preparation phase of the first problem, and the so-
lution to this second problem helps continue preparing for the
first problem. In this case, task 2 can be seen as a subtask of
task 1. The red horizontal line marks the times when people
consciously attend to one of the processes, vertical lines repre-
sent transfer of knowledge between the tasks.
The sub-task can theoretically branch and merge again at different times
in the creative process. In fig. 3.7 a gap in knowledge is discovered through
the preparation for a problem. A sub-task solves the problem and transfers
the knowledge back to the initial task. Now, this process continues. In
fig. 3.8 the verified result from task 2 instead triggers a Eureka experience
for task 1.
Examples in which the solution of the subtask solves early stages of the
umbrella task include Ewan, who gives individual users of his site agency to
understand the space. Their interactions then collate into group behaviour,
and this group behaviour feeds back in his understanding of a problem
(appendix 1.2 line 71). From drawing, Alex goes to use something else.
This then changes the drawing, ‘it’s bound to be different’ afterwards
(appendix 1.3 line 50). Because drawing is such a quick process for Kiera,
it is helping with an umbrella task to ‘put it down’ (appendix 1.4 line 110).
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Lewis uses sub-processes a bit more long-term: with a looming deadline
he gives himself a week to work on a subtask and uses the result produced
in this time to advance his original project (appendix 1.5 line 180). When
talking about the initial phase of the tutorial, Charles takes into account the
contribution of individual sites to the master plan (appendix 1.7 line 47).
Peter talks explicitly about the scale of models when referring to subtasks
that solve problems on a different scale for him (appendix 1.9 line 323).
Other interviewees report how the result of a subtask helps them to solve
the overarching task. Here Joshua accounts for an example where knowl-
edge from a previously started task contributes to his current work (ap-
pendix 1.1 line 56). Kiera uses a sequence of quick subprocesses to solve
an overarching problem (appendix 1.4 line 121). Bailey uses the technique
of ‘breaking down’ into subtasks to identify problems and uses the results
to solve the original problem (appendix 1.6 line 24). During the develop-
ment of the project, Charles recalls to have worked on a building, created
a model from it and suddenly, through this task, he had an idea how to
solve a problem on the master plan. This is how his group came up with
the idea of walled gardens (appendix 1.7 line 73).
For the case in which the subtask is part of the overarching preparation
phase, potentially any number of subtasks can contribute to the main task.
Kiera’s quick sketches might serve as an example here. Even if the results
are discarded at a later stage of the preparation phase or generate yet
another sub-task, they contribute to the main problem. In the case when
subtasks are contributing to the verification of a higher-level task, the
number is also virtually unlimited, similarly to the subtasks contributing
to the preparation of a problem. In contrast, there is only one sub-task
possibly triggering or contributing to the illumination phase of the main
task. Here the outcome of the subtask results in the sudden understanding
of the umbrella task. For example, once Charles had the idea for themaster
plan, other subprocesses could not contribute to this problem anymore
because it was, at least temporarily, solved.
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P1 I1 C1 E1 V1
P2 I2 C2 E2 V2
Figure 3.8: Two creative problem-solving processes happening within the
same time period. The second one is inspired by something
during the preparation phase of the first problem. The solution
of this second problem triggers the illumination phase of the
first problem. In this case, task 2 is a subtask of task 1. The
red horizontal line marks the times when people consciously
attend to one of the processes, vertical lines represent transfer
of knowledge between the tasks.
3.6.5 Model comparison
The emergent model Sawyer (2016) developed maps very intuitively onto
the design process. This might even be biased by the language used by the
artists, who often learn about the design process during their education.
Here I have shown that the same emergent model fits just as well on the
sequential model of creativity, taking into account that the observed time
contains more than one creative solution. I called this the multi-layered
model.
For the data collected by Sawyer (2016), it might not make a difference
which model to choose. On the other hand, in the data I collected during
the interview with architects, they frequently mention originality and even
insight as part of their process. This is difficult to integrate into the cyclic
design thinking model as presented by Sawyer (2016). Instead, taking into
account a sequence of several sequential models, the data from both artists
and architects can be explained.
Based on the idea of several sequential models contributing to one overar-
ching problem, I theorised that four different types of links between pro-
cesses must exist. In the previous sections, I demonstrated that these links
were experienced by the interviewees. Consequently, the multi-layered
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model introduced in section 3.5.2 fits the data from the interviews with ar-
chitects. This wider generalisability of the multi-layered model of creative
problem solving makes it a better model for the analysed datasets.
3.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, I report a study involving creative practitioners, who were
interviewed about their creative process. I analysed the recorded data
in accordance with a previous study by Sawyer (2016), who interviewed
creative practitioners from a different profession. Results from the nine
Art students he interviewed showed a great overlapwith the data extracted
from the interviews I conducted with eleven architects. This leads to the
following three scenarios: 1. The emergent categories are quite common
and are part of all conversations of a certain duration, at least within the
two studied professional domains. 2. The questions that emerged frommy
conversations with the architects were, without knowing, similar to the
questions that Keith Sawyer had prepared in advance. 3. There are some
similarities between the process How Artists Create and how architects solve
problems in their domain.
If the same categories emerge from all conversations, this would render
Sawyer’s (2016) and my analysis useless. To verify this would require a
different analysis, such as qualitative content analysis, further interviews,
for example with other professions, or additional measures. For the sec-
ond point, it is unlikely that my questions and Keith Sawyer’s are compa-
rable since my interviews were unstructured. Hence the questions were
inconsistent even between interviewee in my study because each conver-
sation took a different course. There is no evidence to reject the third
point. Therefore I assume for this chapter, that the creative process of
artists and architects are similar, at least for the observed sample.
It is interesting to note that the body of work as the only one of the cate-
gories from Sawyer’s (2016) emergent model explicitly refer to the cre-
ative product. While Material hints to the contributing artefacts, the other
categories seem to be associated with the action of creating. Consequently,
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the creative practitioners seem more concerned with the creative process
than with the produced outcome.
Between the interview of artists and architects, two notable differences
in the results stood out. Firstly, the architects mentioned originality as a
positive contributor to the process and, secondly, they reported experienc-
ing insights. This contrasts with the two conclusions Sawyer (2016) drew,
specifically that 1. the creative process of artists cannot be understood as
a sequential model, but only in terms of the iterative design process, and that
2. insight is not part of the creative process.
To resolve the first inconsistency, I described a mapping between the
emergent model by Sawyer (2016) and the sequential model. This also resolved
the second inconsistency, as insight is part of the illumination phase in the
sequential model. Furthermore, and based on the resulting observation that
more than one creative process was part of the time observed through the
interviews, I speculated on the relationship between several sequential
processes within a general multi-layered model.
Themulti-layered model provides a better explanation for the data observed
in interviews with the architecture students and is neutral regarding the
data from Sawyer (2016). The theoretical interactions between several
sequential processes could still benefit from future observations and veri-
fications.
When analysing complex phenomena, such as the Eureka moment, us-
ing a mixed-methods approach is likely to uncover more information
about the phenomenon than using just one method. After discussing the
qualitative data of the architects’ interviews, in the next chapter I will
introduce a method I designed to collect quantitative data on the creative
process. Within the project, the initial set of interviews with architects
were conducted early in 2015. Anecdotes from the interviews with archi-
tects influenced the design of the paradigm described in the following
chapter. Specifically, the choice of mixed media such as using image and
text in the same task, and the idea that the solution itself is of minor im-
portance, are taken from these observations. Once the data from the task
‘Dira’ was collected, I went back to another cohort of architecture students
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to strengthenmy initial observations, but also to see if what I learned from
the experiment holds within the realm of creative practitioners.
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4 Dira as a platform to
understand Eureka moments
To observe the moment solutions emerge as part of the creative process
and test correlates of and interventions on this process, an experimental
paradigm is required. From the literature review on the operationalisation
of insight in section 2.4, I conclude that there is no directmeasure of insight.
Instead, related phenomena are used to identify these moments, such
as positive affect, sudden restructuring, confidence about the solution,
processing fluency, or neural correlates to any of these effects. Further,
the tasks currently used to study Eureka moments rely on these related
phenomena. Even though a link between observed phenomenon and
‘Eureka experience’ is well established, the chronology or even causality
remains unclear. For example, take the connection between mood change
and insight: Does insight increase mood (Chermahini & Hommel, 2012),
does a stimulated positive mood cause Aha moments (Isen, Daubman, &
Nowicki, 1987; Ritter & Ferguson, 2017), or are they both results of another
process? On the conceptual side, the moment solutions emerge are part
of the creative process or the action, yet the assessment through tasks
typically relies on the product or artifact (Glăveanu, 2013; Rhodes, 1961).
Consequently, I identify a need to detect emerging solutions directly and
not via proxy phenomena.
Based on the theoretical discussion of insight in section 2.4.1, the critique
of existing tasks in section 2.5, and what I learned from the interviews
with architects in section 3.7, I designed a new laboratory-based task. I
called this novel experimental paradigm the Dira experiment (Loesche et
al., 2018). With this experiment I contribute to the knowledge of measur-
ing the creative action, specifically by narrowing down the moments of
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emerging solutions. Participants of Dira are asked to find a non-obvious,
unusual, and remote association between a given text and one of six im-
ages. In a computer-based setup, all of these on-screen elements appear
blurred by default and can only be seen clearly when the mouse hovers
above them (see fig. 4.1). Tracing the mouse movement and the hover time
on each image allows to measure the time participants spend attending
to an image during task execution. After selecting their solution, partic-
ipants are asked to report their subjective experience. The experiment
consists of forty of these individual Dira tasks. I hypothesise that the com-
bination of behavioural and self-reported measures can be used to identify
a distinctive behaviour when solutions emerge. I further hypothesise that
people can report the intensity or strength of an emerging solution in
more nuances than a binary scale.
4.1 Rationale
In this section, I describe the origin of Dira and how I acquired the problems
that I asked participants to solve.
4.1.1 Development of Dira
Dira has been developed out of the necessity to collect fine-grained mea-
surements of the creative process. As an experimental paradigm to observe
the moment when solutions emerge, Dira needs to address one funda-
mental requirement: the solution should not be known to the prospective
problem solver from the beginning. Here, a solution is either the answer
itself or an algorithm how to arrive at the answer. If either was known
at the moment the task was given, Dira would merely provide measures
related to other processes, for example processing fluency and memory
retrieval. This addresses one potential problem of existing word-based
tasks discussed in section 2.5.2, where language fluency potentially influ-
ences the results. Furthermore, the memory aspect attends to an issue
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discussed in the context of insightful tasks in section 2.5.3, where previous
knowledge related to the solution is often not controlled for.
In each Dira task I ask people to find a connection between a short text
and one of six images. I assume that, if the text does not describe a feature
of the images but instead has a non-obvious association with aspects of
at least one image, then people cannot know the answer from the begin-
ning. Instead, they might arrive at the solution either through controlled
processes in creative cognition (Beaty & Silvia, 2012; Silvia et al., 2013), or
unconscious associations (Kenett, Anaki, & Faust, 2014; Mednick, 1962).
In the first case, participants generate several metaphors or potential so-
lutions from available information and select one of them as the best fit
at a specific time. In the second case, existing associations are mediated
through similarities of common elements before one of them is identi-
fied as the best match. In both cases, the solution emerges at a distinct
moment before participants choose an image as the solution.
For the developed task I assume that two different modalities for the
stimuli are advantageous to isolate remote conceptual associations. If
the two stimuli that were to be matched used the same modality, matches
could be found for different aspects. For example, matches between two
visual stimuli could not only be based on the depicted content, but also
on colours, forms, and dynamics of the image. For two verbal stimuli the
constructing syllables, cultural connotations, and language fluency of the
problem solver would play a decisive role in the selection of an answer.
By asking people to match content from different modalities, I hope to
circumvent the issues above. The experience of an emerging solution
relies on the inherent quality of the task; in the case of Dira, on the text as
well as on each of the potentially associated images.
Dirawas inspired by the tabletop game Dixit. During each round of this card
game, combinations of text and images are generated. Based on a given
image, one player generates a short story, and all the other players select
one of their unique cards to match the story. The scoring system assures
some difficulty by penalising descriptive texts and easy to find associations,
as well as associations too remote to be identified by other players. More
experiencedDixit players reportedly develop a skill to generate imaginative
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stories that have a non-obvious connection to a given image and they also
select non-obviously associated images for a given story. Consequently,
the generated combination of text and images theoretically conforms
with the criteria for our conceived task, and the quality of the association
potentially increases with the players’ experience.
Dixit, a commercially available and highly acclaimed game, is played all
around the world. The 84 unique images of a Dixit card deck are described
as ‘artwork’ 1 and ‘dreamlike’ 2, and have previously been used in teaching
a foreign language (Cimermanová, 2014) and in research on imaginative
design narratives (Berger & Pain, 2017). The cards have also inspired inter-
ventions to foster creativity (Liapis, Hoover, Yannakakis, Alexopoulos, &
Dimaraki, 2015), and are suggested as ‘an additional source of inspiration’
(Wetzel, Rodden, & Benford, 2017, page 206) for an ideation methodol-
ogy.
Usually Dixit is played locally around a table, however Boite-a-jeux3 pro-
vides an online gaming platform to play it across distances and with other
players of a similar skill level. In August 2014 I accessed the publicly avail-
able recorded game data of 115,213 rounds of Dixit. I filtered this initial
dataset for English rounds with six players. After stopword removal (such
as ‘the’, ‘is’, ‘at’) and word stemming, I removed the rounds with stories
containing the most frequent words from the 90th percentile. Looking at
the story and images, candidates for the Dira task were selected from the
remaining 1000 rounds of recorded Dixit games. With the help of another
experienced Dixit player, I skimmed through these candidates; based on ob-
servations during a pilot study – carried out at the University of Plymouth
with 13 volunteers – I selected 40 sets.
To control for participants domain-specific knowledge, I assigned cate-
gories to each story. I created the categories using a similar coding tech-
nique as in identifying emergent categories for the architects’ interviews
in section 3.2, with the text of the story representing a meaning unit. The
1Dixit publisher’s website http://en.libellud.com/games/dixit, last access: 2018-02-23
2Wikipedia: Dixit (card game) https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Dixit_(card_
game)&oldid=823435686, last access: 2018-04-05
3http://boiteajeux.net; Last access 2017-11-15
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following list shows the eight categories that emerged from this coding,
with the number of attached stories in parenthesis: Literature (8), mu-
sic (6), film (7), science (7), popular culture (12), and high culture (7) as
well as word games (11), and literal interpretations of visual cues (10). The
number of attached stories amounts to more than forty, since each story
could belong to more than one knowledge domain. For example, the sen-
tence “Standing on the shoulders of giants” is meaningful for people in
the scientific community exposed to the life and work of Newton, but also
for fans of the Britpop group ‘Oasis’, who released an album with the same
name. Hence this story would be linked to science as well as music and pop-
ular culture.
The name Dira for the experiment is a play on the name of the game Dixit
the task was inspired by. Dixit is the Latin for ‘he or she said’ (Wiktionary,
2018b) and was supposedly used by the French publisher to highlight the
story-telling aspect of the game. Dira is French for ‘he or she will point
out’ (Wiktionary, 2018a) and highlights the cultural origin of the game as
well the intention to predict the participants’ selection.
The order of the tasks within Dira was initially chosen at random, but
kept the same throughout all experiment reported in this chapter. Verbal
protocols were considered to trace the processingwithin the task. Withmy
primary interest in the process, the discussion in section 2.5.6 suggested
talk-aloud protocols as too invasive and were diregarded. Based on the
discussion in section 2.5.7, mouse-tracking was chosen as the process-
tracing method for the Dira task. This also has an pragmatic aspect, since it
allows running several studies in parallel and without expensive hardware
setup. Furthermore, and in addition to the controlled laboratory study,
this task has the advantage to be replicable, since it could potentially
be used in the future for internet-based studies with larger numbers of
participants.
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4.2 Method
4.2.1 Experimental design and procedure
The computer-based experiment Dira is programmed as a series of differ-
ent screens. From the participants’ perspective, Dira combines perceived
freedom to explore the on-screen elements with aesthetically pleasant
stimuli. Using a familiar mouse based interface, the order and duration
of interaction with the text and images are up to the prospective prob-
lem solvers. The images are taken from the Dixit card game which has
been praised for its artistic and beautiful drawings. Moreover, the whole
experiment is designed like a game. As discussed in section 2.5.5, these
design choices are intended to make the Dira tasks “inherently interesting
or enjoyable”, one of the critical elements that are known to increase in-
trinsic motivation (Ryan & Deci, 2000, page 55). In turn, Baas et al. (2008),
da Costa, Páez, Sánchez, Garaigordobil, and Gondim (2015) have shown
positive correlations between intrinsic motivation and performance in
creative problem solving tasks.
A Dira experiment starts with an opening sequence consisting of a welcome
screen, a questionnaire, and a description of the task. This initial series is
followed by 40 rounds containing a fixation cross, quiz, rating, and optional
explanation or elaboration screens. The experiment concludes with an on-
screen debrief.
The opening: Welcome, Questionnaire, and Description
screen
A welcome screen explains the basic idea of the study as well as potential
risks and the right to withdraw data. The study only continues if partici-
pants understand and agree to the minimum requirements that have been
cleared by the Faculty of Health and Human Sciences Ethics Committee at
the University of Plymouth. Once participants have given their consent,
they are shown the questionnaire.
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Figure 4.1: Example of the screen how participants might have seen it
during a quiz (left), all elements unblurred (centre), and the
colour coded positions (right). The centre and right subfigure
show an example mouse movement. The mouse positions at
at onset and offset times t1 to t7 are recorded as raw data. The
figure on the right shows assigned symbolic names and colours
for each position ‘a’–‘f ’ and ‘story’ as used in later plots. The
story was initially inspired by the image with the white circle,
because in ‘image c’ the shadow reveals the true intention of the
figures in the foreground. The black circle marks an example
of a ‘chosen solution’. Dixit images by Libellud 4.
During the questionnaire, participants are asked to specify their age, gender
and primary language, and if they have participated in the study Dira
before. They are also asked to rate their fluency in understanding written
English and familiarity with the card game Dixit on seven-point Likert
items. Participants are also asked to rate themselves in 14 additional
seven-point Likert items, four of which belong to the Subjective Happiness
Scale (SHS) developed by Lyubomirsky and Lepper (1999) and ten more of
the Curiosity and Exploration Inventory II (CEI-II) as published by Kashdan
et al. (2009). The scales were chosen because emotional states, openness
to experience, and intrinsic motivation are known to influence problem
solving (Baas et al., 2008; Beaty, Nusbaum, & Silvia, 2014; Eccles & Wigfield,
2002).
Once participants have completed the questionnaire, the procedure of
the experiment is explained to them in detail in a description screen. This
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screen also holds a minimal and neo-Gestalt-inspired definition of the ‘Eu-
rekamoment’ as “the common human experience of suddenly understand-
ing a previously incomprehensible problem or concept”, for accessibility
reasons taken fromWikipedia (2016). Afterwards, the 40 rounds of the ex-
periment begin.
The round: Fixation cross, Quiz, Rating, and other screens
Each round starts with a fixation cross which is shown at the centre of the
screen for a randomised time between 750ms and 1,250ms. Afterwards
text and images appear on the quiz screen as illustrated in fig. 4.1: one
text on top and six images in a grid of two rows by three columns. Unless
the participants hover the mouse on top of these elements, the letters of
the text are shown in a randomised order, and the images are strongly
blurred. An example can be seen in the second screen of fig. 4.2, which
shows the text “Don’t judge a book by its cover” with the letters in a
randomised order and images blurred except for image f, over which the
mouse pointer hovers. The recording of hover times during the quiz allows
to track when participants pay attention to each of the elements and for
how long (Navalpakkam & Churchill, 2012). For a further description of
the blurring technique in context of mouse tracing, refer to section 2.5.7.
On this screen, participants attempt to find the image that they think is
most likely associated with the text and select it through a single click.
Following the contemplations in section 2.5.5, there is no time limit for
completing this task. Once participants have chosen a solution, they are
advanced to the rating screen.
During the rating screen, participants are asked to rate their performance
in the quiz. They are asked the following four questions, with the range of
possible responses on seven-point Likert items in brackets: “How confident
are you that the solution is right?” (not confident — very confident), “How
hard was it for you to come up with the solution?” (not hard — very hard),
“How strong did you experience a Eureka moment?” (not at all — very
strong), and “How happy are you with your answer?” (very unhappy —
very happy). After submitting the answers, the next round starts with a
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fixation cross. The next section 4.2.2 describes the additional screens that
were added to the round, depending on the experiment.
Debrief
Participants who have completed the 40 rounds conclude their partici-
pation with the debrief screen. Here they are informed that the study
intended to measure the timing of their behaviour during the quiz. Par-
ticipants are encouraged to give additional feedback concerning the ex-
periment, and they have the option to leave an email address in case they
want to be informed of the results of the study. This on-screen debrief
was followed by a short unstructured personal discussion relating to their
experience in the Dira experiment.
4.2.2 Experiments
Dira was administered in three different between-subject experiments. In
experiment 1 the participants were not given any feedback regarding their
answers and they had no reference to evaluate their performance. In ex-
periment 2 participants were presented with a potential solution at the
end of each round, to see how this help would affect their behaviour and
experience. In experiment 3, participants were asked to elaborate on their
solution; this was done with the aim of increasing participants’ engage-
ment with the task. Experiment 1 was the first to be run, and all partic-
ipants at the time followed the same protocol. Subsequent participants
were randomly assigned to either experiment 2 or experiment 3.
In experiment 2 I added the screen explanation to each round as illustrated
in fig. 4.2. Appended after the rating, it is the last screen before the start
of the next round. The explanation screen shows the intended solution, the
image that initially inspired the storyteller to invent the text. I also showed
participants a short explanation on how the intended solution and text
are connected. The short sentence is based on a text taken from the
stimulus dataset and is designed to help the participants: One method to
solve a Dira task is to empathise with the storyteller and find the intended
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Figure 4.2: Experiment of the Dira rounds. Each parallelogram represents
a part of the experiment; the annotation in the upper right
corner identifies in which experiment the parts appear. Dixit
images by Libellud.
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solution that initially inspired the text. To assess the success of this help,
the participants were then asked to rate “How much does the Explanation
help [you] to understand the association between image and text?”. Their
answer ranged from ‘not at all’ to ‘very much’ on a seven-point Likert
item. Submitting the answer started the next round of experiment 2 with
a fixation cross.
In experiment 3 an elaboration screenwas placed between the rating and the
explanation screen, as shown in fig. 4.2. In this screen, participants saw the
given story and their selected image, and they were asked to elaborate on
their decision. Afterwards, they saw the explanation screen described above.
Once they completed these additional screens, participants restarted the
next round of experiment 3 with a fixation cross.
4.2.3 Task administration
The controlled study Dira is designed as a computer-based task adminis-
tered in a laboratory setup. The task was administered through a custom
developed web application delivered through a full-screen web browser.
The hardware setup of an optical mouse and 22 inch LCD screen with
1,920×1,080 pixel resolution was familiar to the participants from the
library and public computing spaces across campus. The experiment was
delivered in a dedicated room with a maximum of five participants at the
same time, who were asked to stay silent during the experiment. I con-
ducted the individual brief and debrief outside the room to keep any dis-
traction to a minimum, and collected informed consent for participantion
from participants; then they were accommodated to a computer showing
a welcome screen.
4.2.4 Participants
124 participants between the age of 18 and 56 (age = 22.6, sd = 6.99)
were recruited from a local pool of pre-registered psychology students and
members of the public. Psychology students received course credits and
points for running their studies. Members of the public, mostly students
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Figure 4.3: Distribution of interaction times on elements during the quiz.
The modes of the bimodal distribution are marked with red
lines. The cutoff time between the two distributions, a result
of the classification described in the text, is shown in blue.
from other courses, received monetary compensation around National
MinimumWage per hour. The overall sample is therefore similar to the
one described by Henrich, Heine, and Norenzayan (2010). Participants
were randomly assigned to one of three different Dira experiments.
4.2.5 Data pre-processing
The data collected during the quiz of the Dira task are intended to trace
the participants’ thought process through their behaviour. Since their
thoughts are influenced by or reactions to what they see on the screen
during the experiment, I discuss here what they can actually perceive. The
recorded dataset includes chronological information concerning the order
in which participants engage with elements, as well as the duration of the
interactions. This data requires a more detailed look.
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A rather simple observation stems from the chronology or order in which
participants engage with elements. This shows that people do not hover
over the text element in all rounds. Participants who have not seen the
text will not be able to find an association between the text and images for
that round. One of the reasons for not looking at all images, on the other
hand, could be that the solution was already found. Therefore, rounds
with missing interactions for some of the images were still analysed, while
rounds in which participants did not look at the text were excluded from
further analysis.
The order in which participants look at the images does not influence their
understanding of the task. All of the six images have a connection to the
text and it is previously unknown which of the images will be selected by
any of the participants as their solution. Furthermore the most frequently
chosen images are at different locations, initially chosen at random. More-
over, there is no intended or know connection between the images that
would influence the knowledge acquired through the order of interaction.
This is different for the text and images, as both of these elements have a
different role in the quiz. There is only one text per round that needs to be
matched to one of the six images. The order in which the text is looked at
plays therefore an important role. Images that people have seen before
looking at the text play a different role than the images seen afterwards.
When looking at the text, the content of the images seen before needs
to be recovered from memory to extract the meaning related to the new
information. This might require revisiting these images for additional
details. When looking at the same image before and after the text, it is
unclear what type of information is perceived during which interaction.
Therefore rounds with image interactions before the first text interactions
might differ from the other rounds, while the order in which participants
look at images does not have an influence on the processes of interest.
The number of interactions and the length, on the other hand, can have
an influence as discussed below and in the rest of the chapter. In general,
the duration of interactions with text and images is assumed to relate
to the amount of acquired and processed information. The duration is
driven by individual differences as well as differences between tasks. This
includes processing fluency as well as ease of information retrieval, but
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also fatique over time, and task difficulty. These effects can be classified
either as between subjects or between rounds. In the analysis, for example
in section 4.3.2, they are modelled with game round and participants as
random effects. However, the data also includes quick movements that
reveals elements potentially for a shorter amount of time than required
to perceive its content. Specifically, previous research does not provide
evidence for perceptual discrimination between visual stimuli shown for
less than 100ms (VanRullen & Thorpe, 2001; Zoefel & VanRullen, 2017).
Furthermore, Salti et al. (2015) argue for a required exposure of more than
250ms necessary to consciously perceive a stimulus.
Theoretically, if people in the Dira task want to look at an element not
adjacent to the current mouse position, they need to move the pointer
across one or more elements. In this case, the distance of the mouse
pointer from the target image is between 1.5 times and 4.3 times the size
of the target. According to Fitts’ law, the task of moving to a distant image
has an index of difficulty between 1.3 and 2.4. Applying the extreme values
for throughput suggested in Soukoreff and MacKenzie (2004), participants
are estimated to require between 260ms and 640ms for the whole distance
and therefore between 150ms and 170ms to cross an image between the
starting position and the target image. During this movement, the element
is briefly unblurred on screen. fig. 4.4 shows examples of this movement
at the beginning of rounds 4 to 7.
For the data collected during the Dira experiment, the density of the dura-
tion of interactions in fig. 4.3 shows how often participants interact with
elements for certain durations. The bimodal distribution suggests that
there are at least two different types of behaviour recorded. Shorter inter-
actions, in fig. 4.3 marked as the local maxima around 44ms, are distinctly
different from longer hover times peaking around 437ms. A cluster model
fitted to the log-transformed duration using two components (Scrucca,
Fop, Murphy, & Raftery, 2016) classifies 17,849 interactions as short and
63,452 as long, divided at 130ms.
The predicted movement time according to Fitts’ law and the identified
time dividing the bimodal distribution of hover times suggest that the
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shorter engagements with elements might be movements across the ele-
ment, targeting another one. If participants follow the mouse movement
and see the intermediately unblurred image on screen during the shorter
engagement, the following unblurred target image acts as a backward
mask. Incidentally, the measured time could be related to the predicted
time applying Fitts’ law to the Dira task. In any case, assuming that specific
information from a higher conceptual level is required to identify remote
associations in the Dira task, these activations would require more time
than the previously mentioned 100ms (VanRullen & Thorpe, 2001; Zoefel
& VanRullen, 2017), assumptions that are in line with the single neuron
recordings done by Quiroga, Mukamel, Isham, Malach, and Fried (2008).
For the Dira experiment I am interested in interactions for which partici-
pants can distinguish between the content of the different images. Con-
cluding the different cited streams of research I assume that shorter inter-
actions below 130ms from the bimodal distribution shown in fig. 4.3 have
no or little influence on the process Dira intends to capture. Instead, the
threshold for consciously perceiving the content of images is presumably
much higher. In accordance with Fitts’ law, I assume that the shorter ob-
served behaviour represents mouse movements across elements moving
for a different target without cognitive processing of the image. Conse-
quently, element interactions below the identified 130ms are excluded
from further analysis.
4.3 Results
In this section, I first report on the type of raw behavioural data collected
during the quiz and derived measures such as the chronology of informa-
tion acquisition. I then report results from the self-reported items during
the rating. I then show that the number of interactions with elements
relates to the reported strength of the Eureka experience. Finally, I re-
port results of the length of different interactions in comparison to the
reported strength of reported Eureka experience.
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4.3.1 Available process-tracing measures
Participants’ interaction with elements on the quiz screen is a metric for
tracing their problem solving process. While the current chapter focuses
on the moment solutions emerge, the experimental paradigm could also
be used to trace other aspects of the creative process. Since the extracted
behavioural measures are vital for understanding the subsequent writing,
I elaborate on the raw data and its derived measures in this section.
To illustrate the kind of data collected in Dira, I will now discuss fig. 4.4 in
more detail. The duration of interaction with each element is the differ-
ence between offset and onset time which is the raw data recorded during
the task. fig. 4.4 shows the example of one participant’s interaction within
the first 10 seconds of each of the 40 rounds. Each of the coloured bars
represents a timespan during which the mouse pointer hovers on top of
an element. The length represents the duration, and the colour signifies
with which element the participants interact. For example, in the first
round on the bottom of fig. 4.4, this particular participant spent a long
time on image b (for colour and naming scheme see fig. 4.1). The second
round instead starts with three short interactions with image d, image e,
and image b followed by a short time without any element interaction be-
fore hovering on top of the text for almost two seconds. Some rounds, like
the third one, are finished within the ten second period shown in fig. 4.4,
others like the first two continued for a more extended period.
Figure 4.4 also shows additional data that is available in Dira. I refer to the
moment participants select their solution as the quiz time since it ends the
current quiz. The example participant selects the solution for round 3 at
around 8,500ms and round 4 at around 8,000ms. The selected solution,
for example, image c for round 3, is also indicated as a horizontal black line
for the rounds in fig. 4.4. The vertical black line marks the end of what I
call the First Full Scan, the end of the interaction with the seventh unique
element. Participants have interacted with each element at least once at
the end of the First Full Scan. The number next to the vertical axis in fig. 4.4
represents the strength of the Eurekamoment participants indicate during
the rating screen. The example participant reported no Eureka experience
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Figure 4.4: One participant’s interaction with text and images during the
first 10 seconds (x-axis) of each of the 40 rounds (y-axis). The
length of each coloured bar notifies the duration, the colour
identifies the position of the element. Horizontal black lines
mark the items that are selected in this round, the vertical black
lines mark the end of the First Full Scan. The numbers between
one and seven next to the y-axis show the reported strength
of the Eureka experience for that round, in green if the chosen
solution is the one that inspired the text. The green blocks
mark rounds that are kept for further analysis. For details see
text.
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for rounds 2 and 3, but a strong one for rounds 19 and 26. If the number is
shown in green, the selected solution is the same as the intended solution
that initially inspired the story. Finally, the green box next to the vertical
axis indicates rounds that are part of the analysis and not filtered out for
one of the reasons explicated previously in section 4.2.5. For example, only
rounds in which people initially look at the text are used in the analysis.
As discussed in section 4.2.5, this allows a direct comparison of interaction
times and duration. Quick movement data is removed first which means
that round 4 is kept for the analysis since the two quick interactions before
the text hover time are considered to be too short to allow people to
perceive their content. On the other hand, the hover time on ‘image a’
before the text interaction in round 2 is long enough for the participant to
see the content. After seeing the text and then going back to this image,
the processes might differ from rounds in which participants do not see
an image first. The order in which participants look at the images do
not influence if they are kept or not. In summary, only rounds in which
people look at the text first are kept for the analysis for reasons of having
comparable data.
4.3.2 Interaction times with elements
During the quiz, two different types of stimuli are present on the screen,
namely text and images. In the analysis of Dira, the interaction time with
elements is an important measure of information acquision. Consequently,
it is interesting to see whether the interaction times between the two
modalities are fundamentally different. Besides, the image and story po-
tentially play a different role in the task: the story in the quiz might be
perceived as the question or task, while each of the six images represent
potential solutions that link to the only story.
A plot of the average interaction times with the image versus the text
addresses this question by revealing how they are related. In fig. 4.5 each
point represents one quiz, one axis shows the interaction time on the image,
the other is the story interaction time. Rounds in which participants spend
a longer time at the images but a shorter time on the story will show up in
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Figure 4.5: Density of average interaction times on images over story.
the upper left area of the plot, roundswith shorter interaciton times on the
images but longer interaction times on the text in the bottom right area.
Slower rounds are closer to the upper right area, while faster rounds are
closer to the bottom left area. The density estimation of the distribution
highlights the relationship between interaction time with the images and
the story and allows an estimation of the behaviour of participants in the
majority of Dira rounds.
In fig. 4.5 the estimation for the highest density of rounds is around 900ms
story interaction time and between 700ms and 900ms image interaction
time. This pattern towards longer story interaction time as compared to
the image interaction time is consistent across all rounds. This suggests
that participants spend longer times on the story than on the images, and
that potentially two different cognitive processes are at work.
Within the Dira task, the longer interaction time on the story might have
two different reasons. Either the modality of the element requires partic-
ipants to spend a longer time on the text to perceive its content, or the
task of connecting the story with one of the images results in a longer
interaction. In the latter case the perception of the stimulus itself plays a
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Figure 4.6: Interaction duration with the text as a function of text length.
Each dot represents the text interaction time for one Dira round.
The green line represents a fitted linearmodel, showing a longer
interaction time for longer texts.
minor role, resulting in similar interaction times for different text stimuli.
On the other hand, if the modality of the stimulus and therefore the per-
ception itself plays a role, then the interaction time would relate to some
intrinsic quality of the element. For example, a longer text would increase
the reading time, or a syntactically more complex story would require a
longer time to comprehend.
Here I test the following assumption: If the previously observed longer
interaction time on text (as compared to image interactions) is caused
by the role of the text in the Dira task, then the interaction time would
not significantly increase with longer texts. On the other hand, if the
perception time is caused bottom-up by text itself, then an increase of text
length would also increase the interaction time.
In fig. 4.6 the interaction time is shown as a function of the text length
(mean(story length) = 20.8, SD(story) = 16.88. The figure suggests that
longer texts result in longer interactions. A fitted linear mixed-effects
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model with game round and participant as random effects shows that text
length affects interaction duration (χ2(1) = 32.0, p < .01), increasing
it by 39.8ms per letter. This suggests that the difference between the
interaction time for images and text is not primarily caused by their role
in the Dira task, but instead by the content of the text.
4.3.3 Available self-reported measures
Participants of the Dira task are required to provide self-reported mea-
sures in addition to the implicit behavioural data collected during the quiz.
During the reporting screen they are asked to account for the strength of
their just encountered Eureka experience, their confidence in the given
solution, the perceived difficulty of the task, and their current happiness
on seven-point Likert items respectively. Besides, participants in exper-
iments 2 and 3 are also asked to rate how well they understand the link
between the text and a preselected solution, the inspiring intended solution.
In experiment 3 they are furthermore asked to write down how their solu-
tion is associated with the text. These measures are collected during each
of the 40 rounds.
Other tasks previously used in the literature rely on self-rating of the
insight experience as well, but people are usually forced to answer on
a dichotomous scale (Danek et al., 2014b; Jarman, 2014; Kounios et al.,
2008; Laukkonen & Tangen, 2017; Ovington, Saliba, Moran, Goldring, &
MacDonald, 2015). In Dira, and following the work by Bowden and Jung-
Beeman (2007), Danek et al. (2014a), MacGregor and Cunningham (2008)
mentioned in section 2.4.2, I give participants the possibility to report
their subjective experiece on a broader scale to substantiate the discussion
in section 2.4.2 empirically. Confidence was one of the feature repeatedly
found in the literature on insight (Hedne et al., 2016; Topolinski & Reber,
2010a; Webb et al., 2016). Furthermore, the Dira task has an intended solution
which initially inspired the story, but all other images are linked to the
story as well. Therefore Dira does not have a single ‘objectively’ correct
answer, but following the argument of Hedne et al. (2016), confidence can
act as a proxy-measure of the subjective feeling of correctness. Difficulty is
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Figure 4.7: Confidence, perceived task difficulty, and happiness related
to the reported strength of the Eureka experience. The size
of the circle represents the number of rounds in which the
combination was reported, larger circles representing more
answers.
assessed as a measure to compare the different Dira rounds. Finally I assess
the happiness of the participants since positive mood and mood changes
have been found to be associatedwith insight (Baas et al., 2008). Also, Abdel-
Khalek (2006) previously demonstrated that single-item measurements of
happiness are sufficient to assess positive affects and emotions.
As illustrated in fig. 4.7, for rounds in which participants report a strong Eu-
reka experience they are also confident regarding their solution. Rounds
with weaker or no Eureka experience are reported across the whole spec-
trum of confidence, but with a tendency towards low confidence as well.
Instead, rounds with strong Eureka experiences are rarely rated as low
confidence. This asymmetry leads to an overall Spearman’s rank corre-
lation of ρ = .62, p < .01. In contrast, rounds with strong reported
Eurekas rank low in difficulty and rarely as ‘hard to come up with a so-
lution’. Rounds with a low or no Eureka experience are perceived with
varying difficulty. The overall correlation between the reported Eureka
experience and stated task difficulty is ρ = −.41, p < .01. Finally, for
weak or no perceived Eureka, participants express a range of different hap-
piness, but only high happiness for strong Eureka experiences. Reported
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Figure 4.8: Number of interactions before (top row) and after (bottom row)
First Full Scan over the reported strength of Eureka experience.
Eureka and happiness are correlated by ρ = .6, p < .01. The reliability
of the rating is either good for reported Eureka (α = .86) and difficulty
(α = .87), or acceptable for happiness (α = .78) and confidence (α = .77)
based on Cronbach’s alpha. Conceptually these four measures are linked
in section 2.4.2, particularly through the literature review of Topolinski
and Reber (2010a), who discuss the relationship between ease, positive
affect, and confidence to insight. This link is reflected by the data collected
in Dirawith good reliability, as suggested by Cronbach’s α = .86 across the
four measures. Consequently, these findings confirm my second hypothe-
sis that participants can report their experience on more than a binary
scale.
4.3.4 Number of interactions
In this section, I take a first look at the relationship between the self-
reported intensity of the Eureka experience and the chronology extracted
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from the behavioural data. For example, when participants acquire infor-
mation during the quiz and they find a solution, they might stop looking
at more images. Therefore I hypothesise that the Eureka experience is
stronger for rounds with fewer interactions. Figure 4.8 shows how many
elements a participant interacts with during each of the 40 rounds of the
Dira experiment. The sub-figure on the top shows the number of interac-
tions during the First Full Scan before participants have seen each element
at least once. An average of ten to twelve interactions means that partici-
pants tend to go back and forth between elements even before they have
seen all seven elements. More specifically, if participants look at elements
in a certain order, looking back at one element and then continuing with
the round can result in two additional interactions. To give an example:
one participant has looked at image a and image b and then goes back to
image a before continuing with image b, image c, and image d. In this case,
the participant had interacted twice with image a and image b during the
First Full Scan. This particular round would have accounted for at least nine
interactions before the end of the First Full Scan. To arrive at the numbers
shown in fig. 4.8, this seems to happen twice in a typical First Full Scan.
To test the above hypothesis, I built an ordinal mixed-effects model (Chris-
tensen, 2015) with reported Eureka as a dependent variable. The number
of interactions, the classification into before and after First Full Scan, and the
experiments were used as predictors. The rounds of the experiment as well
as participants were considered as random effects. Results from this model
indicate that there is a significant negative effect (estimate = −.06, z =
−6.27, p < .01) of numbers of hovers on the reported Eureka before the
end of the First Full Scan. The model also shows a significant negative effect
(estimate = −.35, z = −3.68, p < .01) for the number of interactions
after the end of the First Full Scan. This confirms my hypothesis that the
Eureka experience is stronger for rounds with fewer interactions during
and after the First Full Scan. On the other hand, there is no evidence that
experiment 2 or 3 have an effect compared to participants in experiment 1
(estimates = [−.12,−.28], z = [−.35,−.88], p = [.73, .38] ≮ .01).
During the First Full Scan, the above model shows a significant effect of
the number of interactions with elements on the strength of the Eureka
experience. Across all experiment, this difference is between 12.61 inter-
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actions for no or low Eureka experiences and 11.38 interactions for strong
reported Eurekas. After the First Full Scan participants do not interact with
all the images and text, again. The significant effect of the number of in-
teractions on the reported strength of Eureka is higher this time and more
pronounced in fig. 4.8: the difference is between 9.65 interactions for no
experience of a Eureka and 4.24 interactions for a strong one. There is no
evidence for an effect of the experiment on these results. Considering that
the behaviour of participants with different Eureka experiences seems to
change before the end of the First Full Scan, it is interesting to examine the
behaviour during the First Full Scan in more detail. Hereafter I will exam-
ine whether the duration of hovering over elements provides additional
information.
4.3.5 Last hover during First Full Scan
Here I report the results for the hover duration on the seventh unique
element. It is the last image during the First Full Scan and the first time
participants interact with this specific element. Following up on the pre-
vious finding of an interesting difference between interactions during and
after the First Full Scan, I want to narrow down the time of emerging solu-
tions by exploring this specific hover time. More specifically I show the
ratio of the duration on the last image compared to the mean of previous
interactions. The chronometrical measure of hover time is illustrated in
fig. 4.9. To correct for individual differences in processing speed, I plot
the ratio of the hover time on the last image and the average hover times
on all other images during the First Full Scan. By plotting the ratio instead
of the absolute values, the ‘baseline speed’ of participants is ignored, for
instance if a person is quick or slow in the actual round. fig. 4.9 shows
separately the ratio of rounds in which this element is the one (C)hosen
later in the experiment and rounds which end on a (N)on-chosen one.
Figure 4.9 shows two effects: Firstly, for the First Full Scans ending on a
chosen image, the median of the hover time is roughly 50% higher on that
element than for non-chosen ones (1,323ms vs 855.9ms). Secondly, less
time seems to be spent on the last non-chosen image than on the previous
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Figure 4.9: The ratio between the last hover time within the First Full Scan
and the average of all other hover times in the First Full Scan,
separated by rounds in which participants hover over the cho-
sen image last vs the ones in which they look at another picture.
A value of onemeans that they are equal, lower than onemeans
the last scan is shorter than the previous ones. In addition to
the box-plot (showing the median and distribution), the lines
show a linear model fitted to the mean ratio and surrounded
by the 95% confidence interval in light grey.
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ones for stronger Eureka experiences, whereas more time is spent on the
last image for low Eureka values. To quantify these effects I built an ordinal
mixed-effect regression model with the strength of the reported Eureka
experience as a dependent variable and the ratio between last and average
hover time, the type of element for the last hover, and the experiment as
predictors. The round of the experiment and the participant were used as
random effects. This model shows a significant effect of the ratio on the
strength of the reported Eureka (estimate = −.24, z = −6.1, p < .01)
as well as for rounds in which the last element is the chosen one. This
model shows a significant effect of the ratio on the strength of the reported
Eureka (estimate = .2, z = 2.71, p < .01). There is no evidence for
the ratio in experiment 2 or 3 affecting the reported Eureka intensity
(estimate = [−.09,−.55], z = [−.32,−.32], p = [.75, .05] ≮ .01).
The negative slope of the ratio over the strength of Eureka, in fig. 4.9
particularly evident for the last hover on the non-chosen image, suggests
that a solution has emerged before the end of the First Full Scan. The
change of the ratio is either the result of a decrease of the numerator, an
increase of the denominator, or a combination of both. The numerator
decreases if participants spent less time on the last image when having
a stronger Eureka experience. The denominator represents the average
time spent on all previous images. It increases if participants spend more
time on at least one of the previous images. If participants had Eureka
experiences while looking at the image they are going to choose later, and
thiswould be associatedwith them looking longer at that image, this would
increase the denominator in the rounds which end on the non-chosen
images. The observed increase would also explain the difference between
rounds that end on chosen and non-chosen images. If participants spent
less time on subsequent images, for example after a Eureka experience,
this would decrease the numerator for the rounds ending on non-chosen
images, but not for the ones ending on chosen images. This interpretation
of the observations suggests that the measured ratio is a compound of
chronological effects and hover duration. Therefore I focus now on the
duration spent on the chosen image and its relation to the strength of
Eureka.
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Figure 4.10: The hover duration on the images after participants have seen
the story and within the First Full Scan, without movement
data. The time spent on the (C)hosen picture is longer the
time spent on the five other images that are (N)ot chosen.
4.3.6 Chosen images and length of interactions
The observation of the ratio of last and average interaction times during
the First Full Scan suggests that the interaction times between chosen and
non-chosen images differ. Instead of a compound measure, I purely show
the duration of hover times during the First Full Scan on (C)hosen and (N)on-
chosen images in fig. 4.10. AMann-Whitney test indicates that the duration
of viewing chosen images (duration = 935.9ms) is significantly longer
than for non-chosen pictures (duration = 687.8ms), U = 20, 873, 370,
p < .01). Furthermore, there is a significant difference between the
three experiments regarding the hover duration on non-chosen images
(H = 42.07, p < .01, MdExperiment 1 = 663.2, MdExperiment 2 = 679.7,
MdExperiment 3 = 727.9), according to a Kruskal-Wallis test. At the same
time, I did not find support for a difference between experiments for
the chosen images (H = 9.18, p = .01 ≮ .01,MdExperiment 1 = 879.8,
MdExperiment 2 = 915.9,MdExperiment 3 = 1, 048).
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I now look at the link between hover duration and reported Eureka ex-
perience in more detail. I built an ordinal regression model with the
reported strength of the Eureka experience as the dependent variable.
Using the hovering time on the chosen images as a predictor, there was no
evidence for a link between the strength of Eureka and interaction time
(estimate = .01, z = .21, p = .83 ≮ .01). This is not unexpected, since
the raw data includes slower and faster participants. Instead, if an ordinal
mixed-effects model considers the participant as a random effect, there is
statistical evidence supporting the link between hover duration and Eu-
reka experience (estimate = .14, z = 3.16, p < .01). From this example,
I conclude that the raw recorded hover durations with text and images
have little validity in connection with the self-reportedmeasures collected
during the rating screen. To address this, I remove the influence of partic-
ipants and the task by considering the ratio between the time spent on
chosen and non-chosen images calculated separately for each round. This
suggested ratio between interaction times for a single round and with a
single participant does not include chronological components related to
the order of interactions; it is between measured times only.
Figure 4.11 shows the ratio between the hover duration on the chosen
image and the average time spent on the other images. This ratio is
higher for rounds in which participants report a stronger Eureka expe-
rience. An ordinal mixed-effects model fitted to the data supports this
observation. The model uses the strength of the reported Eureka expe-
rience as a dependent variable and the ratio between the time spent on
the selected image compared to the average duration on all other im-
ages as well as the experiment as a predictor. The round of the Dira task
and the participant are used as random variables. This model confirms
that an increase in the ratio corresponds to a stronger Eureka experi-
ence (estimate = .02, z = 5.65, p < .01). With a ratio of 1.3 for no
Eureka and 2 for a strong Eureka, participants seem to spend approx-
imately 50% more time on the chosen image in rounds when they re-
port a strong Eureka experience. However, the model does not provide
evidence for an influence of experiment 2 or 3 on the reported Eureka
(estimates = [−.1,−.58], z = [−.33,−2], p = [.74, .05] ≮ .01).
Here I have presented two main findings. Firstly, the observations of the
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Figure 4.11: The ratio of time spent on the chosen image over non-chosen
images as a box-whisker plot with a linear model fit to the
mean. The median for the ratio depicted in the box-whisker
plot shows that participants spend nearly 1.3 times as much
time on the chosen image compared to the others for a low
Eureka, but about twice the time for a strong Eureka.
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length of interaction with elements show that participants spend more
time on the images they will select later in the task. Secondly, for rounds
with a strong reported Eureka experience, the time spent on the chosen
image is significantly longer than in rounds with a weaker or no Eureka
experience.
4.4 Discussion
The moment when a solution to a problem emerges is an extraordinary
experience. It causes people to cry out Eureka, Aha, or Uh-oh as vocalisation
of their changed mood as discussed in section 2.2.1 and section 2.2.3 re-
spectively. In this chapter, I suggest Dira as a novel experimental paradigm
to observe these moments as part of the creative process. In section 2.4
I have discussed how previous studies rely on the judgement of creative
artefacts, actors, affordances, and audiences — or use proxy phenomena to
assess the process contributing to creativity, innovation, and problem solv-
ing. In this study, I tested 124 people who participated in a controlled lab
experiment designed to study the emergence of solutions. Using the novel
experimental paradigm Dira, I recorded behavioural data during several
creative processes. Specifically, I determine the chronology and chrono-
metric measures of participants’ interaction with the stimulus text and
images as potential solutions. After each round, I ask the participants to
self-report their experience on four different items. Addressing the gap
in existing measures of the creative action, I contribute to knowledge by
having developed a novel experimental paradigm. Here I discuss the im-
plications of combined behavioural and metacognitive measures in the
Dira task.
4.4.1 Eureka experiences in Dira
Results from the behavioural data within the First Full Scan of Dira show that
participants spend longer times on images they are going to select as their
solution. Moreover, the length of the interaction on these chosen images
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is linked to the strength of the reported Eureka experience, with longer
hover durations associated with stronger Eureka experiences. As shown in
section 4.3.5, themedian interaction timeon the chosen image is about 50%
longer than on the non-chosen ones. Another result related to the strength
of Eureka is reported in section 4.3.6. For rounds that evoke a strong
Eureka experience, participants spend about 50% more time hovering on
the chosen image as compared to rounds with no or low reported Eurekas.
The current analysis does not allow drawing any conclusions regarding
causality, since the study was observational. Future studies could test
if more extended engagement yields stronger Eureka experiences or if
stronger Eureka experiences lead to longer hover durations.
After participants have interacted with the chosen image, they are less
likely to continue looking for more elements according to the results in
section 4.3.4. Supposedly participants continuously scan the elements
on the screen for a solution. If they find an association, the number of
elements they interact with afterwards is related to the strength of the
Eureka experience reported later. The significant effect can be observed
as early as during the First Full Scan and the initial interaction with the
images. These results suggest that something distinctive might already be
happening during the initial engagement with the images.
With support from the ordinalmixed-effectsmodel considering behavioural
and self-reported measures, I also confirm my first hypothesis that be-
haviour happening during the quiz influences the reported intensity of
Eureka. It would seem natural that the Eureka experience also happens
during this time. This timing does not comply with the classical sequen-
tial model, where the insight is preceded by preparation, incubation, and
intimation and the verification phase is supposedly rather quick due to
little constraints from the task itself. However, the multi-layered model
explains this timing. In fig. 4.12 I conceptualised Dira as a multi-layered
model with two layers. As suggested in section 4.4.2, each interaction with
an element is considered to be part of the same problem on layer 2. In
section 4.3.4 I have demonstrated that participants interact several times
with the same element and hence they are shown as longer processes in
fig. 4.12. In reality these processes would start at differnt times and most
likely also end at different times. Within each process the length of a
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phase is varible. For demonstration purposes I shortened all phases on
image b except verification. If image b was to become the selected solution,
this moment early on in the experiment might be perceived with a Eureka
experience. Already in this simplification, the participant might perceive
two different Eureka moments either at t1 for understanding the image and
potentially making a connection to the text, or at t2, after the participant
has engaged with all images. While sequential models only explain the illu-
mination at t2, the multi-layered model has greater explanatory strength for
early insight.
P1 I1 C1 E1 V1Dira
Ps Is Cs Es Vsstory
Pa Ia Ca Ea Vaimage a
Pb Ib Cb Eb Vbimage b
Pc Ic Cc Ec Vcimage c
Pd Id Cd Ed Vdimage d
Pe Ie Ce Ee Veimage e
Pf If Cf Ef Vfimage f
t1 t2
Figure 4.12: Dira represented as a multi-layered model on two hierarchies.
Finding a connection between the story and one of the images
is the top-layer, understanding and interpreting each each
element are the sub-tasks. In Dira the first interaction with an
image could be considered the start of its [p]reparation phase.
The phases would have different length.
However, we cannot rule out the possibility that the Eureka experience is
the result of a post-event evaluation. In any case, due to the short experi-
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mental time, these experiences would qualify as immediate insights accord-
ing to Cranford and Moss (2012). In their study of convergent thinking
they found a difference between solutions found through a classical insight
sequence and immediate insights. The immediate insights only consisted of an
Aha orEureka experience and were considerably faster. This quick insight is
also in line with the idea of intrapersonal creativity or mini-c introduced
by (Beghetto & Kaufman, 2007). In future studies it might be worth explor-
ing if these observations could be explained by a multi-layered model as
well.
It would also be interesting to design a modified version of Dira to elicit
non-immediate insights as well, for example by tapping into the thought sup-
pression as used in the delayed incubation paradigm (Kenneth J. Gilhooly,
Georgiou, Sirota, & Paphiti-Galeano, 2014) or more generally in little-c type
of tasks. I leave this speculation for future studies.












































































Figure 4.13: Schematic diagram of the process for solving one Dira task. The workflow starts in the top left corner with the questionWhat is the task? and
at some point just Stops, potentially with a Eurekamoment (bottom left). The time t1 is measured when the mouse hovers over the text, each
time a participant looks at an image time t2 is stored, the time t3 is taken each time participants revisit an image to score images, and time t4
when a decision is made. Under the assumption that participants generate enough concepts for each image at first sight, the change at a can be
estimated. From the selection made at b, a measure of correctness could be assumed.
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The interface of the quiz appears rather simple with only seven elements
on the screen and the mouse as the only way to interact. On the other
hand, the freedom to explore these elements in any order creates many
possible interaction patterns. Participants could start with any of the
images like image d or the text and then look at the other elements in
any order they want. In section 4.2.5 I began to discuss some observed
interaction patterns, for example not looking at the story at all. If I wanted
to speculate on the cognitive processes involved in the Dira task, then each
interaction with an element would consist of several subtasks. To further
reduce complexity, I only discuss the rounds in which participants look at
the story first.
In fig. 4.13 I give a speculative illustration of what participants might do to
solve the Dira task, heavily inspired by information processing accounts.
The participants’ potential thought processes can be traced starting on
the top left box asking “What is the task?” and follow the arrows. For
example, the first step could be to read the text. This interaction with
the Dira task is observed and recorded as time t1. In this speculation, the
prospective problem solver interprets the ambiguous story and generates
a concept, an internal representation, for it. If the participant assumes
this concept has a good chance of being correct, it is stored in memory.
Otherwise, another concept is generated. If the memory contains enough
good candidates, then the problem solver advances to the next element,
image 1. A sequence of processes similar to the text is done for each image,
starting with feature extraction. From this manifold feature, concepts are
formed and stored in memory until the participant is satisfied with the
extracted knowledge and advances to the next image. At the end of the
First Full Scan, the participant has at least one concept for each image n. If
the person now arrives at the decision marked with a and does not have
enough concepts for all images, some of the images might be revisited.
Possibly the generated image concepts are now ranked regarding their
match with the text concept. Now, if there is a gap between the highest
rank and the next ones, then this image is a good candidate, after verifying
thematch, might get selected at b. Depending on other featuresmentioned
in section 2.4.3 like mood, suddenness, or ease of processing, the solution
might be perceived as insightful. If the gap in the ranked image concepts
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is not after the first image, then further iterations of looking at images
might be used to make the decision.
From the description and the many loops in fig. 4.13 it seems obvious to
describe the problem-solving in Dira with iterative models such as design
thinking. Nevertheless, I want to offer another alternative here. In fig. 4.13
some boxes are surrounded by a continuous line, others by dashed lines,
and the third type by dotted lines. Let us assume, that these boxes belong
to processes on layer 1, layer 2, and layer 3 of a multi-layered-model as
introduced in section 3.7 respectively. Under this assumption, understand-
ing an image would be considered a layer 2 problem, with the extraction
of features as a sub-task. Understanding one image would at some point
contribute to answering the overarching question “What is the task?”.
In this schema, Dira only provides sparse data. Specifically, the times
marked with t1 to t4 and the decisions at a and b are the behavioural data
used in this analysis. Inferences about the behaviour between measures
could only be drawn based on large amounts of data. Adding other in-
struments, for example, neuroimaging methods might help in identifying
the timing of more of these elements. For the moment, and based on the
data at hand, I suggest that only analysis on layer 1 and, to some extent,
layer 2 is feasible. As an indirect and secondary implication from this cur-
rent section, I suggest that the previously introduced multi-layered model
helps in discussing creative processes such as the ones involved in the Dira
experiment.
4.4.3 Subjective experience
In more detail, the strong Eureka experience in rounds with high confidence
is consistent with previous findings introduced in section 2.4.3. The re-
ported confidence is potentially linked to a subjective feeling of being
correct.
Happiness and,more generally, a positivemood is strongly linked to insights
and Eureka experiences in the existing literature as shown in section 2.4.3.
In the Dira task participants experiencing a strong Eureka seldom report
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low happiness, but instead are consistently happier than with weaker or
no Eureka experiences. The fine-grained exploration of the emotional space
associated with emerging solutions could be a topic for future research.
The results for the relationship between difficulty and Eureka show that
Dira tasks with a strong Eureka experience are rarely perceived as difficult.
This finding seems counter-intuitive from the perspective of the classical
insight sequence introduced in section 2.4.1 in which a complicated impasse
has to be navigated. However, perceived difficulty can change in hindsight
as discussed in section 2.4.3. Finally, yet another interpretation is that
the participants experience insights in Dira tasks that are not difficult for
them.
4.4.4 Differences between experiments and personalities
I administered Dira in three different experiments with a between-subject
design. As explained in section 4.2.1, I asked participants questions from
the Subjective Happiness Scale (SHS) and the Curiosity and Exploration
Inventory II (CEI-II) during the opening sequence. The four items from
SHS result in a single measure for “happiness from the respondent’s own
perspective” (Lyubomirsky & Lepper, 1999, page 150). The ten items from
CEI-II represent two dimensions of curiosity, “themotivation to seek knowl-
edge and new experiences” (stretching, here ‘CEI_stretch’) and “a general
willingness to embrace the novel, uncertain, and unpredictable nature
of everyday life” (embracing, here ‘CEI_embrace’) (Kashdan et al., 2009,
page 995). For the observed sample I did not find supporting evidence
for individual difference within the collected data. Specifically, fig. 4.14
shows that there is no significant correlation between reported Eureka
and any of the metrics assessed to inform about the personality traits.
There are low correlations between the happiness reported after each
round and the SHS. This suggests that the single item measurement after
each round is related to people’s overall happiness. At the same time the
low correlation highlights that other effects influence the self-reported
happiness after each round, potentially the difference between rounds.
The low but significant correlation between self-reported happiness and
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Figure 4.14: Correlation between subjective happiness (SHS), the motiva-
tion to seek new knowledge (CEI_stretch), the willingness to
embrace novelty (CEI_embrace), and participants’ self reports
after each round aggregated on an individual level. Only sig-
nificant correlations are shown, a value of ‘0’ shows that the
correlation does not pass the significance threshold of 0.05.
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the CEI shows that both dimensions of curiosity and positive mood are
correlated. Since the correlation is lower than between the CEI and SHS
on a participants’ aggregation level, this once again suggests that the ex-
periments have an influence on the self-reported happiness. This requires
further exploration, but suggests that the manipulations in ‘Dira’, as well
as the measures regarding happiness could be meaningful. Out of the self-
reported measures, only confidence shows significant correlations with
personality traits related to CEI-II. From a conceptual level this suggests
that people who are more curious are also more confident in their choice
of solutions. While this requires further unpacking in future research, this
is a promising trend. Reported eureka and difficulty not surpassing the sign-
ficiance threshold should not be overinterpreted, but could suggest that
Eureka can be experienced independent of individuals subjective happi-
ness and curiosity, and that the task difficulty is not related to personality
traits measured with the two instruments.
Considering the difference between experiments, I observedsignificant
results between some of them. For example, section 4.3.6 shows a longer
hover time on the non-chosen images for experiments 2 and 3. Likewise in
section 4.3.6, I find no evidence that the length of the interactions by itself
predicts the strength of the Eureka experience. However, the duration
acts as a predictor if I consider participants as a random factor in the
model. With the current analytical method, the cause remains unclear,
but results suggest that individual variability moderate the experience
and performance in the Dira experiment. Future research could expand
the findings of the current study to address how and if personality traits
accurately predict the reported eureka experiences.
In a trial-by-trial comparison, I reveal a link between fewer interactions
and stronger Eureka experiences. In section 4.3.4 I compare the differences
in the number of interactions observed between Eureka intensities, sepa-
rately during and after the First Full Scan. I observe a significantly larger
variance between no and strong Eureka experiences after the First Full Scan.
This difference implies that the experience is influenced by element inter-
actions and not by the participants’ approach to the task.
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4.4.5 Experimental control
The participants’ freedom to choose the order and duration of stimulus
interaction is supposed to increase task engagement, but it does not come
without costs. The flexibility to look at elements in any order allows
participants in the Dira experiment to not look at elements necessary to
solve the problem. For example, some participants choose not to look at
the text before selecting one of the images. Furthermore, participants
who start with the text and try to find a matching image afterwards might
use a different approach to solve the problem than others who engage
with images first and interact with the text later during the task. In the
first case, they only need to store the text itself or a derived concept in
working memory to match it against each of the images they look at. In
the second case instead, they need to remember up to six images and
related concepts to match each of them with the text. For the analysis in
this chapter, I filtered for rounds in which participants started with the
text and removed all others. Future studies could eliminate the second
case through a changed experimental design by specifying the chronology,
for example by showing the text first.
As discussed earlier, the bimodal distribution of hover durations suggests
that participants unblur elements for at least two different reasons. As dis-
cussed in section 4.2.5, participantsmight either intend tomove themouse
pointer across by targeting elements on the other side or consciously en-
gage with the text and images. In the current study, I assumed interactions
shorter than 130ms to represent mousemovement across elements. While
these interactions were removed post-hoc from the current study, avoid-
ing short unblurring could be implemented in the experimental design.
The elements could only be shown clearly if the hover time exceeds the
movement time predicted by Fitts’ law (Soukoreff & MacKenzie, 2004).
4.5 Concluding Dira
In the Dira task, I estimate the moment of the emerging solution based on
the participants’ behaviour and self-reports without relying on additional
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indicators. The data suggests that this is happening during the First Full
Scan when people interact with the element they will select later on. Like
in many design and engineering problems more than one solution is con-
sidered to be correct in this task. This is one of the results from chapter 3
that came out of the interviews with architects. For Dira I demonstrate
how behavioural data and meta-cognitive monitoring are integrated by
this instrument to identify sub-processes of the creative process.
The results suggest that participants can distinguish between Eureka experi-
ences of different strengths. Thus, my results support the previous findings
mentioned in section 2.4.2 that Eureka experiences are not limited to having
or not having an insight, but that the perception of this experience can
have different intensity levels. Future studies should keep this in mind
when assessing Eureka experiences.
Looking at the whole process of finding a solution to a ‘truly ill-defined
problem’ (see section 2.6.2), people show a distinctive behaviour early in
the process related to the strength of their Eureka experience. While the
exact timing remains unclear, observations through Dira help narrowing
down insight. The reported results further suggest that immediate insights
exist and can be reported by people who experience them.
The creative process is often studied indirectly through creative artefacts,
actor, audience, or affordances. While this current work focuses on the
temporal aspects of the insight, Dira could be utilised to observe other
sub-processes of the creative action with no or little manipulations to
the experimental paradigm. Notably the duration of observing the ele-
ments could help to understand the stage Wallas (1926) coined as ‘prepa-
ration’. The time course of ‘incubation’ could be observed by adding a
distractor task and tracing people’s behaviour similarly to the Dira experi-
ment. Finally, when taking into account the time participants spend on
their chosen solution and their secondary potential solution, more pro-
cess based information about the ‘verification’ phase could be collected.
With advancements in these other potential applications of tasks similar
to Dira, the creative action could be observed in more detail. Future stud-
ies could revisit the relationship between insights and creativity (Beaty,
Nusbaum, & Silvia, 2014). Furthermore, creative actor’s traits such as fluid
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intelligence (Beaty, Silvia, Nusbaum, Jauk, & Benedek, 2014) or working
memory (Lee & Therriault, 2013), as well as the creative affordances of
different task types could be observed. In section 2.5 I have discussed a
range of potential problems, such as convergent thinking tasks, insightful
problems, and divergent thinking tasksk, but also complex real-word prob-
lems could be considered. While these applications are currently merely
speculations, I have shown in this work the use of Dira in advancing the
knowledge about insight. Nevertheless, the current findings go beyond the
isolated Eureka moment as they situate the phenomenon within the whole





Interviews with creative practitioners in chapter 3, the development of a
novel process-based psychological experiment in chapter 4, and a cross-
disciplinary literature review in chapter 2, constitute the main contribu-
tions of this thesis. These different methodologies allowed me to further
the understanding of the moment when solutions emerge, often coined as
insight, Eureka experience, or Aha moment. While the research topic is easy
to convey in everyday language and the well known 20-second elevator
pitch, the use of this imprecise wording in scientific papers on this topic
had considerable influence on all three branches of this project.
A review of existing tasks as a precursor to developing Dira revealed that
the phenomenon had been operationalised through different aspects: the
phenomenon was so self-explanatory to previous authors, that they failed
to provide a precise definition in their publications. When the observed
phenomena were defined, then this was often done through a mixture of
theoretical and experiential descriptions, as shown in section 2.4.3. The
currently used terminology seems elusive but had apparently been so from
the beginning. In section 2.2.2 I compared the original German version
and the first English translation of one of the seminal works of the field
(Köhler, 1921/1963, 1925/1976). From my analysis, it seems that the term
insight was coined somewhat by accident in the translation, rather than
intentionally by the author. As a consequence, this did not only generate
distinct conceptual branches for the two languages I observed, but also the
English term blended with previous technical uses and everyday language.
This confusion is apparent in the attempted clarifications by the same au-
thor even more than 20 years later. The imprecision of language continues
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to be a point of disagreement up until the more recent publications on
the topic. One example of this was Sawyer’s (2016) publication, on which
I based the analysis of my architects’ interviews. In his original article,
Sawyer (2016) concludes that insights are not part of the artists’ creative
process. I discuss Sawyer’s (2016) underlying assumption in the context
of the literature on full insight and partial insight (Koffka, 1936; Ohlsson,
1992), classification of personal creativity, historical creativity (Boden, 2004)
and the four C of creativity (Beghetto & Kaufman, 2007). As a result, I sug-
gest that the concept Sawyer used in his text only manifests aspects of the
existing literature, but does not necessarily reflect the phenomenon of
emerging solutions as researched in this thesis. Sawyer’s (2016) dismissal
of a possibly sequential creative process based on his use of the word insight
seems premature, but not unusual for the observed ambiguous, equivocal,
and vague use of the words in the literature. In section 2.2.8 I, therefore,
suggest a pragmatic use of the terms for the context of this thesis and for
future works dedicated to emerging solutions.
Insight is considered to be a part of creativity, innovation, and problem-
solving. Based on the works by Rhodes (1961), Glăveanu proposed a classi-
fication of research on creativity that he called ‘The Five A’s Framework’.
Glăveanu (2013, page 78) suggested using actor, action, artefact, audience, and
affordance to situate research within the “system of symbolic and material
human creation”. Within this framework, the phenomenon of emerging
solutions is part of the action or, to relate to Rhodes’s (1961) well-known
terminology, the creative process. In the literature I found two opposing
approaches to understand the action of creation: a class of sequential models
and the iterative design thinking (Howard et al., 2008, also see).
The theoretical foundation of design thinking goes back to cognitive sci-
entists such as the Artificial Intelligence researcher Herbert Alexander
Simon (1969). The basic assumption is that creative actors iterate through
a number of ‘spaces’ or phases until the problem is solved. I showed a
visualisation in section 2.7.5. The design process in one of its many imple-
mentations is part of the curriculum of artists, architects, and engineers.
Since these professions are often considered to produce creative artefacts,
I administered a study in chapter 3. The aim was to observe if insight is
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part of their action and if indeed design thinking can be used to trace their
creative process.
The alternative, the prototypical sequential model of creativity was pub-
lished byWallas (1926) and consists of five consecutive stages as illustrated
in section 2.7.4. Psychological tasks and studies often assume this underly-
ing process. To assess the action, publications in Cognitive Science rely on
measuring the artefacts or enquire information from the audience or about
the actor. In this thesis, I introduce a novel experimental paradigm that
provides information about the action of the creative process itself. The
study in chapter 4 demonstrates that the observed physical dimension of
the action links to the internal psychological experience.
5.2 A new multi-layered model
At a fundamental level, design thinking and sequential models differ regarding
their visualisation as a circle or as a line respectively. Once the design
thinking process has started, it keeps iterating cyclically through the same
phases over and over again, until a final solution is found. Consquenlty
this action is depcted as a circle. In any of the sequential models, the creative
action starts at some point and progresses through consecutive stages
towards the final solution. There is no repetition of stages in this linear
process and as a result the action is represented as a line.
Models of the creative process are used in the education of practitioner. As
mentioned earlier, the Eureka experience of Archimedes was initially written
down in a textbook for architects 2000 years ago (Pollio, 15/1914). Von
Helmholtz (1892) talked about his own creative process with the intention
of helping others to become more productive and his model was later
adapted by Wallas (1926). And design thinking has been used by creative
practitioners and engineers since Herbert Alexander Simon (1969) wrote
about it. The choice of the theoretical model informs the creative practice
in how the problem and solution are approached. Teaching and applying
the model best suited for the environment of the practitioners potentially
improves the quality and quantity of creative products. The observation of
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the process, on the other hand, informs the theoretical model that is used
in communicationwith the peers an in planning for the process. Therefore,
the choice of the model has direct consequences on how the actors shape
the action, and consequently on the artefact. If the process is perceived as
a line, then then going back to a stage that was previously completed is
difficult and as a setback, while the iterating through the same stage again
is seen as progress in iterative models like design thinking.
Sequential and iterative models have previously been considered exclusive
– the creative process was either sequential or iterative. As a result of my
interviews with architects and taking into account the results of Sawyer’s
(2016) study, I suggest in chapter 3 how to map experiences previously
discussed as a cyclic process on a sequential model. Visually, this means
straightening the circle into several line segments. These line segments
could then be arranged as parallel in time, and even organised in hierar-
chical layers. This has the advantage of defined start and endpoints, of a
representation of the continuous progression on the highest layer of the
hierarchy, and a representation of repeating stages throughout the action.
Applying the multi-layered model of creativity to creative projects gives
a higher explanatory power to the practitioners as they can account for
observations more easily than in a sequential model. At the same time the
processes within each layer are more predictable and structured than in
cyclic iterative models. Applying the multi-layered model to educational
settings gives students a framework to organise their own creative action
in an effective and goal-oriented way, while obtaining the same flexibil-
ity of the design thinkingmodel. This multi-layered model is discussed in
greater detail in section 3.5.2.
5.3 Expanding the results of the interviews
During the interviews with architects, I found that they often work on
several problems at the same time, or use techniques that allow them to
manipulate several aspects of their work simultaneously. These different
problems can be organised in hierarchies, such as the contextualisation of
the whole building, section in a scale that shows the human experience,
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or details such as features of windows. Once these actions are transformed
into sequential models, their arrangement in hierarchical structures allows
a more detailed explanation of the reality. In section 3.6 I speculate on
the nature of structural and temporal arrangements. In section 4.4.1 I
observe the phenomenon of immediate insight in the data collected through
Dira. While the temporal aspect of this observation is difficult to explain
through a single sequential model or a design process, the subtask of a multi-
layeredmodel, as explained in section 3.6.4, can account for this phenomena.
However Dira was originally designed as a hierarchical task, and it was
only during post-hoc examinations that I found that the multilayered
model could fit both the qualitative architects’ data and the behavioural
participants’ data. While more data and analyses following up on sub-level
as started in section 4.3.2 are required to provide additional empirical
support for the multi-layered model, this model is currently the best fit
for all these kinds of data.
5.4 Expanding the results of Dira
In the current literature, classical insight tasks and convergent thinking tasks
are used to study the moment when solutions emerge. In both cases, the
extracted measures are not based on the action. For example, in conver-
gent thinking tasks, the total time to reach an artefact only measures the
total length of the action and provides no information about the process
itself. Individual differences of the actor mediate this measured duration.
Current mood, language fluency, or fluid intelligence have previously been
identified as contributing factors. As shown in section 2.4, for some tasks
it is assumed that solutions can only be reached through insight. In other
cases the actor self-reports as either experiencing or not experiencing an
insight. This forced binary choice is then used to classify or compare the
assumed action, for example by contrasting recorded neuroimaging data.
The results from the Dira study show that human experience of the phe-
nomenon is richer than this dichotomous assumption. In fact, people are
capable of providing a reliable and consistent account of their experience.
Reports from some of the architects, who talked about Aha moments of
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varying intensity, support this breadth of experience. For example, Lewis
talked about ‘bursting bubbles’ as cognitive leaps happening several times
within a project, Charles reported an ‘Aha moment’ coming up with the
idea of a walled garden, and for Zak ideas began to ‘click’ when transfer-
ring knowledge from one year to another. Consequently, future research
should take into account that Eureka experiences are not dichotomous.
5.5 Future directions
The results from the studies presented here open the way to a newmethod-
ology of answering questions on insight, innovation, and problem solving.
For example, Dira was designed with architects and creative practitioners
in mind: the task contains verbal and visual cues, it has more than one cor-
rect answer, and the constraints are ill-defined and potentially ambiguous.
Nevertheless, the task has not yet been administered to participants sam-
pled from an arts or design background. In this study, Dira can be utilised
to study the role of individual differences and domain-specific training
on the action. Furthermore, modifications of the task itself, for example,
adding or removing solutions or using more or less complex stimuli, can
contribute to understanding the role of working memory, visual percep-
tion, and associative networks in the creative process.
The portability of Dira allows studying the influence of the environment
on the creative performance. Contrasting data collected in the noisy group
setting of an architect’s studiowith a silent and isolated roomcould be used
to determine the effect of social, auditory, and visual distractors on the
information acquisition process. Other modifiers of cognitive processes
that have previously been identified as mediators of divergent and conver-
gent production can be tested for their impact on the creative process as
well. Examples are the influence of mindfulness meditation, intoxication,
or mood changes.
When developing the task, one of the criteria was repeatability with the
same participant. Besides applications in longitudinal studies, Dira could
also be used in neuroimaging studies or to compare mouse tracing with
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eye tracking. In current EEG studies, the subjective experience of insight is
assessed after the task, but the neuroimaging data is the only temporal
data recorded during the action. Together with the non-binary scale for
Eureka experiences, Dira allows more detailed analysis of the process itself.
The interviews with architects demonstrate that creative practitioners
reflect on their work and their processes. The recurring theme of itera-
tion and exploration indicates that the students act upon and report the
process they are taught as part of their curriculum. The experienced and
reported iterations could, therefore, result from confirmation bias. This
hypothesis could be tested along with the effectiveness of themulti-layered
model of creativity in a pedagogical intervention. In this study, a group of
creative practitioners could be taught the novel developed model instead
of design thinking. Their change of processes could be assessed through a
longitudinal study based on Dira, and their performance in the tutorial
through the regular grading.
Finally, the fine-grained behavioural data collected during the task exe-
cution provides more information about the human performance than
previously existing techniques. This can be utilised in computational mod-
eling of the creative process similar to the work by Hélie and Sun (2010),
reducing the number of necessary assumptions and incresing the number
of verifiable steps. Disassembling the whole creative action into smaller
sub-processes by consulting the the multi-layered model, gives compu-
tational modellers more checkpoints to verify the effectiveness of their
policy manipulation against the collected human behaviour. Therefore,
the computer models are not black boxes with input, output, and unknown
steps in between, but instead can be verified in between against data theo-
retically grounded in the multi-layered model. For example, in previous
tasks participants are asked to press a button once they found a solution
(Salvi et al., 2016). Hence there is no data to estimate what participants
were doing before pressing the button and therefore no data to check in-
termediate results from computational models. The fine-grained data col-
lected through tasks like ‘Dira’ (see chapter 4) provides transitional results,
and the multi-layered model from section 3.5.2 gives a theoretical under-




Creative solutions emerge as a rare and surprising phenomenon, which
is often followed by positive affect. The agreement of two or more pub-
lications on the same theoretical definition or description of this event
seems similarly rare and surprising, as I have shown in an innovative re-
view of the literature. With this thesis I contribute to the endeavour of
understanding the complex phenomenon of emerging solutions through
an interdisciplinary approach: 1. I trace the theoretical underpinning
across several fields, 2. observe and identify the phenomenon in real-life
situations, 3. provide a multi-layered model to unify previously opposing
sequential models of creativity and design thinking, 4. suggest an experimental
paradigm to study not the resulting products, but the process emerging so-
lutions are a part of, and 5. explain how people create in this novel task.
Several technical terms, such as Eureka experience, Aha moment, insight,
illumination, hunch, and epiphany are regularly used in the literature of
Cognitive Science. While I was able to demonstrate a tendency in how
these terms are currently being used and suggest several interpretations
of the phenomenon, the field is lacking clear and agreed on definitions.
Publications often rely on everyday language when researching these phe-
nomena. In chapter 2 I name ambiguous terms from different disciplinary
backgrounds related to the phenomenon of interest. Historically I trace
one potential cause for the ambiguous use of the term insight. Here I iden-
tify an imprecise translation of the German equivalent Einsicht through
comparative linguistic analysis. With this investigation, I contribute to a
better understanding of the terminology.
The research conductedwithin this thesis did not occur in a vacuum, rather
I embedded it in the interdisciplinary research on ‘Cognitive Innovation’.
With the breadth of literature on the phenomenon of interest, ranging
179
6 Conclusion
from psychological studies of neural correlates of insight to the education
in Zen Buddhism and from social applications to artificial intelligence, the
necessity to ‘think outside the box’ of disciplines emerged and seemed
necessary to relate existing findings. My contributions to the framework
of ‘Cognitive Innovation’ informed the research practice andmethods used
within this thesis.
The missing – or ever-changing – definition of the phenomenon makes it
easy to dismiss its existence, evenwith clear and distinguishable subjective
experiences of creative practitioners and problem solvers. By replicating
a study with creative practitioners, I demonstrate in this thesis that the
phenomenon of insight is part of the architects’ work, but not necessarily of
the design thinking vocabulary. In this work, I present compelling evidence
that architects trained in design thinking experience Eureka and find it
useful to include the phenomenon in reflections on their processes and
practice.
I addressed the apparent conflict between iterative design cycles and se-
quential models of creativity in this work as well. Discussing the previ-
ously separated streams of research in a shared vocabulary, I propose a
multi-layered model of creativity in this thesis. In this theoretical model, I
organise sequences of creative problem-solving in hierarchies. This model,
inspired by research from different disciplines, provides additional ex-
planatory power to the data collected from architects and artists.
With the novel Dira task I propose an experimental paradigm to collect
empirical data on the action or the creative process itself. Informed by
the literature review, this seems necessary, since existing tasks related
to the insight phenomenon often rely on the assessment of the artefact or
creative product. In my literature review, I also identify measures that
seem to rely on the actor, the audience, or the affordance. These previous
approaches conflict with the assumption that insight is part of the action or
creative process. With the task Dira, I demonstrate that the behavioural data
collected in Dira can be used to narrow down the moment when solutions
emerge. Furthermore, I show, that the multi-layered model of creativity I
developed gives explanatory power where previously existing sequential
models and design thinking fall short.
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With the result from the Dira experiment, I contribute to the discussion
in the literature between insight as a binary phenomenon or a gradual
experience. Essentially, some research suggests that people either have
a Eureka experience or they do not, while other studies give participants
a more gradual response option. The interviews I conducted with archi-
tects show that they perceive cognitive leaps in partial problems as weaker
insights than for final solutions. In Dira I was able to quantify this differ-
ence and confirm, that participants recognise emerging solutions not as
dichotomous phenomena; instead, they were able to distinguish between
different intensities of Eureka experiences.
Closing remarks
In summary, the phenomenon of emerging solutions is a fascinating and
intrinsically interdisciplinary research topic. Even with the vast amount
of literature dedicated to insight, Eureka experiences, Aha moments, epipha-
nies, and hunches, these subjective experiences of cognitive leaps seem to
lack process-based and systematic exploration. Considering ‘Cognitive
Innovation’ as a theoretical underpinning for the interdisciplinary work
provided a useful way of thinking about the individual, societal, and tech-
nological aspects of the Eureka moment. Furthermore, the methodology
and terminology spanning several traditional disciplines allowed a novel
and useful way of approaching insight. The mixed-methods approach in
this thesis resulted in a novel theoretical model supported through em-
pirical data from a novel task and observations of creative practitioners.
Future research is invited to build on the experiences of the Dira experi-
ment in the quest for the Eureka moment.
Future
There is a range of future research on the emerging phenomena that would
interest me. The Dira task could be modified to measure other aspects of
the creative action. I believe, neuroimaging can be used to identify the
brain networks involved in solving the task. This would allow to identify
brain activation correlated with the behavioural data to strengthen as-
sumptions on thought processes. Given the opportunity, I would want to
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use these different data sources to advance the computational models of
Eureka moments, for example building on the epiphany learning research,
and therefore the time course of emergent phenomena in general. On the
theoretical side, I want to explore other implications of ‘Cognitive Innova-
tion’ as the framework that enabled this line of research and to think and
work outside disciplinary boxes.
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1.1 Interview with Joshua Watts
Frank Loesche: What I am interested in is: How do you solve problems in1
your domain? And to start with: What would you consider a problem?2
Joshua Watts: So you mean in architecture, or in architecture school?3
Frank: If there is a difference, maybe you could explain that?4
Joshua: I guess as a start — its designing versus site analysis and looking at5
it. Well, if it is going to be within the budget…6
So if we find any kind of problems or issues with its going to become almost7
like a stimulus or stimuli to emphasize upon.8
Frank: So you would basically go to that place and experience…9
Joshua: So as is said: my site is on the Barbican. So you could say “There is10
not enough connection to the water”. That could be a problem.11
Frank: Who tells you that not having a connection to thewater is a problem?12
Is that part of the task you are given?13
Joshua: It’s more like a personal analysis, I guess.14
Frank: So you try to put yourself into the place15
Joshua: …and then you can speak to the people as well and see what opens16
up. Although I would say with a person it’s more an individual site analysis,17
and then developed upon what you think the problems are.18
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Frank: And you basically try to get the feeling of the site, understand the19
place. Do you have any other constraints — and why do you choose the20
site in the first place? How do you make it your own problem?21
Joshua: Personally, well — the site that I chose I chose because there wasn’t22
much activity, there wasn’t much going on at the site. So I wanted to kind23
of revive the site itself and then use the building to create some kind of24
presence tomake it want to go to the place rather than just walk through.25
Frank: So the motivation is to change things?26
Joshua: Yes, to use architectural design to make like a better landscape,27
trying to improve existing regions.28
Frank: Do you want to make yourself being seen in some way- is that part29
of your motivation as well?30
Joshua: I think so. … I don’t know. I think each project, everyones project31
is quite personal. So yes, I think architecture school itself is a good place32
to test yourself, your own ideas, do things which might not necessarily be33
viable in a real world, but can still provide like a good testing bed to try34
things out. I guess from that actually an idea might spring out.35
Frank: So it’s more about learning how to approach things?36
Joshua: I think: Yes. I’d say, it’s more of a learning process rather than37
necessarily doing something what is completely understood. It’s more like38
learning how the design process works.39
Frank: What did you learn then in this tutorial? Is there something you40
can pin down like “I was down there one Sunday, the sun was shining or I41
had a chat with some friend and then suddenly…”42
Joshua: What we are doing now is some kind of a development of something43
we have been doing last year. And we have this site, which is a car park.44
We developed into this kind of public urban landscape. So for this project45
I have then chosen the site next to it. So I want to develop that into46
what we have done last year. It’s more of a development of the things we47
have already done rather than “I spoke with someone about this space48
specifically”. Just another place I have identified and have developed.49
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Frank: Can you name a few days that had a impact on your work or is50
it more like a steady flowing process: you start at some point and the51
more work you put in and the more time you put in, the more you will52
actually get out. Or is it more like: sometimes you solve more in one day53
and sometimes you solve less?54
Joshua: I think, there is definitely, I am going back to lasts year, but there is55
definitely some days where something just clicks and you just have an idea.56
And from there you just develop it and you keep working, but since then it57
has been a fairly steady flow. You start off with fairly sketchy designs, and58
then you are refining those until you have a building. From there you go59
down in scale so you start looking at it in more detail how it starts to go60
together. So I’d say there are times, there are days when ideas click and61
from there…62
Frank: And once you change the scale to … is it scaling down when you go63
closer?64
Joshua: It’s scaling down.65
Frank: So if you change the scale, how does that help?66
Joshua: It gives you more, for me personal, it gives me more — knowing67
about what I am designing. The more detail you look into, the more you68
scale down, the more you know how the building is going to go together.69
The more elements… I am making a 1:20 scale. So it’s quite big, and it’s70
just beginning to show how exactly things are going to go together. Well71
say, a few months ago I was more looking at sketching at a plan. Without72
really knowing how it might look or it might go together.73
Frank: So what changes if you take a sketch out and put it into a model? So74
what is the difference between a sketch and a model for you?75
Joshua: So personally I use models to show more of how the building goes76
together while the sketch is more of a form, maybe where different rooms77
might go. So let’s say there might be a room here, or where the roof might78
go. But when it comes to a model it’s not really about showing these79
different spaces. It’s showing how the whole thing is going to go together,80
how it might look.81
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Frank: By “showing” — do you mean in a way of communicating with82
others, and communicating with your group, or with your tutorial? Or do83
you mean for yourself, show it to yourself?84
Joshua: hm…85
Frank: I mean if you were asked just to build the building —would you need86
the model for yourself or is it something to communicate with others?87
Joshua: They do help me a lot, personally. I used not to like the mod-88
els… Models communicate to other people much more than just drawings.89
When you do a sketch to yourself you just see where you’re at while with90
the model it more like a still frame. And obviously in architecture, build-91
ings are 3D itself, and sketches are not.92
Katharine Willis: When you do a site analysis, it might be useful to mention93
howyou do thatwith drawings. Frankmight not know that you are actually94
getting lots of drawings as part of that process, so it’s not literally just95
walking down there.96
Joshua: Site analysis is a process. A lot of it is taking photos, a lot of drawings97
on site. And then a lot of examining along the site. And sketches and98
everything. Just to kind of giving yourself as broad of a picture as you can.99
But then it can expand out of the site, so you look at city scale problems.100
So in my project I am looking at the lack of green space in the city. So that101
is something that isn’t necessary just looking at the site I am building on,102
it focuses on a wider problem and trying to use the building to encourage103
the introduction of more green space into the city.104
Frank: Does that also mean you look at the history of this place.105
Joshua: A lot of people do that, personally I haven’t. That could be another106
stimulus for designing. The history of a place and what has happened on107
a site in previous times. You could try to reintroduce things that have108
happened before back onto the site. Kind like the train line on the Barbican109
which isn’t used any more but some people trying to kind of reintroduce110
that.111




Joshua: There are lots of different assignments, so it kind of varies where114
you’re from. But within the assignment it’s very open what you can look115
at. So you can make your own assumptions and site analysis.116
Frank: So for example the choice not to look at the history— that is entirely117
your choice not to do that?118
Joshua: Yes. I just thought that — history is the history. I wasn’t actually119
too interested into examining that.120
Frank: You said it’s more like looking for a stimulus that actually influences121
your work. Is there something I am totally missing?122
Katharine: People from different units will have different input. You will123
have a certain input that is given, a document with what’s defined, what’s124
not defined.125
Joshua: There are certain things everyone has to consider for the final126
presentations.127
Frank: Thank you very much.128
1.2 Interview with Ewan Palmer
Frank Loesche: I am interested in the whole process, how you approach the1
problems that are given. What would you consider to be a problem in your2
work throughout a tutorial?3
EwanPalmer: I suppose finding a solution towhatever design process you’ve4
been through.5
Frank: So who put the design process on you? Who decides what problems6
you ought to work on?7
Ewan: It’s part of the assignment. You have have to hit certain criteria,8
like 1500 square meter building that has to have at least two floors. Do9
whatever you want with that, really. I guess I just mainly go through10
drawings, draw everything out. Try to think. Once it’s in my head then I11
try to get most of it out on paper so that I can see it physically.12
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Frank: So if you hear “I have to build a 1500 square meter building with13
two floors” you immediately start drawing?14
Ewan: Yes, start sketching out first ideas. So it might be really basic. And15
then move from sketch drawing to something a bit more solid. So it might16
be like a plan that was drawn out at the drawing board. That won’t be17
perfect. So I’ll make iterations about it until I get into it.18
Frank: So where do you get your first initial idea from? I mean, looking19
back at it what you have done in the past, what do you think was the20
inspiration or source for that?21
Ewan: Various things that I have seen and experienced. Taking inspiration22
from memory, I suppose.23
Frank: Would that be something you have seen recently or does it not really24
matter?25
Ewan: Things that have happened recently — probably more. They are26
more in front of your mind, so you might be more influenced by this. But27
it wouldn’t be specific to the most recent thing you have seen.28
Frank: Does it matter where you put your building? If you just hear “150029
square meter building” it might be something different to put it on the30
Barbican than just next door, right?31
Ewan: Yes, obviously. You are given some sort of site. At the moment that’s32
Exeter.33
Frank: So understanding that is obviously the first task?34
Ewan: Yes, obviously the surroundings have an influence on what you are35
thinking about and how you come up with your structure.36
Frank: So did you start drawing before you actually went there? — you37
obviously go to that place at some point, right?38
Ewan: Yeah… No, not really. The first thing we did was visiting the site. I39




Frank: Do you try to follow the form of the place or do you try to rather42
contrast it in some way?43
Ewan: Well, I think it depends. It depends on what you are trying to do,44
what your agenda is, what the idea is…45
Frank: So which project are you working on at the moment?46
Ewan: At the moment the Exeter Quay.47
Frank: What was the general idea of what you want to understand in this48
tutorial?49
Ewan: Exeter Quay is like an abandoned boat yard, it’s every once in a while50
flooded. So it’s about safety considerations in the proposal.51
Frank: Do you just try to secure it then?52
Ewan: It’s about bringing the site back to the city. At the moment it’s53
very separated from the city centre itself. There are good connotations54
and bad connotations about that. We always talk about “stitching things55
back together”. I am looking at, whether that would be a good thing or56
a bad thing. And how individuals can basically change a city, can change57
something.58
Frank: So you are looking at the social scale, gentrification?59
Ewan: It’s sort of a mapping to the idea of people creating a city rather60
than institutions. So where people work with the city might not necessary61
be the main part of the city. And why is that? What influences that? How62
does this adapt? How does it change the city? How does the city adapt to63
the person rather than the way around?64
Frank: How can you help that process with architecture?65
Ewan: At the moment I am trying to use the idea of agencies. I give the66
individuals agency to create their own spaces. At the moment I am map-67
ping each individual. And their individual map is displayed which effects68
a wider populous of designers and architects who are effecting the city69
directly and physically. Then they are influenced by what the individual is70
doing rather than by other things.71
222
Appendix
Frank: Are those individuals people you actually met at the site or are they72
more like personaes that you created.73
Ewan: Yes, they would be if it was actually a live project, but in this context,74
you know…75
Frank: Why is that important and how does that help you?76
Ewan: To me it is more of an agenda rather than… I think that cities at77
the moment are very verbalised and not focused on the individuals that78
occupy them. So I almost try to fight against that process that is happening79
at the moment.80
Frank: So how do you do that?81
Ewan: So it is about the idea of agency again, the mapping, influencing the82
people who are influencing the city directly. Like architects. They effect83
the city by building and constructing stuff, but you effect those individuals84
and you give the individuals more agency than they would have initially.85
Frank: So do you give them space, or do you give them a building?86
Ewan: You give them a connection to the people who effect the city directly.87
Take from them what they think about the city and how they use the city88
and people who directly act, like architects, get to see that. And that, in89
turn, effect what they do to the city. It’s about the relationship between90
those two.91
Frank: Was there anything surprising in the current project for yourself? I92
mean from your perspective, or was it a rather smooth experience from93
your first encounter…94
Ewan: I don’t think it was a smooth experience. I think there are certain95
points in the process where you try to work things out and then suddenly,96
how do you say “Eureka moment”, you jump a bit. And then you have like97
another plateau where you try to think through things and work through98
things and then again, you sort of jump again. Do you knowwhat Imean?99
Frank: Yes. Why do you stay on a plateau? Why don’t you just continue in100
progress? What do you think keeps you from doing so?101
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Ewan: I think it has to do with the way I work, getting things onto paper,102
getting things out physically. Having a bit of a making process. So you103
might be doing something that you think is useful initially but maybe104
it isn’t and then you change what you are doing. So you might go from105
drawing to modelling… I think you have to find the right media to solve106
the problem that you are trying to tackle.107
Frank: There is a different medium for each type of problem I suppose?108
Ewan: Yes. It’s hard to identify, I suppose. Sometimes you might want to109
work on two-dimensional forms, just drawings. Sometimes that wouldn’t110
work. So you wanna work in three dimensional form like modelling, or111
working on a computer. That’s not three dimensional, but it is seen three112
dimensional.113
Frank: How do you know it is the right medium?114
Ewan: I suppose you only know once you’ve come up with the solution.115
Frank: Why do you know it’s a solution?116
Ewan: I think it’s about how you perceive the solution. It might not be the117
right solution to everyone, but it would be perceived like that.118
Frank: It is more like a feeling then?119
Ewan: Yes.120
Frank: And changing the medium… I mean if you knew you could solve the121
problem using a 3D computer model, would you still start drawing first122
and doing a model or would straight go to the…123
Ewan: Yes, straight. I personally would. I always try to use the medium I124
think would solve the problem, sometimes it just doesn’t and you have to125
change how you work, adapt.126
Frank: Thank you very much. Just one final question. Do you think it helps127
to work in groups or do you like the individual tasks better, to show what128
you have done yourself? Or is it more helpful…129
Ewan: I think it is easier to work as an individual, but it is interesting to130
work in a group to mix agendas. Trying to solve things as a group. It is131
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definitely harder because each got a different idea and each trying to get132
to the solution, but your solution might not be the same as theirs.133
Frank: And you tried to work in different groups, right? Which one was134
easier?135
Ewan: I think smaller groups. You start off in groups of six or seven and136
now in groups of four. I personally think four is a nicer number, just a little137
bit easier to get on with everyone.138
Frank: OK, that’s it. Thanks again.139
1.3 Interview with Alex Wells
Frank Loesche: Like I said earlier: I am working on creative problem solving.1
I am really interested in what you think is a problem in architecture? What2
are you trying to solve here?3
Alex Wells: I think you don’t really know what the problem is to begin4
with. It’s almost like you are looking for a problem. Maybe it’s not a5
problem, maybe its something… a quality which is uncertain in that. That6
is the problem that should be presented or highlighted. I think it is totally7
subjective to where it is, I guess.8
Frank: What do you mean by uncertain quality?9
Alex: There could be something really unspoken of or really positive about10
a community or about a landscape. You know, whatever it is, sometimes11
more, sometimes less… it should be highlighted, it could be highlighted. It12
could be better for the wider context if it was highlighted, but it is not. So13
you highlight it.14
Frank: How do you find something that is worth highlighting?15
Alex: I don’t know. OK… Sometimes it’s just like through inspection, or16
sometimes it’s back to nothing…17
Frank: Do you have an example for that? I mean coming from the outside18
of the field, it’s kinda hard…19
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Alex: Yeah. I don’t know. I think the idea of back to nothing is like. It’s not20
really talked about that much in architectural approach. So maybe I am21
there, stuck in the project and then just, accidentally, I go somewhere else22
and for some reason… by going there it brings something to look back at23
the project differently. So it’s just pure coincidence. I talk to someone and24
it just happens that they knew someone who knew someone that…25
Frank: Is that you main approach then?26
Alex: No, definitely not. It’s just like… No it’s just — if you have a dead end27
it helps sometimes.28
Frank: Why do you end up in dead ends? I mean, if you say, you usually29
have a different approach to problems…30
Alex: I don’t know. I think sometimes you just use momentum I guess, if31
it happens that you sort of getting there. Other times you just try to be32
creative, I think: just working in many different ways. Sort of juggling33
everything. And then you solve by juggling with yourself. Sometimes you34
just need a chat with like minded.35
Frank: So your usual approach is “juggling”, and every once in a while you36
have an “accident”.37
Alex: yeah. And then you drop everything…38
Frank: How do you feel about the juggling process itself. Is it kind of39
frustrating to start with this process and looking from one to the other.40
Alex: Yes, it’s kind of frustrating, but you know it is frustrating. So you41
accept it.42
Frank: So you start and you know it will frustrate you…43
Alex: Yeah. So you know that. Because you end up spending so much time44
on one and then you know when you move on to another thing it’s gonna45
be great and it’s going to change completely. Does that make sense? So46
constantly, everything youmake, you almost know, it is not going to be the47
same after the next drawing you are going to do. So for instance you do48
a drawing and you use something else, and you go back to your drawing,49
it’s bound to be different. So you end up redrawing everything. So that’s50
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kind of frustrating, and that’s sort of juggling a bit. Every time you touch51
something, next time you touch it, it’s completely different. So it’s always52
changing.53
Frank: Isn’t it some kind of steady progress then?54
Alex: Yes, yes, it’s definitely progressive.55
Frank: Why is it frustrating then?56
Alex: No, it’s good, because it is progressive, it is frustrating because it57
takes a lot of time. No it feels good to touch it again, but I would still say58
it’s frustrating.59
Frank: OK, this approach was the juggling one, the other one was the60
accident.61
Alex: Yeah. But the accident is very, like…62
Frank: How often does that happen?63
Alex: I don’t know.64
Frank: On a weekly basis, one time a year…65
Alex: No, no. Maybe a few times a year. Or even just little things, you read66
something you wouldn’t normally read or you watch something you don’t67
normally watch… So in that sense, those little things… They can happen68
on very small scales and on very large scales. I guess it could happen all69
the time, though… We are just not conscious about…70
Frank: Could you give me an example?71
Alex: In the last project, it was at the time when you are trying to present72
everything. So you are there. You know that the next project after is73
basically already developing. So this is like the middle, this is presenting74
where you are. And while I was working on those I went to a lecture about75
a Montreal based landscaper who was just talking through his approach76
to landscaping in a community. And from that I saw all the floors in my77
design at the moment. Because of the deadline I knew I couldn’t change it78
in time. So just kept that in mind and now, once I handed it in and I got79
back to it in January, it is much like — I am having all those new ideas that80
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coming into design and developed it. So it is just like an accident that I81
listened to that, but I just hold it now came back to it in time.82
Frank: That happens at small scales as well?83
Alex: Yeah, I think that was more of a small scale. A big scale would be, I84
don’t know… Architects designed a building which wasn’t meant for this85
client, but then it turned out that the shape, the form the building ended up86
in having a representation of that Chinese symbol. So they saw the building87
and they said — “Oh, so is that our building?” And they said “No?”, “But88
that represents this in our language…” From that, from this accident they89
designed a building that represents something to them. That accident, or90
that accidental view, made them give a building to them.91
Frank: Besides small things adding up you also said that you work with92
different models, like drawings… How does help you?93
Alex: The same idea of juggling. You work in one medium and then you94
trying to translate it into another medium. But through that translation it95
develops. So if you do a drawing of that space and when you do and try to96
replicate that space in this new format, you see those floors in that space97
that you created. And then develop those problems. I don’t remember98
how you identify the problems, I think you just “know” the problems. I99
think through that translations you just see… It doesn’t necessary convey100
what you are trying to say.101
Frank: So if you translate it back to the drawing then would it be differ-102
ent?103
Alex: Yeah. So when you are trying to translate it back you look at it com-104
pletely different. Maybe not entirely different, but bits have changed.105
Frank: So a good way to solve all your problems would just be to make a106
model, drawing, model, drawing….107
Alex: Yeah, yeah.108
Frank: Is that what you would do?109
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Alex: Yeah. But it’s not always just like alterations between models and110
drawings. It doesn’t have to be physical. It could be writing. So you write111
about the space and then you realize.112
Frank: So how do you identify the type of problems for example that makes113
you want to write about it?114
Alex: I don’t know. I think a lot of help is to … I think that’s when the115
work comes. The work is when you don’t know where to go. So you116
don’t know whether to make a model, make a drawing… But nothing is117
changing. That’s when you start talking to other people or start getting118
your inspiration from other people. Through that, you say I want to try119
this. Also it’s about what I feel comfortable with. Personally I rarely write120
about my work because I am not very comfortable writing. While a lot121
of people do and through that. I don’t even know how you decide what122
kind of hierarchy you pick yourself in terms of doing drawings more often,123
making models more.124
Frank: Could someone just starting, like me, follow your path to solve the125
problem? Or what would you suggest? What is the difference there?126
Alex: I think it is a process of you knowing how. I mean, the way I work now127
wasn’t the same as I worked last year. It is a lot more efficient. And I am128
sure, by the time next year, I know how I work a lot more than how I work129
now. The same, if you just started, you would probably, in a very simple130
case, draw out something. Or maybe not, because you might not know131
how to draw. It also goes back to your background. But it’s also about how132
I was brought up, the education and how I was taught…133
Frank: Would you say you get inspiration from other people? Are those134
architects as well?135
Alex: It could be anyone. I mean, I talk to my mom about projects and she136
goes “what about it”… You know, she is a nurse. She has no clue, really. It’s137
quite nice when go outside of the insula of architecture. You know, talk to138
real people.139
Katharine Willis: It strikes me, how students work — it’s more like a skill.140
You basically gained the skill, knowing how it works. I think if you came141
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in and did a project, you wouldn’t have the skills to complete it. You might142
be in the same process, but there are some skills that you have to have to143
complete that. So it’s not just the task itself.144
Alex: Yeah, that’s because, you have gained that through experience.145
Katharine: I think that’s the point of experience. Because you are basically146
repeating the same process pretty much all the way through your project147
while you are doing different tasks. So it’s sort of a repetition, but it’s a148
different condition, basically.149
Frank: So how does the tutor help, or what is the role of the tutor in this150
process?151
Alex: It sort of takes the same role. It is an outsider person coming in but152
also they take the role of a tutor in general. So they make you do things153
that you wouldn’t or haven’t even ever done before.154
Frank: Just within the architectural domain or do they also take your155
thinking “outside the box”?156
Alex: Yes, definitely. This year… I have never really been political or eco-157
nomical and then, this year I have put that sort of perspective on every158
step… So I shifted to be more politically. I think it’s probably from the159
tutor or more current events or things like that.160
Frank: So what is your tutorial, what site are you working on right now?161
Alex: in … Island…162
Frank: Thank you, that was very helpful.163
1.4 Interview with Kiera Stanley
Frank Loesche: Maybe first: in which tutorial are you working or what1
project are you working on? Can you describe what you are doing at the2
moment?3
Kiera Stanley: OK, so I am working in Plymouth which is a car park. And I4
am designing a proper boat building and a pub for the community.5
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Frank: What kind of problems do you see or how do you get engaged with6
the project, how does it start?7
Kiera: I don’t know. It’s not really like a tangible thing. You get inspired by8
something and then this motivates you for a while until you hit the next9
wall and then, I think you have to — for me it was so — when you always10
think about it, when you always think about the next part of the project11
you just keep having ideas. And then you just want to make them visible12
on paper…13
Frank: How do you chase up those ideas, how do you get creative? Do you14
have a special technique for that?15
Kiera: Generally, I don’t know. Probably getting out of the studio. Well for16
some of the ideas. Sometimes when you are in a place where you can’t get17
an idea you just need to clear your head and get out and get some fresh18
thinking. Which just means being in a situation which isn’t as relevant to19
what I am doing.20
Frank: So is this something completely different?21
Kiera: Yeah!22
Frank: Or do you actually go to the place …23
Kiera: Oh, sometimes I do. I quite often go for a run and I run past the24
site. And that kind of helps. What am I trying to think? It’s just running25
around…26
Frank: What are you trying to change in that place? Why are you trying to27
change it?28
Kiera: I am trying to change it because it’s kind of a forgotten location in29
Plymouth and there is no real need to go there. And also doesn’t seem30
to have any meaning or character. And so I am trying to bring some of31
that meaning back to a real building. And that’s why I think it is more32
important to have ideas rather than just design something just because it33
has to be something that is more meaningful to go to this space.34
Frank: How do you know it will be more meaningful? Is it you personal35
point of view that matters?36
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Kiera: I just think it’s personal. But I think that it’s something that has a37
bit more input. Like something… for the people… who might think this38
is just a car park. It’s not like you would like to visit something like a car39
park. It’s something that kind of intrigues me.40
Frank: I mean the car park itself has a meaning to the car owners that go41
to places nearby. So you could argue it has a meaning. Who decides that42
you want to change it to open it to others as well?43
Kiera: I suppose it is generally… the function of a car park is this utilitarian44
thing. It doesn’t really have any wider influence on that. It is not really45
good for anybody other than the people who are moving. Nobody else46
would see someone driving a car in there “Oh that looks exciting. I should47
do that.” I mean it’s not… It’s just a function.48
Frank: I mean it probably has influenced the neighbouring areas. Someone49
who wants to go to a nearby place will drive there.50
Kiera: Yeah, I mean…. That’s how I think it has a lot to do about scale. Kind51
of a wider connotation. I think the thing to do with meaning… [Interrup-52
tion]53
I think what I am trying to do, what I am trying to put in is something54
that creates some kind of local interest rather than something thats on a55
different scale. And a car is something, you just don’t get in a car for a ten56
second drive. You get in the car to go to Dartmoor or something. So it’s57
kind of a local… And that’s something that a neighbour will benefit from58
rather than having a car park.59
Frank: So basically you change the scale of looking at one particular spot.60
You changed your scale when looking at it. How do you identify problems61
within that space? Do you talk to neighbours? Or do you go there?62
Kiera: Yeah, I mean. During this project we talked to a lot of people. Drivers,63
and a couple of nearby businesses, and asking them what they thought of64
the space. And the most interesting thing was talking to a guy who runs a65
pub and he was talking about all this history. There used to be an emigra-66
tions. People who go to South Africa, and Australia, and America… and all67
the people just parking their cars there would be completely oblivious to68
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that fact because it is just a convenient location by the water and so… it69
was something about the building also kind of really activating something70
completely forgotten as well…71
Frank: That is something you are trying to do now? Reviving the history?72
Kiera: In a way. I mean history is all about the sea. And I am working out …73
so it’s just about bringing back that dimension.74
Frank: One of sources of the inspirations seems to be you running around75
in that area, another one is the history. Are there other influences you76
could identify at the moment?77
Kiera: Well, I think it is slightly selfish, really. But I am doing things from78
ideas I had on previous projects. Like “Oh, I wish, I could do that” — but it79
didn’t work. So it’s in a kind of agenda to think “Oh, wow, last year I really80
wanted to do that” and so… probably from a kind of selfish perspective…81
Frank: Is it about building your own skill set in a way?82
Kiera: Yeah, definitely83
Frank: So what kind of skills do you want to learn?84
Kiera: What I am aiming at is to produce things that will help me in the85
next stages. So when I look at a piece of work I like “OK, I’ve done that and86
I cheated about that little thing there.” And I can put in more effort for87
follow ups and I am really up for that. In a completely different setting.88
Perfecting one project in one style… Lots of thoughts and feelings, but I89
can dig it up later on and look at it and think “Oh look, it got this and it90
got that… and then I just make one thing”…91
Frank: So you are trying to build your portfolio at the end?92
Kiera: Yeah!93
Frank: Are you trying to test yourself out what you are good at? Are you94
more considering on learning the technique or try…Or is itmore important95
for you to have solved the problem or do you want to put your name on96
the map of Plymouth?97
233
Appendix
Kiera: I don’t know if I really care about putting my name here. It’s not98
that I don’t want to… What I want to achieve is more about having some99
skills that I can apply to building a name for myself. But I mean the skills,100
I just need to build them more on the computer whereas a lot of people101
are much better in sketching. And so I also recognise where my strengths102
are. Especially last year I tried to be good at everything. And I approached103
it. I did everything. But I knew I want a variety of visual styles, but I didn’t104
know methods will get me there that I am better at.105
Frank: How do you get better in thosemethods? Does it help you to produce106
new ideas?107
Kiera: Yeah. Exactly! Because the process of putting it down is quick and I108
am able to not worry about how to represent. You just have an idea and109
then communicate that idea, put it down. And that really helps.110
Frank: Is it just about the time or is it also about the effort you put in?111
Kiera: It’s about time. Cause sometime you spend so long trying to work112
out how to best represent a thing.113
Frank: So is a main constraint for you by solving a problem the time? Or114
what is it in this tutorium? What puts the most pressure on you?115
Kiera: Yeah, I think when you have a deadline or a time. Then you tend to116
have more ideas and you will try things and just see if it works.117
Frank: So you are saying when you have a deadline you have more ideas?118
Kiera: In a way. Because you know the deadline. And you then take your119
time and kind of … the ideas kind of evolve. I try loads of things and I120
quickly see if it works.. And then I just do one of them.121
Frank: So how do you know which one works? I mean, it’s probably not122
like in math where you know 2+2 equals 4?123
Kiera: [Laughs] No. I mean. I don’t know. Sometimes when you have one124
thing… For me… I guess at some point you just need the justification from125
other people, you need another perspective. Gosh, I wish I could do this or126
that and all from different pieces, of if you do this from this. And it’s kind127
of… and then at some point it’s just like “Wait, that’s much better”…128
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Frank: So you say the group is quite important for you to solve the prob-129
lems?130
Kiera: Yeah, in a way…131
Frank: Not so much for creating the idea132
Kiera: Not so much for creating the idea. I think if you spend time with133
a problem quite long, you can’t really stand back and need a fresh set of134
eyes to look at it.135
Frank: Do they have to be “trained eyes” as well or do you show it to your136
friends137
Kiera: I guess to some kind of extend that helps. I mean when you have a138
group of people and you are always working with them they kind of know139
what your ideas are, anyway. And so they go “Oh, do this, this relates to140
your other thing you are doing.” So having people that are familiar with it141
helps.142
Frank: Familiar also with the project or just with your methodology? Prob-143
ably you know what the others in the tutorial are doing, right?144
Kiera: Maybe other people are aware of parts of my project, but not as145
much as I do…146
Frank: Did I forget anything?147
Katharine Willis: Just a little thing. Say when you are showing it to your148
friends and you were explaining it like, this one little room is going to be149
two little rooms. I guess you could explain it to someone else, but if you150
could show it to someone else, lets say you have a plan, or more a sketch…151
People, you know, there is a level of … they are not trained in a way to read152
that information…153
Kiera: The question is if you have a really rough sketch up with much of the154
lines just going everywhere and I say “Oh, this room is going to be great”.155
And I didn’t have the people that are always here, they probably would be156
like “That’s not a room, that just a…”157
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Katharine: But also just the language of drawing, sometimes is not… You do158
need a level of knowledge to understand what those things will look like.159
That might mean it’s a line, OK, but it actually shows XYZ. So I think, that160
sort of level of tacit knowledge about drawing styles or ways of working161
how to represent…162
Frank: So is the drawing actually for yourself to understand the problem163
better?164
Kiera: Yeah, I think I aim mainly for myself. And so that’s why it helps165
other people that are familiar with the way that I do my work… Because166
when I am doing it for a broader audience, it will be much more finished167
things and I will do them very differently from when I was doing them for168
myself.169
Frank: So you have two different drawing styles, one for developing ideas170
and one for selling your ideas? It’s like two different languages?171
Kierw: Yes, definitely. It’s like a framework and then I polish it up…172
Katharine: There tends to be a format where you present your finals…173
which are tend to be done later in the project. We encourage them to do174
them early, but they tend to be done later in the project. And there will175
be a set called “Working drawings” which is the step to be presented and176
people will flick through, but they are not meant to be finished.177
Frank: So only the last ones are laymen’s audience?178
Katharine: Well, I think both of them are still for an informed audience, but179
there is a level where one is something that is complete, one is still drawing180
stuff here… they are called working drawings, you are still working on181
them. Both need a level of reading skills. But probably for the working182
drawing knowing more would help to know OK, that’s part of this…183
Kiera: Yes.184
Frank: Thank you very much….185
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1.5 Interview with Lewis Vaughan
Frank Loesche: What I would like to do is: let you explain to me how you1
are creative.2
Lewis Vaughan: My creative design process?3
Frank:Yes, how do you do that?4
Lewis: I am probably one of the worst examples you can get for a good5
design process of all these over at Architecture. Because one of the things6
I picked up from this. When you come from GCSE and A-Level creative7
subjects like Art or Graphic Communication, which I did when I was sort8
of younger, there is a real sort of lean or direction around conducting9
one sketchbook. Which is the perfect, idealistic looking sketchbook with10
everything perfectly ordered, pretty, and flaps coming out of them, trying11
to present and display your process as efficiently as possible. Which I12
totally understand at that stage, because that’s one key component you13
need to continue through the design process. In a way to present your14
ideas to the examination board. But it does push a lot of students down15
that sort of perfection route, trying to make everything absolute finesse.16
Which is… it can put a lot of pressure on the student, a lot of pressure. I’m17
one who struggles with anxiety and stress. And the creative process is the18
worst sort of beaten by that.19
Frank: Why did you choose to be an Architect then?20
Lewis: I don’t know. It’s just… I know. I should probably lean away from it.21
But it’s creativity is something within me, which I feel I have to justify for22
the future. It’s something I do have a real passion in when I am really into23
it and when I am doing things right and when I am into perfecting things.24
But when I’m not, it can really sort of bear down on sort of, how you are25
feeling… and stuff. And so, I have kind of gone down that perfection route,26
which isn’t the best. Yeah, Creativity… I mean it’s terrible for some people,27
because it never has any limits to it like in other academic subjects as28
science or English, or maths — there is a right or wrong answer in some29
cases. Oh yeah, the question. As for us the subjects we are doing, or the30
exams, there is a short right or wrong answer, whether you pass the exam31
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or not. While with creativity its a much more personal thing. There is no32
limit on the amount of work you put in. Yeah, there is no limit to creativity.33
Which is great. It’s exciting. But it can be sort of stressful when you want34
to put a limit on it and you want to come to an end.35
Frank: So how do you find the time limit then? So when you’re working36
through it…37
Lewis: I don’t know. The problem is. I’d love a 9-to-5 job, but this course…38
Even though I might not be doing a lot of work, I’d be constantly thinking39
and thinking and thinking about my process. And some in the studio say40
they came up with the best ideas at three in the morning when they wake41
up in night terrors about their work. But they have an incredible idea42
ready for the studio in the morning. And sometimes it is when you get43
into a general flow. And you could be in the studio and you think: “It’s44
six o’clock I gotta go home, I need a stretcher, have some tea, get to the45
gym, have a bit of a down time”. But you have got one idea and you need46
to sort of justify it. And that’s the same. You are looking on that scale and47
then on the whole thing. As I said earlier, I wanted to justify my creative48
inhibition almost. I feel like I need to see how things go.49
Frank: How do you approach a problem in general? So if you are going to a50
brief, what are the first things you are doing afterwards?51
Lewis: Well, it’s always been taught in all the classes to go through a simple52
process of analysing the brief, doing initial research, maybe going back to53
the brief seeing how that reflects on the brief.54
Frank: Do you actually go to the places? Did you go to the site and have a55
look around?56
Lewis: Oh yes. This year is the first year, actually we did it at the end of last57
year. This is only recent that I have a site attached to one of my projects58
since I only plunged in recently into Architecture. Yeah, that is one of the59
most important things, I certainly found it in this project. As you go to the60
site and you really immerse yourself into the environment and you really61
need to understand the environment. And there you might not be doing62
direct research of how many bricks are on site, how many lamp posts are63
there, how many people are there on time. Well, amount of people matter.64
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You need to get a real feel for the space, you need to, it needs to… If I did a65
project on my house right now back home, it would probably be my best66
project I ever did. Because I know it so well. As its not knowing it through67
facts, it’s knowing it through experience. And that’s one key factor about68
Architecture, it’s always about the personal experience in this place.69
Frank: If you put out a draft or a model, is that an externalisation of your70
internal thought process or is that too big of a claim? How do you see71
that yourself? Is that you somehow made out of stone, or is that some-72
thing completely detached from yourself, but sourced in your personal73
experience? What is your relationship to the thing you create?74
Lewis: That’s the frustrating part about finishing the project, trying to put75
it out, trying to capture what you thought, what was going on in your head,76
because I think that’s almost impossible to do. I’ve never been particularly77
proud of any of my projects because I feel like they don’t justify the space78
I am trying to create or representing the space that’s already there. I don’t79
know. You could spend every minute, second of your life trying to do a80
project like that, and I don’t think you can capture your thoughts in stone,81
as you said.82
Frank: How do you approach the project then? Do you just have one piece83
of paper and sit down to sketch?84
Lewis: Lots of people have different processes as you will probably find out85
asking everyone. Some people upstairs are a lot more structured about86
their work and they can say: Alright, I need to produce this model, just87
get on with it. And they start making the model. Some people would sit88
there thinking consistently and then will do something in the very last89
minute, but spend a lot of time considering what they are going to produce.90
And then you have me. It’s a bit of a Mad-Hatter. I’ll get so stressed at91
this process of the design project. It’s… no. For me it doesn’t fit any more.92
Ideas spring out of nowhere. So my process is getting a piece of paper and93
scribbling an idea, drawing a cross-section of an idea. And I sometimes94
jump to the very end process of design. And will do what I consider like a95
final cross-section sketch. And then that gets screwed up, or reconsidered.96
And I admittedly think it’s just best for me to be fooling around. One thing:97
never fight your individual design process. And I think that’s why a lot98
239
Appendix
of our design briefs can be quite ambiguous. That’s because everybody99
is completely different the way they design. And so to set these sort of100
loop holes for people to jump through. Or: “OK, I want you to produce101
these amount of models on this day and I want you to produce that on this102
day, and this cross-section on this day.” It doesn’t… Well sometimes tutors103
find it useful to get that structure out and the work out and work under104
pressure. But sometimes, for a good designer, it doesn’t necessarily work105
out.106
Frank: For yourself, at the beginning of the year you start working on107
something. And whenever you have the feeling you need to jump…108
Lewis: Yeah, Imeant that’s why I broughtmy sketch books. ’Cause you’ll see,109
I just literally start scribbling away. I mean this was from third semesters110
project where I did try to go in a linear fashion of analysing the site, and111
then moved to the other side. This is when I got myself a pretty neat112
sketchbook. But then I just started skipping ahead to the end processes113
and ideas, which I should choose at the very end, but I touched base on114
them. And this is just sort of scribbling out. People tell me off for spending115
so much time in my sketchbook. But it is… a very helpful process to get116
all your mind out just one booklet. Otherwise you’d find me scribbling on117
this paper, chucking it all over the place. I can’t collate it all. But yeah. I’m118
just going through. I find it quite easy to jump up and down the ladder of119
the design process.120
Frank: What do you mean by jumping up and down the ladder?121
Lewis: Like I was saying, the tutors are trying to get you go through this122
initial idea, research, development, go back to initial ideas… Where as I’ll123
do sort of final ideas, jump back to research, jump back to initial ideas,124
panic, do a little more research, jump to… So that’s why jumping up and125
down on sort of a ladder… But me, it’s all about just having the ability… I126
don’t know…127
Frank: I see a lot of different type of drawings. What is this for example?128
Lewis: That’s axonometric. When everything is on a 35 degree angle, but129
that drawing is exploded…130
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Frank: And what is this? A piece of a wall?131
Lewis: No, this is actually a bee-hive. It’s been from my last project. A bee-132
keeping, kind of a archive and research laboratory which also integrates133
disadvantaged members of the society who may be unemployed. Might134
be quite young and having very little passion for their teacher. Or maybe135
elderly and quite lonely and want to sort of feel connected to a community136
or a group of people. And so people could come to this centre, and they137
temporary live there in a hostel-style accommodation, where they would138
learn things like …sublimely the responsibilities on how to keep up their139
welfare, and how to maintain a kitchen space. And then within that, there140
is… It’s like a micro-society within this research laboratory. Because there141
are all these groups of people living… So I am trying to condense the scale142
of society into this research.143
Frank: So you use the bee-hive…144
Lewis: So bee-keeping introduces levels of responsibility, teaches about145
nature, science, and society in a way. How bees live there, these people146
live in a quite similar fashion.147
Frank: Also these drawing have different scales, if I see that right.148
Lewis: That’s the other issue. That’s why I think the tutors want you to149
work on drawing boards and nice pretty drawings, so you can work with150
scale. Scale doesn’t really work in my case. [laughs] It’s certainly an early151
stage. I don’t know. We all develop our own scales when we are at a young152
age. And I feel like it should come as a natural ability to draw the scales. I153
just sort of sketch on this level. It sometimes kicks me in the butt. Cause154
I’ll try and draw out the final design and I realise I’ve got a 5 meter tall wall155
and a 1 meter tall step. And I’ll go “agh. OK, right.” and I’ll go back. But I156
mean I am really just second year, so I’ve got a lot to learn. But yeah, scale157
is one thing I am trying to introduce much earlier on in these projects.158
But yeah, it’ll just be… Yeah, this design process doesn’t, for me, fit out in159
an orderly fashion. They come in sort of bubbles, which burst. And so I’ll160
have moments of having a complete design process from start to finish. I’ll161
have an idea, I’ll develop it, I finish it, and I’ll pop it. That ones sitting on162
a long strand, if that makes sense. It doesn’t sort of fit into that diagram.163
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It’s loads of little design processes and then I gotta try and collect them164
into one… try to mould it or squish it into that sort of…165
Frank: Is that a conscious process? Do you sit down and say: Now I want to166
mould everything into one process…167
Lewis: No, it’s not really conscious. It just happens, it just happens.168
Frank: How do you know you arrive at a solution?169
Lewis: It’s when you sort of feel moderately comfortable with the design170
you might have come up with. I guess, that’s when you need to put a cap171
on it. Or a deadline comes around the corner and you know you’ve got172
to tell yourself to finish. But I mean, this project. I will definitely revisit173
and redo entirely. But I mean, that’s the good thing about having these174
deadlines. You can go… That sort of feeling of finishing a project is really175
good, cause it enables you to do a much stronger form of reflection than176
you can do when you are in the design process, because you are under this177
pressure to complete for that deadline. But being able to put a cap on it178
and then give yourself a week. And then you reflect and you say “I really179
liked that, actually that could be something, we could take it”. That’s a180
much more positive experience than the design process itself. So I guess,181
when it comes to the future, and I’ve got some projects, I’ll set myself a182
deadline, maybe two weeks ahead? I know: I’ll say this, but it’ll never183
happen. But that would be the ideal situation if someone was informed184
that there was a deadline, but completely lied to them that this was the185
final deadline, but the real deadline was two weeks after.186
Frank: If you draw out something, are there moments when you realise:187
Oh I didn’t intent this to be something, but actually this happens to be188
quite interesting and you try to follow up on this?189
Lewis: Yes, that always happens. That tends to happen, especially when190
you are doing abstract work. Where it is a lot more ambiguous and you191
can see things for other things and spin the paper upside down, and you192
see something else and that inspires you. And then, the idea that you are193
inspired by your own work and not just other people’s buildings, other194
people’s work, and art and stuff… is really, really interesting.195
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Frank: Talking about other people: How much does the group help you?196
Working in a group, is that something that works for you?197
Lewis: Working in a group can or working with other people can work198
and can not work. It just depends who you are with. Sometimes it’s good199
to have someone who challenges you. Someone that you think is on the200
same level and you can compete with them. Other times its nice to have a201
bit of re-assurance of someone who has a lot more knowledge than you202
and who likes to sort of beam that to you. It’s nice to have that sort of203
backup. And then other times you can have people who you feel you need204
to carry along. It can be irritating but also quite positive because you can205
feel like… You learn through teaching is one thing, and it is also quite a206
nice feeling to help someone through…And […] always says: It’s so much207
easier to talk about other people’s ideas than your own. And the process of208
doing that can sometimes bring up ideas. Like yesterday, a lot of us in the209
studio were panicking, stressful, doing spatial layout. So someone might210
go and talk to someone else about theirs and trying to direct them towards211
your own. That just makes you feel good and brings up a lot of positive,212
creative thoughts. And when you go back to your own work, that really213
juices things up.214
Frank: Does that also happenwhen you talk to people outside the studio?215
Lewis: Yeah. That bee-keeping project… My mum is a bee-keeper. That’s216
where the whole idea came from and I was able to get a lot of resources217
from her and research. It was just coming through a conversation. Rather218
than just sitting on a computer and search for this, search for that, it has a219
lot more character to it. Because you are getting a lot more ideas out of220
the way someone says it, not just…221
Frank: I mean, you obviously know that she is bee-keeping but in other222
cases like: You go down the street and you hear someone talking and pick223
up something and use that later on. Does that ever happen?224
Lewis: I can’t think of a time it’s happened to me, but it probably has. Yeah,225
overhearing conversations and stuff. Yeah, a lots of different types of226
research. Based on your prior research and just looking at other stuff,227
trying to narrow it down. But like I was saying at the start: That sort228
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of experience of the environment at the site, that is a research in itself,229
which can almost not be recorded. Or can be, to a certain extend, but230
everyone here attempts it and then feels like they are justifying the real231
environment.232
Frank: And totally switching topics again: You seem to be very sketch-233
centred? Your background is fine arts, you said?234
Lewis: Yeah. I did a – there is just Arts in A-level. No, in GCE I studiedArts, or235
Arts and Design. Quite basic. And then I moved to Graphic communication,236
whichwasmore Applied Arts, and Advertisement, or a book cover, or doing237
illustrations all the way through.238
Frank: So what kind of material do you use in the process? Do you also use239
sketches, or do you also use computers, models, or what kind of things?240
Lewis: Yeah, I use computers.241
Frank: Writing?242
Lewis: Writing certainly helps. I don’t find myself that literate, I’m not243
that good with my words.244
Frank: But I saw those diagrams, and those tree-things.245
Lewis: Yeah, Bubble-Diagrams, and brain-storms, and that sort of things246
really helps to get ideas out. Sometimes recording your own voice. But247
yeah. I do a lot of sketching, trying to integrate computers where possible.248
But I certainly find there is a limit, sometimes with computers. A lot of249
people are getting straight onto google sketchup and then doing a render250
straight form that. It looks very plastic, very fake. A sketch can provide or251
can illustrate an environment a lot better than that, sometimes.252
Frank: Why is that?253
Lewis: I don’t know. Because it has character and it has a sense it was done254
in situ. I don’t know. I don’t know. I don’t know if there is any way of255
specifically picking up on this. I can get a lot more from someones sketch256
on site than if someone went on site, took photos and then modelled it257
in CAD. You get like a great sense of form, as opposed to CAD drawings or258
renders or anything like that. But I don’t know.259
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Frank: That’s probablymissing the personal experience that youmentioned260
earlier which you have, when you go down to the site?261
Lewis: Yeah, certainly.262
Frank: When you are working on this project right now, are you already263
thinking about your next step? Or do you get inspired in your current264
work by previous work, or is each project totally separatedand you start265
over again, or sometimes do you revisit…?266
Lewis: It’s a bit of both. It really depends on the situation. Sometimes you267
think of… Sometimes you are in the moment where you reflect back on an268
old project and sometimes you are just completely looking the oposite way269
and trying to move forwards. It’s really good, that’s why it’s really good to270
have these coversations. Because it can then influence me to then go back271
and look at an older project. And that’s the good thing about the studio272
here at Plymouth. That you are able to sit within the same place in the273
studio, have your own desk. And then go to someone elses desk. It’s rather274
than just feeling you are sitting down in a completely fresh environment275
every time you are going to do some study, or going to do some work. I276
now know. I have set myself set up a network of people, knowing that this277
person sat over there and that person is sat over there. So I might go over278
there to check on that person.279
Frank: So do they have different roles in your project as well? You know280
that person is going to challenge you, that person is going to tell you281
something about, I don’t know…282
Lewis: Yeah, yeah. Yeah. To sort of locate them within the studio is quite283
helpful, it’s good. It’s very helpful to have these sort of conversations.284
Frank: Thank you, that’s pretty much it from my side.285
1.6 Interview with Bailey Watson
Frank Loesche: Alright. So what I would like to know is, how you create?1
Bailey Watson: OK, hmm… I don’t know if you have any questions?2
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Frank: Sure. As far as I understand your whole process starts with a brief,3
is that correct?4
Bailey: Not necessarily. The initial. I’ll start… I’ll do a timeline.5
Frank: OK, that might be a good idea.6
Bailey: So we start the, we get introduced to a site. Two years ago it was7
Exeter quay last year it was Union Street, this year it is Derry’s Cross down8
in Plymouth.9
Frank: I have actually been involved with the Exeter task, I talked with a10
few guys back then.11
Bailey: So once we have the site it is down to us to analyse the site, find12
problems…We come up with problems basically. And from these problems13
we then create our own brief. So we, ahem… If there is a certain problem14
an individual wants to fix, then they create a proposition that would fix15
that problem.16
Frank: How do you decide on a problem, if that’s your first step?17
Bailey: I am using problem as quite a vague word, it’s… It’s more of archi-18
tectural problems. So if the road doesn’t work, if the pavement doesn’t19
work, if the building doesn’t work. If an access doesn’t work. Well, if an20
access does work, we identify the things that do work as well. We break21
them down. We ask ourselves why they work. Using our knowledge we22
have been taught, we can break certain aspects of a city down. From that,23
we then break the city down and then we take that forward. The distilled24
information. We take that forward into the problem that we found and we25
are trying to translate that into the problem to come to a solution.26
Frank: OK. So do you already have a solution in mind when you come up27
with a problem?28
Bailey: We are encouraged not to, but everyone does. When you get given29
a project you automatically thinking about what the end solution is. But30
they teach in such a way that we come up gradually rather than “I wanna31
do this at the end of the day”. So when it comes to a project in, say I’ll use32
the one I am doing right now as an example, so that’ll be Derry’s Cross.33
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And, originally I was gonna do like a market processing unit. It’s now34
changed. After one tutorial it’s gonna be a completely different project.35
So regarding the creativity side of it: The project changes constantly. So36
it’s not like I am thinking about the end goal at the start.37
Frank: In this example, what triggered you to change the whole project?38
What was the thing?39
Bailey: It’s the tutorial. So in a one-to-one with the tutor or even a one-to-40
one with a fellow course mate influences what you do. And they just bring41
in simple logic. Because sometimes you just sat in there in the studio for a42
few hours and you are not thinking straight and you are doing stupid stuff.43
And then someone just coming over. Even having a break, having a coffee,44
for example, helps. They tell us not to be in the studio for more than two45
hours, to get out, walk. Because some of our best decisions, mine included,46
are not in the studio. It’s just when you are doing random stuff. Which is47
quite interesting.48
Frank: Did you recognise any patterns in those random things?49
Bailey: I have, I have! Ahem, I tend to come up with my best ideas before50
I go to bed. Because sometimes I read before I go to bed, sometimes I…51
ahem… For example I was looking at scheme in Barcelona, a fish market,52
breaking it down. And then I thought, wow! That would be good in what53
I do. And then it comes back to the idea, of I broke up that building54
into simple why and why it doesn’t work. And then pull it back to my55
scheme and thought, OK: This bit doesn’t work, I can make it more like56
this? Of course, the setting is different. And then, yeah. The process just57
progressively gets harder and harder and then stopped. We go into more58
details. So it’s not just the box and we are trying to position things within59
the box. How people walk into this box and things like that. Then it goes60
down to experience.61
Frank: So is it always this process of starting at 10,000 foot and going62
down?63
Bailey: Yeah, yeah. Well, we are encouraged to… Say we work at a scale of 164
to 1000 we then go to 1 to 100, then they tell us to go back out again, and65
then go back in — and that’s the process.66
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Frank: Does that work for you?67
Bailey: I love it! That’s how I work. So when I do it my way, I initially do68
some sketches. And then draw some more detailed plans, and then model69
that so I can see it in 3D, so I can hold it in my hands and look at it.70
Frank: So you build real models or rather computer models?71
Bailey: Both, really. Both simultaneously. Physically it’s easier, because72
you can take a close look at it and stuff. So I build a model, like an A473
model, look around it. Then they tell us to section the model to see the74
space inside. Then, to go back to the drawing, draw problems, and draw75
another plan, and model that again. Now you have two models. Compare76
them. Go through that another 15 times or something. So that’s how I77
progress, anyway. And it’s all about the experience of the person. So we78
are taught to design for people, then for a place, then for a building. That’s79
our process. And sometimes, I was thinking about this the other night, in80
Architecture we happen to think about the happy accident. I don’t know81
if you’ve… So when we do… It doesn’t happen when we are drawing, it82
only happens when we are modelling. So if I was modelling a building83
and accidentally put a piece of cardboard in the wrong place, and then84
look at it and think: Wow. That’s actually what I did. And that, then, gives85
you almost like Adrenalin, and you think wow, and then you just get so86
involved in it. And then, take that back to drawing, model that again. That87
little cardboard can change your whole scheme.88
Frank: So does it also depend on the type of model? So if you have a89
cardboard model and you accidentally drop a piece of glass on it.90
Bailey: Exactly! That happens a lot! People’s models get dropped in the91
studio and there will be a mess on the floor but they take a look at it and92
go: Wow, that’s incredible.93
Frank: But you don’t drop your models on purpose then?94
Bailey: No, I wouldn’t do that.95
Frank: That couldn’t be part of the process?96
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Bailey: Some people probably have, maybe. I don’t know. Personally, for97
me, the are to precious to drop. But from personal experience, dropping a98
model and looking at it, that has happened in the past. That process just99
keep going and coming, really.100
Frank: Why do you think those happy accidents work? How can they101
trigger something you haven’t seen before?102
Bailey: I think it’s more of a… I don’t know. If it happens, you look at it103
and think, why haven’t I thought of that? Because we get so involved in a104
certain thing. Like I said earlier, it takes a bit of an outsiders perspective105
to look at it and say: oh, what about this? Then, it’s a completely different106
thought process then. An then you frame your enquiries completely dif-107
ferent. I don’t know why it’s like this. It’s just oh: I’m so involved in this108
one part, but changing that one part changes the whole thing as a whole.109
Maybe it’s nice to get someone or that accident to happen, to talk to you,110
and tell you that if you move that there, it changes this…111
Frank: So do you talk with your non-Architect friends and family members112
about your work as well?113
Bailey: Yeah. I live with my girlfriend. She does medicine. So she has114
no clue what I am doing. And all the time… Another thing we get told115
in Architecture, when we do our final presentations: If a member of the116
public could walk in and see the work, they should instantly know that117
it’s about. If they can’t do that, then the work doesn’t work. So I use my118
girlfriend as a…119
Frank: proxy?120
Bailey: Yeah, yeah. So before a review I show my work to her and I go:121
What is it? She might know bits of it because I talked to her before. If she122
says that could be that, that could be this, then I know this will get me123
some extra marks. And it does! So having my girlfriend talk to me about124
this…She has no clue about Architecture, though… So this building I am125
doing at the moment — no clue. But I’ll ask her about a certain part and126
she’ll go: I don’t really like that. And I say: Why? And then she tell me and127
I go wow. I didn’t really think of that. Because we are taught in such a way,128
that we are Architecture students, not public. So if we go into a building,129
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we are already reading the building as it is. When we go to an Art museum,130
for example we went to one in Copenhagen, none of us were looking at the131
art. All of us were looking at the building. But the part is, the art is within132
the building, it makes the building what it is, which is what the public sees.133
We were like: the door is there, the window there, there is glass there…134
And they were telling us: look! We were a load of Architecture students —135
but don’t be a load of Architecture students. Be a member of the public.136
And it changed my experience of the place. And doing that, they teach us137
some sort of exercise, that almost disconnect us from the studio, from the138
architectural world, take off the architectural hat.139
Frank: So how does that work. How do you do these exercises?140
Bailey: It’s hard. They tell us, when we do the analysis of the site. For141
example when we do the Deryls cross, they tell us just walk down there,142
just experience the site. you know, it’s hard for us to do, because we are143
like… We are looking constantly, there is a building, and building, and144
building. But they try. But it’s hard to disconnect. But it is sometimes easy145
just to walk down there, walk through there, and walk home, and then146
take notes of what has happened. Don’t take a camera, that’s one of the147
things they tell us, don’t … And draw it all from the mind, from memory.148
Because then you pick up on certain things regarding the site, you are not149
just tracing over. Yeah, that’s how…150
Frank: So how often do you revisit the site during the process? Is that151
something you only do at the beginning to get an inspiration?152
Bailey: We… I visit the site… I work down there, so I visit the site three153
times a week. Well, so not visit. I go through. So I’m a different user.154
Frank: But for example for Exeter, you might not have walked through155
there so often?156
Bailey: Yeah, Exeter… Maybe once a month. Well, the project lasted for157
the whole year, the whole ten months. So every three months. If we were158
doing a big project, we would do the project. We would then go… right OK.159
Because the project is in isolation and it’s not actually there, we have to160
go back to the site… OK, putting it there doesn’t really work, so we move it161
there. The we come back to the studio, re-evaluate… It’s hard to design a162
250
Appendix
building if you are not really there. It lacks experience. You don’t know163
who uses it. And that’s one thing, we are taught in Design. It all comes164
down to the process.165
Frank: You talk a lot about we. How do you work in group, or what role166
does a group have in your work?167
Bailey: So, commonly within Plymouth, the second and third years join168
together which is rare. That doesn’t happen in many places in the UK.169
And I think it’s quite interesting. Because I have seen Architecture schools170
isolating second and third years, because there is such a massive drop171
between first, second, and third years in knowledge. Here they merge172
together, to refresh the third years, because we are so involved in our173
dissertations and things going on. But also for us to teach the second years174
as well. So we get put into groups of four or five, two second years, two175
third years. So we get to choose a site, create a master plan within our site176
to design the whole of our site. And then within our site we position our177
buildings. But then these buildings need to link together regarding the178
propositions and occupations that inhabit them. So we are in constant179
dialog with the group. As well as the year as well. They like us to talk with180
other groups. And use their propositions in our proposition. Sam, I am181
linking to him even though he is not in my group. They really like the182
team bonding aspect. And sometimes it really does help to have a team,183
but sometimes it doesn’t.184
Frank: Why does it not help?185
Bailey: This course is very demanding, and some people, they almost lock186
themselves in. They are just concerned where their building is going. And187
it’s hard to communicate with someone who is so isolated. And that almost188
weakens the master plan. Because there is that isolated building on the189
side, that noone is connected to. And that’s frustrating, because we need190
the masterplan to work as a scheme, and when someone is not following191
it.192
Frank: How do you work with these people? Do you try to challenge them,193
do you try to be authorative?194
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Bailey: I had it a few times. My personality is… Because I already work in195
an Architectural office, I know how it would work if we are outside the196
university as well as inside… The group I am current in, I am struggling197
with one student. He is not doing as much work as he could be doing, and198
it’s slowing us all down. Because I am trying to get the group work done199
first. So I can then go on to my individual work. So I am trying to get them200
to do certain work, because they are not doing that at the moment, and201
that’s hard, very hard.202
Frank: So you are trying to take the role as a group leader, weighting in all203
your experience as a third year student and your real life experience?204
Bailey: Yeah, that’s how the second and third years see that in hierarchy.205
So there are two third years, who are like the leaders. And then there are206
the second years, who look at us and we teach them, and stuff like that. So207
when a third year stops to, almost pause, it really slows progression down.208
It does affect my work as well, because I can’t exactly do that part of my209
project, because I need him to do this part of the project. But, there are210
things put in place to help the people who are doing the work, and help211
the people who are not doing the work. Lets see for example the tutor. He212
would step in and intervene if something was getting out of hand.213
Frank: So he would see that, or would he need your hint?214
Bailey: Both. The project I had last years was five of us and four didn’t do215
any work. But that time they put us in groups, this year we got to choose216
our groups. Which is good and bad. And last year I told him, but he also217
knew, he could also see this was tough. He helpedme on that regard, which218
was nice because I knew in the back of my mind, that I would get a pull219
down from my group, which was a relief. And he does that quite a lot.220
Frank: OK, so what are the positive aspects about groups then?221
Bailey: So I was in a group in Exeter and I never had so much fun in my222
life. If you get into the right group, and everyone works together, and it223
works like a well oiled machine, it’s fantastic. The energy within the group,224
and the projects themselves. And even the tutors can see that they work.225
That’s it, there is no other way to say it: The projects work. It’s amazing.226
It’s fantastic. Because… I wasn’t worrying that X and Y wasn’t doing their227
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work. And they were worried I was still working. We were all on the same228
page, every few days we were having a meeting and we’d say: Look, that’s229
where we are, this is where we are going, this is where we need to be. A230
few days later we’d come back and say, this is what I’ve done, this is what I231
need to do…Constant conversation between each other. That! I got a good232
mark for that. We all did. We all got a very good mark for that, really. It233
was fantastic.234
Frank: And was that project difficult for you?235
Bailey: Which one?236
Frank: The one where you had the good experience.237
Bailey: I would say no, it wasn’t difficult because we were all working238
together. It wasn’t like I am struggling to get this information out of239
somebody. The information was already there for me to grab. We didn’t240
have to ask questions. We already knew the answers. I could progress my241
building constantly, while the other were progressing theirs. And that was242
really good. But regarding the project now and last year, where I didn’t243
have the good group, it’s hard on me. Because I know, that’s what I want244
and it should be happening, but it’s not. So I am looking at that project245
thinking, that’s where I wanna be, but this is where I am right now. And246
it’s not really much I can do about it. So I put more stress on my group, or247
not stress, but… hardness on my group. So like: look, I wanna be like my248
group before because I just want all of us working together.249
Frank: Did you try to implement some of the group interactions that you250
might have had back then?251
Bailey: Yeah, yeah. Exactly. I’d schedule meetings every Wednesday where252
would come in and have meetings. And regarding exercises, like drawing253
or talking. I’d set up a room, just for us. But its… It’s struggling for me,254
because it’s not working how it was before. And because I did so well in255
that project, I wanna do well in this project, my final project. It’s not much256
I can do about it. I am accepting it that they will not be like the group257
before. So I almost have to change my way of working now. Because at258
the end of the year, we all have to present our buildings at the same time.259
And if they don’t work, or if they don’t work together, then the tutors will260
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bring it up and we will all get marked down. Regarding the mark, we get261
group marks and individual marks. They have different weightings. And262
the tutor has influence on that, which is good.263
Frank: I am pretty much through with my questions. Thank you for your264
time.265
1.7 Interview with Charles White
Frank Loesche: So what I would like to learn from you is: How do you create?1
If asked you that question, how would you respond? Or should I rather ask2
you more specific questions?3
CharlesWhite: I can startwith that. It’s not a clear process, I would definitely4
say, it’s actually quite nasty. I am definitely a culprit of thinking quite a5
long time. And then… Interestingly, the panic of the deadline looming6
then forces me to produce quite quickly. So I think I work quite well I’m7
being pushed into a corner. But I have done quite a lot of thinking before8
that, so that thinking then comes into play. I am personally trying to work9
on thinking and doing more from intended, earlier on. I reckon that’s10
probably better for me.11
Frank: So when is the sweet spot for you? When do you start doing?12
Charles: A week before the deadline normally [laughs]. But this time it’s13
actually happening a bit earlier, which is good, there is more time to work14
on. So I kind of force myself to do more stuff with my hands. That, in turn,15
is then probably more fruitful that way. Because normally I am afraid of16
going wrong. So I am spending a long time thinking about it. Because if17
I am not bringing it down to paper, I am not making a mistake. An I go18
through a lot of things in my head, and normally it works out right. So I19
am now trying to make it more of a multi… Basically trying to combine20
working and producing to go more hand in hand now. Yeah, beforehand I21
think it was really going into that corner, that helps.22
Frank: So when you start producing, you already have a very clear under-23




Frank: So you have already processed every possible outcome before, and26
then you just put it into existence, out of your thought?27
Charles: I try. The thinking is also… I am not producing output in the Uni-28
versity and academic sense, but a lot of thinking comes hand in hand with29
sketching — which I should have mentioned. Yeah, so lots of scribbling.30
Frank: OK, so maybe let’s go back to the beginning again. So when you get31
a new project, does the tutor come into the room, tells you “this is your32
site, you have two months” — or how does it work?33
Charles: He says, yeah… you have about twomonths, or one and a half. This34
time they have given us the whole brief, which is interesting. Sometimes35
they drip-feed us because often, when people have the full brief, they jump36
too quickly. So they drip-feed us, to give us just the right amount to do.37
This time, the tutor has given us just everything. So he has given us the38
outcomes that he needs. So it’s slightly different. Now that he has done39
that, I just start analysing the site.40
Frank: How do you do that?41
Charles: Lots of visits. Researching the programmes on the site. Trying42
to work out what the gap is, what could be useful there. And what would43
kind of enrich the site, because its quite a… …sits not a particularly high…44
Its a place that is kinda falling to disrepair. So we are trying to think, what45
can we do. Although we are doing a master plan on things we can change46
on a large scale, at the end of the day we have one project. What is that,47
how can do that as much as… That’s what we are looking at. So trying to48
look for gaps, look for spaces. Trying to work out the atmosphere what49
it’s like to be in the site, and what’s the atmosphere we want to create?50
And how do we go about doing that? That’s how we are trying to picture51
ourselves. I suppose as a group we are trying to produce outputs that are52
trying to capture that atmosphere, and then the atmosphere we are trying53
to create. So we are trying to create those walled gardens, those intimate54
spaces. Where as Plymouth is very linear and sparse, it’s almost kind of55
like Wild West. It’s quite low and having those wide streets. And all the56
buildings have kind of like this false front that looks quite grand, and it57
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just crumbles away at the back. So we are dealing with that crumble bit.58
And trying to kind of… Instead of it always being oriented towards the59
street, there are all these courtyards or car parks. And we wanna try to flip60
the orientation two ways. So we are dealing with these car parks that we61
want to make into courtyards or more intimate spaces. So we are trying62
to make walled gardens, these little gem-like space, which hopefully start63
renewing it. So that’s kind of our thought.64
Frank: How did you come up with that idea?65
Charles: We spent a lot of time looking at the site.66
Frank: As a group?67
Charles: As a group and individually, and I think we all got this kind of68
critique of Plymouth of being too large and too sparse. And maybe these69
places, these localised, centralised spaces are necessary. We started coming70
up with it… One building, for example, is a… Sports Direct. It’s one building71
that we had. It’s like this: It’s a solid building and there is more shops in72
here. And then we traced it inverted to create a walled garden. So that was73
kind of like an Ahamoment. I mean, I call this a walled garden. This is kind74
of the heart space for our site. So that’s one thingwe areworkingwith. And75
then its just kind of playing with that: How much openings do we want?76
Do you want to have this kind of surprise when you go inside? Do you want77
to open it up, so that people can see in completely? Do we want to conceal78
it to some extend? We still want people to know they are welcome when79
they want to go in, but we don’ t want them to be able to see everything80
that’s in there. So it’s kind of working on where is that balance? My site is81
here. I am creating a music school. A kind of community school, where82
small groups can come. So it’s kind of the soundtrack to this garden. On83
the one hand I am now playing with another balance. We do want people84
to know of its existence and hear the music so maybe they can interact85
with it. Maybe that motivates them to go to that school and pick up an86
instrument. And on the other hand we got the people that need to practice87
and how exposed do they want to feel. So I kind of place the band spaces88
and the group spaces on the bottom. And then some more spaces up high.89
So that’s kind of, a lot of what I do is thinking about balances. So on one90
hand I wanna do this, on the other hand this, and where is the point where91
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they meet? So that’s… this is more… when I am… this book is… I am kind92
of starting to understand things, but there are still questions. Whereas93
this book is more… This is… I’ll document a lecture in here, but at the same94
time I am also scribbling stuff and working on stuff.95
Frank: So you first work in this one, then you select elements and move96
them to the other one?97
Charles: I mean it depends. If I am feeling fairly focused, I can go straight98
to this one. But for this one I don’t worry about it being pretty.99
Frank: How do you know when to choose which book?100
Charles: This one I… Cause sometimes during lecture something comes up,101
not necessarily related to the lectures. So I am scribbling there. This one102
is more a document of my process. And my tutor might look at this. So103
this one is more outwards orientated as well as being used for myself. This104
is pure me. So that’s how that works. So it’s kind of starting to become a105
bit more messy and I am working stuff out. Whereas before, when I first106
started, once I worked on something I put it in. Where this is more work107
in progress.108
Frank: I see a lot of different scales, and different perspectives here…109
Charles: I think they always told us: don’t confine yourself to one scale.110
You might spend ages working on a scale and then you switch scales, and111
then it causes problems. For example, I was working quite a long time on 1112
to 500, but with that, and I don’t know what it is, you tend to end up with113
spaces that are too big. Because it’s quite hard to understand the human114
scale in relationship to that scale. If you draw a section in 1 to 500 and115
you draw in your humans, it’s quite hard to get them right, because it’s116
just too small. But you start getting an understanding at 1 to 200. You can117
then just get him big enough, relate him to… Yeah, so working at different118
scales, there are different merits at different scales.119
Frank: How do you know when to switch between those different scales?120
Charles: Normally it starts off big. So 1 to 1000. Then it kind of goes down121
smaller. Once you get… At the moment I am trying to work at 1 to 500122
mainly, but I keep looking and switching to 1 to 200. But it’s not just the123
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scale. I think the key thing is to work at plans and cross sections at the124
same time. Here I am working in plan, but I am working in section here.125
And here is a section, but I immediately put it on plan. So that’s how I126
have been working on here on my page. So its about switching scales until127
you have sections and plan working at the same time. This is how I am128
dissolving the task in my thinking stages. I kind of passing through all my129
thinking stages. I am not yet creating my photo shot outputs that end up130
pretty and go on the board. So I still think this is kind of the thinking time,131
even though it is visual. Kind of thinking what you can see from where.132
Things like that. So whereas before I was in the pressure that made me133
create something, now I almost put the pressure on myself.134
Frank: So how does this work in relation to the group you are working135
in. Is the group putting pressure on you, are you putting pressure on the136
group?137
Charles: Yeah, actually. Because they are all good workers which is good for138
me. As I said, I work hard. If I am working by myself I might be a bit more139
relaxed. So I think working in the group is good for me. Also working with140
second and third years, I am a second year, definitely helps.141
Frank: Do you also take input from them? So if you see them bringing142
something, do you take and develop it? Does that inspire you in some143
way?144
Charles: Yeah it does, yeah. I mean, we are encouraged to bounce off our145
ideas. There is definitely a… everyone is always a bit funny about their146
own ideas. And its always like: Well, I gave you that idea and you gave me147
this. Oh, but you never said… Which is definitely something we need to148
reduce. I mean, I am always a co-worker who is trying to re-invent the149
wheel. I want it to be new. I want it to be never done before. I think if that150
is your aspiration, that will never happen. So I keep holding my answers151
and just keep waiting and waiting and waiting. But I never re-invent the152
wheel [laughs]. Yeah, so there is this slight thing about ideas. But as a153
group we are pretty good because we are all working on the same side and154
we all have the same master plan to work on.155
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Frank: Do you also go out and try to get inspiration from other gardening156
places?157
Charles: Yeah! I like reading, weather its novels or… I quite like reading158
Philosophy. I like to take inspiration from things that are written. From159
an Architects point of view that is much more subjective than if I looked160
up some buildings on Pinterest. Because if I am on Pinterest, it’s very hard161
not to see that shape or space they are trying to be creating. Whereas if162
it is in a different medium entirely, I can get inspired by it. And the way163
I read it and make it into an Architectural way would be very different164
from someone else making it into an Architectural way. So by choosing a165
different medium, a different genre, it allows me to be inspired and I kind166
of get the inspiration that I need without falling into the trap of copying.167
Frank: Do you consciously use that for yourself as well? I saw that you168
write about your work?169
Charles: Yeah. I mean, I like writing. I just wrote some essays. So a lot170
of that is just me interrogating how people will respond to the building171
and how much does architecture articulate the space. An entirely flexible172
space doesn’t necessarily let the people appropriating it, using it the way173
they want. Actually, if you create a certain set of parameters, people are174
actually more inventive in their response to them. So that was something175
I was looking at through writing.176
Frank: So do you think, if the tutor came in with a very constrained task,177
would you be more creative? Or is there also a balance between that?178
Charles: I think so. I mean, we are told to think about a program for a space.179
I find that very hard, because it is a very open question. And I don’t want180
it to be a box-ticking exercise either. I want to be able to respond in an181
effective way. So it needs to have some parameters to respond to, so I can182
be inventive. I mean, with the same version of… When I was talking about183
this same version here. It is much easier keep this and play with it, as you184
can see the emerging designs here… I can be far more… I can probably185
produce something far more interesting, far more inventive, when I play186
with something that’s already there, than if you gave me a blank field. I187
mean just designed in a blank field and won a competition, but it’s still nice188
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to have these parameters, whether or not they are physical parameters or189
a brief to play with. Because if it is too open…190
Frank: So in this case, the blank field, you came up with the constraints191
yourself…192
Charles: Yeah, so we used it.193
Frank: So is that a technique that works for you?194
Charles: I think so.195
Charles: Yeah, I like that.196
Frank: Is there any other key element? This inversion seems to play a197
vital part, but is there another key… At some point you came up with the198
emphasis of sound, the music school. How did you choose to get the music199
school there?200
Charles: We all wanted a program that would enrich the site. I was one201
of the later ones thinking about programming in my group. So Matt was202
doing a workshop, some kind of community workshop where people can203
come and build their own things. It’s a bit like there is a University, but for204
the community and for everyone to come in. Jackie was doing a similar205
thing, but on a smaller scale, doing a jewellery workshop where people206
would come and learn. It’s all about facilitating the community to learn. It207
was all about enriching the site. Withme, I also sort of wanted to encourage208
an individual to enrich their lives in variant different ways. Whether or209
not its a luxury like music or a workshop, they actually need a prop for210
their business. I like music one. We also had this walled garden. Part of it211
was stemmed out of, how do we get people into here? We are all making212
these things here, and maybe there is an acoustic quality that draws them213
in. So I started to figure out a soundtrack to the site and we also use the214
existing structure that we wanted to keep, like in a church-like quality.215
Churches are both, kind of quiet but there is also charged with sound. I216
thought if there is some kind of performance, like a musical, I thought that217
might be useful. So I started playing with the music school idea. And then218
just thinking about the acoustic qualities of that, really. Here I am playing219
with audio and visual, maybe there is also kind of a journey through. Here220
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is a diagram of this. One of the entries is through and existing shop, which221
I am turning into a mimicry shop. So you are going into the shop and it222
suddenly opens up. You wouldn’t know it was there, you were just going223
into a shop and it suddenly opens up into this large space. This is the shop.224
So you are going into the shop and it opens up. And then maybe they225
can see people performing or practising. So I kind of wanted this journey226
of going through. Maybe it starts auditory and then you go and see. Or227
maybe you can see it from the distance, and then you need to go around228
and you can only hear it. And then you go and listen. I am kind of playing229
with those ideas, what draws people to the spaces. If I can hear something,230
I probably want to be able to see it, and if I see something, I probably want231
to be able to see and hear it. Either way, the journey starts when you move232
in. That’s when I thought about the music school.233
Frank: Great. But that’s very abstract, at the moment for me these are just234
lines. Do you already have some kind of image what it will look like? Are235
these concrete walls, is it wooden?236
Charles: These are existing brick walls of the existing building. So I got that237
to play with, I got one material. I have the acoustics to think about. So238
these will be fairly soft materials. I have a loose, a very loose idea of it in239
my head. Very loose. I have a very loose idea or maybe I can picture just a240
small amount of it.241
Frank: So how are you going to catch that idea at the end?242
Charles: That will be through drawings. That’s when I start comprehending243
what’s happening there, and what’s happening there…Otherwise it’s just a244
shadow in your head. I don’t know what it is, yet.245
Frank: Do you use other media, like computer modelling?246
Charles: It will get to the point where I will get onto the computer.247
Frank: But it’s not something you are using at the moment?248
Charles: I am making models, I am making physical models at this time249
scale. I printed out some… I made some plans, but it’s more like boxes.250
Very sketchy. So I photocopy that, put it on some thin card, and then just251
slice it up and just stack it in the areas. That gives me certain areas. That’s252
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a very quick way. That’s one of the things I have done. That’s when I feel253
like being more productive early on. It really helps working with that254
medium. I use words quite often, because I am good at describing things.255
Because through reviews I can understand what you are trying to achieve256
early on, without doing a physical drawing. It means I am trying to hold257
off the outputs for quite a long time, which isn’t a good thing. I need to do258
outputs early on.259
Frank: You said earlier on, that you are afraid of mistakes? So if something260
goes wrong with your model, do you just throw it away?261
Charles: No, I keep it. That’s the type I tend to keep in here. I am kind of262
OK with making mistakes in here, I am now starting to be OK with making263
mistakes in here as well. But even for the model I just made, that’s OK.264
Because there are a few things I will change. But yeah, that used to be a265
problem.266
Frank: As what kind of Architect do you picture yourself in a certain time,267
let’s say in five years from now?268
Charles: I want to be successful as an Architect. If that’s the case, then you269
get to design… you get more flexibility to design. I want to be successful270
because that means you get to design your own buildings.271
Frank: Do you specialise, or think about a certain type of Architecture that272
you want to do?273
Charles: I like the small domestic scale. When I started… when I wanted to274
be an Architect when I was younger. Well, when I was 18. I wanted to be a275
dentist, but I changed… I always wanted to design my own house. Once276
I started studying I also saw the larger buildings like museums, galleries.277
And that’s also interesting. It’s quite useful to do this interview.278
Frank: Thank you. Can I ask you to fill in one more form?279
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1.8 Interview with Zak Walker
Frank: I would like to learn how you create. If that is too general, I could1
also ask in more detail. But maybe you could start with a quick summary2
of how you create?3
Zak: So I think for me, something really… In my second year, I found it4
kind of hard to create without kind of doing it step by step with a brief5
that we were given. And then last summer, when I was finishing off work6
for the year, something really began to click with me, I suppose. And it7
was about the tutor giving clarity to a sketch, or a diagram… OK, so it8
might be an item from the brief that I would take and make something9
from it. I would then be given feedback, like I said. And the tutor would10
then start to step back from “This is your next task”. And this kind of11
instilled confidence in me. So if this was a diagram we were doing to12
explain the spatial arrangement then it would go from that. And they13
would maybe give a prompt, but not a solution. And then I would sort of14
begin to grasp where it might go in terms of the next thing to generate15
what it is I am trying to get to, if that makes sense? For instance from16
that diagram I was looking at massing models. And actually choosing17
objects, solid objects, that only represented something in terms of mass,18
not height, width, length, detail or anything. And just manipulate those19
shapes. I said to myself, just produce a number of outputs, six seemed to20
be an obvious solution for some reason, take those, document those. So21
that there is a series of steps or evolutions between those things in the22
order they are actually produced. Take the sixth one and say, I kind of got23
to this. Now, how do I translate this into something, I guess, how to refine24
it slightly? So I take that model that wasn’t of any particular scale. It just25
represented some scale of importance or anything like that in terms of26
its size. And then try to apply some parameters to that. So maybe create27
a spatial model of 1 to 200. Those parameters are then so fixed in term28
of how thick a wall is, how big is an opening. So then I actually start to29
put the scale of a human into that sort of spatial setting. And from that I30
began to… By going from that one initial step where I had some feedback31
to then generate something on my own as a kind of way to refine that. I32
took that a step further by making this model. So I began to kind of let33
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go a little bit by the tutor or by that sort of thing. And began to kind of34
steer the project myself a little bit. And as that kind of went on, the task I35
was undertaking, or willing to test, or try out, became much more rapid….36
Work began to generate it faster. Because it was about going through these37
processes and not finalising something each stage. But maybe more of a:38
OK, just get a little bit of an idea, this is starting to work, take a spatial39
model. It was then about bringing that up to a different scale like a 1 to40
100, for example. And actually to begin think about how will that space,41
and I know we need that space, because it has to provide a function to this42
overall programme. But what equipment needs to go into that space to43
actually provide its function? And a 1 to 100 scale allowed me to do that.44
I put in equipment, I put in a human scale. Back to the free plan. OK, so45
in the free plan this is working, but in structuring a level situation, how46
does this work? So it’s about taking that plan, that wasn’t very refined, it47
wasn’t about taking out a scale ruler and then precisely drawing the line48
and making sure the pencil line was the same all the way along. But rather49
I’d roughly sketch it, mark a couple of points for length, fill it in by hand.50
Take that plan. Do the same for a section. Draw some markers, draw a51
section, draw some indicated height of things that might be existing. And52
then I was saying, I got these ground sections quickly sketched, what if I53
bring that out into the model? So I actually begin to model that. Which54
allowed me a platform in which to photograph. Which I could then collage55
perspective images out, which would then give me a spatial quality for56
those individual spaces. And from that, the process began to become a bit57
more iterative, again.58
Frank: So what would you do next?59
Zak: So from taking the perspective images, I would kind of put it on the60
back burner. So I was thinking, this space is setting up something, but I61
then need to think about… I will come back to this once I worked out how62
the spatial arrangement actually might be, in order to some light qualities63
perhaps, surreality qualities, those sorts of things. Or maybe detailing.64
Frank: Do you have an order of other qualities that you try to look at65
afterwards? Do you first look at the space, then light, then function?66
Zak: I think for me it went from…67
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Frank: How do you decide what to tackle next?68
Zak: I think what I do is I went back to my plan. Because in my mind I69
have that idea of producing several versions. Then jumping to a different70
medium to test out what I produced. That actually meant coming back71
to the sketch. Sketch a section. Taking a sketch section, printing it out.72
And using it in 2 1/2 dimensions, so choosing a 10mm build-out section to73
kind of draw around some of those kind of elements as it were. Floor line74
or roof line or wall here or opening there. And just apply some physical75
elements to those sketches in order to realise those qualities. I didn’t do76
that with the plan, even though I could have done that with the plan. For77
what I went to do from there was to say: well, OK. This actually gives me a78
stepping stone to produce a sketch model of this. Work out… OK, so the79
sketch model. Photograph it. Print it out. What’s wrong with the sketch80
model? Why is it not working perspectively? Why is it not working in a81
plan view? Sketch over the top. Take those iterations. Produce another82
plan, rough sketch, sections…Model again, very quickly, just to clarify those83
elements. 1 to 200 scale again. And I went through, I think, 2 or 3 of those84
models. Sectional, 2 1/2 dimension models I made three of those. And85
there I fracture it with three key sort of spaces, to try and… Because, from86
working out key spaces the other become kind of auxiliary sort of spaces,87
that’s important. And then from there, I began to say OK. There has been a88
number of iterations. I’ve got all this information to support where I have89
come to. And then it became about, due to time constraints actually then,90
what is a final plan section, but not finished? So it was kind of a place to91
pause for assessment. It was a sort of a finalised image. And so, from going92
through that. And having feedback in terms of written feedback, grading,93
those sort of processes I went through allowedme to say, I’ll keep it for this94
year, the third year. I can forego that sort of tutorial support in a sense,95
and actually apply those processes I did last year in my work this year.96
Although, where I was producing those kind of outputs in the summer97
was… Actually occurred later during the design process. So how to think98
about this year, where I begin a new design process from the beginning.99
What do I need to embody into myself to allow me to get to, when I was at100
that stage…When I get to that stage this year, I am ready to apply the same101
kind of techniques. So I think what it did ultimately just let me to…Because102
265
Appendix
we were given a bit of a guidance in terms of initial briefing for this year…103
So actually… So that might be existing context, plans, sections… Actually104
I was able to do those kind of task more quickly this year. I was able to105
think about work not being seemingly complete. But actually were able106
to distil some of the things that were required of us. And didn’t so much107
require things like plans and sections. Because of the nature of initialising108
the projects, but sort of going from that initialisation to where we are now.109
I have began to think about my spatial programme. I have began to think110
about bubble diagram. Being something that’s very iterative, very quick.111
And taking a point where its… This is at a point where it’s undergone a112
certain level of development. It may or not be right, but I feel confident113
that I can translate this and test it through another medium. So I used114
bubble diagrams this year. Started to produce massing models. But I felt I115
could mass by hand or use a digital technique such as a 3D printer. Which116
is what I did because it saved me time. For the same volumetric output117
that I would have done by hand. And definitely accuracy was more on my118
side.119
Frank: So does the accuracy help you? Or is the roughness of a hand-made120
model something that might support your creative process as well?121
Zak: By doing that task, it gave me more time to arrange the spaces. I122
got to, I think, this time six iterations seemed quite comfortable again123
because I had the time on my side. So I took that model and I decided,124
what I would do is, I would just simply photograph. I photographed all of125
them, in case I ever had to fall back on a particular step. I took the sixth126
one, photographed it, printed it out. No, sorry. I photographed it. I scaled127
it up - roughly, because I knew the model was produced 1 to 500. And at128
that scale it allowed me to be more free without a lot of spatial constraints.129
So I scaled it up to roughly 1 to 200, which allowed me to roughly sketch130
over a plan or spatial arrangement. And how those space might actually131
interconnect. And from that again I would do a section, very quickly.132
Printed off the section. Would add a 2 1/2 dimension to it. Which allowed133
to then decipher where the ceiling height might be, where the ground134
height might be. Where is the relationship of those spaces in section and135
their roof or floor heights to another adjacent sort of space. And so from136
that I was able to. What did I do then? I took that and I began to produce a137
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1 to 200… somewhere between a massing model and an actual model. But138
it’s a model that’s essentially is a massing, represented at a different scale .139
But it’s allowing me to input human scale into that model. It’s allowing140
me to test…141
Frank: Why can you only do that on a 1 to 200, not on a 1 to 500? Is it too142
small?143
Zak: The 1 to 500 doesn’t allow you to kind of put yourself in a first person144
humanistic scale into themodel. 1 to 200 begins to do that a little bit. Other145
scales would be better, 1 to 100, 1 to 50, 1 to 20… But they would require too146
much in terms of their detailing, yeah, of their detailing or their condition147
to actually be able to go that far ahead in the initial stage.148
Frank: So I guess the current project doesn’t require you to go too much149
into detail then? At the end of the project you might just present a rough150
idea what the Derry’s cross might look like?151
Zak: Yeah, I think so. I think the project will eventually allow you to refine152
it. Work schematically though it and begin to refine the project, you can153
begin to elaborate on those special things. Larger scales apply a material154
element to it, apply an experiential element to it.155
Frank: How would you apply those material elements to it, for example?156
Zak: Initially, I suppose, you could take what might be a rough section,157
1 to 200. And increase that to 1 to 50, perhaps. You could then apply158
physical real world elements that you can find or manipulate. You could159
apply that to the model. Or the alternative could be, to photograph it.160
Put that model into a programme, like Photoshopping programme, and161
apply textural elements that might give you those sorts of conditions. It162
might be that you could work with pencil or some other tool into that to163
actually, through shading, to draw out maybe experiential qualities, such164
as lights, that sort of things. And then I think from that. Because you’ve165
began to, let’s say. I’ve got these material elements that will allow these166
quality structures like experiences or the way it feels… You can bring that167
to a much larger scale, 1 to 20, 1 to 10, 1 to 5. And you can start to say, in168
order to construct these material elements, they need to be detailed in169
this way. Which means that the construct will go together by way of just170
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detailing. So from doing it beforehand in card and doing a lot of it by hand171
versus 3d printer. I think when I did it by hand in card, as I was putting172
together the card massing models previously, I was, I think I was more173
aware of my hands, even if the scale wasn’t allowing me to represent the174
spatial intentions. It was allowing me more to think about those spatial175
relationships as I was doing it. So I think what I am trying to say is, when I176
was trying to do the 1 to 500, I was already consciouswhere I was going next177
and maybe the next scale, than I was when I said OK, produce those spatial178
relationships, send them to the 3D printer, because the 3D printer was just179
producing it. My mind was actually elsewhere, thinking about something180
else. So what I might have done was actually taking me off the tangible.181
It might have made me less prescriptive to the design process, possibly.182
I know that my mind was neutral in terms of the spatial arrangements,183
cause all I would be waiting to do is for those models to be printed and184
then to arrange them. Which is kind of, seems a bit of contradictory. If I185
wasn’t thinking about the model being produced itself, actually my mind186
was free and I could have been thinking about spatial arrangements, but187
I wasn’t. I was thinking about other aspects of the outputs and that sort188
of thing. So I actually think in hindsight, the manual massing, that sort189
of thing, would have lend itself. Although it didn’t allow for more time, it190
was more intuitive in a sense that it was already…. Because I had to think191
about… So that was what would give me that drive in “What’s the spatial192
arrangement?” I know, I’m not doing it, but when I come to do it, what it’s193
gonna be? Which would then allow me to jump, I think more smoothly,194
into another scale, if that makes sense. And I think probably, by, cause195
I initially had a tendency to do a section and plan on AutoCAD, or do it196
on computer because I felt it would be a bit quicker. By looming to me197
through kind of Lumière shapes and things, what it was actually doing was198
kind of the same as the 3D printed massing models. It wasn’t getting me199
to think about so much the next stage. Because all I was thinking about200
was completing that drawing. But actually there is never really an end to201
it, because you can keep chopping and changing it, just drawing another202
line. Actually, by doing something by hand, would have done this time203
for plans and sections, through doing that, it allows me to think about204
the next scale. So, the digital tools, although initially could be quicker, to205
realise something, actually I think are hindering us, in a sense. Because,206
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like I said, by doing it by hand, you are actually driving that tool, which is,207
you know, you are trying to bring out something. But you haven’t to think208
about other things, you haven’t to think about spatial parameters. So you209
are already in the next step ahead, while you are doing it in the previous…210
So that’s kind of, I suppose, where I am at.211
Frank: Does it ever happen, that if you do a manual model, or if you do212
something on the computer, something accidentally happens?213
Zak: If I find… Because I think even by drawing out manually these quick214
sectional things, you feel actually you might be a bit restricted. So you215
pick up the sketch book. And you can just scribble something. And before216
you have even scribbled or you thought, it’s gonna be part of an image.217
You have already realised something. And you just want to get the next218
piece of tracing paper over the section or plan you have done. It’s not219
even finished. It’s not even finished. You have not annotated it. Not even220
put a door in, or a window. You want to pause that there, you want to get221
another thing. Take the thing that you just sketched. Take that out. Work222
that over the top. You feel like what you end up doing is bridging the thing223
you been drawing before and the thing you have just drawn. And you got224
something other. OK wait, I am at a point now. I am at a point where I225
should now develop this several other times. Or should I test it. Should I226
model it. And it’s thosemoments where I think I actually struggle. Because227
its like, that you need to be intuitive in order to meet the demands of the228
brief, you know that you’ve got learning outcomes, you know that you are229
gonna be graded, you know that you gonna be looked at through several230
things. And, you’ve produced… So you started a drawing that has evolved.231
You produced one rough sketch and you decided this is the point where232
I jump. What is the correct thing to do? Is it to… Is it to now… Take this233
drawing a number of times and redraw it before you actually test it…But I234
think generally, on the whole, I would… Yeah, I think what I would try to235
do, is to look at… Take what I was drawing, take the other half drawing,236
combine it, make that into a single entity. Then I would say: This, that237
thing that I sketched, has gave me… it is not replaced what I was doing,238
but it given me a part of the solution where I was struggling. So actually,239
it’s not something other. It’s just the thing I would have drawn had I been240
able to keep going and known what it was I was going to do. So I take that241
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thing, that I combined. Produce probably a number of iterations. I like242
this thing of working in threes and sixes. That seems to suite well with me.243
It seems to show that I’ve… I’ve thought about a number of combinations.244
So I probably would work that up a number of times. And then I would245
take it into a model. That would allow me to test physically. I wouldn’t246
be going back to computer I don’t think, to kind of to do that. Because it247
would seem too early, to be able to fix things down on a computer. So yeah,248
I think that’s how I would kind of overcome those things.249
Frank: Or if you had already done six but didn’t find anything, would you250
do another one or just go ahead?251
Zak: I think it would come to how… I don’t know where it’s coming from.252
I couldn’t describe where it’s coming from. But I think it’s the instilled253
confidence or the thing at that point and how it’s speaking to me. It might254
say: “This is strong. It’s not easy, now, to go into another draw”. It does not255
seem like an easy leap. If it was easy, I think I would have to test it through256
a model, first. It might be, that I am doing the model and it’s really not257
working. In which case I am just going back to the drawing, go back and do258
the sixth. If it got to be the case where there are six iterations, and it’s…259
I’ve done six iterations and it’s illogical to jump to, and it has developed260
slightly, but it doesn’t feel quite at the point where it should be, I think, I261
would be resisting myself doing another one. Because if it is not working,262
I need to find out why. So I would probably still test it. But it might be in263
this situation, that I have to test it, OK it’s not working, and I have done264
six, and I have always done six. But this time my luck has run out and I265
need to do a seventh drawing, or an eight, or a ninth. To get to that point266
where… to get that feeling that I have if it was just two drawings. There267
was a point of confidence, a point of, where the leap of faith is just too268
much. And so I’ll do that. And then go and test it. And it would be the269
testing that kind of is that point where I go back, do I carry on work this270
up? If that makes sense…271
Frank: So if you would switch to a different drawing, or a different scale,272
or a different approach, do you have a specific goal in mind for that?273
Something you could verify your results against?274
270
Appendix
Zak: I think the performative sort of side of it, or the technical point of275
it, comes to a point where… Because there… in the academic sense there276
is a deadline. In the real world it might be a meeting with a client. So in277
either way there is a deadline. And you need to allocate a certain amount278
of time to produce those images, in order to meet that… And so you know,279
that actually, in order to allow yourself that time, you have to give yourself280
the previous deadline. So it’s about, how much iterative stuff can I get to281
that point before you work out those final drawings. So that deadline you282
set yourself, you need to resolve these schematic things. And you need to283
resolve those technical things. So I think it would be about what you’ve284
got to that point. So you think to yourself, whatever I’ve got, I need to…285
Speaking in terms of how it tends to happen versus what should happen.286
So kind of get your scheme. And you say, right. So how am I gonna plug287
in these performative things. So I know I’ve got a wall there, it’s not a288
window, it’s a wall. So what’s my u-value calculation gonna be for that wall.289
What that starts to do, I think is it… You say, OK. Well, initially I thought290
that’s plaster and that’s a brick. And then there is a cladding, but actually,291
maybe it’s another brick wall. And so you can conduct an u-value for that.292
The u-value tells you, actually that’s meeting what part bababa building293
regulation is saying. So I need to look at other materials that are gonna294
make this wall conform to this requirement. You might go around in a few295
circles. You might actually make recordings of these previous attempts to296
actually meet this u-value. And you can say, look, I’ve tried this… And then297
you might get to a version actually does make the u-value. It might not be298
exact but it’s close enough or it’s better. So you say OK, so that does that.299
That’s meeting that outcome that I’m gonna be assessed on. So you can300
kind of sign-post that. And say that’s for that. You can repeat that element301
for maybe a roof structure, or a floor structure, or you got a window. And302
so you start to… That would obviously have a lead to the reality of things303
because you have to meet those certain requirements.304
Frank: I meant earlier on, so before these external regulations come in. Is305
there something you impose yourself on the next step?306
Zak: That’s what I am thinking. Because that’s what tends to happen. What307
I think should happen is that you set those requirements earlier on in your308
design process. So it might be at the stage where you produced… Oh no, I309
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think if you are massing it, in the 1 to 500, it’s too early. But once you get to310
1 to 200, and you have roughly sketched out a plan and sections, you could311
already begin to think that the roof or the walls have those requirements.312
They are in the law. And if this was for a client or a real-life project, you’d313
have to instil these performance things. So actually at that stage you could314
begin and look at those things. And say, actually, in this early stage, I315
need to do this. It might mean that you are not so conscious about doing316
another 5 drawings as you are about to be applying these parameters to317
that one drawing. And it might be that through those parameters you318
can maybe… you either sketch or diagrammise those things around the319
image, but actually from that you could do another iteration. But it might320
be the performance things that, in this case, drive the next iteration. As so321
much as well, I have drawn a series of lines, let me draw another series of322
lines - it’s performance based. If that’s what you meant by that? Yeah. But323
also for the 1 to 500 you have to decide when to stop at some point. So is324
that a feeling or is that something that you define at the very early stage325
yourself? Generally my 1 to 500 is: each of the spaces that I know that I326
should or I would generally need to put in my building programme, and327
they are all printed as individual blocks. And they would be repositioned328
on a map on the same scale of 1 to 500 showing the context. And in my329
mind, I’d be a user and think where these blocks would go in terms of330
a user. And then through each sort of iteration I am trying to begin to331
structure those components. And trying to get to a point where, I suppose,332
it becomes harder to orientate those objects. And it’s that feeling then,333
that is. It’s not about being stuck… It’s not a stuck thing. I don’t need help.334
Or I need to scrap and redo. It’s that thing that is saying: Well, test this335
now. Do it in a different way. Because it’s kind of a pause thing, this stuck336
point. And the testing. Which is actually the same thing. It’s the same337
feeling. It’s about, you’ve reached the point where it’s difficult to move338
on. So maybe you’ve gone to the extend of whatever it is. So actually, I339
am just thinking about different solutions now that we are talking about340
it, it could be that you have a conversation with somebody about it. They341
might come up with something. But in a way, you are still testing it. You342
are just testing it through somebody else. Yeah, I think it’s a feeling. It’s a343
feeling of pausing. It’s a feeling of taking that thing in another direction.344
And testing it, even at that stage.345
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Frank: So in your testing, do you actually take the position of a persona or346
a stakeholder of the process?347
Zak: Or are you still yourself looking at it? I think, in the 1 to 500… You348
are thinking about it in terms of the client. Because all your research349
up to that date, would be putting yourself in the shoes of that person.350
So you might actually go and meet. If it is something about someone351
who is involved in printing, perhaps. You would go and meet with the352
printer. You’d go to a print house. And you ask. You do this research. You353
interview. You walk through the spaces, you maybe photograph, you make354
sketches. You put yourself in that occupation. You are translating that.355
Because you are still trying to say, these are the spatial requirements. You356
are still in their shoes. I think if you get to that point where you are kind357
of pausing. Or you are saying, I can’t go any further, you begin to test it. I358
think you switch roles in a sense. Because you have gone as far as you can359
at that point. In terms of being occupative about it. And you need to say360
as an Architect, I need to… I know my requirements in terms of spatial, I361
know what the occupational needs are. How am I going to achieve these362
for the client? And I think it’s that pivotal thing from massing to, in a363
sense, testing. It’s that hinge, that allows you to switch roles. And I think364
I see the tutors, I see the tutor as a client, essentially. They are the ones365
that are going to review that this thing as a client would. So even if it’s366
just the tutor, before a big deadline, you need to be able to explain how367
you tested the spaces in order to meet those requirements that the client368
has set upon you. And it’s… unless you have tested the work that you have369
done previously, you can’t actually know if it’s working or not. So I guess370
that’s how that might work.371
Frank: And you also said something interesting earlier. You said, you are372
going through the spaces. So what other influences do you have on your373
work?374
Zak: I look at the site. I think looking at the site is as well…Maybe it’s about375
producing sort of a narrative for those spaces. Generally I like to perceive376
spaces as processes. So if it is a printing thing, it’s about what happens377
first. What happens next… And actually, so there is something about what378
feeds in to that initiation. And there is some form of outcome and what379
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has been produced. And so you can start to think about the external things380
outside the space that you created have an influence, and maybe influence381
themselves backwards. So how your spaces become dependent on those382
that initiate your programme. As well as spaces that have then a depen-383
dency in terms of, they are depending upon something you are producing.384
So maybe it’s actually reciprocal, maybe they are giving something back. I385
like to think about those processes and narratives that allow those sort of386
things. To think about how your programme, your building, might relate387
back to this context. But also, something I started to do recently, is just to388
take a sketchbook, take a pencil. And I might even be speaking out loud,389
because I do it, but in my head I’m stepping into the building. Where am I390
going next? I am going here, and then I’m going here, I’m going up there,391
and I’m going across here. Then I’m going to do that task, then I probably392
go here, and then I am going back here. I am going to go there, I am going393
here. The product, whatever it is, is gonna go maybe that way, but I don’t394
go where the product goes. I go back to that space because that is how I395
exit the building. And actually, the pencil hasn’t left the paper. And I have396
this kind of journey, that I’ve drawn out. And actually, from that, you can397
take that image, print it out, and you start position spatial settings on this398
journey. Because you’ve allowed your mind to guide you through. I think399
that’s another way of me trying to transcribe how I might begin to look at400
that sort of setup.401
Frank: And are you talking to other people as well, maybe not Architects402
even?403
Zak: Yeah. And actually, in a similar way… I think it’s good to have the404
conversations. I think things that I don’t know if I should be conscious405
of them, but I am conscious of them… One is the idea that if you talk to406
someone, it might be that they try to come up with suggestive ideas for407
it, but it might be, and this is the thing I am conscious about, they are408
suppressive about your design to better their own. Or whether those409
designs are actually constructive in a sense that they help you to do better410
work.411
Frank: But that’s mostly for other Architects, isn’t it? Do you also talk to412
other people about your designs?413
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Zak: I think when I talk to… I get the general consensus, that when I talk414
to other people, for example if I talk to my partner, I might talk to her, I415
get the feeling that she is not interested in the subject. It might be that416
she is not interested, it might be that she doesn’t understand it. She might417
not have enough background knowledge, or terminology, or processes418
that happen. And so that field of Architecture isn’t interesting for her. So419
that becomes hard. I think some people are interested or are stimulated,420
such as my parents, because they want to know how well I am doing at the421
University. They become intellectual engaged with what it is I am doing.422
Although the technicalities of it, in any given sense, become more of a423
blur again. Because they don’t have that background of understanding.424
But I think by having these conversations, what actually I do I free up425
those ideas that I am holding on to in my own head. And allow me to426
give myself clarity. Allow me to actually think about what else it could be.427
How I, you know, can actually go back to my design and actually come up428
with some other concepts. But I think if I do that, I need to be conscious429
of what it is that I am coming up with, what it is that I previously got.430
And is it an evolution or is it a discarding of something? And how do I go431
about to maybe saying to the tutor, you know, this is what I have done.432
Have I discarded something? Or have I simply just adjusted it, you know,433
have I evolved it? Or do I have work that documents or lead on from that.434
Understandably, if it’s discarded, howdo I represent that as being discarded.435
How do I represent what I have now got to? And what is the thing in436
between, which is why have I done what I have done? And that’s generally437
what has come out when I had that conversation with someone that freed438
up my mind. Yeah, I think I know where I want to go in my future. I know439
within that constraints, that I have to finish my first part of my degree, I440
have to get some experience. I need to do a masters programme. I need to441
get more experience and do a part three. And then at that point, I’ve only442
a number of years of experience. Is it beneficial to maybe go and work443
for somebody then? How long? I don’t know. There seems to be a stigma444
about things being five years. Five years seem to be a suitable amount of445
time. Do I then spend my time contesting that? Try to understand why446
that might be? Or do I just fit in with it? You know, do that for five years.447
But I know, at the end point, I want to be working for myself. It’s just that448
bit of vagueness in between. But I think, previously… Because I’ve got this449
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ability to assess something to an extend, maybe that comes back to that450
I say I do six iterations of something and I know that’s a pausing point, I451
think what it does it entrusts me with a certain level of confidence. So if452
it was about working for it for five years, I might actually before the five453
years say to myself, actually no! I’m confident now. I can jump that and go454
and do the thing, which I know in my head is what I want to achieve. Or it455
might be that I do five years, and I am getting that feeling of confidence.456
So I work longer. But I still know that the end point is working for myself.457
So I do have those conversations with myself. And actually I think even458
before I get to that part about finishing University, I think within myself, I459
can look at a piece of work and I can critique it against something other. I460
know I got within myself the ability to know what I like. I know something461
that I have seen which actually I know what the task is the output in order462
to meet the assessment. And I can contextualise that piece of work that I463
like with what the output is. So then I know why I like it. I know why it is464
doing what it is doing. And then I can use that to reflect my own work and465
say this is why I am not doing what is as strong as it could be. Because this466
other piece of work has given me a gauge in which to set. So I have those467
conversations with myself.468
Frank: So is this years work influenced by last years work, for example?469
Zak: I think what its about from last year is understanding basic principles.470
This year it seems that they are related in a sense that they apply to the471
field of Architecture. The school decides that the elements that we have472
done are going to be assess again this year. But actually there is some kind473
of level, there is adding a level of, level of… I don’t wanna say hardness, it’s474
not. It’s an increase in the academic level. There is some parameters that475
might apply to that. So it might be that we are doing a technical report.476
And actually the technical has to with thermal efficiency. It might be to477
do with structure. And it’s the same things that we have learned about478
in the previous year, we can still apply to this year, but actually, you are479
going deeper. Which adds that level or professionalism. This academic480
level to it. I feel that those things become transferable. And as long as481
you have basic understanding of things, it’s easy to apply them. But then482
you kind of begin to go into another field of learning, which is about those483
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elements that apply to depth what you currently know. So that always484
building upon that, if that makes sense.485
Frank: The group you are working in, is that helping you?486
Zak: At the moment it’s a little bit of a hindrance, in terms of, I suppose487
the body of work that needs to be produced within the time constraints.488
Because obviously, the number of people versus level of work can actually489
reduce the amount of work any one person within the time frame. De-490
pending people’s individual personalities and ways of assessing things we491
are doing and individual time tables, that can have an impact on how that492
work gets produced. I think the idea of being a member within a group ac-493
tually helps overall. Because it allows you to consistently being stimulated.494
It allows you to test your proposition amongst all of those different mem-495
bers. And actually, you might be testing it with each one. There might be496
overlaps if you rigorously test it with two members at the same time, or497
maybe it’s all five members. There are overlaps, there are crossovers and498
the project becomes very very strong. And I think as those things come499
out, you don’t necessarily achieved that by yourself. And that can instil500
confidence in yourself. So the group aspect does help.501
Frank: Thank you, that was a very interesting conversation.502
1.9 Interview with Peter Kemp
Peter Kemp: So what do you want to know?1
Frank Loesche: I want to know how you create. So maybe you can tell me2
how you do it in the course? Do you start with the brief? Or maybe even3
before that?4
Peter: I think it depends entirely on what sort of brief or project it is.5
Depending on if we know who the client is exactly, or if we are making the6
client up.7
Frank: So what’s the case for the Derry’s cross project?8
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Peter: For this project we are looking at how the Plymouth City plan and9
the Plymouth city council are looking for new ideas for the city. In a way10
the client is the council. And in a wider sense the city of Plymouth. It’s11
sort of trying to create more civic space. I think that’s the sort of first12
thing we started to look at. It was about what we felt civic space would13
be. What would be helpful in a city. And then, first of all, we looked at the14
Abercombie.15
Frank: What’s that?16
Peter: That was the plan that was made initially like post-war to redesign17
the city. So how about this kind of came into being. How about was it then18
implemented. And the successes and failures of it.19
Frank: So it is considered to be a modern city, Architecture wise, after the20
war?21
Peter: Yeah, yeah. Because a lot of Plymouth in general was bombed. It22
had to be… Because the plan… It had allowed to be taken down. And then,23
sort of, Armada way, Royal Parade, and the Western Approach was then24
coated around the city. The Marked changed position. But we found that25
by looking intomaps from 1890. And then comparing tomaps from,maybe,26
1960s.27
Frank: So where did the market used to be?28
Peter: It used to be more in line with sort of bottom of Drake Circus. So it29
had a much more celebrated position within the city. Now it’s totally put30
into the back. Which… with anything that’s built up around it. So it kind31
of gets a little bit lost within everything else around the market, which32
is a shame. Because the market, it’s like an everyday event… You can go,33
you can pick up bits and bobs, gather the food for the day or the week,34
however you want to use it. I think it’s a shame that it lost that kind of35
focus with it. Yeah, so I think, we initially looked at how the shift changed36
from pre-war to post-war. And how the city is very dense. And it was very37
mixed use. So, how before it was all of the ground floors were shops and38




Frank: Are there still residential areas down there?41
Peter: There are, but largely it’s storage for shops that don’t need the42
storage. So they rent the land, so that’s three to four stories. And they use43
the bottom and the other stories are used extremely poorly. So it’s just an44
inefficient use of space. We found out, that shift obviously pushed a lot45
of people out of the city and then made the east and the west of the city46
more exposed to the connection to the town centre. And how the Western47
Approach kind of acts like a barrier between the residential area above48
Union Street and then into the city, into the market.49
Frank: Is that your own observation, or did you also talk to people in the50
area?51
Peter: Yeah, I think we looked at plans and maps like from a hundred years52
ago and more recent. We then looked at… We then did figure-ground53
studies of where residential units were and where they are now. There is a54
lot of smaller units back until 1890s, and they were more people focused.55
They were a lot narrower. You were made to engage with your neighbours,56
the terrain, everything around you. And I think, making these sweeping57
gestures, like the Armada Way, it becomes very kind a sole if you are58
walking around that area. Because, again, I supposed, what we were doing59
is seeing the failures of it. Because if we understand what doesn’t work60
about it, we can then attempt to not make these mistakes again. And I61
guess that’s how we start the process. It’s addressing exactly what the62
issue is, and what the plan wants.63
Frank: Did each of you do that individually, or did you do it as a group, or64
was it a mix?65
Peter: Very mixed. Sometimes you went to the site all together, and some-66
times you went to site as one or two. I, for example, went down and took67
pictures of all New George Street, and of Cornwall Street. The shop faces.68
And then piece them together to a very long texture. And then from that69
we looked up what exact shows were occupying the space. So there was a70
lot of… If you move down the street, as you walk further towards the mar-71
ket, it became less of the shops, and smaller ground, and went from being72
three stories to being two stories. And there was a definite shift in focus73
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between shops that were nearer Armada Way and shops that were nearer74
the market. And they were allowed to be more run down the further you75
get down that way. And there were fewer independent and Plymouth ori-76
ented shops and selling things that you wouldn’t get anywhere else. So77
I think the point of… We have picked up on how the shift changes. And78
then we kind of thought, we want to change that. We want to add in more79
local produce which celebrates the locality of Plymouth. So we then kind80
of talked about how we could do that. Maybe farming. Implementing like81
an urban farm. So, around that, we’ve got… We have one person who is82
implementing a local farm for growth and maybe teaching.83
Frank: So you basically went down to the site, identified a need for local84
produces. So you came together and made the decision to have a farm and85
then went off? Did each of you decide individually what you wanted to do86
then?87
Peter: Yeah, we all decided. We had the main focus on the market. And88
initially we were trying to commit the market to Derry’s Cross and make it89
more about the theatre. So making Derry’s Cross more of a cultural hub.90
But we then found that distance is quite far to bridge that gap with all of91
our projects. I think, if there was maybe more intervention allowed, more92
projects available, then we could have made that distance work for us. But93
we shifted our locations around, maybe 15 times. And eventually we found94
that we need a market square just like the one next to the market that is95
currently used as a car park. So we had to iterate, and iterate, and iterate,96
before we got to our locations.97
Frank: So how did you decide that this was the right location to work on at98
the end?99
Peter: I think we looked at what we were trying to do with our propositions.100
For instance, I was going to act almost like a gateway into the rest of the101
project. That directly let me to decide on the location. Aisha as well.102
She was also doing like gateway, but from a different side. So we were103
both gateways to start and finish off the process. And then Bobby’s was a104
tannery and a butcher. So they are connected quite heavily, because the105
butcher would use maybe five cows a week. They would be located on106
the site as well, for grassing. So they would be breed elsewhere, and then107
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brought in for the last few days of grassing. And then using the skins from108
the animals, they would go to the tannery. And from there they would109
go on to become some produce. I think for us it was about utilising every110
part of the process, no matter what process it was. So each of our waste111
products could go into the next programme.112
Frank: Is that something that applies to your creative process as well?113
Peter: Yeah. I think you think through things so many times in your head114
when you walk from the studio, when you walk from home, when you115
are walking around. I think getting out of the studio is very important,116
because that is when you have your best ideas.117
Frank: Why do you ever come to the studio then?118
Peter: To put them on paper.119
Frank: You could take paper with you…120
Peter: I always do. I think it is obviously important to work through things121
on paper as much as it is to have those ideas and think about them. And I122
think actually drawing it, then you actually put it from your brain down123
on the page and then you can come back to it later and pick out elements124
that work very well, and leave out others that don’t work so much.125
Frank: How do you decide which ones are the good ones?126
Peter: Partly just testing. Testing, modelling, imagining you being in the127
building, in the space.128
Frank: How do you test?129
Peter: I supposed, at the beginning through diagramming how you want130
the space to work.131
Frank: Mostly in a sense of spatiality?132
Peter: Yeah, spatially. Or say, if you want a space to feel very open or very133
tightened or constricted, how others are feeling and how do you want it134
to come across? And then within that you think about how you would135
interact with the space. And maybe you would sketch out the use of that.136
And take that one step further, maybe you make some models. And from137
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that you can see how the light interacts with the space. And when you138
sort of created a physical kind of form to it, the more models, the more139
details you can bring on to it, it helps you to move along.140
Frank: How do you model? Do you do it digitally?141
Peter: Sometimes by hand, sometimes on SketchUp, or 3Ds Max142
Frank: Why do you sometimes do it by hand and sometimes on SketchUp?143
Peter: I think it’s very easy and quick to create to smaller CAD model of144
what you want it to feel like. But that has a very different feel to when you145
look at an actual 3D model. Because it’s a difference if you can only look at146
it on screen or if you can actually pick it up and just manipulate it through147
the movement in spaces. In past projects I have maybe made like 5 or 6148
different models for each space. And then moved them all around. And149
changed the orientation of certain elements of them, and photographed150
them to document the entire process. But that was just from one quick151
model. And from one model I made maybe 30 different interpretations152
and combinations of spaces. And from that I can see things that work,153
things that don’t work. And then push that along further. It kind of goes154
back to the iterations, seeing what works and what doesn’t.155
Frank: So you basically sketch ideas first, then put them into a model and156
test if it works. You then identify the elements that work and don’t work157
and then go back?158
Peter: I think, at least for me anyway, it’s less about what doesn’t work,159
more about what does. Because sometimes what doesn’t work for one160
thing, could work for another part of the design. So even if… Like last161
night I came in and made maybe five models. Not because I thought they162
would be right for what I was doing. I just though if I would install them,163
maybe I see something completely different. Because how you imagine164
things, that’s not always how it comes out.165
Frank: Why is that?166
Peter: I think people have different emotions about what things can be or167




Frank: Are you showing these models to other people as well or is it mainly170
for yourself?171
Peter: I think it’s primarily for myself to rush through that process. I think,172
part of it… I think if amodel becomes successful and it leadsme somewhere,173
then I use this or the documentation of that process. Because it might not174
be the model itself, but it might be a photo taken from a model that sparks175
and idea. And that can take you on a completely different route.176
Frank: If you take pictures of a model, do you keep all of them, or do you177
immediately delete some of them?178
Peter: I am usually quite bothered by deleting pictures, so I usually just179
keep them all.180
Frank: Was that ever useful, or is it just a habit?181
Peter: Sometimes it’s useful. It’s always good to keep past things. Because182
then you can flick through old sketch books and see what you saw years183
ago and it kind of awakens an idea. And that’s the same with models, and184
sketches, and pictures.185
Frank: So if you think about your past, do you also think about your future?186
For example where you might be in five years from now.187
Peter: I could probably have a guess where I think I’d be. I would like188
to… I think I’d be finished with this course, be graduated, and work as an189
Architect. However, I might be doing a Masters or something. It could be190
completely different.191
Frank: I mean in regards to the type of designs you are doing at themoment192
— does your projected future play a role there?193
Peter: I think for some people, yeah. For me, I always find new things that194
interest me, which is probably quite bad. In a way it’s good, in a way it’s195
bad. Because I think I get quite distracted. And I think I really pick up196
quite some odd skills and things I don’t need to be learning. But then I do.197
I did like a lot of kayaking, climbing, hiking. Do some outdoor stuff. Travel198
a lot. I love to get lost and find a way back.199
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Frank: Does that somehow resonate in the project you are doing right200
now?201
Peter: Maybe. Maybe that’s how I view lots of things I don’t want right202
now. For instance, that we as a society, as a species, eat too much meat. It’s203
unsustainable for the amount of people on the planet. You can’t advocate204
that there being less people without quite some big confrontations. So205
we have to look ahead on how to solve this problem. And I think it’s not206
outside the responsibility of Architects to look at these issues. Because it207
affects everyone and if the Architecture of a city can bring the people more208
together, more sensible about food and local produce, then that would209
be a great step forward. I think it’s long term. And I think my research210
hasn’t really gone to many places, yet. I’d love to look into more. Maybe211
that’s kind of my next stage. I’m always wanting to do something that212
pushes me. And I think the studio that I am in at the moment is the one213
that made me most uncomfortable. So that’s why I went down that route.214
Because I don’t think you’ll learn anything if you do the same things over215
and over again. If you are getting a pad on the back for the things that you216
can do, there is not a lot of point to do that. But if you try, fail, shuffle, fail,217
try, that always gets you in a forward kind of momentum. I always wish218
to learn something from the process. So I think that’s kind of the main219
thing.220
Frank: So you are reflecting on the process itself as well?221
Peter: I think I do it a lot of times by not really thinking about it. So if222
something doesn’t work, I just move on and try something different. I223
should be documenting that, so that later I can look back what did or didn’t224
work. For me it’s very much the process how you get from A to B. Because225
it’s not just oneway of doing things. For example here in the current studio,226
if you are working on the same project and you all have the same starting227
point, no two projects will be the same. Because everyone is bringing in228
their past experiences, their past failures, successes, everything. They put229
themselves into the project.230




Peter: Because we are all human beings. People are different. I think people233
are so varied, and that’s a great thing. That’s probably a reason why social234
housing doesn’t necessarily always work. Because if you are designing235
for a group of people which… You are designing for the average, and the236
average doesn’t necessarily exist. It could be working with everyone and237
it would be lovely if it was as easy as that. And people are unpredictable,238
changeable, adaptable…239
Frank: So do you work with persona to put them in the position of stake-240
holders in the project?241
Peter: Sometimes its subconscious, other times its very conscious. Because242
it would be kind of silly, to just at your wants and needs for a product243
because you are probably not the person using it. You can do your best to244
maybe look at a group of people and how they would use the space. That245
would be defining the user. That would be an initial step.246
Frank: Do you also talk with non-Architects about your work?247
Peter: Yeah, when I get home. Yeah, I think it’s good getting different248
opinions on things. We all create some kind of microcosm of thought in249
the studio. As much as it is good to talk with other people in the studio,250
I think it’s better to talk to people out of the studio because then you251
don’t get the same kind of ideas going round and round and round. So252
fresh eyes are very positive, because then you get a fresh take on to things.253
They might not be as educated within the profession of design, but they254
might see something that you completely overlooked, which could be a255
key feature to a design. And maybe that’s what takes it from just a stack of256
building materials to something meaningful to a community, to a place.257
Frank: So talking about materials. Does that play a role in your design? Is258
that something you consider in your design process, or does it come in259
very late?260
Peter: I think as I go on and design more and do more projects, and get261
a greater understanding on what could be done, that will change. Just262
as the technology that you understand limits what you can produce to263
some extend…You can have all these wonderful ideas in your head. If you264
can’t put that onto paper, if you can’t put all these structured on a paper265
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on an actual design, on an actual working structure, then it’s not gonna266
mean anything. Your knowledge is a limiting factor to what you can and267
can’t do. You know, the tools available to you, are a limiting factor. I think268
the library is a great resource to go to. I think people tend to overlook269
the wealth of knowledge that is in text and rely way to heavily on online270
journals, online resources. They tend to look at flashy, very well illustrated271
things, like Dezeen or Artdaily or those design websites. They are nice to272
watch or to view. But sometimes they are very far removed from actually273
gaining knowledge. They are pretty pictures. And they are letting you274
gaze on them, but you are not getting much from them.275
Frank: How does knowledge relate to your project. Do you think you276
understand the problem from the beginning?277
Peter: No, I would never say that I understand the problem. Yeah, I think278
you have to learn about the problem as you go along. I think to assume279
that you know anything, is a limiting factor again. It always holds you280
back. I think being open to new ideas, to not knowing… accepting that281
is…282
Frank: But you need to know at some point, right?283
Peter: No. I think you work towards a point. At the beginning, I think, you284
are very open. Because otherwise you are just gonna be making the same285
building.And it’s not gonna be… It could be spot on. It could be absolutely286
great what’s in your head, but then, if you draw it out four or five times,287
you might be seeing something that you didn’t see prior to that. And then288
you keep drawing, keep iterating, keep changing the process. And you289
keep creating those different output. And you might work your way back290
to the start, but if you work your way back to the start, then you know that291
that’s. That your first instincts were right in some way.292
Frank: So if you had unlimited time for this project, would that be a good293
thing or a bad thing?294
Peter: No, I think that would be a bad thing. I just spent weeks or months295
doing a painting when I could have probably stopped after five days.296
Frank: Is it just not progressing after some time or is it getting worse?297
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Peter: I think it’s just done when it’s done. But when it’s done it’s hard to298
sustain. It’s hard to know when it’s completed. I think sometimes you just299
have to stop, take a step back, and get yourself out. Try to see it from a lot300
further away. And that might tell you when it’s completed. Because for301
example with the painting or drawing, it’s hard to knowwhen you finished302
something. Because sometimes it’s five or ten steps before you think it’s303
done.304
Frank: So does your tutor come and tell you to work something else? Is305
that something that might help, something that you learn during your306
education here?307
Peter: Yeah, I think you get better of finding when, or how much more308
effort, howmuch more time, whatever you put into it, is not related to, it’s309
not gonna be any additions to the meaning and to the output. It’s finding310
that point. You get slowly better at it, I would say. The tutors can help311
with that. Nudge you into not spending hours and hours and hours on a312
tiny detail. As well as… Especially in our studio, they are getting you to313
look at 1 to 5, and one to 200 and going back further. So you are looking at314
it in various scales all the time switching from scale to scale.315
Frank: So when is the time to switch between those scales?316
Peter: Any time.317
Frank: But when is the time you decide to change?318
Peter: I think, first I look at the massing. Then I look at much more minor319
scale. Then I look how light enters a room. Then that would be a much320
smaller scale. But sometimes you need kind of a midpoint to see these321
things are not getting lost with each other. So it’s constantly shifting back322
and forth to see what you are doing… one is complementing the other.323
Frank: So you switch whenever you think one of them is achieving what324
you wanted it to address?325
Peter: Yeah. I think it’s really handy to pause time sometimes. Then build326
kind of a huge set from the models, and really really plan on the space.327
But obviously, the more experience you have, the quicker you get there328
with your modelling and showing it at some point. Because there was a lot329
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of time wasted in the making, in going over the same thing because you330
feel save in that area. Which I do from time to time. Drawing the same331
thing again, not because I think I will gain anything from it, or because332
it’s gonna add to the project. Just because I felt like I know that part a bit333
and that will produce another drawing that will look very nice, but it’s not334
gonna do it.335
Frank: You might use that as an anchor or a starting point then?336
Peter: Yeah, a little bit. I think it’s being honest to yourself. It’s telling337
yourself you want to move on from one part of it. Of course that comes338
back to knowing when something is completed. Because you can work too339
much on one thing and then it becomes overworked. There is a beauty in340
things being just right. It’s not too worked. It’s more kind of, it is what it341
is. It’s not too much. Sometimes I think I manage it, but then…342
Frank: Thank you very much.343
1.10 Interview with Amelia Gardiner
Frank Loesche: Basically, the only question that I have is: How do you1
create?2
Amelia Gardiner: At the moment I have been working… So far I worked in3
plan and section, when I first started designing. I had my programme and4
from that I sort of did bubble diagrams. So different bubbles to showwhere5
different things would go. And then I tried to work in plan and section6
But in my last tutorial I found that like the way that I created in my plan7
wasn’t really good enough.8
Frank: How do you know it is not good enough?9
Amelia: I was talking to one of the tutors and he said like, it makes sense,10
but it’s not… it hasn’t got enough creativity about the design itself. So it’s11
too formal.12
Frank: Did you see that yourself as well afterwards?13
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Amelia: Yeah, after he said it, it became really obvious. So today I have14
been starting to work in perspective. So I am redoingmywhole design, but15
from an experiential point of view as opposed to just plans and sections.16
Which is almost as if I restarted the process.17
Frank: So you are working somewhere around Derry’s cross? So what18
exactly are you designing?19
Amelia: Do you know the bank building? It’s like a really old-fashioned20
building that’s been turned into a pub, but it’s a really detailed kind of21
facade.22
Frank: Sorry, where is it?23
Amelia: It’s got so… The car park is there, the big car park. And then there24
is the Theatre Royal. And it’s like the building in the middle. Yeah, so25
there is this big car park behind it. And I am taking out the car park and26
repurposing the bank building. So it’s becoming an allotment / kitchen /27
garden / seed bank type thing.28
Frank: How did you come up with that idea in the beginning? Did you walk29
down there?30
Amelia: Yeah, we went to site and we were walking around and then we31
were looking at the age groups that were there. So we went into the32
Athenaeum and talked to some of the people there. They are mainly33
sort of like third age, old people around that area. And then we looked34
more into regeneration in general. Because it’s sort of lacking in character35
around that area. It used to be the centre of Plymouth, almost. And now36
it’s just sort of dead. So we wanted a regeneration sort of theme. And then37
it sort of became obvious that the allotments were quite important for38
that.39
Frank: How did you decide for the regeneration theme? Based on your40
research you could have built more retirement homes as well. So how did41
you decide on regeneration?42
Amelia: We didn’t want to just isolate the third age. So we wanted to43
reintroduce the younger people. And also the student accommodation44
being built just right behind Reel cinema. So we didn’t want to sort of45
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ignore that demographic completely. It was the regeneration to bring46
those two generations together, almost. And to create a space that made47
sense for both of those ages at once.48
Frank: So the idea started from an almost social point of view?49
Amelia: Yeah, I think so. I think because we went to the site and actually50
spoke to people, that really influenced our decision as a whole. We liked51
to tour around Athenaeum and also around the civic centre, that really52
made the difference.53
Frank: How do you translate those conversation that you had into Archi-54
tecture? Do you immediately sit down and start sketching?55
Amelia: I think it was a case of problem solving. So we did a lot of group56
discussions right at the start to sort of come to a conclusion about what57
would be…what wouldmake themost sense. As well as a lot of background58
research. We looked a lot into the history of Plymouth. And sort of rede-59
veloping that aspect. It was really just a case of talking until we all agreed60
on an idea. And then we went on from there.61
Frank: Was it necessary that everyone agrees? Or would you have been62
fine if the others had implemented other ideas?63
Amelia: I think for a coherent master plan, it doesn’t make sense for one64
person to be on the edge, because otherwise it won’t work as a whole. The65
one person who disagrees will always do less well than everyone else in66
the group.67
Frank: Do you have the feeling that people had different weight during68
those discussions?69
Amelia: I feel like the third years, and I am a second year, the third years70
had a lot more influence to start with. And then the second years came71
into sort of our own afterwards because obviously we don’t have as much72
experience as they do. And they have done a similar project to this last73
year. So it’s good to hear their opinions first and from that we can figure74
out our own mind.75
Frank: So did you use their experience as input to your own process?76
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Amelia: Yeah, definitely. I feel like we are definitely learning from them77
the whole time. Because it’s getting a fresh perspective on a new topic.78
So interesting to listen to sort of get your bearings before you sort of dive79
in.80
Frank: Talking about fresh: I’ve heard before that your role as a second year81
might also be to bring in a fresh view? Does that reflect your experience?82
Amelia: Yeah, I feel like we are helping them as well. Because we have our83
own things that we sort of developed at the start of second year. Because84
it’s run differently this year. Because we are doing more CAD based and85
things like that. And they are more focused on hand drawing. And I feel86
like we are bringing in some computer knowledge, almost. And ways of87
working that way. And they are teaching us a lot about hand drawing.88
Which I hadn’t really done since first year.89
Frank: So how does that work: Does someone else do hand drawing, then90
you put it in a computer model, and then you redraw that?91
Amelia: I feel like we have all done pretty similar amounts of everything.92
Because it’s all our individual designs that we are doing. But then there are93
some things that we are better at than others. I found that I am strongest94
at tracing and creating details for bigger drawings. So I have been doing a95
lot of drawing of historical Plymouth. Which then go into bigger schemes.96
That’s sort of been my job through this part so far.97
Frank: Do you always keep in mind, for example if you are drawing those98
details, what the big overview, the whole project looks like?99
Amelia: Yeah, definitely. We had like a layout of what it will actually look100
like and I was given the section to then work on. And then I reintroduced101
that back into the drawing.102
Frank: Did that also change the big drawing whenever you did something103
or were you mostly filling in gaps?104
Amelia: Yeah, a little bit. The way a drawing is done really influences the105
rest of what’s surrounding it. Because it’s that style. It didn’t make sense106
for anyone else to continue drawing. Because that would then clash with107
that style of the drawing. Did you then translate that into CAD as well? Not108
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necessarily that one, because that was historical Plymouth. So it wasn’t109
that relevant to create CAD drawings of it. But for my own project… I110
haven’t started CAD yet, because I often rework that design a lot of times.111
I really haven’t gotten to the idea, yet.112
Frank: You are doing mostly hand drawings then?113
Amelia: Yeah, so far. I have done a lot of iterations on tracing paper. Just114
like hundreds of sheets of tracing paper so far. But the last project I did a115
lot more CAD drawings because I was more certain about my idea earlier116
on.117
Frank: Do you currently use the same scale all the time then?118
Amelia: I have done a lot of 500 and 1125 working in plan, because you119
want to see the wider context. But I feel like you have to work in a variety120
of scales. So like understanding your building as a whole. So if you don’t121
work on a smaller scale, you will never know the technology and certain122
elements of it. And then if you don’t work with the wider context, it won’t123
make sense with the rest of the site.124
Frank: What do you base your decision which scale to use on?125
Amelia: I think, if I want to focus on context, it would be more something126
like 1 to 1000. But if I want to focus on technology… I feel like I zoom in as127
I go through. So I will start off with a really wide scale and as I develop I128
zoom in. I know that you are supposed to work on small and large scale at129
the same time, but I find that quite difficult, so I always go from larger to130
smaller.131
Frank: OK, so you zoom in, and then, do you zoom out again, or do you just132
stay there?133
Amelia: Maybe zoom out at the end, to see if the final… So when I got the134
facade and things like that, like, decided, then I zoom back out and put135
that in a context. But I mainly zoom in to start with.136
Frank: You mentioned earlier that you now changed to perspective. So137
what changes for you if you do that?138
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Amelia: I think it’s more about the experience. Seeing how people interact139
with that space, so even if you don’t really know what it’s about. So you140
start deciding like key circulations, and probably aesthetics when you are141
doing a perspective, rather than the layout. And then from those things142
you can decide on the layout rather than the other way around, which I143
am finding quite helpful.144
Frank: So is the aesthetics mostly based on forms? Or what else do you145
consider?146
Amelia: I think I often base it on a wider context. So I look around at the147
site. So that’s really key at the moment because I am working with the148
bank facade, which is like a really complex sand stone design. And so going149
with anything too complex, or too similar, isn’t going to work out. So you150
can’t really replicate that style.151
Frank: Are you looking into the type of stone and othermaterials as well?152
Amelia: I think the surroundings are the main thing I focus on.153
Frank: And light, I guess? Or is that something that comes in later?154
Amelia: I think that’s more interior details later, and how different things155
are highlighted as well.156
Frank: So after the perspective drawings, what will be the next step?157
Amelia: I think from that I’ll go on to plans and sections. Because I think I158
will be in a better position to do it then. Rather than just diving straight159
into that like I did at the beginning, which didn’t work out.160
Frank: Do you also build real models in addition to CAD?161
Amelia: Yeah, I made one so far. I probably should have made more. But I162
think that will go again with the next steps of plans and sections. When I163
have an idea in plans and sections, I can make themmore 3D and work out164
from there.165




Amelia: I think it’s more like a realisation if an idea that looks good in plan168
and section, could actually work in real life, because you are putting those169
things together and you see how these things interact.170
Frank: So how do you decide if it works?171
Amelia: I think it’s just a case of looking at sort of scales. So thinking about172
it from a human perspective. If something looks ridiculously small, it’s a173
sort of sense that you’ve gone wrong somewhere.174
Frank: So it’s basically experience that you already have with existing175
models?176
Amelia: Yeah, yeah.177
Frank: Do you move the models around as well, or do you just put it on the178
table and walk around…179
Amelia: It’s always helpful if there are models of other people in the master180
plan as well. That is something that really made a difference with the181
last model that I made. Because my building connects to someone else.182
Seeing that connection in model form is really useful, to see if that works183
together.184
Frank: If you look at those models — by the way, are they made from the185
same material?186
Amelia: Similar, not quite the same.187
Frank: So they have a different texture, maybe a different colour?188
Amelia: Yeah, we are working both in cardboard, I have just been using189
a different card board to the other person. Out of accidental almost, no190
intention.191
Frank: Did that have an influence, would something have changed if both192
of you had used the same cardboard?193
Amelia: I think as of now, it’s alright, since we are mostly looking at form.194
But I think when it gets more to a final model, it will make more of a195
difference. Because you will be able to see it more of the way of the196
intended materials and their representation and how they work together.197
294
Appendix
So if my building is a completely different material and design form the198
person next to me, it’s gonna really influence the site.199
Frank: So if you are looking ahead, do you already plan for what to do next200
year?201
Amelia: I think I want to learn how to use ArchiCAD. Which is something202
I am really struggling with at the moment. But I know it’s important in203
most practices. So it’s something I definitely wanna do before it gets to the204
point where I am applying for part two. Because I know it will help me to205
go further. I can get into better Universities for masters. That’s definitely206
something I wanna look up next.207
Frank: Do you also have a vision of yourself in 10 years from now or does208
that not really play a role right now?209
Amelia: Yeah, I think so. Before I came to Uni I did a work experience that I210
got out of complete accident in a place in Shoreditch in London. And that211
really inspired me and I wanna do something fast paced like that again. It212
was not a huge firm, but it was right at the centre of London and they do a213
lot of variety of things. And I really enjoyed being in that sort of fast paced214
atmosphere. Even if it was just for a while, but it was nice to experience215
it.216
Frank: So how did you become an Architect then?217
Amelia: I think it was, I was really into Arts, and I was really into Maths218
and Physics type of things when I was younger. I was less into Maths and219
Physics when I got older. But Art was really key for me and it was putting220
Art into a real world situation. That was sort of the main thing that threw221
me to it. But then I also decided when I was like seven, that I wanted to be222
an Architect out of nowhere. So it’s those two things coming together.223
Frank: Is it still the thing that you wanted it to be when you were seven?224
Amelia: Yeah, I can’t imagine doing any other job at this point of time. A lot225
of other people degrees that go in a lot of different ways, but I think with226




1.11 Interview with Spencer Barnett
Frank: All I want to know is: How do you create? That’s an easy question,1
but maybe not an easy answer?2
Spencer: I don’t know where to start.3
Frank: OK, so how do you start a project. For example for the Derry’s cross4
project, how did that begin?5
Spencer: To begin with, what we kind of looked like for us, was… I was6
kind of looking for an aerial view, a plan, and taking in everything that is7
around us. Like a macro, a micro view. So maybe on 1250 scale.8
Frank: So even before you went down there? Or do you already know the9
place?10
Spencer: I kind of knew the place already. I went to the gym last year quite11
a bit, it’s right in the centre there. But I looked at it where it was on the12
site. And sort of deciding what was around there. And then we went down13
there and took quite a few photos, which is quite enjoyable. The first14
time we went it was quite rainy, so quite miserable. But after a few I went15
down there and the weather has been a lot more better. Started looking16
at all the way the people were interacting with all the buildings. Like, we17
asked questionnaires as well. We printed off quite a few. So like asking18
locals. How old they were, what their purpose was that day, how long they19
spent in that area, if they are from Plymouth, and their transport, and20
everything. Purely for us and the building style that we wanted to create.21
We found out some quite interesting stuff. Like a lot of the elderly people22
would always come throughout the day to play Bingo at the Bingo hall.23
And they would always get the bus. So they were always quite short for24
time because they got off the bus, go get for the Bingo and then go off from25
Bingo straight to the bus. And there was always like no time in between.26
So they were always rushing. They were not able to stop, unfortunately.27
We were kind of able to guess their ages. And then from there we went on28
back to the plans, back to the drawing boards and how the surrounding29
areas of Plymouth and what we want to create with our sites, like our30
programmes. And we are doing vernacular, like redefine vernacular. So31
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we are looking for like originality. Like creating spaces that suite or that32
used to be in that area anyway. So we found out that the bank, my site,33
which is near the civic centre, it’s like the Weatherspoons, that used to34
be like a central area to Plymouth. Quite a long time ago. That was quite35
interesting. Near there, there is the Athenaeum which used to be, well it’s36
a place of knowledge. So it got like an archive in it. So we looked at like37
archives coming on from there. So out of our four, we got a group of four,38
we are doing — it’s all kind of archive based. So we got like a memory bank.39
Photography, which sort of involves…40
Frank: What’s a memory bank?41
Spencer: That’s his sort of programme style. So he is looking at how to42
create memories and how to record memories. So you got photos, voice43
recordings…We got Hannah’s, which is more like greenery, environmental.44
So she is looking at creating a seed bank. There is one in the Arctic, I think,45
which collects one seed of every fruit seed of every single plant. So just46
if there ever was a, I don’t know, an extinction of a certain species of a47
certain plant, they could bring that back. Which is quite cool. And then48
you’ve got other things such as… I am going into, I am doing a knowledge49
bank, so a library. So I designed something that incorporates everything I50
know about libraries. So people… A place to sit, a place to enjoy and read,51
or maybe you’ve got a coffee, for example. If you are enjoying a good book52
and need a drink. Hot or cold beverage. A place for, I don’t know…. Either53
for comfort, or maybe just for…. So if you are reading a novel or something,54
you can have a nice leather sofa and it’s quite relaxing. You can imagine,55
you can immerse yourself in that space. Or you’ve got a, I don’t know, a56
scientific book that you are reading and you are trying to do essay notes57
or something. So you want a nice wooden table that’s quite solid. You58
feel like you are prepared writing these things down. So these are two59
contrasting… You wouldn’t wanna be in a leather sofa on a wooden desk60
to write, that would be difficult. So you create different rooms for those61
different spaces.62




Spencer: Yeah, that’s the thing. I enjoy libraries, it just never has that feel.65
For me the university library is great for doing work at night, because it’s66
open 24 hours, but the books I usually get on Amazon or I borrow them67
off someone else. I don’t know. Or I find them online. There is a lot of68
paper online, there is a lot… because I’m quite lazy. Anyway, so it’s difficult.69
It’s more of a, trying to bring the community back in. And make that70
feel that the library is open to everyone. It’s reinvented. It’s not just for71
knowledge. It’s for people to come together as like a social, the more of72
the humble academic idea. Groups of people coming together. Like a guild73
almost. Come together, share knowledge, and then talk about it. Which is74
interesting, because that’s what the Athenaeum does as well. They have75
classes of people come along and they do like painting, drawing sketches,76
and they set up in one of the rooms that looks over the rest of the site77
along the roads.. So seats like that overlooking the street, almost like a78
lounge, is one of my ideas. That was kind of bringing ideas from different79
aspects that I could think of as well. And then look on present ones online.80
Like different libraries around the world. The Western and all sorts… Then81
you’ve got…82
Frank: So you essentially take those elements and put them together? Or83
how does you process of creating new things work?84
Spencer: I look at different ideas, and then I take chunks and bits that I85
enjoy. That was quite an interesting process. I’ve always quite like being…86
having a room, specific room for specific purposes and whether or not87
it’s one large room that has multi purposes, or individual room set up for88
specific ideas. But, as a child, having hidey holes or little place only you89
get to or only you knew about it in the attic or in the roof and where your90
parents wouldn’t really know about it. Having a bookshelf like a secret91
like a back that opens up and you go in there to a room that is your own.92
And there you are not gonna hear anyone else. The ideas of having books93
covering the entire bookshelf. But then, if you find a certain area, you could94
pull open a door. And it would always look like a bookshelf. But you could95
actually go into a room that then had accesses for your technology, like96
a computer, a desk, a chair. That could be quite nice. Kind of integrating97
that kind of stuff in. Whether or not I would want to have a certain kind98
of light in that area, or have light into that area.99
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Frank: How do you design for that? Or more general, how do you get it out100
of your head into the real world?101
Spencer: For me… That’s the trouble. That is a lot of different ideas and102
trying to bring them out on to the paper. So I started off. For me I started103
out and draw in sections, where the public spaces and where the private104
spaces were gonna be. And then decided, that each room, where about it’s105
gonna sit in relation in the building. And then looked at plan, looked at106
how the public spaces outside and how the building was gonna start to107
shape as well. And where the light was coming in. And how people would108
move through the building.109
Frank: Do you just imagine that from the section?110
Spencer: Section, elevation… I have created 3D models on my computer.111
Frank: So how do you go about that? Do you start with a section and then112
do the computer model or both in parallel?113
Spencer: I do both. I try to do both in parallel. If I get stuck, I find if I go to114
3D it’s a lot easier for me to develop my ideas. If I do the sections on the115
computer, then I can create a 3D model quite quickly. I can look at it and116
show people. I am not great at articulating and trying to explain. So for117
them to then understand or for me to bounce off ideas this is quite good.118
Yeah, sometimes I do sections and then look at how the building is oriented119
in comparison of light. So if I wanted a roomwith a lot of light, I would put120
it on the south side. And then elevation kind of helps. Because you can do121
that in exactly the same, and look at the plans of the entire site with the122
buildings as well. So it’s not like jagged. And that helps with topography,123
with elevation and section as well. Because you have underground, have124
above ground. And then doing it again on the computer with 3D models,125
that also helps me to orient everything again. And then work out scale.126
Frank: So what do you see in the 3D model that you don’t see in the sec-127
tion?128
Spencer: It’s the scale, possibly. It’s more like I can see, I see how everything129
fits together. So you’ve got. It’s quite easy to draw a set if steps, and then130
draw a person that’s like out of scale. It looks great in section, but then131
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if you put in in the plan, it looks kind of out of place, because it’s taking132
up a large amount of your area, just for some of the steps. So if I put in133
in 3D, I can see both at the same time. I can see where it is oriented in134
one plane and move it about and see if it fit a bit better. And then I can go135
back to section or elevation. You can see it sitting in it’s area but you just136
know how it looks like in 3D, and whether or not it fit. Especially with the137
software we’ve got, I use ArchiCAD, you can use the materials as well that138
you want. For example if you want metal steps, or if you want glass steps,139
you can create them. So when you render it, it looks quite realistic. So you140
can visualise it a bit more, especially if you are showing it to someone.141
Frank: So does the choice of material influence how you design in the142
section? So if you had a metal staircase, would that change something143
around that as well?144
Spencer: Yeah, I think so. For these materials, it would definitely… I think145
especially for my building. I want to be it quite like, I guess, classic Ar-146
chitecture… not Architecture, I mean, library style. Like wooden. Like147
you would imagine, quite nice… So having metal steps might not be the148
way forward, but if you had like stone steps, it would make it feel oldie149
again. But also then glass step, even though it makes it modern, also gives150
you that crystal like feeling. So it doesn’t feel like it’s taking up space be-151
cause the light is kind of going through it. And it’s fractured rather than152
just being solid metal. Also the sound would be like a lot different. If you153
are walking through on metal steps in a quiet library, whereas if it’s on154
solid stone its that pad… It’s quite enjoyable to think about these things, I155
guess.156
Frank: Since material has such a big impact, how do you select it then? Do157
you go through your list and start with wood, then stone, then metal…158
Spencer: Yeah, kind of. You do think about what I wanted with this building.159
And then where it’s going. And then I kind of look at the material the160
building site currently uses. So for the external facade it would kind of161
be slightly related to what’s round there already. So it doesn’t stick out162
too much. Which does kind of limit me a bit. But then, if you don’t want163
to be too outrageous, unless your building is already kind of bold. But164
won’t mind to kind of fit in with my other team mates and class mates165
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ideas as well. But then the internal structures are more about how I want166
the feeling. If you want to have a shiny new polished surface, feel like a167
hospital or something, then I would go for glass interior and thicknesses168
that feel kind of like it’s clean and pristine and shiny floors. Where if169
wanted to have that oldie feeling, I would put some nice oak, wooden170
floor boards, or this beautiful kind of brown teak kind of bookshelf unit171
that goes quite around. And then large windows that let a huge amount of172
lights through. Kind of like this. It’s quite fun. People would then feel that173
they are more connected than they already are. Which can happen with a174
lot of material. Concrete always makes you feel a bit more, I don’t know…175
If you are between two big concrete walls, you feel a bit more enclosed.176
Whereas if its glass, you feel like you are free a bit more. Which is nice how177
material can make you feel like that, which is quite interesting.178
Frank: You mentioned early in our conversation, that you are thinking179
about originality as well. Does that influence your choice of materials as180
well?181
Spencer: I guess, originality definitely help with that. So if you…A library182
near where I used to live, that was like one of those county country council183
house libraries. It had those really thin cheap tin metal shelves which184
are grey as paint. It’s useful, it’s functional for what it’s needed for… You185
can imagine that, but with… Imagine that in your house, that would be186
amazing. And how about having it in your own library, in the city that187
you live in and you could go to. I guess it’s more of an idea for people188
who’d… I don’t know. You’d love it to be that way. And whether or not it189
will be useful for you, but you’d definitely use it for the novelty. But having190
beautiful wooden shelves, that you could see were worn over time because191
people have used them, rather that metal where you can only see that the192
paint is gone and that’s it… It’s kind of more of a feel, more of a If I had a193
house it would probably just be wooden everything so it would felt more194
kind of homey… Beautiful like faux leather sofas that you can just sink into.195
Enjoyable and definitely comfy. Just to be reading a good book. Or if you196
are doing, like I said, scientific reports or an English novel then you gonna197
read some non-fiction. And you know that’s all you came for. So you don’t198
want to sit in a comfy chair because otherwise you might just be drifting199
off reading this boring essay or something. So you’ve gotta sit down at a200
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hard chair at a hard surface and write. Or if you wanted, I don’t know… For201
me, I split. I wrote out every genre of book that I knew. That I could think202
of from the top of my head. And put those in three different categories to203
create three different rooms.. I would usually draw them, but I wrote them204
out this time. It’s not my usual method. But I wrote it downwhat I thought205
that each book room would create. For example, fiction books with series206
or novels or adventure books, all that kind of stuff. I put it into good-reads.207
So you would have a good-read room, which would have those sofas, coffee208
machines, and coffee tables. And they would have enough spaces, like209
personal spaces, big enough to wave around your arms and you wouldn’t210
hit anyone. Then you had, I don’t know, health books. So that’s definitely211
kind of non-fictionally. It’s all about improvement and stylizing your life212
about better health, better you, so self-help kind of books. You wouldn’t213
want a comfy chair, but you wouldn’t want a hard desk, either. Maybe214
it’s more like an office desk the type you see at home. You can sit down,215
flip the lamp on… Could even try to take a few notes, but you wouldn’t216
necessarily … But you are enjoying it, you are doing this for yourself. That217
was another one. And then you’ve had the information books. You’ve had218
essay writing and stuff. And that was definitely kind of structured, maybe219
the way you were taught in school. That’s what you wanted, what you220
came to the library for to do your research. Which is quite funny. If you go221
to libraries in America just with lines of wooden desks in strips and then222
lamps on each one, wooden chairs. And you would set up, sit down, and223
get your work done. But what you then have to think about is children224
as well. Would the children want to read those books and if so, would the225
adults want to have those noisy children around them? So creating pods,226
where the children could then go insidewith the books fromwherever they227
have been to. Sit down, and then they could read those books. Whether228
or not this was a novel, they had their own desk in the corner. So would229
be debatable what age groups they would be, maybe four to sixteen. Or230
twelve, maybe. And for the between zero and four, you’d have a play plan,231
where the parents could leave their kids.232
Frank: So does this also come out of your observations on the site? Did you233
see kids there?234
Spencer: Yeah. What we observed from the questionnaires was that a lot of235
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parents and families would move though that space. They walked through236
that space. But they rarely just use it for anything other than just a gateway.237
A pathway to get somewhere else. So whether or not that change… There238
were a lot of people moving. Whether or not that would change through239
the library…Hopefully they will flow through there, then stop, then go in.240
Which would definitely be the aim any library there. Yeah, it’s interesting.241
And hopefully the kids would be there for that reason to then use that242
space. I am not sure whether or not the parents would want their kids to243
be in the library and reading without their supervisions. And not having244
that supervision. They were safe inside the library. There isn’t any way of245
them getting out there without them.246
Frank: So you haven’t really talked with any parents yet if they liked your247
idea?248
Spencer: No. We only asked them question about how they use that space249
currently. We had quite some weird reactions, because I am quite a big250
person. So walking up to a family and ask them so: “Hey would you want251
to keep your kids safe if we had a library here?” and you see the parents252
pull their kids close and carry on walking. And I am like OK, that’s fair,253
that’s up to them. Even Hannah, who is that tiny little girl, she didn’t have254
much luck talking to families. The parents are just like close tunnel vision,255
trying to get places… So we kind of left those off, didn’t really care.256
Frank: Do you talk to any of your non-Architect friends about your ideas?257
Spencer: My parents. Yeah, a few friends who do ask. But it’s not that many.258
We are not trying to talk about Architecture that much when we go out.259
So I don’t want anyone else getting bored of what we are talking about.260
Which is sad, but that’s the reason we chose this and they didn’t, I guess.261
Frank: But your parents enjoy those talks?262
Spencer: My mum and dad love it. My dad is… My parents are very creative.263
My dad is trained as an estate manager, he has been doing it for forty years,264
and he can build, design a house. He can do the electrical, all the plumbing265
himself. Give him a project and he’ll do it by himself. Whereas my mum…266
She is definitely more the arty one in the family. Very practical. She is a267
seamstress. So she does all the sewing and making. She is very good. She268
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loves learning. She is definitely someone… If I start talking with her about269
my project, she’ll definitely go “Oh yeah, I love this. I have recently read270
a book that has something to do with this.” And then she’ll have a deep271
discussion about, I don’t know… And she’ll say I saw this Facebook post or272
I saw this building… And then she will have some way or methodology to273
discuss it. And she will have ideas and will just send me these notes that274
she’d have. And then I’d discuss my building and she will go Oh yeah, do275
you remember… and then we’ll have another discussion about a building276
she saw and that was related and that was related to my building. Which277
is quite fun for me. I am one of six children. So my older siblings are all278
very kind of arty. She basically has like six university degrees after helping279
all of us out. So that’s the fun for her. For me that’s quite nice to have a280
parent like that to discuss Architecture. She does enjoy listening to what I281
am saying. And then feeds off, and bounces ideas back and forth.282
Frank: Does that happen a lot in your group as well? Do you have a lot of283
group discussions?284
Spencer: Yeah, there is quite a lot of group discussion. It’s more, it’s more285
about… Especially in the beginning it’s more like… I think people are trying286
to make themselves understand, where everyone else is situated. We knew287
each other as friends, but we didn’t know where each other’s ideas were288
individually. And then I think it has taken some time. People have worked289
around each other’s ideas. And some kind of backlash between a could290
in the team which has been interesting to see how they developed their291
ideas over that clash. But then came back and worked on it even harder.292
Frank: So do you think working in that group helps or rather hinders you293
getting to your goal?294
Spencer: That depends. Me personally, if it was a time based, project, which295
it is, I’d definitely say working in teamsmakes it easier as long as you know296
the team you are working with and you know what their goals are. I am297
quite happy to work with whoever I’ve got. Because if I have ideas, I’m298
quite happy to bounce them off. And if I get stuck down on one idea… So299
this morning I’ve changed an idea that I’ve had for two weeks.300
Frank: So how did that happen?301
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Spencer: I had an original design that linked in with Hannah’s project. The302
bank, down at the site, has this kind of curve. She was trying to bring303
that around so I did as well but that made mine a cylinder. And from304
that cylinder it also went to the room outside this lobby, this lounge area,305
that’s situated to look over the rest of the site. There was still this kind of306
cylinder idea. It was OK. It was quite standard. If you’d been in the middle,307
it would have looked quite cool. If you turn around and have those books308
if you’d imagine it. It was sunk into the ground as well. So it was six foot309
high and three below… But then I didn’t know why I carried on with the310
curve on the side and the front. It just didn’t seem to fit. It kind of felt311
like the back end of what it was up against, the car park. So it was kind312
of… I had though about everything on the interior, and everything kind313
of worked. But outside, on the sections, like on this one, kind of felt like314
you get pulled in by this curve and then you get stuck between the current315
half the car park to the left and this wedge that I created. So there was316
just dead space here. And then the rest of the curve just kind of left it. It317
felt like it could have taken you somewhere, but it really wasn’t. So kind of318
instead of that I wanted this open space, which was quite public. Thinking319
about how I wanted to cut the public and wanted to bring their focus of320
attention to to the entry way. They could see the interior. It might have321
take more of a journey to go into that area. Because it was concave, it322
would bring them in. Because it was covered by the car park, bring the323
sink of the car park lower. So that you get all the light from the south324
facing area shining though. It would have been quite dark, so there would325
have been unnatural light, which would have been quite sad, especially for326
such a nice building. But that took some change, I am not developing that327
again. I could see from the 3D modelling, that it would not have worked.328
Frank: How did you decide it would not work?329
Spencer: I guess it is from the training, but it’s definitely a feeling for me.330
This part I haven’t really thought about it, haven’t thought about how it331
would situate itself. The reason why I left the dead space, and I didn’t332
have a reason. I had chosen the form, but I hadn’t really thought about333
the space I left behind. So that’s in Architecture it’s not just about the334
space you create, it’s also the space haven’t used. Leaving a dead space335
like that was kind of null. Not really useful for anyone. Was just kind of336
305
Appendix
pointless, and would have left me as if I had failed. I guess, you can’t think337
of everything, but if you think about something and there is no reason to338
keep it… I mean it was just itching, I had to change it.339
Frank: So would you say that training for Architects is also about feelings340
and emotions, so maybe there are some hidden properties of the trait?341
Spencer: Yeah. It is definitely the effect of the training over the year. Of342
what I have learned and read and what I have seen of Architects them-343
selves. There is an Architect that designed a church and he thought about344
absolutely everything. I have forgotten his name, it’s in Sweden. And it’s a345
really beautiful church. But it’s basically… He didn’t cut any brick, whatso-346
ever. The entire… The only thing he added, he sliced off a few faces in the347
front so that the priest wouldn’t get caught on the rough surfaces. Every-348
thing was beautifully aligned and thought about. Up to the fact that the349
windows, the light… From what people told and what the bible said, Jesus350
Christ died at 3.30 or 3.15 or something. And the sunlight shown through351
at this time would shine on his name and the date of the building being352
built. I mean, to think about that. To have that idea of people having to353
notice that years later after he is gone and how every brick… It’s just a354
phenomenal building, to be honest. I am not religious, so it’s not for me,355
but I can definitely appreciate going there. He just did think of everything.356
The brick cut sizes, how everything had to be oriented. To create that357
space that was so phenomenal. And like a water flowing area that had this358
little arch way…359
Frank: Is that your ideal as well, is that what you want to be in 10 years?360
One of these Architects that thinks of everything?361
Spencer: I’d love to be able to think about everything, every little detail,362
and obviously, if you got time, then you could. Depends whether or not it363
would be useful to think about everything. But there is even stuff I have364
noticed with my dead. He is not a famous Architect, in fact he is not a365
trained Architect, but he can design and draw. He did all the drawings for366
the current house that we are living in. Stuff that he built, this beautiful367
oak beams for our roof, which he built three years ago and we put in368
last summer. He built them to the exact specifications he worked out.369
Drilled the holes and everything. I only realised now, that we are doing370
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the interior, another year later or so, we started doing all the electrics and371
all the lighting. And he drilled in holes in the beams, which you can’t drill372
in right now because there is no space and the drill bit would need to be373
like this, there is a hole through all the beam to hold al the electrics. He374
did that three four years ago for things that we are doing now. That just375
took me back a little, I was quite impressed by that.376
Frank: So if you are thinking ahead, is there something you are working377
towards for the next year?378
Spencer: For this I chose RDV, because I wanted to improve my thought379
processes. The tutor is an Architect rather than someone who could just380
rely on technology. I am quite technology based. I am young enough to381
just turn on the computer and know how to use programs. And if I don’t382
know there is YouTube and I can work it out. So from there I just didn’t383
want to follow through and do easy stuff. I want to be able to think about384
my design a bit more, have a thought process, use paper, and do draw385
sections by hand. For me the RDV was more kind of interesting.386
Frank: So why is this hand drawing and paper thing important?387
Spencer: Because for me it’s different from using computers. You can have388
more of flow with pen and paper. You can just draw a line and if you get it389
wrong rub it out and start again. It’s never gonna be the same ever again.390
While on the computer you can undo it and do the line exactly where it391
needs to go. So it’s a bit more classical, more interesting, I guess.392
Frank: But doesn’t that introduce a lot of errors?393
Spencer: Yeah, a lot of errors and a lot of faults. But that’s part of the394
process. Whether or not those errors were actual error or you want to395
keep them, or if they were quirky or you might want to make them more396
quirky…397
Frank: Did you find quirks during the current project?398
Spencer: Yeah, with the design I just scrubbed I found the cylindrical sphere399
having stairs to the centre. But then I though about what when I did them400
just in right angles? And it would have been funny, if you looked down the401
staircase, nothing would have fitted together. An odd shape to look down402
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onto. The broken up light would have made people feel like they weren’t403
going in the same direction. Or at the back. I am trying to bring the people404
from behind the building back around to the front. But I want to do that405
without splitting them of. So creating maybe some unique patterns on the406
floor.407
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“Dira” is a novel experimental paradigm to record combinations of behavioral
and metacognitive measures for the creative process. This task allows assessing
chronological and chronometric aspects of the creative process directly and without a
detour through creative products or proxy phenomena. In a study with 124 participants
we show that (a) people spend more time attending to selected vs. rejected potential
solutions, (b) there is a clear connection between behavioral patterns and self-reported
measures, (c) the reported intensity of Eureka experiences is a function of interaction
time with potential solutions, and (d) experiences of emerging solutions can happen
immediately after engaging with a problem, before participants explore all potential
solutions. The conducted study exemplifies how “Dira” can be used as an instrument
to narrow down the moment when solutions emerge. We conclude that the “Dira”
experiment is paving the way to study the process, as opposed to the product, of creative
problem solving.
Keywords: creative problem solving, divergent thinking, convergent thinking, behavioral experimental paradigm,
chronometric temporal measures, insight, chronology
1. INTRODUCTION
Creativity (Runco and Acar, 2012), innovation (Amabile, 1988), and problem solving (Newell
and Simon, 1972) have shaped human history, culture, and technology. Valued by today’s society
for their contributions to education, recruiting, and employment (Cropley, 2016) they are also
likely to play an essential role in our future society. Moreover, creativity, innovation, and problem
solving are required to address the increasingly complex problems we are facing. A commonality
between these phenomena is the aim of identifying novel and useful answers to more or less
well-defined and ill-defined questions (Simon, 1973; Weisberg, 2006). Based on observations and
reports from eminent scientists such as Helmholtz and Poincaré, Wallas (1926) famously suggested
that the process of generating answers or creative products consists of several consecutive phases.
Since then the exact structure and number of these stages are being debated (Amabile, 1983;
Finke, 1996; Csikszentmihalyi, 2009; Amabile and Pratt, 2016), but arguably, the moment when
a solution emerges lies at the heart of the matter. This “illumination” phase often follows and
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precedes other stages (Howard et al., 2008): Before finding the
solution, the problem solver needs to “prepare” for the problem
at hand, for example by understanding the question, potentially
within the larger context. If people do not solve the problem
in this phase, they might enter a stage of “incubation.” In
this stage, they are thought to unconsciously keep processing
the problem while they consciously attend to other tasks. The
feeling of manifesting associations or fringe consciousness coined
as “intimation” is the next stage in this model (Sadler-Smith,
2015). Following this, the problem solvers experience a phase
of “illumination” when they suddenly have an idea that answers
the question. Afterwards, during the “verification” stage, this
solution is tested. Certain models consider additional stages
to communicate and implement a found solution as part of
the process. Csikszentmihalyi (2009), for example, calls it the
“elaboration” stage. To sum up, within existing case studies
of creativity, innovation, and problem solving and the theories
behind them, the moment when solutions emerge is part of
a longer “creative process.” However, most studies focused on
the outcome of these three phenomena, without considering the
various processes behind them.
Previous studies identify the moment when solutions
emerge through a range of different phenomena (Kounios
and Beeman, 2014), for example restructuring the problem
representation (Knoblich et al., 1999; Fleck and Weisberg,
2004), an alteration of mood (Baas et al., 2008; Subramaniam
et al., 2009), and the suddenness of changes (Topolinski and
Reber, 2010a). Reports of these potentially associated phenomena
have been used as markers of “insights,” “Aha! moments,” and
“Eureka experiences.” However, some of these phenomena might
only be weak proxies. Danek et al. (2016) have shown that
not every solved problem relies on restructuring. In a follow-
up study, Danek and Wiley (2017) revealed that not every
experience of insight results in a solved problem. Even if a link
between observed phenomenon and “Eureka experience” is well
established as for the mood change, the chronology or even
causality remains unclear: Does insight increase mood (Akbari
Chermahini and Hommel, 2012), does a stimulated positive
mood cause “Aha! moments” (Isen et al., 1987; Ritter and
Ferguson, 2017), or are they both results of another process?
Therefore, there is a need to detect emerging solutions directly
and not via proxy phenomena. Moreover, most studies on insight
assume Eureka experiences are dichotomous, “Aha! moments”
either suddenly happen or not (Bowden and Jung-Beeman, 2003;
Gilhooly and Murphy, 2005; Subramaniam et al., 2009; Hedne
et al., 2016). Possibly the phenomenon benefits from a more
differential view, theoretically and empirically.
In this paper, we introduce “Dira” as a novel experimental
paradigm to narrow down the moments of emerging solutions
within the creative process. In each of the forty “Dira” tasks,
participants are asked to find a solution. A solution is the
image they consider to correspond best with a one-line text.
On a computer display, the on-screen text and images appear
blurred by default and can only be seen clearly when the mouse
hovers above them (see Figure 1). Tracing the mouse movement
and the hover time on each image allows to measure the time
participants spend processing an image during task execution
and before they report a solution. After each task participants
provide metacognitive self-reports, such as the intensity of their
Eureka experience that accompanies emerging solutions (Cushen
and Wiley, 2012; Danek et al., 2014). We hypothesize that
the combination of behavioral measures of the process and
self-reports can be used to identify distinctive behaviors when
solutions emerge and localize the solutions’ emergence in time.
Further, we hypothesize that feedback on the participants’ choice
moderates the behavior and the reported Eureka experience
thereafter.
2. RATIONALE
In this section, we summarize existing tasks that have been used
to observe themoment solutions emerge during creative problem
solving and we provide an argument for a novel experimental
paradigm. We describe the origin of “Dira” and how we acquired
the problems participants are asked to solve. Finally, we argue
for the mouse-tracking method to trace people’s problem solving
process.
2.1. Existing Tasks Related to Emerging
Solutions
Different types of tasks have traditionally been associated
with the creative process and emerging solutions, namely
insight tasks, divergent thinking tasks, and convergent thinking
tasks.
From a historical perspective, insight tasks (Maier, 1930;
Duncker, 1963; Gardner, 1978; MacGregor et al., 2001) are
the oldest of these types of tasks. They predate the distinction
between divergent and convergent production as introduced
by Guilford (1967) and were consequently developed without
a direct reference to one of these processes. These insight
tasks often take the form of riddles or visual puzzles and
are built around the assumption that the task itself requires
restructuring (Knoblich et al., 1999; Fleck and Weisberg, 2004).
The overlap between insight tasks and convergent thinking tasks
seem particularly strong: for example, Bowden and Jung-Beeman
(2003) argue, that convergent thinking problems like the Remote
Associate Task share properties with insight tasks. Nevertheless,
convergent thinking tasks can either be solved via insight or
without. Similarly, classical insight problems are often thought
to converge to a single solution, even though examples for the
nine-dot problem show that more than one solution is possible
(Maier, 1930; Sarcone, 2014). Furthermore, and as Bowden et al.
(2005) and Danek et al. (2016) demonstrate, finding solutions
to insight tasks does not require insight or an Aha experience.
While timing has been discussed since the earliest studies on
insight tasks, often it only relates to the time when a solution
is found. These type of tasks are not repeatable and allow only
between-subject comparisons. Even more, having solved similar
problems in the past seems to influence the process (Lung and
Dominowski, 1985), and it is difficult to identify the similarity
between problems as well as to control for previous exposure.
Consequently, the classic insight problems are not considered for
this study.
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FIGURE 1 | Example of the screen during a “quiz” (Left), all elements unblurred (Center), and the color coded positions (Right). The center and right subfigure show
an example mouse movement. The mouse positions at onset and offset times t1 to t7 are recorded as raw data. The figure on the right shows assigned symbolic
names and colors for each position “a”–“f” and “story” (text) as used in later plots. The text was initially inspired by the image with the white circle, because in
“image c” the shadow reveals the true intention of the figures in the foreground. The black circle marks an example of a “chosen solution”. Dixit images by Libellud.
Divergent thinking tasks (Torrance, 1966; Guilford, 1967;
Runco et al., 2016), in which people are asked to generate several
potential solutions to a question, are associated with individual
creative processes. Nevertheless, the measurement of originality
is usually assessed within the cohort of the experiment and not
for an isolated individual. Consider a “Brick Uses” task (Wilson
et al., 1954; Guilford, 1967, p. 143) in which participants are
asked for alternative uses of a brick. An answer to use the
brick’s pigments to paint might be unique within an experiment,
but the participant might just have reported an instance from
memory (Gilhooly et al., 2007; Hass, 2017). Hence this solution,
although original within the experiment, did not require creative
problem solving from this particular individual. Furthermore,
before assessing the originality, raters decide if answers are
considered for the scoring. For the answer “to paint” in a “Brick
Uses” task, which is similar to the previous example, some would
consider it an “impossible answer” and consequently remove the
answer before scoring originality. Time measurements are often
provided by a minimum or maximum task time and through
fluency measures, and recently the moments of the production
of a solution have received more attention (Forthmann et al.,
2017). Divergent thinking tasks are in general repeatable, but the
difficulty in scoring, and the unknown origin of the solution,
either from memory or as a novel product, disqualify these types
of tasks for our purpose.
Finally, Convergent thinking tasks (Mednick, 1962; Knoblich
et al., 1999; Bowden and Jung-Beeman, 2003), require
participants to come up with a single solution. These tasks
are based on the difficulty to search a large problem space,
produce interim solutions, and verify these results. Some of
these tasks, such as the Compound Remote Associates test,
were developed to specifically address the shortcomings of
the classical insight tasks (Bowden and Jung-Beeman, 2003).
Convergent thinking tasks typically provide a large number
of stimuli for repeated measures. For word-based convergent
thinking problems, language fluency affects the ability to solve
the problem (Hommel et al., 2011).
In our study, we intended to observe behavior during the
creative process, but for problems with three verbal stimuli such
as the Compound Remote Associate task, prospective problem
solvers might not exhibit much observable behavior. The low
number of word-based stimuli within a single task (typically
three) are easy to memorize, and participants can operate entirely
on their working memory. There is little incentive to reread the
words or exhibit other behavioral cues through which the internal
thought process could be traced. The timing of the solution
and the success within a given time are central measurements
in this type of task. For example, Salvi et al. (2016) ask their
participants to press a button as soon as they found a solution.
This timing relates only to the whole process but does not
allow the identification of the involved sub-stages. Therefore
we decided not to use convergent thinking tasks to trace the
emerging solution within the creative problem solving process.
2.2. Development of “Dira”
“Dira” has been developed out of the necessity to collect
fine-grained measurements of the creative process. As an
experimental paradigm to observe the moment when solutions
emerge, “Dira” needs to address one fundamental requirement:
the solution should not be known from the beginning. In this
sense, a solution could either be the answer itself or an algorithm
how to arrive at the answer. If either was known at the moment
the task was given, “Dira” would merely provide measures related
to other processes, for example processing fluency and memory
retrieval.
“Dira” is inspired by “Dixit,” a commercially available and
internationally acclaimed card game. The word “Dixit” is Latin
for “he or she said,” chosen by the French developers of the
game, supposedly to highlight the story-telling aspect. We use the
French word “Dira” for “he or she will point out” as a reference
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to the process throughout the task as well as the origin of the
inspiring game. The 84 unique images of a “Dixit” card deck are
described as “artwork”1 and “dreamlike”2 and have previously
been used in teaching a foreign language (Cimermanová, 2014),
in research on imaginative design narratives (Berger and Pain,
2017), and observing conformity and trust between humans and
robots (Salomons et al., 2018). The cards have also inspired
interventions to foster creativity (Liapis et al., 2015), and are
suggested as “an additional source of inspiration” (Wetzel et al.,
2017, p. 206) for an ideation method.
The task “Dira” we developed uses elements and data from
the game “Dixit.” Therefore, we briefly introduce some relevant
aspects of the game. Three to six players can participate in
the “Dixit” game, which is played in several rounds. At the
beginning of a round, one of the players is appointed as the
storyteller. From the deck of 84 unique cards with beautifully
drawn images, each player receives six cards in their hand. Based
on the drawing on one of the cards, the storyteller invents a
short text and tells it to the other players. Related to this text, all
other players select one card from their hand. The selected cards
are shuffled and played on the table. Now all players except the
storyteller have to guess which of the images originally inspired
the text. Based on their choice, the storyteller and all other players
receive points. Hereby the scoring system penalizes storyteller
that produce descriptive texts and associations that are easy to
find. Furthermore it encourages the others to play cards with a
similar non-obvious connection to the text. Moreover, and based
on the different associations the players formed, each image has
some connection to the text. At the end of a round, a group of
players has produced a combination of a short text and as many
associated images as there are players. Nevertheless, and as the
example in Figure 1 illustrates, it would defy the purpose of the
game if the other players would immediately understand any of
these connections.
In each “Dira” task we ask people to find a connection
between a short text and one of six images sampled from past
“Dixit” games with six players. As argued before, people are
unlikely to identify the image that inspired the text immediately.
Instead, they might find a connection between the text and one
of the six potential solutions through controlled processes in
creative cognition (Beaty and Silvia, 2012; Silvia et al., 2013) or
unconscious associations (Mednick, 1962; Kenett et al., 2014). In
the first case, participants generate several metaphors or potential
solutions from available information and select one of them as the
best fit at a specific time. In the second case, existing associations
are mediated through similarities of common elements before
one of them is identified as the best match. In both cases,
the solution emerges at a distinct moment before participants
select one image by a mouse click. Participants in the “Dira”
task are forced to make a choice, but which of the six possible
solutions they choose depends on their prior knowledge and their
subjective understanding of the task at hand. These differences
1Dixit publisher’s website http://en.libellud.com/games/dixit, last access: 2018-02-
23.
2Wikipedia: Dixit (card game) https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Dixit_
(card_game)&oldid=823435686, last access: 2018-04-05.
in problem difficulty are described for other problems as well.
Often, the correctness of a task solution is considered vital to the
measures and consequently needs to be controlled for, as Öllinger
et al. (2014) demonstrate for a well know 9-dot problem. “Dira”
does not have one objectively correct solution and we are not
interested in the exact timing of finding the subjectively correct
solution. Instead, we assess the behavior during the process
through the interaction times with text and images.
For the developed task we assume that two differentmodalities
for the stimuli are advantageous to isolate remote conceptual
associations. If the two stimuli that were to be matched used
the same modality, matches could be found for aspects of these
stimuli that are outside the interest of this study. For example
matches between two visual stimuli could not only be based on
the depicted content, but also on colors, forms, and dynamics
of the image. For two verbal stimuli the constructing syllables,
cultural connotations, and language fluency of the problem solver
would play a decisive role in the selection of an answer. By asking
people to match content from different modalities, we hope to
circumvent the issues above.
2.3. Dataset
The experience of an emerging solution relies on the inherent
quality of the task; in the case of “Dira” on the text as well as on
each of the potentially associated images. Instead of constructing
a synthetic dataset, we crowdsourced the combination of a
single text and six accompanying images from a community of
experienced “Dixit” players. Usually, the card game “Dixit” is
played locally around a table. For groups not sharing the same
space, Boite-a-jeux3 provides an online gaming platform to play
this game across distances and with other players of a similar
skill level. In August 2014 we accessed the publicly available
recorded game data of 115,213 rounds of “Dixit.” We filtered
this initial dataset for English rounds with six players. After
stopword removal (such as “the,” “is,” “at”) and word stemming,
we removed the rounds with stories containing the most frequent
words from the 90th percentile. Looking at the text and images,
candidate sets for the “Dira” task were selected from the
remaining 1,000 rounds of recorded “Dixit” games. The authors
of this paper, two of which are experienced “Dixit” players, chose
40 combinations of text and images. Afterwards, we identified
between one and three contexts of associated knowledge to
control for participants’ domain-specific knowledge in a later
analysis. For example, the sentence “Standing on the shoulders
of giants” is meaningful in different domains like the scientific
community exposed to life and work of Newton, but also for fans
of the Britpop group “Oasis,” who released an album with the
same name. The identified contexts were then grouped into the
following eight clusters (with the number of associated stories in
brackets): Literature (8), music (6), film (7), science (7), popular
culture (12), and high culture (7) as well as word games (11), and
literal interpretations of visual cues (10). These contexts allow
to control for required knowledge to solve the tasks. Finally,
the order of the tasks within the “Dira” experiment was initially
3http://boiteajeux.net; last access 2017-11-15.
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chosen at random but kept the same throughout all conditions
reported in this paper.
2.4. Mouse-Tracking as Process-Tracing
“Dira” is based on the fundamental assumption that
psychological processes can be traced through observable
behavior (Skinner, 1984). Of particular interest to the emerging
solutions is the participants’ behavior during the task when
they are engaged in a creative problem solving process. At the
beginning of each task, participants do not know the text or the
images. To solve the problem, they have to acquire information
from these elements and find associations between the text and
the images. For “Dira” the process of information acquisition is
related to the order and timing of interactions with each of the
elements on the “quiz” screen. Different methods are commonly
used to trace these chronology and chronometric measures of
processes, for example through verbal protocols (Newell and
Simon, 1972), eye-tracking (Thomas and Lleras, 2007), and
mouse-tracking (Freeman and Ambady, 2010).
Verbal and think-aloud protocols have been used in
insight tasks (Fleck and Weisberg, 2004), divergent thinking
tasks (Gilhooly et al., 2007), convergent thinking tasks (Cranford
and Moss, 2012), and also in real-world problem solving (Newell
and Simon, 1972; Kozbelt et al., 2015). While Schooler et al.
(1993) identified an overshadowing effect for insight problem
solving, Gilhooly et al. (2007) did not find any effect on fluency
and novelty production in a divergent thinking task. In a meta-
study, Fox et al. (2011) did not see an effect of verbalization
on the results of tasks, but they noted an increase in the time
required. These results suggest that think-aloud protocols might
or might not change the solutions provided for a task, but they
most certainly change the process.With our interest in narrowing
down the time of emerging solutions within a process, verbal
protocols seemed too invasive and were disregarded.
In a direct comparison between eye-tracking and mouse-
tracking, Lohse and Johnson (1996, p. 37) conclude that mouse
interactions “predispose people to use a more systematic search
and process more information than they normally would.”
Similar to the technique described by Ullrich et al. (2003),
elements in the “quiz” of “Dira” that are not directly under
the mouse pointer are blurred. These indistinct images prevent
participants from accessing this information without moving
the mouse pointer to an element. A notable difference to the
method developed by Ullrich et al. (2003) is that elements in
“Dira” do not fade over time; elements are visible for the whole
time the mouse pointer hovers over them. Uncovered images
imply that information acquisition and information processing is
possible throughout the whole hover time. Indeed, participants
will not necessarily direct their full attention to the currently
unblurred text or image. While this appears as a disadvantage
of mouse-tracking, Ferreira et al. (2008) have observed the same
issue for eye-tracking. People are also known to not always
perceive visual input when generating ideas (Walcher et al.,
2017). Furthermore, other processes such as memory access are
related to eye movements as well (Johansson and Johansson,
2013; Scholz et al., 2015). Nevertheless, Freeman and Ambady
(2010) have shown that mouse-tracking provides reliable insight
intomental processes andwhile it providesmore robustmeasures
than eye-tracking, it is also easier to administer. Mouse-tracking
was chosen as the process-tracing method for the “Dira” task,
also because it allows running several studies in parallel in a non-
invasive setup using standard hardware participants are familiar
with.
3. METHODS
3.1. Experimental Design and Conditions
The computer-based experiment “Dira” is programmed as a
series of different screens. From the participants’ perspective,
“Dira” combines perceived freedom to explore the task with
aesthetically pleasant stimuli. Participants interact with the text
and images of the task by hovering the mouse pointer over these
elements. The order and duration of these interactions are up
to the prospective problem solvers. The images are taken from
the “Dixit” card game which has been praised for its artistic and
beautiful drawings. Moreover, the whole experiment is designed
like a game. These design choices are intended to make the
“Dira” tasks “inherently interesting or enjoyable,” one of the
critical elements that are known to increase intrinsic motivation
in participants (Ryan and Deci, 2000, p. 55). In turn, Baas
et al. (2008) and da Costa et al. (2015) have shown positive
correlations between intrinsic motivation and performance in
creative problem solving tasks.
For the current study, “Dira” was administered in three
different between-subject conditions. In condition 1 “Dira” does
not provide any feedback and participants have no reference
to evaluate their answers and performance in the task. In
condition 2 we added a potential solution to trigger extrinsic
insights. Given that tasks are often perceived as difficult, this
demonstrates a possible solution to the participants and hence
is thought to increase the motivation to solve the next problem.
Furthermore, these solutions have the potential of triggering
extrinsic insights, which are a special type of insight following the
recent argument by Rothmaler et al. (2017). Given the correlation
between mood and insight (Subramaniam et al., 2009; Akbari
Chermahini and Hommel, 2012) a triggered Eureka experience
could have a positive effect on the intrinsic motivation and
metacognition. In condition 2 we want to explore if this leads
to a change in the reported experience and observed behavior.
In condition 3 we ask participants to elaborate on their reported
solution. We expect this verbalization of an answer to increase
the metacognitive awareness during task execution (Hedne et al.,
2016) and hence an effect on “quiz time” and reported Eureka
experience. Condition 1 was the first to be run and all participants
at the time followed the same protocol. Subsequent participants
at a later time were randomly assigned to either condition 2 or
condition 3.
In condition 2 the additional screen “explanation” is added
to each round as illustrated in Figure 2. Appended after the
“rating,” it is the last screen before the start of the next round. The
“explanation” screen shows the “intended solution,” the image
that initially inspired the storyteller to invent the text. We also
show a short explanation on how the intended solution and text
are connected. The short sentence is based on a text taken from
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FIGURE 2 | Experimental conditions of the “Dira” rounds. Each parallelogram represents a screen and the annotation in the right upper corner identifies in which
condition the screens are used.
the stimulus dataset and is designed to help the participants: One
method to solve a “Dira” task is to empathize with the storyteller
and find the intended solution that initially inspired the text. To
assess the success of this help, we then ask the participants to
rate “How much does the Explanation help [you] to understand
the association between image and text?” Their answer ranges
from “not at all” to “very much” on a seven-point Likert item.
Submitting the answer starts the next round of condition 2 with
a “fixation cross.”
In condition 3 an “elaboration” screen is placed between the
“rating” and the “explanation” screen as shown in Figure 2. In
this screen, participants see the given text and their selected
image, and they are asked to elaborate on their decision.
Afterwards, they see the same “explanation” screen as described
above. Once they have completed these additional screens,
participants restart the next “round” of condition 3 with a
“fixation cross.”
3.2. Procedure
Any “Dira” experiment starts with an opening sequence
consisting of a “welcome” screen, a “questionnaire,” and a
“description” of the task. This initial series is followed by
40 rounds containing a “fixation cross,” “quiz,” “rating,” and
optional “explanation” or “elaboration” screens. The experiment
concludes with an on-screen “debrief.”
A “welcome” screen explains the basic idea of the study as well
as potential risks and the right to withdraw data. The study only
continues if participants understand and agree to the minimum
requirements that have been cleared by the Faculty of Health
and Human Sciences Ethics Committee at Plymouth University.
Once participants have given their consent, they are shown the
“questionnaire.”
During the “questionnaire” participants are asked to specify
their age, gender and primary language and if they have
participated in the study “Dira” before. They are also asked to rate
their fluency in understanding written English and familiarity
with the card game “Dixit” on a seven-point Likert item.
Participants are also asked to rate themselves in 14 additional
seven-point Likert item questions, four of which belong to the
Subjective Happiness Scale (SHS) developed by Lyubomirsky and
Lepper (1999) and ten more of the Curiosity and Exploration
Inventory II (CEI-II) as published by Kashdan et al. (2009).
The scales were chosen because emotional states (Baas et al.,
2008), openness to experience, and intrinsic motivation (Eccles
and Wigfield, 2002) are known to influence problem solving
(Beaty et al., 2014). These results are not discussed here since the
interaction between individual differences and the performance
in the “Dira” task are beyond the scope of the current article.
Once participants have completed the questionnaire, the
procedure of the experiment is explained to them in detail in
a “description” screen. This screen also holds a minimal and
neo-Gestalt inspired definition of the “Eureka moment” as
“the common human experience of suddenly understanding
a previously incomprehensible problem or concept,” for
accessibility reasons taken from Wikipedia (2016). Afterwards,
the 40 “rounds” of the experiment begin.
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FIGURE 3 | Distribution of hovering times on elements during the “quiz.” The modes of the bimodal distribution are marked with red lines. The cutoff time between the
two distributions, a result of the classification described in the text, is shown in blue.
Each “round” starts with a “fixation cross” which is shown at
the center of the screen for a randomized time between 750 and
1,250ms. Afterwards text and images appear on the “quiz” screen
as illustrated in Figure 1: one text on top and six images in a grid
of two rows by three columns. Unless the participants hover the
mouse on top of these elements, the letters of the text are shown
in a randomized order, and the images are strongly blurred. An
example can be seen in the second screen of Figure 2 which
shows the text “Don’t judge a book by its cover” with the letters
in a randomized order and images blurred except for “image f”
over which the mouse pointer hovers. The recording of hover
times during the “quiz” allows to track when participants pay
attention to each of the elements and for how long (Navalpakkam
and Churchill, 2012). On this screen, participants attempt to find
the image that they think is most likely associated with the text
and select it through a single click. There is no time limit for
completing this task. Once participants have chosen a solution,
they advance to the “rating” screen.
During the “rating” screen, participants are asked to rate their
performance in the “quiz.” They are asked the following four
questions, with the range of possible responses on seven-point
Likert items in brackets: “How confident are you that the solution
is right?” (not confident—very confident), “How hard was it
for you to come up with the solution?” (not hard—very hard),
“How strong did you experience a Eureka moment?” (not at all—
very strong), and “How happy are you with your answer?” (very
unhappy—very happy). After submitting the answers, the next
round starts with a “fixation cross.”
Participants who have completed the 40 rounds conclude their
participation with the “debrief” screen. Here they are informed
that the study intended to measure the timing of their behavior
during the “quiz.” Participants are encouraged to give additional
feedback concerning the experiment, and they have the option
to leave an email address in case they want to be informed of
the results of the study. This on-screen debrief was followed
by a short unstructured personal discussion relating to their
experience in the Dira experiment.
3.3. Task Administration
The controlled study “Dira” was designed as a computer-based
task administered in a laboratory setup. The task was delivered
through a custom developed web application delivered through
a full-screen web browser. The same type of computer mouse
with an optical sensor and the same type of 22 inch LCD screen
with 1,920× 1,080 pixel resolution were used for the whole
experiment. Participants are most likely familiar with the setup as
it is the same hardware available to students in library and public
computing spaces across campus. The experiment was delivered
in a dedicated room with no more than five participants at the
same time who were asked to stay silent during the experiment.
Welcome and debrief was performed outside the room to keep
any distraction to a minimum. Informed consent was collected
from participants; then they were accommodated at a computer
showing a “welcome” screen.
3.4. Participants
One hundred and twenty-four participants between the age of
18 and 56 (age = 22.6, sd = 6.99) were recruited from a local
pool of pre-registered psychology students and a second pool that
was open to students of other courses and members of the public.
While two of the participants chose not to report their gender, 83
identified as female and 39 as male. Psychology students received
course credits and points for running their studies. Participants
from the second pool received monetary compensation. The
overall sample appears similar to the one described by Henrich
et al. (2010).
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FIGURE 4 | One participant’s interaction with text and images during the first 10 s (x-axis) of each of the 40 rounds (y-axis). The length of each colored bar notifies the
duration, the color identifies the position of the element. Horizontal black lines mark the items that are selected in this round, the vertical black lines mark the end of
the “First Full Scan.” The numbers between one and seven next to the y-axis show the reported strength of the Eureka experience for that round. The green blocks
mark rounds that are kept for further analysis. For details see text.
3.5. Data Pre-processing
The data collected during the “quiz” of the “Dira” task are
intended to trace the participants’ thought process through
their behavior. The recorded dataset includes chronological
information concerning the order in which participants engage
with elements, as well as the duration of the interactions.
The chronology or order in which participants engage with
elements shows that they do not interact with all elements in each
round. If participants do not look at the text, this has implications
on their ability to solve the problem: Participants who have not
seen the text will not be able to find an association between the
text and one of the images for this particular round. On the other
hand, if they have seen the text but not all images, they are still
able to find a solution. Rounds in which participants did not look
at the text were therefore excluded from further analysis, whereas
rounds with missing interactions for some images were still
analyzed. Furthermore, cognitive processes deployed in rounds
that start with the text might differ from the ones starting with
one of the images. To control for these different modalities, we
focus in this paper on the rounds starting with text and remove
all others.
The duration of interactions with text and images is assumed
to relate to the amount of acquired and processed information.
However, the data also include quick movements that do not
contribute to acquiring information, as illustrated in Figure 3. If
people want to look at an element not adjacent to the current
mouse position, they need to move the pointer across one or
more elements. In this case, the distance of the mouse pointer
from the target image is between 1.5 times and 4.3 times the
size of the target. According to Fitts’ law, the task of moving
to a distant image has an index of difficulty between 1.3 and
2.4. Applying the extreme values for throughput suggested in
Soukoreff and MacKenzie (2004), participants are estimated to
require between 260 and 640ms for the whole distance and
therefore between 150 and 170ms to cross an image between the
starting position and the target image. During this movement,
the element is briefly unblurred on screen. Figure 4 shows
examples of this movement at the beginning of rounds 4–7. The
density of the duration of interactions in Figure 3 shows how
often participants interact with elements for certain durations.
The bimodal distribution suggests that there are at least two
different types of behavior recorded. Shorter interactions, in
Figure 3marked as the local maxima around 44ms, are distinctly
different from longer hover times peaking around 437ms. A
cluster model fitted to the log-transformed duration using two
components (Scrucca et al., 2016) classifies 17,849 interactions
as short and 63,452 as long, divided at 130ms. The predicted
movement time according to Fitts’ law and the identified time
dividing the bimodal distribution of hover times suggest that the
shorter engagements with elements might be movements across
the element, targeting another one. If participants follow the
mouse movement and see the intermediately unblurred image on
screen during the shorter engagement, the following unblurred
target image acts as a backward mask. Previous research does not
provide evidence for perceptual discrimination between visual
stimuli shown for less than 100 ms (VanRullen and Thorpe,
2001; Zoefel and VanRullen, 2017). Furthermore, Salti et al.
(2015) argue for a required exposure of more than 250ms
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necessary to consciously perceive a stimulus. Assuming that
specific information from a higher conceptual level is required to
identify remote associations in the “Dira” task, these activations
would require additional time, as Quiroga et al. (2008) have
shown in single neuron recordings. For the “Dira” experiment
we are interested in interactions for which participants can
distinguish between different images. Concluding the different
cited streams of research we assume that shorter interactions
from the bimodal distribution shown in Figure 3 have no or
little influence on the process “Dira” intends to capture. In
accordance with Fitts’ law, we assume that the shorter observed
behavior represents mouse movements across elements moving
for a different target without cognitive processing of the image.
Consequently, element interactions below the identified 130ms
are excluded from further analysis.
4. RESULTS
We first report on the type of raw behavioral data collected
during the “quiz” and derived measures such as the chronology
of information acquisition. Secondly we present the self-reported
measures collected during the “rating” screen. We then show that
the number of interactions with elements relates to the reported
strength of the Eureka experience. Finally, we report results of
the length of different interactions in comparison to the reported
strength of reported Eureka experience. For the statistical tests
we adopted a critical α level of 0.01 as originally put forward
by Melton (1962) and Trafimow et al. (2018). For each test
where the estimated amount of false discoveries surpasses this
threshold, we transparently report this value as suggested by
Lakens et al. (2018). We adopt this practice for our study and the
chosen traditional threshold, in particular since the discussion on
statistical testing is far from over (Benjamin et al., 2017; Trafimow
et al., 2018).
4.1. Available Process-Tracing Measures
Participants’ interaction with elements on the “quiz” screen is
a metric for tracing their problem solving process. The time
to produce solutions has previously been used in convergent
thinking tasks (Salvi et al., 2016) and divergent thinking tasks
(Forthmann et al., 2017), a measure that is similar to the “quiz
time” in this paper. “Dira” employs a novel method by collecting
behavioral data, namely the interaction times with the stimuli,
throughout the creative process. This is a novel approach by
shifting the focus from measuring the duration to produce a
“creative product” to providing chronological measures of the
process itself. While the current paper focuses on the moment
solutions emerge, the experimental paradigm could be used to
trace other aspects of the creative process such as preparing
for the task or the verification of solutions. Since the extracted
behavioral measures are vital for understanding the subsequent
writing, we elaborate on the raw data and their derived measures
in this section.
To illustrate the kind of data collected in “Dira,” we will
now discuss in detail Figure 4. The duration of interaction with
each element is the difference between offset and onset time
which is the raw data recorded during the task. Figure 4 shows
the example of one participant’s interaction within the first
10 seconds of each of the 40 rounds. Each of the colored bars
represents a timespan during which the mouse pointer hovers
on top of an element. The length represents the duration, and
the color signifies with which element the participants interact.
For example, in the first round on the bottom of Figure 4, this
particular participant spent a long time on “image b” (for color
and naming scheme see Figure 1). The second round instead
starts with three short interactions with “image d,” “image e,”
and “image b” followed by a short time without any element
interaction before hovering on top of the “text” for almost two
seconds. Some rounds, like the third one, are finished within the
ten second period shown in Figure 4, others like the first two
continued for a more extended period.
Figure 4 also shows additional data that is available in “Dira.”
We refer to the moment participants select their solution as
the “quiz time” since it ends the current “quiz.” This measure
is similar to existing measures in other tasks, such as the total
time to solve convergent thinking tasks as reported by Salvi
et al. (2016) or to produce utterances for divergent thinking
tasks (Forthmann et al., 2017). The example participant selects
FIGURE 5 | Confidence, perceived task difficulty, and happiness related to the reported strength of the Eureka experience. The size of the circle represents the
number of rounds in which the combination was reported, larger circles representing more answers.
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FIGURE 6 | Number of hovers before (Top row) and after (Bottom row) “First Full Scan” over the reported strength of Eureka experience.
the solution for round 3 at around 8,500ms and round 4 at
around 8,000ms. The selected solution, for example, “image c”
for round 3, is also indicated as a horizontal black line for the
rounds in Figure 4. The vertical black line marks the end of
what we call the “First Full Scan,” the end of the interaction
with the seventh unique element. Participants have interacted
with each element at least once at the end of the “First Full
Scan.” The number next to the vertical axis in Figure 4 represents
the strength of the Eureka moment participants indicate during
the “rating” screen. The example participant had no Eureka
experience in round 2 and 3, but a strong one in round 19 and 26.
Finally, the green box next to the vertical axis indicates rounds
that are part of the analysis and not filtered out for one of the
reasons explicated previously.
We administered “Dira” in three different conditions with
a between-subject design as introduced in section 3.1. Based
on the previously provided argument we hypothesized a longer
interaction time for conditions 2 and 3. To test this, we built two
linear mixed-effects models. Firstly we used the length of the First
Full Scan as a dependent variable with the participant and round
of the experiment as a random effect. We found no evidence for a
difference between the three conditions (χ2(2) = 2.4, p = 0.3).
In a second model, we used the quiz time as the dependent
variable as it is most similar to the task time used in other tasks
(Salvi et al., 2016; Forthmann et al., 2017). With participant and
round of the experiment as random effects, we found no evidence
that would support an effect of the experimental condition on
time to report a solution (χ2(2) = 0.87, p = 0.65). Without
support for the effect of the experimental conditions, there is no
argument to distinguish between the three conditions regarding
behavioral data.
4.2. Available Self-Reported Measures
Participants in the “Dira” task are required to provide self-
reported measures in addition to the implicit behavioral data
collected during the “quiz.” During the “reporting” screen they
are asked to account for the strength of their just encountered
Eureka experience, their confidence in the given solution, the
perceived difficulty of the task, and their current happiness on
seven-point Likert items respectively. Besides, participants in
condition 2 and 3 are also asked to rate how well they understand
the connection between the text and a potential solution. In
condition 3 they are furthermore asked to write down how their
solution is associated with the text. These measures are collected
during each of the 40 rounds. In section 3.1 we hypothesized
an increase in the reported Eureka experience for condition 3.
Nevertheless, this is not supported by the collected data (χ2(2) =
4.81, p = 0.09). Consequently, we cannot maintain a separate
analysis for the self-reports in the three conditions.
As illustrated in Figure 5, for rounds in which participants
report a strong Eureka experience they are also confident
regarding their solution. Rounds with weaker or no Eureka
experience are reported across the whole spectrum of confidence,
but with a tendency toward low confidence as well. Instead,
rounds with strong Eureka experiences are rarely rated as low
confidence. This asymmetry leads to an overall Spearman’s
rank correlation of ρ = 0.62, p < 0.01. In contrast, rounds
with strong reported Eurekas rank low in difficulty and rarely
as “hard to come up with a solution.” Rounds with a low
or no Eureka experience are perceived with varying difficulty.
The overall correlation between the reported Eureka experience
and stated task difficulty is ρ = −0.41, p < 0.01. Finally, for
weak or no perceived Eureka, participants express a range of
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FIGURE 7 | The ratio between the last hover time within the First Full Scan and the average of all other hover times in the “First Full Scan,” separated by rounds in
which participants hover over the chosen image last vs. the ones they look at another picture. A value of one means that they are equal, lower than one means the last
scan is shorter than the previous ones. In addition to the box-whisker plot (showing the median and distribution), the lines show a linear model fitted to the mean ratio
and surrounded by the 95% confidence interval in light gray.
different happiness, but only high happiness for strong Eureka
experiences. Reported Eureka and happiness are correlated by
ρ = 0.6, p < 0.01. The reliability of the rating is either good
for reported Eureka (α = 0.86) and difficulty (α = 0.87), or
acceptable for happiness (α = 0.78) and confidence (α = 0.77)
based on Cronbach’s alpha. Conceptually these four measures are
linked by the literature review of Topolinski and Reber (2010a),
who discuss the relationship between ease, positive affect, and
confidence to insight. This link is reflected by the data collected
in “Dira” with good reliability suggested by Cronbach’s α =
0.86 across the four measures. Consequently, these findings
confirm our second hypothesis that participants can report their
experience on more than a binary scale.
4.3. Number of Interactions
In this section, we take a first look at the relationship between
the self-reported intensity of the Eureka experience and the
chronology extracted from the behavioral data. For example,
when participants acquire information during the “quiz” and
they find a solution, they might stop looking at more images.
Therefore we hypothesize that the Eureka experience is stronger
for rounds with fewer interactions. Figure 6 shows how many
elements a participant interacts with during each of the 40 rounds
of the “Dira” experiment. The sub-figure on the top shows
the number of interactions during the “First Full Scan” before
participants have seen each element at least once. An average of
ten to twelve interactions means that participants tend to go back
and forth between elements even before they have seen all seven
elements. More specifically, if participants look at elements in a
certain order, looking back at one element and then continuing
with the round can result in two additional interactions. To
give an example: one participant has looked at “image a” and
“image b” and then goes back to “image a” before continuing with
“image b,” “image c,” and “image d.” In this case, the participant
had interacted twice with “image a” and “image b” during the
“First Full Scan.” This particular round would have accounted for
at least nine interactions before the end of the “First Full Scan.”
To arrive at the numbers shown in Figure 6, this seems to happen
twice in a typical “First Full Scan.”
To test the above hypothesis, we built an ordinal mixed-
effects model (Christensen, 2015) with reported Eureka as a
dependent variable. The number of interactions, the classification
into before and after “First Full Scan,” and the experimental
conditions were used as predictors. The rounds of the experiment
as well as participants were considered as random effects. Results
from this model indicate that there is a significant negative effect
(estimate = −0.06, z = −6.27, p < 0.01) of numbers of hovers
on the reported Eureka before the end of the “First Full Scan.”
The model also shows a significant negative effect (estimate =
−0.35, z = −3.68, p < 0.01) for the number of interactions after
the end of the “First Full Scan.” This confirms our hypothesis
for the interactions during and after the “First Full Scan.” On
the other hand, there is no evidence that condition 2 or 3 have
an effect compared to participants in condition 1 (estimates =
[−0.12, −0.28], z = [−0.35, −0.88], p = [0.73, 0.38]).
During the “First Full Scan,” the above model shows a
significant effect of the number of interactions with elements on
the strength of the Eureka experience. Across all conditions, this
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FIGURE 8 | The hover duration on the images within the First Full Scan. The time on the (C)hosen picture is longer the time on the five other images that are (N)ot
chosen.
difference is between 12.61 interactions for no or low Eureka
experiences and 11.38 interactions for strong reported Eurekas.
After the “First Full Scan” participants do not interact with all
the images and text, again. The significant effect of the number
of interactions on the reported strength of Eureka is higher
this time and more pronounced in Figure 6: the difference is
between 9.65 interactions for no experience of a Eureka and 4.24
interactions for a strong one. There is no evidence for an effect of
the experimental condition on these results. Considering that the
behavior of participants with different Eureka experiences seems
to change before the end of the “First Full Scan,” it is of interest to
examine the behavior during the “First Full Scan” in more detail.
Hereafter we will examine whether the duration of hovering over
elements provides additional information.
4.4. Last Hover During First Full Scan
Here we report the results for the hover duration on the seventh
unique element. It is the last image during the “First Full Scan”
and the first time participants interact with this specific element.
Following up on the previous finding of an interesting difference
between interactions during and after the “First Full Scan,” we
want to narrow down the time of emerging solutions by exploring
this specific hover time. More specifically we show the ratio
of the duration on the last image compared to the mean of
previous interactions. The chronometrical measure of hover time
is illustrated in Figure 7. To correct for individual differences in
processing speed, we plot the ratio of the hover time on the last
image and the average hover times on all other images during the
“First Full Scan.” Figure 7 plots separately the ratio of rounds in
which this element is the one (C)hosen later in the experiment
and rounds which end on a (N)on-chosen one.
Figure 7 shows two effects: Firstly, for the “First Full Scans”
ending on a chosen image, the median of the hover time is
roughly 50% higher on that element than for non-chosen ones
(1,323 vs. 855.9ms). Secondly, less time seems to be spent on
the last non-chosen image than on the previous ones for stronger
Eureka experiences, whereas more time is spent on the last image
for low Eureka values. To quantify these effects we built an
ordinal mixed-effect regression model with the strength of the
reported Eureka experience as a dependent variable and the ratio,
the type of element for the last hover, and the experimental
condition as predictors. The round of the experiment and the
participant were used as random effects. This model shows a
significant effect of the ratio on the strength of the reported
Eureka (estimate = −0.24, z = −6.1, p < 0.01). It further
shows a significant effect for rounds in which the last element
is the chosen one on the strength of the reported Eureka
(estimate = 0.2, z = 2.71, p < 0.01). There is no evidence
for the ratio in condition 2 or 3 affecting the reported Eureka
intensity (estimate = [−0.09,−0.55], z = [−0.32, −0.32], p =
[0.75, 0.05]).
The negative slope of the ratio over the strength of Eureka, in
Figure 7 particularly evident for the last hover on the non-chosen
image, suggests that a solution has emerged before the end of the
“First Full Scan.” The change of the ratio is either the result of
a decrease of the numerator, an increase of the denominator, or
a combination of both. The numerator decreases if participants
spent less time on the last image when having a stronger Eureka
experience. The denominator represents the average time spent
on all previous images. It increases if participants spend more
time on at least one of the previous images. If participants had
Eureka experiences while looking at the image they are going
to choose later, and this would be associated with them looking
longer at that image, this would increase the denominator in
the rounds which end on the non-chosen images. The observed
increase would also explain the difference between rounds that
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FIGURE 9 | The ratio of time spent on the chosen image over non-chosen images as a box-whisker plot with a linear model fit to the mean. The median for the ratio
depicted in the box-whisker plot shows that participants spend nearly 1.3 times as much time on the chosen image compared to the others for a low Eureka, but
about twice the time for a strong Eureka. The difference between mean (linear model) and median (box-whisker) results from outliers in the data.
end on chosen and non-chosen images. If participants spent
less time on subsequent images, for example after a Eureka
experience, this would decrease the numerator for the rounds
ending on non-chosen images, but not for the ones ending on the
chosen images. This interpretation of the observations suggests
that the measured ratio is a compound of chronological effects
and hover duration. Therefore we focus now on the duration
spent on the chosen image and its relation to the strength of
Eureka.
4.5. Chosen Images and Length of
Interactions
The observation of the ratio of interaction times during the “First
Full Scan” suggests that the interaction times between chosen
and non-chosen images differ. Instead of a compound measure,
we purely show the duration of hover times during the “First
Full Scan” on (C)hosen and (N)on-chosen images in Figure 8. A
Mann-Whitney test indicates that the duration of viewing chosen
images (duration = 935.9ms) is significantly longer than for
non-chosen pictures (duration= 687.8ms), U = 20,873,370, p
< 0.01). Furthermore, there is a significant difference between
the three conditions regarding the hover duration on non-
chosen images (H = 42.07), p < 0.01 MdCondition 1 = 663.2,
MdCondition 2 = 679.7, MdCondition 3 = 727.9), according to
a Kruskal-Wallis test. Furthermore, there is a difference
between conditions for the chosen images (H= 9.18, p =
0.01,MdCondition 1= 879.8,MdCondition 2 = 915.9,MdCondition 3 =
1,048). Participants spend a significantly longer time on the
chosen image in the third condition than in the other two
conditions, and more time in the second condition compared to
the first one.
We now look at the link between hover duration and reported
Eureka experience in more detail. We built an ordinal regression
model with the reported strength of the Eureka experience
as the dependent variable. With the hovering time on the
chosen images as a predictor, we failed to find evidence for a
link between the strength of the Eureka and interaction time
(estimate = 0.01, z = 0.21, p = 0.83). This is not unexpected
since the raw data include slower and faster participants. Instead,
if an ordinal mixed-effects model considers the participant as
a random effect, the evidence supporting the link between
hover duration and Eureka experience surpasses the threshold
(estimate = 0.14, z = 3.16, p < 0.01). From this example we
conclude that the recorded raw hover durations with text and
images have little validity in connection with the self-reported
measures collected during the “rating” screen. To address this, we
remove the influence of participants and the task by considering
the ratio between the time spent on chosen and non-chosen
images calculated separately for each round. This suggested
ratio between interaction times for a single round and with a
single participant does not include chronological components
related to the order of interactions; it is between measured times
only.
Figure 9 shows the ratio between the hover duration on the
chosen image and the average time spent on the other images.
This ratio is higher for rounds in which participants report
a stronger Eureka experience. An ordinal mixed-effects model
fitted to the data supports this observation. The model uses
the strength of the reported Eureka experience as a dependent
variable and the ratio between the time spent on the selected
image compared to the average duration on all other images as
well as the experimental condition as a predictor. The round of
the “Dira” task and the participant are used as random variables.
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This model confirms that an increase in the ratio corresponds to
a stronger Eureka experience (estimate = 0.02, z = 5.65, p <
0.01). With a ratio of 1.3 for no Eureka and 2 for a strong Eureka,
participants seem to spend approximately 50% more time on
the chosen image in rounds when they report a strong Eureka
experience. However, the model does not provide evidence for an
influence of condition 2 or 3 on the reported Eureka (estimates =
[−0.1,−0.58], z = [−0.33, −2], p = [0.74, 0.05]).
Here we have presented two main findings. Firstly, the
observations of the length of interaction with elements show
that participants spend more time on the images they will select
later in the task. Secondly, for rounds with a strong reported
Eureka experience, the time spent on the chosen image is
significantly longer than in rounds with a weaker or no Eureka
experience.
5. DISCUSSION
The moment when a solution to a problem emerges is
an extraordinary experience. It causes people to cry out
“Eureka” (Pollio, 1914), “Aha” (Bühler, 1908), or “Uh-oh” (Hill
and Kemp, 2016) and often their mood increases. In this
paper, we suggest “Dira” as a novel experimental paradigm to
observe these moments as part of the creative process. Many
previous studies rely on the judgement of creative products,
persons, or press (Rhodes, 1961)—or use proxy phenomena
to assess the process contributing to creativity, innovation,
and problem solving. In this study, we tested 124 people who
participated in a controlled lab experiment designed to study the
emergence of solutions. “Dira” records behavioral data during
each task to observe the creative process directly. Specifically,
we determine the chronology and chronometric measures of
participants’ interaction with potential solutions. After each
task, we ask the participants to self-report their experience
on four different items. Here we discuss the implications of
combined behavioral and metacognitive measures in the “Dira”
task.
5.1. Eureka Experiences in “Dira”
Results from the behavioral data within the “First Full Scan”
of “Dira” show that participants spend longer times on images
they are going to select as their solution. Moreover, the length
of the interaction on these chosen images is linked to the
strength of the reported Eureka experience, with longer hover
durations associated with stronger Eureka experiences. As shown
in section 4.4, the median interaction time on the chosen image
is about 50% longer than on the non-chosen ones. Another result
related to the strength of Eureka is reported in section 4.5. For
rounds that evoke a strong Eureka experience, participants spend
about 50%more time hovering on the chosen image as compared
to rounds with no or low reported Eurekas. The current analysis
does not allow drawing any conclusions regarding causality.
Future studies could test if more extended engagement yields
stronger Eureka experiences or if stronger Eureka experiences
lead to longer hover durations.
After participants have interacted with the chosen image,
they are less likely to continue looking for more elements
according to the results in section 4.3. Supposedly participants
continuously scan the elements on the screen for a solution. If
they find an association, the number of elements they interact
with afterwards is related to the strength of the Eureka experience
reported later. The significant effect can be observed as early as
during the “First Full Scan” and the initial interaction with the
images. These results suggest that something distinctive might
already be happening during the initial engagement with the
images.
With support from the ordinal mixed-effects model
considering behavioral and self-reported measures, we confirm
our first hypothesis that behavior happening during the “quiz”
results in the reported intensity of Eureka. It would seem
natural that the Eureka experience also happens during this
time. However, it is not impossible that the Eureka experience
is the result of a post-event evaluation. In any case, due to the
short quiz time, these experiences would qualify as immediate
insights according to Cranford andMoss (2012). In their study of
convergent thinking, they found a difference between solutions
found through a “classical insight” sequence and “immediate
insights.” The immediate insights only consisted of an “Aha!”
or Eureka experience and were considerably faster. This quick
insight is also in line with the idea of intrapersonal creativity or
mini-c introduced by Beghetto and Kaufman (2007). It would
be interesting to design a modified version of “Dira” to elicit
non-immediate insights as well, for example by tapping into the
thought suppression as used in the delayed incubation paradigm
(Gilhooly et al., 2014) or more generally in “little-c” type of tasks.
We leave this speculation for future studies.
5.2. Subjective Experience
In more detail, the strong Eureka experience in rounds with high
confidence is consistent with previous findings, for example by
Hedne et al. (2016). In their study on magic tricks, problems
solved via insight were rated with higher confidence than
problems solved without insight. Previously Danek et al. (2014)
had assessed a higher confidence rating for insight solutions
as well, but they had used confidence in the definition of
insight given to the participants, so this could have been a
potential confound in their results. Hedne et al. (2016) also
explicitly link confidence with the correctness of the solution,
and Steele et al. (2018) highlight that confidence predicts a
creative outcome. Further support comes from Topolinski and
Reber (2010b) and Salvi et al. (2016) who identified a higher
probability to be correct for insight solutions in convergent
thinking tasks.
Happiness and, more generally, a positive mood is strongly
linked to insights and Eureka experiences in the existing
literature. In the “Dira” task participants experiencing a strong
Eureka seldom report low happiness, but instead are consistently
happier than with weaker or no Eureka experiences. The
meta-review of Baas et al. (2008) provides a comprehensive
overview of the relationship between mood and insight. More
recently Shen et al. (2015) explore 98 different emotional
states and their relationship to “Aha!” experiences. Results
from their studies 2 and 3 suggest a link between insight and
happiness—along with a list of other positive emotional states.
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The mapping of states in two dimensions affords that other
emotions could mask happiness for weaker Eureka experiences.
While Abdel-Khalek (2006) finds single-item measurements
of happiness sufficient to assess related positive affects and
emotions, the fine-grained exploration of the emotional space
associated with emerging solutions could be a topic for future
research.
Our results for the relationship between difficulty and Eureka
show that “Dira” tasks with a strong Eureka experience are
rarely perceived as difficult. This finding seems counter-intuitive
from the perspective of the classical “insight sequence” (Ohlsson,
1992) in which a complicated impasse has to be navigated.
However, perceived difficulty can change in hindsight. Even
if the task appears to be problematic while working on it,
Topolinski and Reber (2010a) have shown that having an
insight can change this. In a review of the literature, they
identify a change of processing fluency as a result of having
an insight. After having found the solution, they conclude, the
problem appears to be easier than it was during the attempt
to solve it. Alternatively, yet another interpretation is that the
participants experience insights in tasks that are not difficult for
them.
5.3. Differences Between Conditions and
Personalities
In section 3.1 we provide a theoretical argument for
administering “Dira” in the three different conditions. In
particular, we hypothesized providing a potential solution would
result in an increased interaction time. The collected data do
not support this hypothesis as the results in section 4.1 show.
We had further assumed that the additional task of elaborating
on the chosen solution would increase the interaction time
and change the self-report. As section 4.2 demonstrates,
the data do not provide evidence for this effect. This could
either mean that the theoretical argument is not sound and
additional variables would influence the measurements to an
extent that masks the hypothesized effect. Furthermore, the
introduced interventions might tap into different effects than
expected. Assuming that the theoretical argument is valid,
the effect size could be too small or “Dira” as an instrument
not sensitive enough to measure the effect within the sample.
In summary, there is no evidence that supports a difference
between the behavioral or self-reported measures among the
three conditions.
In a trial-by-trial comparison, we reveal a link between fewer
interactions and stronger Eureka experiences. In section 4.3
we compare the differences in the number of interactions
observed between Eureka intensities, separately during and
after the “First Full Scan.” We observe a significantly larger
variance between no and strong Eureka experiences after the
“First Full Scan.” This difference implies that the experience is
influenced by element interactions and not by the participants’
distinctive approach to the task. On the other hand, individual
variability might moderate the experience and performance in
the “Dira” experiment. Future research could expand the method
we suggest to address the relationship with personality traits.
Specifically, “Dira” could be used to test if traits known to
correlate with creative production (Batey et al., 2010) predict
eureka experiences.
5.4. Experimental Control
The participants’ freedom to choose the order and duration of
stimulus interaction is supposed to increase task engagement, but
it does not come without costs. The flexibility to look at elements
in any order allows participants in the “Dira” experiment to not
look at elements necessary to solve the problem. For example,
some participants choose not to look at the text before selecting
one of the images. Furthermore, participants who start with the
text and try to find a matching image afterwards might use a
different approach to solve the problem than others who engage
with images first and interact with the text later during the task.
In the first case, they only need to store the text itself or a derived
concept in working memory to match it against each of the
images they look at. In the second case instead, they need to
remember up to six images and related concepts to match each
of them with the text. In the current study, we filtered for rounds
in which participants started with the text and removed all others.
Future studies could eliminate the second case by specifying the
chronology, for example by showing the text first.
As discussed earlier, the bimodal distribution of hover
durations suggests that participants unblur elements for at least
two different reasons. As discussed in section 3.5, participants
might either intend to move the mouse pointer across by
targeting elements on the other side or consciously engage
with the text and images. In the current study, we assumed
interactions shorter than 130ms to represent mouse movement
across elements. While these interactions were removed post-
hoc from the current study, avoiding short unblurring could be
implemented in the experimental design. The elements could
only be shown clearly if the hover time exceeds the movement
time predicted by Fitts’ law (Soukoreff and MacKenzie, 2004).
6. CONCLUSION
In the “Dira” task, we estimate the moment of the emerging
solution based on the participants’ behavior and self-reports
without relying on additional indicators. Like inmany design and
engineering problems, more than one solution is correct for this
task. For “Dira” we demonstrate how behavioral data and meta-
cognitive monitoring are integrated by this instrument to identify
sub-processes of the creative process.
The results suggest that participants can distinguish between
Eureka experiences of different strengths. Thus, our results
suggest that Eureka experiences are not limited to having or not
having an insight, but that the perception of this experience can
have different intensity levels. Future studies should keep this in
mind when assessing Eureka experiences.
Looking at the whole process of finding a solution to an
ill-defined problem, people experience something early in the
problem solving process that they relate to the Eureka experience.
While the exact timing remains unclear, observations in “Dira”
help narrowing down insight and other sub-processes. For
example, before seeing all the elements in the “Dira” task,
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participants in our study exhibit distinctive behavior related to
the strength of their reported Eureka experience. Our results
suggest that immediate insights exist and can be reported by
people who experience them.
The creative process is often studied indirectly through
the creative product, person, or press. We propose “Dira”
as an experimental platform to record behavior as Eureka
experiences are happening. This instrument and future
studies applying the same underlying principle can bring
us another step closer to understanding the creative
process.
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Abstract 
This paper revisits the concept of Cognitive Innovation with the aim of helping 
newcomers appreciate its (intended) demarcating purpose and relevance to the 
wider literature on cognition and creativity in the humanities, arts, and sciences. 
Particular emphasis is paid to discussion of the pitfalls of sense-making and the 
concept’s affordance. The main argument presented is that proponents of the con-
cept face the dilemma of seeking to demonstrate its transdisciplinary nature and 
applicability vis-a-vis retaining its semantic distinctness. Proceeding from a classi-
fication of Cognitive Innovation as a dispositional construct, we discuss how it 
feeds into existing research approaches and opens up new sensibilities in related 
areas. The perspectives of temporality, interdisciplinary balancing, technology, 
and metatheories are proposed as promising areas for future elaboration of the 
function of Cognitive Innovation. 
Keywords: concept analysis; creativity; interdisciplinarity; metatheory; temporality. 
 
Introduction 
In her seminal paper on concept analysis, Rodgers argues that intellectual progres-
sion is greatly impaired when definitions and attributes of fundamental concepts are 
not made clear: “[Q]uestions regarding vague or ambiguous concepts are met with 
confused responses that are dependent upon individual and often ad hoc interpreta-
tions” (Rodgers, 1989, p. 330). Conceptual unclarity characterizes several research 
areas that have become tantalizing in cognitive science within the last decades, in-
cluding creativity, consciousness, cognition and play. Research that proposes 
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measures of creativity or attempts to determine neural correlates of creativity is of-
ten criticized not on the basis of its methodological rigor, but on the basis of its claim 
to represent the concept of creativity. At the same time this might also be the root of 
disagreement between different lines of research. 
Lack of clarity regarding the concept of creativity has been a recurrent theme within 
CogNovo’s1 network of principal investigators, PhD students, affiliates, and partners, 
where presentations on creativity have often extended into dead-end discussions 
about fundamental ontological and epistemological questions. In order to overcome 
these discursive impasses, Denham and colleagues proposed the notion of Cognitive 
Innovation to help position (or perhaps displace) creativity. In this paper, we draw 
attention to the notion of Cognitive Innovation as we understand Denham (2014), 
Gummerum and Denham (2014) and Denham and Punt (2017), collectively referred 
to as “Denham and colleagues.” 
To help tighten the grip of the concept’s unique affordance, we examine a series of 
issues regarding interpretation and comprehension of the depictions by which the 
concept comes into expression. Our aim is twofold: first, to help newcomers to the 
concept appreciate its (intended) demarcating purpose; second, to suggest new ap-
proaches to interdisciplinary research on cognition. 
 
Cognitive Innovation as a Neologism 
The notion of Cognitive Innovation was coined long before the recent rendering by 
Denham and colleagues, when Acker and McReynolds (1965) introduced the Ob-
scure Figures Test as a measurement of Cognitive Innovation. Their paper references 
a talk at the annual convention of the American Psychology Association as the source 
of the term, but the available proceedings do not mention it at all (McReynolds, 
1964). Presumably the term was discussed during the talk and summarized in Acker 
and McReynolds (1965): 
It is conceived that in the course of his commerce with his2 environment, an individual 
builds up an over-all cognitive structure which for him represents the nature of reality 
and in terms of which input data should be processed. This over-all cognitive struc-
ture can be assumed to undergo certain changes over time. The processes whereby 
these changes are brought about are what is meant by “cognitive innovation,” i.e., in-
novation or the introduction of newness into the cognitive structure. (p. 851) 
                                                                  
1 CogNovo started as a doctoral training program at Plymouth University, jointly funded by the EU through 
the Marie Curie Actions and Plymouth University. For an overview of the CogNovo program 
(https://CogNovo.eu) and its twenty-four research projects, see Maranan, Loesche, and Denham (2015). 
2 For clarification: even though only male performance is discussed, females and males participated in the 
study. Presumably the assumption and results apply to both genders, even though the wording suggests 
otherwise. 
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The cognitive structure mentioned here resembles to some extent imagery or mental 
representation and individual knowledge. The manipulation of internal structures 
towards something novel is what Acker and McReynolds (1965) address with their 
use of the term Cognitive Innovation. Denham and colleagues also mention such ma-
nipulation as a key property in their articulation of the concept. Interestingly this 
exhibits some overlap between the two uses of the term, without explicit reference. 
In perhaps the most succinct linguistic definition available from their contributions, 
Denham articulates the concept of Cognitive Innovation as “a recursive process in 
which an individual probes its boundaries to seek out new knowledge, selects prom-
ising avenues for more extensive exploitation, and synthesizes what it learns within 
its growing body of knowledge” (Denham & Punt, 2017, supplement, p. 4). Denham 
refers to Cognitive Innovation as a generic and recursive function manipulating not 
just the imagery (and other explicit knowledge), but also the individual’s set of inter-
nal mental processes and the Cognitive Innovation function itself. The sum of sensory 
inputs is the third distinct parameter feeding into the Cognitive Innovation function. 
In its functional form, Cognitive Innovation is presented as 
 
𝐹𝑡+𝑑𝑡 , 𝑥𝑡+𝑑𝑡 ⇐ 𝐹𝑡(𝐹𝑡 , 𝑥𝑡 , 𝑠𝑡) 
where 
𝐹 represents the mental processing of an individual, and the set of things it knows 
about, . . . 𝐹𝑡  represents all internal (mental) processes, is the set of ideas, facts, 
words, and so on that are known by the individual and can be exchanged with others, 
𝑠𝑡 are things in the world perceptually accessible to the individual and 𝑡 is an index 
of time. (Denham & Punt, 2017, supplement, p. 5) 
 
Cognitive Innovation as a Dispositional Concept 
Whereas Denham and colleagues seem to have a strong idea about the essence of 
Cognitive Innovation, we draw attention to the question of how to make sense across 
the vast range of disciplines that are engaged with cognition and innovation. Lack of 
familiarity with the concept poses at least two pitfalls in terms of sense-making. 
First, the reallocation of meaning to a compound term which makes use of omnipres-
ent words with rich historical semiotic loads requires the term to be freed from un-
intended meanings. Familiarity with its constituting terms of cognition and 
innovation may misleadingly activate interpretations that combine unintended at-
tributes of both. Cognitive science forms its own research domain, including a set of 
disciplines at the intersection between neuroscience, anthropology, artificial intelli-
gence, linguistics, philosophy, and psychology (see Thagard, 2005, p. X [sic]). Inno-
vation appears to be used within social sciences and economic and engineering 
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literature, with an emphasis on multi- and interdisciplinary work (see Crossan & 
Apaydin, 2009; Fagerberg, Fosaas, & Sapprasert, 2012). As a result, innovation has a 
number of definitions across and within different disciplines, often related to the 
“implementation of creative ideas” (Amabile, 1988, p. 126) and echoing two dimen-
sions also used for the definition of creativity on individual levels of novelty and use-
fulness (see Runco & Jaeger, 2012; Stein, 1953), but typically measured on an 
organizational level (Sawyer & Bunderson, 2013, p. 14). In short, we note that each 
of the constituting elements of Cognitive Innovation are very rich and semantically 
overloaded. As opposed to the blank slate approach of inventing an artificial word to 
describe the concept, cognition and innovation—to stay within the metaphor—have 
chalk scribbles dense enough to provide some colored but almost indistinguishable 
background. At the same time, this approach situates Cognitive Innovation in approx-
imation to metatheories, involving humans and human behavior. 
A second (general) pitfall of sense-making is that one thing is understood in terms of 
something else, be it an existing conceptual framework, terminology, or historical or 
cultural situatedness. Gadamer’s (1960) notion of fusion of horizons (Horizont-
verschmelzung) eloquently captures the inevitable compromise that takes place dur-
ing any text comprehension: two “horizons,” i.e., scopes of insight restrained by 
“historically effected consciousness,” are fused during the interpretative act—the 
horizon of the text and the one of the reader. Thus, the same description of Cognitive 
Innovation will most likely be understood quite differently by an expert on, say, Cog-
nitive Flexibility Theory (e.g., Spiro, Coulson, Feitovich, & Anderson, 1988) than by 
an expert on epistemology (e.g., Archer, 1988). Both topics share similarities with 
Denham’s description of Cognitive Innovation, but respectively emphasize the differ-
ent aspects of learning and knowledge production. While aspects and insights from 
such related domains are commensurable with the description of Cognitive Innova-
tion, it is impossible to determine in an absolute sense whether such aspects are in-
trinsic features of Cognitive Innovation. Denham may say they are, or are not, and 
someone else may say the opposite. Hereby a challenge regarding the conceptual 
clarity of Cognitive Innovation emerges: Denham’s definition of the concept—a re-
cursive process of exploration, exploitation, and synthesis—is expressed at a very 
high level of abstraction that is easily translatable or applicable to numerous do-
mains and contexts. While this genericity may be embraced and leveraged, as exem-
plified by all the writings of Denham and colleagues, the question of the concept’s 
boundary marking is left unresolved (except for the distinction between creativity 
and Cognitive Innovation).3 Whether or not this semantic fluidity is a problem de-
pends on the ontological underpinnings of the concept. 
                                                                  
3 Denham and Punt, however, seem to be aware of this contingent imposing of meaning onto the concept 
in acknowledging that what they are tackling “is, and also is not, necessarily the same thing” (Denham & 
Punt, 2017, p. 185). 
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Historically, concepts have been thought of as belonging to one of two categories 
(Rodgers, 1989): “Entity views” treat a concept as a clearly demarcated and stable 
“thing” with a rigid set of necessary and sufficient conditions. The essence and truth 
value of a concept can therefore be approached positively through a reductionist ap-
proach and should not be examined relative to some context. “Dispositional views,” 
on the other hand, treat concepts as habits or behavioral potentials. In contrast to a 
fixed and reductionist approach, they acknowledge dynamic formation of concepts 
through individuals’ interpretation and utilization as a sine qua non condition. We 
argue that the concept of Cognitive Innovation is a dispositional construct. This is 
perhaps most clearly expressed in the paper by Denham and Punt (2017), which ar-
ticulates the concept on the basis of two distinct mindsets influenced by the domains 
of computational neuroscience and media archeology, respectively. Whereas this 
dual perspective arguably supports their intention to promote Cognitive Innovation 
as a focus for collaboration between the sciences, arts, and humanities, the format of 
the paper—two self-standing essays “in which the contributing specialisms retain 
their academic and methodological distinction and voice” (Denham & Punt, 2017, 
p. 184)—does not promote fusion of disciplinary horizons by example. Bearing this 
point in mind, the “bridge” from which Denham and Punt (2017) look at Cognitive 
Innovation (as indicated by the paper’s title) is probably better understood as a nau-
tical metaphor (i.e., the platform from which a ship is commanded) than as a con-
struction that connects existing platforms across a gap. A pertinent question posed 
by this interpretation is: Where is the ship heading? 
 
Charting New Territories in Cognitive Innovation 
If we proceed from the assumption that Cognitive Innovation is a dispositional con-
struct, we can begin to envisage how the concept feeds into existing research ap-
proaches and opens up new sensibilities. The following three strands of thought 
follow from our contemplation of the notational form of the functional definition of 
Cognitive Innovation. 
 
Emphasizing the Temporality of Cognitive Innovation and Creativity 
In cognitive sciences, creativity is assumed to be a stable trait that can be measured 
without changing it. Both the functional description of creativity by Denham and col-
leagues and their characterization of Cognitive Innovation instead emphasize their 
malleability to influences over time. Even in their notation, time might be overlooked 
as a small subscript to the parameters and results, but it is a subscript to every single 
parameter. Indeed time, it could be argued, should be more explicitly addressed in 
the study of creativity as it emerges from Cognitive Innovation. 
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The effect of task-specific training has been shown for divergent and convergent 
thinking (Scott, Leritz, & Mumford, 2004), as well as insightful tasks (Weisberg, 
2014). This alteration of internal knowledge, as represented by xt in the Cognitive 
Innovation function, changes with repeated exposure and therefore time. Based on 
this empirical and anecdotal underpinning it is no surprise that time plays an im-
portant role in many theoretical models of creativity, such as the temporal stages 
mentioned by Wallas (1926) to Csikszentmihalyi (1988), and basically any idea that 
taps into the second “P” (Process) from Rhodes’ (1961) “four Ps of creativity” model, 
which uses time as an independent variable. 
Following up on this theoretical stance, it remains unclear how much the recursion 
of perceived time (for example, through Earth’s rotations around the Sun and itself) 
or technologically and culturally constructed time (rotations of minute hands on 
clocks, “the same” bus every 7 minutes) itself is intrinsically reflected in the func-
tional description by Denham and colleagues. Future discussions might want to ad-
dress the effect chrono-biological or chrono-technological processes have on the 
recursion of Cognitive Innovation. 
A temporal perspective can also be used to illustrate the difference between Cogni-
tive Innovation and creativity. Denham and colleagues characterize creativity as an 
exaptation of Cognitive Innovation and appear to suggest that creativity is a contem-
porary and socially grounded expression of what is ultimately Cognitive Innovation.4 
The distinction can be perceived with a thought experiment: What was creativity (or 
what did people think about it) 10 years ago? Probably it was similar to what we 
think now. What about 100 years ago, when the word “creativity” first emerged in 
Western languages? What about 6,500 years ago, when the wheel was invented? 
What about 525 million years ago, when the first vertebrates emerged? 525 million 
years ago, creativity was probably “non-existent,” whereas cognitive innovation 
probably did exist.  
                                                                  
4 Part of what distinguishes creativity from Cognitive Innovation is that the notion and valuation of cre-
a ⁠tivity (and what constitutes a creative product, process, or person) is contingent on its environment in 
all its social, cultural, technological, and political dimensions. For instance, it has been suggested that so-
cial risk-taking is associated with creativity (Tyagi, Hanoch, Hall, Runco, & Denham, 2017); that is to say, 
what or who is creative is not necessarily considered socially acceptable. A second distinction of Cognitive 
Innovation from creativity—potentially also a consequence of the involvement of multiple agents—is the 
application or at least applicability of the resulting products. The formula Cognitive Innovation = creativity 
+ communication + application is oversimplifying the idea of Cognitive Innovation as an “endless cycle of 
exploration, exploitation, and explanation” (see Gummerum & Denham, 2014, p. 586), but emphasizes the 
distinction to creativity nevertheless. 
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Decomposability, Balancing Interdisciplinarity, and Technology 
The functional definition of Cognitive Innovation states that it is recursively consti-
tuted of an individual’s mental processes (𝐹), their existing knowledge (𝑥), and prop-
erties of the perceptually accessible world (𝑠). Denham and Punt (2017) further 
suggest creativity is constituted not only by the terms of the Cognitive Innovation 
function, but additionally by the knowledge (𝑦 ) and cultural and societal pro-
cesses (𝐺) of the community (Denham & Punt, 2017, supplement, p. 10). We propose 
that the decomposability of Cognitive Innovation and creativity in such particular 
terms affords strategies for evaluating and advancing interdisciplinary research pro-
grams such as CogNovo. 
First, it suggests that a research group studying Cognitive Innovation and creativity 
would best be served by a disciplinary mix that included not only cognitive neurosci-
ence and psychology to cover terms 𝐹 and 𝑥, but also cultural anthropology and po-
litical sociology (which were absent in CogNovo), perhaps with an emphasis on 
ethnography as a methodology. This complement of disciplines more fully corre-
sponds to the components of the functions. 
Second, it calls for reflection on the role that computational sciences and media stud-
ies play in the research agenda of an interdisciplinary research group studying hu-
man creativity. Why should computation, media, and technology matter in this field? 
In the creativity function, where do things like hammers, telescopes and mobile 
phones fit in? Strictly speaking, they are simply part of the perceptible world, s, yet 
they seem to be more significant than that. We suggest that technology (in the sense 
of apparatuses, equipment, and tools) might be considered to constitute a special as-
pect not only of the material, perceptible world (𝑠), but also of societies’ ways of 
thinking and doing (𝐺). Describing the function of contemporary technology, Punt 
(Denham & Punt, 2017, p. 185) points out that technology serves to supplement the 
human body, either by “alleviat[ing] the hardships of nature through muscular am-
plification” (particularly in the past), whereas contemporary technology (also) ex-
tends the “limitations of the sensory range” of the human organism. Indeed, 
technology can, as McLuhan (1964) argues, be an “extension of ourselves” in that it 
extends the cognitive system as much as it can extend the body (Brey, 2000). Tech-
nology can play an active role both in perceiving the world differently and also in 
transforming it. We thus argue that technology deserves to be set aside as a special 
term in the creativity function. Hence, the creativity function 
𝐹𝑡+𝑑𝑡 , 𝑥𝑡+𝑑𝑡 , 𝐺𝑡+𝑑𝑡 , 𝑦𝑡+𝑑𝑡 , 𝑠𝑡+𝑑𝑡 ⇐ 𝐹𝑡(𝐹𝑡, 𝑥𝑡 , 𝐺𝑡 , 𝑦𝑡 , 𝑠𝑡) 
might be more completely described as 
𝐹𝑡+𝑑𝑡, 𝑥𝑡+𝑑𝑡 , 𝐺𝑡+𝑑𝑡 , 𝑦𝑡+𝑑𝑡 , 𝑠𝑡+𝑑𝑡 , 𝑇𝑡+𝑑𝑡 ⇐ 𝐹𝑡(𝐹𝑡, 𝑥𝑡 , 𝐺𝑡 , 𝑦𝑡 , 𝑠𝑡 , 𝑇𝑡) 
where 𝑇 stands for technology—the apparatuses, devices, and mechanisms that ex-
tend the body and brain, and thus arguably extends (or at the very least mediates) 
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human agency (Latour, 1994). That is to say, the recursive, functional form of Cogni-
tive Innovation and creativity facilitates an extended description of cognition that is 
much in line with theories of The Extended Mind (e.g., Clark & Chalmers, 1998). This 
transcends the focus on intra-cranial processes, which historically have been the ob-
ject of cognitive studies. 
 
Cognitive Innovation and Metatheory 
The existing articulations of Cognitive Innovation do not explicitly mention any par-
ticular philosophical anchorage, nor do they claim to pertain to any context, histori-
cal era or culture. In this regard, the concept shares fundamental features with 
metatheories. One example of a metatheoretical framework with particular strong 
affinities to Cognitive Innovation is Clare Graves’ Emergent, Cyclical, Double-Helix 
Model of Adult BioPsychoSocial Systems Development (e.g., Graves, 1974). Graves’ 
lifelong project was to study no less than the developmental path of human nature. 
In the 1950s he began to collect anthropological and psychological data without hav-
ing any hypothesis, in an approach similar to what was later formalized as Grounded 
Theory by Glaser and Strauss (1967). The culmination of his work was the proposal 
of a pattern and direction in the path of human development in the form of a frame-
work that integrates various theories of human development, e.g., Maslow’s (1943) 
hierarchy of needs, and Dawkins’ (1976) idea of memes. On the basis of data collected 
over a period of more than 30 years, Graves proposed seven developmental levels of 
being or existence in the world that occur in a predictable successive order.5 
Graves’ work, we propose, is relevant for Cognitive Innovation as it demonstrates 
traces of recursion at work and also demonstrates the link to societal processes and 
community knowledge. It is a rich qualitative account of what Cognitive Innovation—
a shadowless structural description—leaves behind, so to speak. Graves’ model 
shares with the model of Cognitive Innovation the aim to account for development 
from more primitive levels or states to more sophisticated levels or states. Graves’ 
model does this by suggesting a particular direction in the spiral of development of 
human nature, whereas the model of Cognitive Innovation suggests bootstrapping 
mechanisms by which development takes place. Whether the latter qualifies for the 
label of a metatheory is debatable, but at least Cognitive Innovation lends itself as a 
useful supplement to enhancing self-reflexivity in metatheoretical frameworks like 
Graves’ in a concise way.  
                                                                  
5 Graves’ work (particularly his taxonomy of developmental levels) has been popularized by Beck and 
Cowan’s (2005) work on Spiral Dynamics and Ken Wilber’s (2000) work on Integral Theory. 




The pragmatic value of the concept of Cognitive Innovation to the academic discourse 
on creativity (and other fields) will stand its test in years to come. It is tempting, both 
to proponents and reviewers of the concept, to elaborate on possible meanings sug-
gested by the semantic load of its two constituting terms, not least because many con-
cepts in the history of cognitive studies appear to be closely related, named similarly, 
or both. However, subsuming too many principles under the concept—a likely conse-
quence of opening it up to fit existing discourses of various disciplines—comes with 
the risk of diluting its semantic span. For this reason, we have suggested that Cognitive 
Innovation ought to be thought of more in terms of a metatheoretical framework than 
as a concept. While increasing the accessibility of Cognitive Innovation to a wide au-
dience is in line with Denham and Punt's aspiration to have it provide “a theoretical 
and practical platform from which to explore disciplinary differences in our under-
standing of creativity” (Denham & Punt, 2017, p. 184), it is potentially confusing to 
propose what seems to be a semantic chameleon as a conceptual demarcation from 
creativity. In addition to pointing out this dilemma (without attempting to solve it), 
we have highlighted a few aspects of sense-making and affordances of the concept 
that we think future investigations should examine in more detail. 
While Denham and Punt (2017) do not directly propose a method to integrate their 
different disciplinary specialisms by which they approach and discuss Cognitive In-
novation, their individual horizons clearly intersect and seem to be within the reach 
of integration or fusion. It seems therefore as if the challenge of promoting Cognitive 
Innovation as a research object lies not so much in the description of the concept, but 
rather in how to study and write about it in a transdisciplinary manner. We have 
outlined a few ideas on temporality, interdisciplinary balancing and metatheories 
that we believe are important to consider in more detail in future enquiries and de-
velopments of Cognitive Innovation to navigate analytical operations in the muddy 
waters of conceptual territory. 
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Our GIFT to All of Us: GA(Y)AM 
Preface 
 
This special issue of AVANT is all about Cognitive Innovation. It is not about CogNovo, 
the interdisciplinary and international doctoral training programme that produced 
three different Off the Lip events. It is not about Off the Lip 2017, the novel sympo-
sium format we developed to collaboratively create a publication resulting in this 
special issue of AVANT. It is not about the seemingly heterogeneous collection of pa-
pers that follow this preface. Collaborative Approaches to Cognitive Innovation re-
quired something else, something we are starting to capture in the four GIFT 
principles. While this special issue is not solely about CogNovo, Off the Lip events, or 
the content of the following submissions, all these aforementioned elements were 
necessary to shape our current understanding of Cognitive Innovation, the very pro-
cess which led to numerous publications, exhibitions, and events during the past 
three years. In a sense, all of our previous endeavours have culminated in this collec-
tion of 26 distinct pieces of work, yet we hope and believe that this special issue also 
marks a beginning. Let us explain. 
Similarly to you reading this article right now, most of us joined the work on Cogni-
tive Innovation in medias res. A unique transdisciplinary strategy was already being 
discussed when the doctoral training programme CogNovo formed around it. At that 
time, it seemed that CogNovo was born out of the desire to build a multidisciplinary 
team, to formulate interdisciplinary research questions, and aiming “to be truly 
transdisciplinary” (Denham, 2014, p. 202). Each of the 25 CogNovo research fellows, 
selected from a large cohort of applicants with a diverse range of backgrounds, were 
assigned to a team of academic supervisors and industrial partners (for more details, 
see Ma ⁠ranan, Loesche, & Denham, 2015). In addition to the doctoral training and 
through several workshops and symposia, spontaneous collaborations were trig-
gered; project-related groups that formed and disbanded, with the roles of each in-
dividual changing over the course of CogNovo. We realise now that these dynamics 
and their implications reflect one of the necessities identified by Choi and Pak (2006) 
in their literature review on transdisciplinarity, to “transcend the disciplinary 
boundaries to look at the dynamics of whole systems” (p. 355), but this discussion 
would take us beyond the scope of this preface. Besides observations of the process, 
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our results can also be traced through the generated artefacts, for example the texts 
written from the angle of multiple disciplines about the shared topic of Cognitive 
Innovation transcending into new knowledge—some of which are collected in this 
special issue of AVANT. 
Cognitive Innovation has been described as a self-referential and incremental pro-
cess that changes itself. Denham and Punt (2017) have given it a functional form, 
mapping the accessible knowledge of the environment, the individual, as well as their 
mental processes through these same mental processes onto themselves. In the first 
Off the Lip in 2015, Blassnigg (2015) linked this to Bergson’s merging of memory and 
image as a “dynamic process within the mind in its constant self-creation in osmosis 
with its enaction in the given environment” (p. 17) As a result, the engagement with 
CogNovo not only changed the knowledge about Cognitive Innovation, but it also 
must have changed the group, changed the individuals involved, and changed the re-
search process itself—a process of Cognitive Innovation as well. In summary, one 
might argue that research is changed by research itself and as such, cannot be 
planned in full at its outset. This leaves the question of how such a dynamic process 
can be understood, not to mention researched? 
 
The GIFT of Improvisation 
Our inspiration for thinking about research in such a dynamic and open setting 
comes from improvisation practice. Improvisation has been described as a vivid 
practice in the arts, which highlights the collaborative settings, openness, ongoing 
exploration, and reinforcement of the creative process. The bases for improvisation 
are curiosity and the embracement of surprise. Improvisation focuses on the process 
rather than the outcome; it welcomes uncertainty and understands progress as a dy-
namic change. Outcomes appear through (and in) the process of doing, without clear 
initial expectations of results. We propose that transdisciplinarity can be understood 
and framed as improvisational research. We consider the following four main prin-
ciples to contribute to this type of research: 
Generosity: Share ideas, constructive criticism, and reflections, to allow 
knowledge and methods to develop, and perspectives to adjust. Share as much 
as you can and be generous enough to acknowledge when the time is not right 
for an idea. Every contribution, from any individual or discipline should be 
considered of equal eligibility. Be curious about their knowledge and methods. 
Interdependence: Use and establish links between partners, research ques-
tions, and solutions from different disciplines. Improving the accessibility of 
your language and ideas reflects a capability to generalise, not to simplify con-
cepts. It allows you to share the perspectives and principles of a discipline, find 
the connections to knowledge from other fields, and establish a common 
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ground with the others. Anticipatory planning cannot account for inputs from 
all participants, instead implement a “rolling ball” strategy and embrace asso-
ciations that allow reshaping ideas. The weight of the influences that shape 
your project will change throughout the different phases of the project. 
Free exploration: Allow time for exploration and experimentation with dif-
ferent approaches. Allow successes and failures to inspire the next step and 
allow input from others as well as coincidences to influence your contribu-
tion. It is important to embrace the risk that comes with this approach. 
Trust: Participation and contribution requires trust. Trust is not built on 
promises, but it needs time and action to grow; trust that everyone is con-
tributing as much as they can. Respect the improvisational space and all in-
dividuals who share it with you, and acknowledge the origin of ideas. 
Improvisational practice does not replace planning and it certainly does not replace 
preparation or research rigour. On the contrary, improvisational time and space re-
quire explicit attention and rigorous planning. Having clear spatial and temporal con-
straints on a collaborative process allows individuals, and the group as a whole, to 
adjust their commitment between sessions according to previous experiences and 
constraints outside the improvisation. These boundaries act as a safety net that al-
lows unconstrained application of the other four principles during improvisation. 
 
GIFT: Current Version 
During CogNovo, the organisation of events changed over time, culminating in this 
year’s Off the Lip 2017. The novel format of a collaborative, feedback-based Off the 
Lip 2017 symposium leading to this special issue was successful beyond our expec-
tations. We invited speakers to come with “almost ready” papers that they would 
consider publishing in this special issue. Once we received all submissions and to 
ensure high quality of feedback, we asked each of the authors to write a response to 
one or two other submissions. During the event, these responses were presented just 
after the papers, before opening the discussion and questions to the whole audience. 
We designed the event as a single track with extended “social time.” These longer 
lunch breaks, shared breakfasts, and evening events served as an informal platform 
to exchange ideas. They emphasised the personal interactions and they also ensured 
that each submission received adequate feedback. The principles of GIFT were im-
plemented inherently and implicitly yet some of them were identified in the discus-
sion with all delegates towards the end of Off the Lip 2017. 
If Cognitive Innovation is, as suggested, the driving force behind the research we 
have practiced within CogNovo, then this practice is not just the result of the 
knowledge of the individuals of the extended network of CogNovo and the environ-
ment we are situated in. It is, at the same time, an aggregated result emerging from 
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all previous events and collaborations, a fleeting temporal manifestation, and a foun-
dation for future iterations. Even through writing and reading this text, we will 
change our and your future practices. Therefore “GIFT Ain’t (Yet) A Manifesto,” but 
we invite you, the reader, to join us in developing the idea further.  
Earlier in this text we articulated the hope that Off the Lip 2017 and these texts will 
not just be the climax of the doctoral training programme CogNovo.eu, but rather 
abeginning. Concretely, we would also like to announce the beginning of the CogNovo 
Foundation. If you enjoy or want to criticise our approach, if you want to engage or 
want to grow these ideas into a “Manifesto,” then please get in contact through our 
website at CogNovo.org. In the meantime, we hope you will find the writings in this 
special issue both an insightful and intriguing input to the next iteration of your pro-
cess of Cognitive Innovation. 
 
Frank Loesche & Klara Łucznik 
with the OTLip17 Committee: 
Susan L. Denham, Hannah Drayson, Kathryn B. Francis, Diego S. Maranan, & Michael Punt 
 
References 
Blassnigg, M. (2015). Creative mind and evolution in Bergson’s philosophy: The self as technol-
ogy. In M. Punt, S. L. Denham, & E. Doove (Eds.), Off the Lip: Transdisciplinary Approaches 
to Cognitive Innovation: Conference proceedings (pp. 11–20). Plymouth, UK: Plymouth 
University. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10026.1/4271 
Choi, B. C. K., & Pak, A. W. P. (2006). Multidisciplinarity, interdisciplinarity and transdiscipli-
narity in health research, services, ducation and policy: 1. Definitions, objectives, and 
evidence of effectiveness. Clinical and Investigative Medicine, 29(6), 351–364. 
Denham, S. L. (2014). Marie meets Leonardo: A perfect match? Leonardo, 47(3). 
doi:10.1162/leon_a_00707. 
Denham, S. L., & Punt M. (2017). Abstract of “Cognitive Innovation: A view from the Bridge.” 
Leonardo, 50(2), 184–185. doi:10.1162/leon_a_01386. 
Maranan, D. S., Loesche F., & Denham, S. L. (2015). CogNovo: Cognitive Innovation for technolog-
ical, artistic, and social domains. In Proceedings of the 21st International Symposium on 
Electronic Art. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10026.1/5076
 
227 
AVANT, Vol. VIII, Special Issue 
ISBN: 978-83-944622-04-6 avant.edu.pl/en 
DOI: 10.26913/80s02017.0111.0021 
 
Dance Improvisational Cognition 
 
Klara Łucznik*  
CogNovo 
Plymouth University, UK 
Klara.Lucznik-@-CogNovo.eu 
Frank Loesche  
CogNovo 
Plymouth University, UK 
 
Received 5 May 2017; accepted 26 September 2017; published 21 November 2017. 
 
Abstract 
Research into group creativity with its dynamic, interpersonal, and multi-perspec-
tive character poses many challenges, among others, how to collect data and capture 
its shared nature. In this paper, we discuss the creative process of an ensemble in 
dance improvisation as an example of vivid and collaborative creative practice. To 
identify aspects of improvisational dance cognition, we designed and applied a video-
stimulated recall approach to capturing the multiple perspectives of the shared cre-
ative process. We tested the method during an improvisational session with dancers, 
showing how the recordings of dancers' thought narratives and internal states might 
be used for studying group creativity. Finally, we presented an audiovisual installa-
tion Between Minds and Bodies that aimed to recreate the dancers’ experience and 
offered immersion into the creative process by accessing individual dancer’s thought 
processes in the improvised performance while watching the dance improvisation. 
Keywords: audiovisual installation; dance; group creativity; improvisation;  
video-stimulated recall method. 
 
Introduction 
In this paper we describe the design and application of a video-stimulated recall ap-
proach for studying group creativity, and an installation that seeks to recreate and 
communicate a group’s shared creative experience to members of the general public. 
To do so, we describe three modules we implemented to annotate and observe the 
creative process in dance improvisation. Each of the three elements “Preparation,” 
“Studio,” and “Installation” can be exchanged and used independently. Here they 
build on one another to provide a conclusive reasoning for decisions we made during 
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the development. Even though we discuss dance improvisation as an example for a 
creative process throughout the paper, we are convinced that this method can be 
applied to a range of tasks and activities to observe and annotate participants’ be-
havior in order to gain a better understanding of their cognitive processes. 
 
Preparation 
In the first part we explain the steps that led to the implementation of the video-
stimulated recall method as well as some technical preparation. 
 
How to Recollect the Creative Process 
Finding a solution or even just an approach to an ill-defined problem often requires 
the exploration of the problem space. One way to understand the cognitive functions 
involved in creative problem solving is to learn more about the involved processes. 
These processes are studied, at least in the domain of creative problem solving, by 
observing divergent thinking as the generation of several intermediate or alterna-
tive solutions, and convergent thinking as the attempt to arrive at a single solution 
(Cropley, 2006). In some cases, finding the solution is accompanied by a Eureka ex-
perience or ‘Aha!’ moment (Bowden, Jung-Beeman, Fleck, & Kounios, 2005). Most 
divergent, convergent, and insightful thinking tasks focus on the outcome and the 
generated product. As a result, they provide snapshots in time through artefacts, but 
they fail to capture the whole process of problem solving.  
Verbal protocols have been shown to provide reliable data about introspection on 
processes (see Fox, Ericsson, & Best, 2011 for a review). Nevertheless, this is not 
viable in group tasks as participants’ verbal reports would influence each other’s 
performance. One way to avoid this is to assess the process after it has finished and 
the solution has been found. However, it is unlikely that the memory of the process 
accurately reflects what happened when solving the problem. Even if people are 
asked immediately after solving a problem, it is difficult for them to recall exactly 
what happened, even more so if they experienced an ‘Aha!’ moment, which has the 
tendency to be the dominant memory of a problem-solving process, potentially 
masking other memories. For example, Danek, Fraps, von Müller, Grothe, and 
Öllinger (2012) showed that people more easily recall magic tricks they discovered 
themselves through an ‘Aha!’ moment than those for which they failed to solve or 
were told the solution. To aid the memory of the problem solvers and help them 
remember the thoughts they had had, Glăveanu and Lahlou (2012) used recordings 
of the process. Video recordings are particularly useful if the problem solving pro-
cess generates artefacts or is accompanied by intermediate output, for example 
writing, movement, or sound. When considering possible tasks, the given problems 
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should be solvable within a limited time for pragmatic reasons regarding observa-
tion and memory recall. Taking these constraints into account and with the aim to 
investigate the creative process in contemporary dance, we decided to observe 
dance improvisation as a vital creative practice in the field of dance. This approach 
makes it possible to capture both the process and the results of the creative process 
at the moment it is created (Sawyer, 1999). 
 
Observing Process 
Improvisation in contemporary dance serves two main purposes: it is an open-form 
performance practice and it is widely used for generating novel movement material 
for choreographic phrases (Carter, 2000). If we consider dance as an ill-defined prob-
lem, improvisation, with its unplanned, open-ended form, gives dancers a chance to 
explore movement beyond habitual patterns; they can discover unknown possibili-
ties and bodily solutions (Forsythe & Haffner, 2012). Creativity in this understanding 
of improvisation is dynamic: the solution for given problems may occur at any time, 
while listening to a task or even after the improvisation is finished, and can be trig-
gered by movements or new problems discovered during the dance. ‘Aha!’ mo-
ments—sudden instances of solving a problem in a creatively successful, coherent 
improvisation piece—come unexpectedly with movement, rather than as a pre-
dis⁠covered idea (Blom & Chaplin, 1988). As dancers commonly use their bodies and 
movement as tools with which to experiment (Kirsh, 2011), new ideas appear 
through dancing while dancers think in a mostly non-propositional way. 
In interviews with dancers about how they improvise, Nakano and Okada (2012) 
show that dancers interact with various stimuli from both internal and external 
sources: they react to imagery, sensations, and feelings that they entertain during the 
performance, as well as to music, space, and their audience. Dancers make movement 
choices by responding to these stimuli and organize their movement extemporarily, 
using techniques such as switching and changing speed, as well as imagining them-
selves from the third person perspective (Nakano & Okada, 2012). Their study gives 
a general understanding of dance improvisation practice; however, it does not exam-
ine the dynamics of the process as it happens as the findings are based on dancers’ 
general recollection and beliefs about their practice. 
In an in-depth analysis of solo performance, De Spain (2003) explored improvisa-
tional cognition using the momentary awareness sampling method in a series of solo 
improvisation sessions with experienced movement improvisers. He recorded mo-
mentary awareness reports by asking improvisers to ‘report now’ what was in the 
front of their mind at random moments of the improvisation. Similarly to Nakano & 
Okada’s (2012) results, he found that improvising awareness could be focused on 
internal sensations, especially proprioception (the feeling from the dancer’s body), 
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mental images related to the body, (like “foot exploring space… have eyeballs in my 
toes”; De Spain, 2003, p. 31), emotional states, or an aesthetic reaction to one’s own 
movement. At the same time, improvisers’ awareness is engaged with the external 
world, which they sense through seeing, hearing, tactical sensations of skin, etc. At-
tention can also manifest as visible movement because of the necessity to direct and 
focus the act of sensing—to turn the head to see or hear in reaction to the surround-
ing environment, etc. Furthermore, De Spain (2003) pointed out the importance of 
memories, especially kinaesthetic ones, which might be echoed in movement 
choices. Finally, the role of awareness of intentionality could be direct (“I’m walk-
ing”) or indirect (“It moved me”), acting as a filter for movement choices and a feed-
back loop regarding the whole process.  
The current research aims to extend De Spain’s (2003) approach beyond the individ-
ual, focusing on dancers’ improvisational cognition as well as the group dynamics in 
a shared creative process of group improvisation. The particular focus on group in-
teraction originates in the social aspect of dance practice, as solitary processes are 
rather unusual in dance creativity in general (Stevens, Fonlupt, Shiffrar, & Decety, 
2000). The exploration in this paper is predominantly experiential, as captured in 
the audiovisual installation Between Minds and Bodies (see section “Installation”); 
however, the methods elaborated through this paper have successfully been de-
ployed in another instance of this project. Qualitative and quantitative studies on 
shared creativity and flow experience in dance improvisation using a similar method 
have been published in Łucznik (2015, 2017). 
 
Studio 
This section consists of three parts: we explain the general setup of the study in “Setup,” 
the second part explains how the process is recorded, and the third demonstrates how 
we gathered feedback from the participants using the video recall method. 
 
Setup 
Group improvisation brings the richness of interactions and interdependence of 
choices made by the dancers within a group. We expected that the distributed char-
acter of practice would shift dancers’ interest from a solo-oriented focus to a collab-
orative, co-creative, and group-oriented process. One of the challenges was to find 
the right way to record the multiple perspectives of the group process. A simple 
ad⁠aptation of De Spain’s (2003) method of talking out loud proved to be unsuccessful 
in group settings, as dancers got distracted and influenced by others’ comments. 
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In the field of ethnography, Glăveanu and Lahlou (2012) explored the use of a sub-
jective camera (subcam) to obtain a first-person audio-visual recording of creative 
action. The collected video material was then used to assess the subjective experi-
ence of the participant through a confrontation interview using excerpts from the 
recording. This approach enabled microscopic, decision-making description of cre-
a⁠tivity at the levels of both process and content. We considered adapting the method 
to document creative processes in dance, but quickly realized that it would be highly 
constrained by the practice. Firstly, dance is a dynamic activity with frequent head 
movements and changes of levels and focus of the field of view. The image obtained 
from a body-mounted camera would be too puzzling to watch and too difficult to in-
terpret. Secondly, dancers rely not only on direct visual cues, but also on peripheral 
vision and other senses like hearing, kinaesthesia, and touch (De Spain, 2003). Fi-
nally, even with the current level of miniaturization of electronic devices, the size of 
available cameras still obstructs and constraints the movement of dancers, particu-
larly in improvisational practice. 
Following up on this, we suggested a video-stimulated recall method (Rowe, 2009) 
to capture dancers’ thought narratives and awareness throughout the dance impro-
v⁠isation. A similar method was used in describing the thinking process underlying 
jazz improvisation (Norgaard, 2001), in which an audiovisual recording of a just fin-
ished improvisation was used as a basis for the interview. While watching the video 
of their performance, musicians were asked to narrate their conscious thoughts, con-
sidering questions such as “Where did that come from?” These works inspired our 
idea of collecting data on participants’ introspection on the creative process through 
verbal protocols (both delayed and outside the group process) and with support for 
the participants’ memories through video-recordings. 
The present adaptation of the video-stimulated recall method is implemented with 
immediate playback. Since we were interested in individual verbal narratives on the 
group process of dance improvisation, we wanted to give our participants the chance 
to play the video recording at their own speed and to pause and resume at will. Ad-
ditionally, we explored the possibility of annotating cognitive states experienced by 
dancers during the improvisation process. For one derived research study, which 
looked into cognitive components that enhance creativity (Łucznik, 2017), we asked 
the participants to report their experience of flow (Csikszentmihalyi, 1975, 1990) 
using this annotating feature. 
The technical setup for the video-stimulated recall method needed to be portable, sim-
ple to apply to a flexible group size, and easy to operate for a single researcher. To pro-
vide the dancers with a familiar interface, we decided to use tablets with an HTML5 
touchscreen interface for the video playback and feedback collection. We used a Wi-Fi 
network and a local web server to quickly transfer the recently recorded video material 
to all connected tablets and collect the participants’ responses in one central location. 
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In our setup, we did the video recording (Figure 1a) with a stationary video camera 
on a tripod with a wide-angle lens, thus capturing all the group’s actions from a third-
person perspective. In this setup we transferred the video recording on an SD memory 
card (Figure 1b) to the computer. A laptop (Figure 1c) that was capable of transcoding 
the videos and running the server software also needed to be set up in the studio. For 
better control over the signal strength and available bandwidth, we chose to provide 
our own portable hotspot (Figure 1d), which gave us full control over network au-
thentication of the laptop and tablet devices. Finally, the browsers on the tablets were 




Figure 1. Schematic setup setup with (a) video source, (b) transport to server, (c) WiFi 
multicast (d) to tablets (e). 
 
Capturing Improvisation 
To capture the creative process in dance improvisation, we invited dancers to take 
part in a workshop. We asked them to engage with several improvisational tasks and 
reflect on their experience using our video-stimulated recall method of the creative 
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process. The improvisation ensemble depicted in the supplemental material con-
sisted of four dancers: Ellen Hunn, Kevin French, Saurav Rai, and Klara Łucznik (one 
of the authors of this paper). In the workshop, the dancers improvised together as a 
group to a score, which provided a starting point for the improvisation (e.g., “Let your 
ears listen to the sounds—of your body, of others, of space. Let your feet sense the 
floor . . . Let all your senses open and lead you for the next few minutes in the dance”). 
Each score lasted around 4–5 minutes and was ended by the experimenter. The im-
provisation was followed by the capture process of the video-stimulated recall pro-
cedure. This procedure was first perceived as unusual, but quickly all dancers got 
used to narrating their process. Moreover, they found the procedure interesting and 
insightful for their own practice.  
The camera recording was started and stopped manually at the beginning and the end 
of the improvised score. Once the recording had stopped, the SD card with the video 
recording was moved to the computer and a prepared computer script was run in or-
der to fulfil two tasks. Firstly, the high-quality video recording was transcoded to a 
low bandwidth stream. Secondly, the script started a web server on the local Wi-Fi 
network. In the first step, the Handbrake1 software transcoded the latest video file 
from the SD card to a stream with a resolution of 640x320 pixels, a quality rating of 18, 
a peak-limited frame rate of 30, and an AAC audio codec with 96kbit/s. The trans-
coding took about a third of the recorded time using an i7 processor (Haswell gener-
ation), for example 1min 30s for a 5-minute improvisation. This step generates a video 
file that could be transmitted to a large number of clients with the given setup, inde-
pendent of the type and setting of the video camera. While the video was transcoding, 
the dancers received tablets with headphones and a short explanation about the next 
step. Through the web application on the tablet, participants had full control of the 
playback of the video stream and were also able to report their state of flow using an 
on–off button. The current position in the video stream and the status of the reported 
flow states were shown on a timeline. These features were implemented in HTML5 
using JavaScript for interactive elements and communication with the server. 
The local web server (implemented using node.js2) on the laptop was able to serve 
the web application and stream the video file simultaneously to multiple clients at 
high-speed while collecting status reports and feedback from the individual parti-
c ⁠ipants. The latter included the status of the video playback; for example, when 
par ⁠ticipants started playback, skipped forward or backwards through the record-
ing, and paused the playback. This information was available for use afterwards to 
                                                                  
1 “HandBrake – The open source video transcoder,” available at https://handbrake.fr/  
(last access: 2017-09-15) 
2 “node.js,” available at https://nodejs.org/en/ (last access: 2017-09-15) 
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syn ⁠chro ⁠nize voice reports with video content. The system also recorded and visual-
ized a single tap on the flow button, which changed the reported flow state at the 
current time in the video from flow to not-flow and vice versa (Figure 2). 
 
 
Using the same programming language for client and server proved to be useful for a 
quick turn-around during the development and prototyping of the video-stimulated 
recall method. Also, using an HTML5-based client deployed from the central we server 
reduced the complexity of the technical setup and the interactions that were neces-
sary from the researcher during the experiment. 
The voice reports were recorded through separate audio recorders. Due to verbal 
communication limitations, one of the dancers, Kevin, provided a detailed recollec-
tion in written form later during the day of the improvisation. Kevin’s condition lim-
its his ability to speak, but he can rely on great memory skills. Since each feedback 
was given individually and video recorded to support the recall process, this change 
of procedure was not expected to influence the outcome of our research interests. 
The video-stimulated procedure for recollecting the creative process and flow states 
was found to be fruitful, as measured in collected narratives of several collaborative 
dance processes that were used to gain further insight into creativity (Łucznik, 2015) 
and the nature of flow experience in dance (Łucznik, 2017). Finally, the method al-
lowed us to collect materials for the audiovisual installation presented below. 
Figure 2. A video simulated recall method—tablet view. 




One recorded instance using the video-stimulated recall method was showcased as 
Between Minds and Bodies during the Off the Lip 2017 event at Plymouth University. 
The video recordings are also available in the supplementary material of this article. 
This section provides a description of this installation. 
 
Between Minds and Bodies 
The audiovisual installation Between Minds and Bodies consists of video materials of an 
improvising dance ensemble accompanied by dancers’ narratives of their creative pro-
cess obtained from an improvisation workshop. In this particular piece of work, our 
interest lies in understanding the creative process in dance through experiencing the 
dancers’ thinking processes in improvised performance. The setup includes a large 
screen and four pairs of headphones. While the group improvisation of the dance en-
semble is presented on the screen, each pair of headphones plays back the voice recall 
of the creative process of a particular dancer, with the other voices playing in the back-
ground at a lower volume. The combination of the screen and the four individual head-
phones allowed the audience to engage with the multi-perspective interactive aspect 
of group creativity. The four different narratives and their combination reveal the co-
agency of dance improvisation in each moment of creation. A spectator has the oppor-
tunity to experience and be immersed in the creative process of any of the dancers at 
any moment during the improvisation, gaining insight into the dancers’ choices, inter-
ests and thoughts, along with the visual output of the group dance. 
 
Watch the installation at: https://doi.org/10.26913/80s02017.0111.0021 
 
As one of the spectators, Aska Sakuta, shared: 
As an intuitive response to this setup, I decided to look at the screen, listen to the sound, 
and walk around, all at once. From the headphones flow multiple streams of conscious-
ness, narrated by different voices, some louder than others. Soon, I start noticing subtle 
consistencies between what is being spoken, and what is being shown on the screen; a 
voice would say “I just lean in,” right as someone on the screen leans on another body, 
and another voice would say “I feel the floor,” as I notice someone's foot sliding across 
the floor. For a moment, I decide to take off the headphones and watch the video on its 
own. Remnants of the voices echo through my consciousness, as I notice some motifs 
that have carried on since they were first presented. I place the headphones back on my 
ears and notice that the narrations have moved on to a completely different theme—my 
attention quickly synchs to the narration, as my eyes start to focus again on what is being 
spoken. This time, however, my body responds to the “movement words” that appear in 
the narration—“entre,” “walk,” “balance,” “rest”—I am seeing, hearing, and doing the 
movements all at once, and I feel as though I am the movers themselves, switching from 
one mover to another, based on the most dominant voice in the recording. 




In this paper we describe an end-to-end approach to identifying salient aspects of 
group creativity by designing a method to capture these aspects. In addition to the 
technical aspects of this process, we also describe a way of sharing these experiences 
with members of the general public in an exhibition. The current research has a 
mostly experiential character of audiovisual installation; the collected material en-
a⁠bles third parties, such as a spectator at the installation or a researcher interested 
in the creative group process, to enter the improvisational process of dancers by en-
gaging with a video recording of improvisation. The multiple perspectives delivered 
through audible layers of dancers’ thoughts from a single group improvisation reveal 
the complexity and interdependency of a creative group process. 
The video-stimulated recall method presented in this paper might be used in the wider 
context of group dynamic research. We suggest using this method if participants’ in-
trospection on processes is of interest. In particular, the video-stimulated recall 
method has shown to be useful for processes that are accommodated by the generation 
of intermediate artefacts (Łucznik, 2015, 2017). Tablets offer an easy to administer and 
time-economic way of capturing the experience and internal states of group members. 
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Response to “Dance Improvisational Cognition” by Eugenia Stamboliev 
 
The paper provides a very thoughtful insight into its research interests and the chal-
lenges of understanding creative dance practice, especially in the context of impro-
v⁠isation and group creativity. It points to the difficulties of recording or explaining 
the creative and often embodied process of dance improvisation. As such, dance im-
provisation is considered an expressive bodily enactment that does not follow a pre-
planned choreography (Nakano & Okada, 2012); therefore, it can only be discussed 
post-practice in the form of a reflection on movement.  
The paper does well in positioning the viewer in the process of dance improvisation 
practice. However, the paper’s understanding of the observing viewer of the dance 
practice could gain from the valuable perspective of the ‘participatory observer’ pro-
vided by anthropology (Jorgensen, 2015), since this position is not a neutral one, but 
interferes with the observed dance improvisation. 
The paper unravels issues with first-person video recording of dance practices as a 
method of exploration and suggests, with reasonable arguments, why ‘video-recall 
methods’ could be a better way to research the process of improvisation.  
The only major problem I see (and I assume the authors also do) is that the verbali-
zation of a non-verbal, embodied process constitutes an issue for many artists or cre-
ative practitioners. Asking dancers about their post-practice and rationalized 
movements could lead to a blurry, and maybe inflated explanation of a process that 
in fact seems less cognitive or rational and much more embodied and non-verbal.  
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Abstract 
With advances in research environments and the accompanying increase in the 
complexity of research projects, the range of skills required to carry out research 
calls for an increase in interdisciplinary and collaborative work. CogNovo, a doc-
toral training program for 25 PhD students, provided a unique opportunity to ob-
serve and analyze collaborative processes. We propose a process-oriented 
framework for understanding research collaborations along two dimensions: in-
terpersonal and project-related. To illustrate the utility of this process-oriented 
framework, we apply the framework matrix to several collaborations that emerged 
within the CogNovo program. The framework that we introduce has several ad-
vantages over existing metrics. Firstly, we offer a process-oriented—as opposed to 
product-oriented—evaluation of interdisciplinary and collaborative endeavors. 
Secondly, we propose a means of assessment that preserves the distinctive profile 
(or “fingerprint”) of a given collaborative project, thus capturing the uniqueness of 
each project and its environment. 
Keywords: collaboration fingerprint; collaborative frame⁠work; group work; 
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With achievements increasingly arising from teamwork, “collaboration” has ac-
quired a vital role in organizational, educational, and research contexts (Larivière, 
Gingras, Sugimoto, & Tsou, 2014). In particular, research collaboration has received 
increased attention, with many leading institutions arguing that complex contem-
porary issues (such as health, environment, and mobility) require solutions that 
combine insights from different disciplines (National Academies, 2005; as cited in 
van Rijnsoever & Hessels, 2011). The complex nature of these issues increasingly 
necessitates that knowledge and solutions can be combined from multiple disci-
plines (Buanes & Jentoft, 2009). Research collaboration has been described in vari-
ous contexts and by various approaches, with a lack of consensus over its definition; 
this is why it is often defined under the umbrella term “collaboration” (Bukvova, 
2010). What “interdisciplinary collaboration” entails has remained particularly un-
clear (Huutoniemi, Klein, Bruun, & Hukkinen, 2010). 
Nevertheless, a common theme among various collaborations is that they involve en-
gagement and interaction between two or more people at one time or repeatedly, in 
order to achieve a common goal (Patel, Pettitt, & Wilson, 2012). Identifying which fac-
tors constitute “successful” interdisciplinary, multidisciplinary, or transdisciplinary1 
collaboration and what participating members can do to nurture these is “of signifi-
cant theoretical interest” (Mansilla, Boix, Lamont, & Sato, 2012, p. 2). Beyond theory, 
shedding light on this “black box” (Kurtzberg & Amabile, 2001) has also become an 
increasing priority for funding bodies and research in industry (Mansilla et al., 2012). 
How to operationalize research collaboration is a topic of debate (Katz & Martin, 
1997). Various approaches have been adopted in order to evaluate research collab-
orations, including bibliometrics, interviews, observations, experiments, and social 
network analysis (Groboljšek, Ferligoj, Mali, Kronegger, & Iglič, 2014). Measuring 
publications through co-authorship evaluation, where publications become the ul-
timate indicator for collaboration success, is particularly common (Bukvova, 2010). 
More specifically, the mean number of authors per paper (termed the “Collaborative 
Index”, Lawani, 1980; as cited in Savanur & Srikanth, 2010), the proportion of multi-
authored papers (termed the “Degree of Collaboration”, Subramanyam, 1983), or a 
combination of these (termed the “Collaboration Coefficient”; Ajiferuke, Burrel, & 
Tague, 1988) have been used as metrics to assess the scope of collaboration across 
fields or disciplines (Savanur & Srikanth, 2010). However, an important point that 
is often overlooked is that not all research collaborations result in co-authored pub-
lications, nor are all co-authorships born out of collaborations (Bukvova, 2010). 
                                                                  
1 Although often used interchangeably or without clear definition (Lawrence, 2010), here we adopt the 
following definitions. Interdisciplinarity “unites” and “synthesises” links between disciplines to form a 
“coherent whole,” multi-disciplinarity draws on information from multiple disciplines but stays within 
disciplinary limits, and transdisciplinarity brings disciplines together in new contexts and transcends ex-
isting disciplinary boundaries (Choi & Pak, 2006, p. 351). Of course, these categories are not always mu-
tually exclusive given the complexity of many research projects (Klein, 2008). 
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In addition, the publication of interdisciplinary research appears to be more diffi-
cult, resulting in a lower number of interdisciplinary publications and co-author-
ships. Bruce, Lyall, Tait, and Williams (2004) identify the lack of opportunities to 
publish interdisciplinary results in high-ranking journals as a discouraging factor to 
work on interdisciplinary topics. 
Evaluating collaborations using product-based approaches, in which outputs of col-
laborations (i.e., co-authorships) are accepted as indicators of collaboration success, 
has the advantage of using easily accessible and measurable data (see Groboljšek 
et al., 2014, for a review). However, these approaches often undervalue the im-
portance of the collaboration process. In their literature review, Aboelela et al. 
(2007) explored the different views on interdisciplinarity in order to compose a 
theoretical definition of interdisciplinary research. Key components of interdiscipli-
nary research from the literature included: covering qualitatively different research 
disciplines; creating a continuum of collaboration which varies from brief commu-
nications to mutual integration; establishing a platform for cooperation, interaction, 
communication, and sharing. In fact, this latter component is considered critical in 
the majority of interdisciplinarity definitions (Aboelela et al., 2007). As such, a pro-
cess-based framework, which focuses on what Callard and Fitzgerald call the “cho-
reography” (2015, p. 80) of cooperation and integration between group members, 
could offer valuable insights for understanding and evaluating research collabora-
tions. Therefore, while we cannot deny the value of collaborative outputs, in the 
present paper, we focus on the process of collaboration and the dynamics of inter-
disciplinary integration. We interpret examples of collaborations within the same 
organization on two dimensions: interpersonal and project-based. To capture and 
evaluate these collaborations, we propose a process-focused matrix. We present 
several example studies of collaborations that were fostered within the interdisci-
plinary CogNovo project2 (Maranan, Loesche, & Denham, 2015), and demonstrate 
how collaboration success can be analyzed by exposing the processes that occurred 
during collaborative work. 
 
Process-Oriented Framework 
The current framework incorporates observable indicators of collaborations 
through two main strands: 1) Interpersonal dimension: how the social dynamics, as 
well as the individual research interests and contributions, shape group collabora-
tions. 2) Project dimension: what specific project tasks and steps need to be com-
pleted in order to reach an outcome. Field knowledge, skills, and project commitment 
are integral to this dimension.  
                                                                  
2 CogNovo is an interdisciplinary doctoral training program jointly funded by the Marie Skłodowska Curie 
Actions and Plymouth University, comprising a network of diverse researchers from various disciplines, 
including Psychology, Computational Neuroscience, Robotics, Arts and Humanities.  
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Of course, any given collaboration will have external conditions for success driven 
by institutional contexts (Mansilla et al., 2012). The conventions and expectations 
of both academic fields and funding organizations will inevitably contribute to the 
collaborative environment and both the interpersonal and project dimensions of 
any given project. The institutional context initiates, supports, and funds the collab-
orations and thus has a significant impact on the overall success of the collaborative 
endeavor. The examples described in the present paper include projects that were 
all completed within the same institutional contexts. As such, at the end of this paper 
we offer suggestions on how the process-oriented framework might be extended 
and adapted to take into account other institutional contexts. 
 
Interpersonal Dimension 
Within our process-oriented framework, the interpersonal aspect of a collaboration 
can arise in three different ways: 1) Mutual collaborations: every participant con-
tributes to the collaboration equally and the contribution from different disciplines 
is weighted equally. Collaboration results in similar outcomes for all involved disci-
plines. 2) Assisted collaborations: the project is led by one discipline and collabora-
tors from other disciplines assist by providing specific knowledge. Collaboration 
results in progress in the main discipline. 3) Emergent collaborations: these collab-
orations do not require a specific domain knowledge. Collaboration may occur on a 
primarily social or pragmatic level (e.g., departmental colleagues organizing a re-
search seminar series) involving no particular discipline, or the collaboration may 
result in progress in a new (or emergent) discipline.  
 
Project Dimension 
All collaborations involve a project dimension, where certain tasks must be accom-
plished in order to achieve the desired outcomes. This dimension involves coordi-
nation between the participants’ knowledge of domain(s) and relevant skills. For 
the projects evaluated within CogNovo, we identified the following primary steps: 
1) Objective & Research Question: formulating objectives and research questions; 
2) Experiment: formulating and/or carrying out methods; 3) Analysis: formulating 
and/or carrying out analyses; 4) Communication: formulating and/or carrying out 
dissemination strategies to communicate collaboration outputs (e.g., writing pa-
pers). Even within the same context, these steps will have different importance and 
may even be skipped entirely depending on the implementation, aim, and success 
of the project. Importantly, although stages are described linearly here, the reitera-
tive and adaptive transfer from one stage to another can be both dynamic and un-
predictable. For example, it is likely that project objectives and research questions 
will be frequently revisited and revised at multiple times during a project lifecycle.  
(Not So) Dangerous Liaisons: A Framework for Evaluating Collaborative Research Projects 
 
171 
Process-Oriented Framework Scheme 
According to the process-oriented framework, each collaboration can be evaluated 
through the interpersonal and project dimensions on a point-based system. We pro-
pose that the four stages of a project should be measured independently. In the first 
stage, Objective & Research Question, a research question is generated and a method 
is explored (and potentially tested). If the research question derives from and seeks 
to fill a gap in literature in two or more distinct domains, the collaboration can be 
seen as mutual. Instead, if the gap can be filled by applying knowledge or a method 
from one of the involved domains, the collaboration is assisted. Finally, if several re-
searchers identify a potentially interesting topic outside of all their domains and cre-
ate a question and method to answer it, the collaboration could be classified as 
emergent. Each project stage can be simultaneously mutual, assisted, and emergent 
to different degrees. An initial scoring of the project can be done in accordance with 
these three categories: we suggest that the sum of the categories for each row should 
be 100%. For example, if a participant wants to express that a project was ⅔ mutual, 
⅓ assisted, and not emergent at all, (s)he would score it as 67% mutual, 33% as-
sisted, and 0% emergent. 
The second stage, Experiment, includes any kind of data collection that contributes to 
answering the questions identified in the first stage. This type of data collection can 
be either grounded or contribute to several domains, and therefore it can be catego-
rized as mutual. If the methodology is borrowed from one domain to address the data 
collection from a second one, this could be classified as assisted. Finally, if the method 
is taken from another line of work in which all participating researchers have only 
lay-people knowledge, this project would lay in the emergent collaboration category. 
The third stage, Analysis, involves any kind of data processing that transforms the 
data collected in the previous stage into knowledge of some kind. The analysis may 
be driven by conventions prescribed by a single discipline. For example, in the sci-
ences, both quantitative and qualitative methods could be applied at this stage, while 
in the humanities historical methods might be adopted, and in philosophy, concep-
tual analysis might be favored. It is also possible for the analysis to incorporate ana-
lytical procedures that combine several disciplinary approaches or that construct 
approaches that transcend traditional methods bound by a single discipline. Note 
that the rule of distributing 100% across the three columns also applies here. 
At the final stage, Communication, results are communicated to others through vari-
ous ways such as poster presentations, talks, papers, or even through chats and other 
forms of informal conversation. If a journal covers two or more research areas that 
the project is situated within, the communication can be seen as mutual. Instead, if 
the results are communicated at a specific conference but calling for support from a 
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different domain, this communication would belong to the assisted category. Finally, 
communications such as open science, code repositories, or public engagements 
events, are considered primarily as belonging to the emergent category. 
In parallel and independent of the measures collected for each stage, the importance 
(or weight) of the stage itself can also be rated. For a project that aims to generate 
new research questions, the main focus might be on the first and, to a lesser extent, 
on the fourth stage. For projects that focus on novel analysis of existing data, the sec-
ond and third stage would receive more weight. The four stages cover the lifecycle of 
a project, thus the sum across all stages is 100%. For example, if all stages have a 
similar weight, then they would each receive 25%. An alternative to rating weights 
in hindsight is the amendment of stage weights based on the project aims. 
Table 1 illustrates an example of this matrix system. In this case, the first step has al-
most ⅓ of the overall weight (30%). This project has no experimental aspect, thus the 
data collection method is not considered a valuable contribution by the collaborators. 
Likewise, the analysis plays only a small role (10%). On the other hand, the commu-
nication of the results is rated as the most important part of this project and received 
a 60% weight in the overall rating. Based on this intuitive rating, an overall rating of 
41% mutual, 15% assisted, and 44% emergent could be calculated for this project.  
 




Mutual Assisted Emergent 
Objective & Research Questions 30 70 30  
Experiment  (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) 
Analysis 10 20 60 20 
Communication  60 30 0 70 
Overall rating  41 15 44 
  
(Not So) Dangerous Liaisons: A Framework for Evaluating Collaborative Research Projects 
 
173 
CogNovo Project Collaboration Examples 
 
Example 1: “Bisensorial” (Hack the Brain 2016 Hackathon). 
 
Collaborators: Diego Maranan, Agi Haines, Jack McKay Fletcher, Sean Clarke, Kim 
Jensen, Ricardo Mutuberria 
Disciplines: Design, Music, Cognitive Neuroscience, Computer Science, Psychology, Arts 
Objective & research questions: Ideate and prototype a “hack” based on the event 
theme, “Hacking yourself for better or for worse,” that maximizes the skills of the 
participants and the resources available during the hackathon. 
Result of design experiments: A working proof-of-concept of a wearable, neuro-
adaptive, vibroacoustic therapeutic device. 
Communication: Presented at Hack the Brain 2016 event; exhibited at Off the 
Lip 2016 public engagement event, Bizarre Bazaar; exhibited at the Cognition Insti-
tute Conference; to be presented at the Ars Electronica STARTS event; discussed in 
PhD thesis (Maranan, 2017). 
Collaboration type:  
Table 2. Evaluation of Bisensorial Project. 
 Weight 
Classification 
Mutual Assisted Emergent 
Objective & Research Questions 50 80 15 5 
Experiment 35 30 70 0 
Analysis  (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) 
Communication  15 75 25 0 
Overall rating  64.25 33 2.75 
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Example 2: BRAMZ (Because youR BrAin MatterZ)  
 
Disciplines: Psychology, Linguistics, Human-Computer Interaction 
Collaborators: Ilaria Torre, Frank Loesche, Kathryn Francis, Raluca Briazu, David 
Bridges 
Objective & research questions: The main aim of this project was to develop per-
sonality measurements through games. Specifically, to build a mobile phone applica-
tion in order to implement the games and collect data from experiment participants.  
Experiment: Prototypical implementation during Computational Modelling workshop 
Analysis: No analysis was conducted. 
Communication: Grant application for the “StudentshIP Enterprise Awards 2014.” 
Collaboration type: 
 




Mutual Assisted Emergent 
Objective & Research Questions 30 70 30 0 
Experiment 10 20 60 20 
Analysis  (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) 
Communication 60 30 0 70 
Overall Rating  41 15 44 
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Example 3: Impasse in Conversations 
 
Disciplines: Linguistics, Psychology 
Collaborators: Ilaria Torre, Frank Loesche 
Objective & research questions: Analyze creative problem solving in social inter-
action, in focusing in particular on how impasses are overcome in conversation.  
Experiment: Choice of conversations, data collection not part of the project. 
Analysis: Conversation analysis on freely available corpus of spontaneous conversa-
tions. 
Communication: paper in Creativity: Theories-Research-Applications Journal (Torre & 
Loesche, 2016); Poster presentation at UK Creativity 2017 Conference (Edinburgh) 
Collaboration type: 
 




Mutual Assisted Emergent 
Objective & Research Questions 35 80 0 20 
Experiment 20 30 50 20 
Analysis 20 50 30 10 
Communication 25 70 0 30 
Overall Rating  61.5 16 20.5 
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Example 4: Distorted Dimensions 
 
Disciplines/fields: Social Psychology, Cognitive Psychology, Philosophy, Art & Design 
Collaborators: Kathryn Francis, Agi Haines, Raluca Briazu 
Objective & research questions: Using moral psychology as a case study, we ex-
plored the importance of incorporating considerations from design research into the 
development of testing tools in the experimental sciences. We further considered 
how the process of “making” might be utilized as a collaborative tool, nurturing suc-
cessful interdisciplinary endeavors. 
Experiments/outputs/results: An interactive and life-like testing tool was con-
structed and incorporated in an existing moral decision-making experiment.  
Communication: (a) Data were collected during an interactive installation with 
members of the public at OTLip16. (b) The data collected were incorporated into a 
scientific publication (Francis et al., 2017). (c) A conference paper exploring the use 
of “thinking through making” as an interdisciplinary collaborative tool was pre-
sented at OTLip17 (Francis et al., 2017. 
Collaboration type: 
 




Mutual Assisted Emergent 
Objective & Research Questions 19 38 32 30 
Experiment 29 48 33 19 
Analysis 21 40 30 30 
Communication 31 42 20 38 
Overall Rating  43 28 29 
  




Research contributions from large and diverse research groups play a key role in the 
solution of complex societal problems (Buanes & Jentoft, 2009). Encouraging collab-
oration between various disciplines results in the sharing of domain-specific 
knowledge, but also in the emergence of new knowledge (De Stefano, Giordano, & 
Vitale, 2011), thus providing novel solutions for unresolved age-old problems. Yet, 
what entails “successful” interdisciplinary collaboration has largely remained un-
clear (Huutoniemi et al., 2010). 
To date, existing attempts to evaluate the impact of interdisciplinary research col-
labo⁠rations have sought to assess product-based outcomes, primarily considering co-
au⁠thorship as a marker of success (Savanur & Srikanth, 2010). Although these product-
based approaches have allowed researchers to accurately quantify the impact of vari-
ous disciplines within a collaboration (e.g., Groboljšek et al., 2014), they often overlook 
process-based markers of success. This is significant given that definitions of success-
ful interdisciplinary collaborations encompass process-based considerations including 
mutual integration, cooperation, communication, and sharing (Aboelela et al., 2007).  
In the current research, we formulated a novel framework for evaluating, as well as 
summarizing, research collaborations. By establishing a process-based framework, 
we have contributed to the literature by complementing the product-based ap-
proaches to evaluating collaborations. By generating a collaborative “fingerprint” for 
each project, the present process-oriented framework allows researchers to examine 
the interdisciplinary dynamics within a research group. This is significant for several 
reasons. Firstly, we can shed light on the “black box” that surrounds the understand-
ing of collaborative processes (Kurtzberg & Amabile, 2001). Secondly, we can use the 
process-based fingerprint to identify which group dynamics and which types of col-
laboration are more likely to succeed. This might be done by uniting our metric with 
product-based markers for success and/or measures of researcher satisfaction.  
When considering the institutions, organizations, and funding bodies that support 
these collaborative endeavors, it is important to note that the collaboration examples 
described in the present paper were supported by the same institution and, as such, 
were fostered within the same organizational context. In order to extend our pro-
cess-oriented framework, we suggest that future research should embrace the flexi-
bility of the stages that we propose, adapting the metric to reflect the aims and 
constraints of their own organizational and institutional contexts.  
Overall and through a detailed look at several collaboration examples that took 
place within the CogNovo project, we have developed a process-based approach for 
understanding both the interpersonal and project dimensions of interdisciplinary 
collaborations. Specifically, we have demonstrated that each collaboration is subject 
to different priorities and pressures. Thus, individual projects can display a unique 
Pinar Oztop, Frank Loesche, Diego S. Maranan, Kathryn B. Francis, Vaibhav Tyagi, & Ilaria Torre 
 
178 
combination of interpersonal dynamics and project tasks. Our process-oriented 
framework and evaluation matrix might be utilized not only to evaluate and provide 
building ingredients for successful interdisciplinary research collaborations, but 
also to quantify the impact of these collaborations beyond product-based metrics. 
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Abstract 
Divergent thinking as a creative ability and perceptual switching between different 
interpretations of an unchanging stimulus (known as perceptual multistability) are 
thought to rely on similar processes. In the current study, we investigate to what 
extent task instructions and inherent stimulus characteristics influence partici-
pants' responses. In the first experiment, participants were asked to give as many 
interpretations for six images as possible. In the second experiment, participants 
reported which of two possible interpretations they saw at any moment for the 
same line drawings. From these two experiments, we extracted measures that al-
low us direct comparison between tasks. Results show that instructions have a 
large influence over the perception of images traditionally used in two different 
paradigms and that these images can be perceived in appropriate ways for both 
tasks. In addition, we suggest that the connection between the two phenomena can 
be explored interchangeably through three experimental manipulations: a) using 
a common set of images across both experiments, b) giving different task instruc-
tions for the two tasks, and c) extracting comparable metrics from both experi-
mental paradigms. 








Every day people face situations for which new ways of seeing and thinking are nec-
essary or at least beneficial. How are they able to arrive at these novel interpreta-
tions? Here we explore two approaches to answer this question: investigating 
creative problem solving (novel ways of reaching a goal) and perceptual switching 
(different ways of interpreting the environment). We also investigate their connec-
tion through homogeneous measurements. 
Creative problem solving refers to the process of generating original and appropriate 
responses to reach a goal. The ability of divergent production (the generation of 
many possible solutions), which is instrumental to creative problem solving (see 
Guilford, 1967), can be assessed in numerous ways (Runco & Pritzker, 2011, p. 548). 
Generally, in divergent thinking tasks people are instructed to generate as many 
ideas as possible for visual or verbal stimuli. The number of generated distinct ideas 
provides a measurement of fluency or flexibility and is thought to reflect the ability 
to mentally restructure the stimulus. 
On the other hand, consider ambiguous images such as Jastrow's bistable duck–
rab ⁠bit (Jastrow, 1900, p. 295): people first perceive one of the interpretations, then 
after prolonged viewing the second interpretation is perceived, after which percep-
tion alternates between the two interpretations of “duck” and “rabbit” (Leopold & 
Logo⁠the⁠tis, 1999; Long & Toppino, 2004). The phenomenon of switching between 
alternative interpretations of ambiguous images is generally known as multistable 
perception, or as bistable perception if only two interpretations are possible 
(Leo⁠pold & Logothetis, 1999). Multistability is considered to involve restructuring 
the interpretations of the ambiguous stimulus at higher levels of cognitive processing 
(Long & Toppino, 2004; Sterzer & Kleinschmidt, 2007). 
Both divergent thinking and perceptual switching tasks attempt to measure the influ-
ence of perceptual and mental restructuring and are therefore thought to rely on sim-
ilar processes (Schooler & Melcher, 1995). Phenomenologically, switching between 
different representations in divergent thinking tasks and different interpretations of 
an ambiguous image have been described as similar human experiences since the early 
20th century by Gestalt theories (Duncker, 1963). Researchers interested in creative 
problem solving and multistability have been both hunting for and haunted by ambi-
guity for a long time. However, the commonalities between creative problem solving 
and perceptual switching have predominantly been observed anecdotally. Only a few 
studies have empirically investigated the relationship between the two phenomena. 
Wiseman, Watt, Gilhooly, and Georgiou (2011) provided empirical support for the 
connection between perceptual switching and divergent thinking or, in general, cre-
ative ability: participants who reported that they could switch more easily to the sec-
ond interpretation of the Jastrow duck–rabbit image also rated themselves as being 
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more artistically creative and better creative problem solvers. They also found a 
strong correlation between self-reported ease of perceptual switching and categori-
cal flexibility measured with a single item unusual uses task. Following up on these 
results, Doherty and Mair (2012) found that fluency for written responses measured 
with the Pattern Meanings task (Wallach & Kogan, 1965, p. 33) is positively corre-
lated with the number of switches in perceptual multistability tasks (duck–rabbit, 
vase–face, Necker cube). The authors speculated that the same executive control 
mechanisms may be involved in perceptual switching and divergent production, 
therefore the relationship is worth exploring further. 
The effect of ambiguous visual stimuli on divergent thinking was also investigated by 
Wu, Gu, and Zhang (2016) and Laukkonen and Tangen (2017). In both studies, am-
biguous and non-ambiguous images were presented before a creativity task (i.e., an 
alternative uses task or insight problem, respectively). The results of both studies 
showed that participants could generate a significantly higher number of solutions 
in the creativity task if they saw an ambiguous figure instead of an unambiguous im-
age. This was interpreted as evidence that ambiguous images facilitate creative ideas, 
possibly due to the fact that both involve resolving conflicting sensory input. 
The three studies by Wiseman et al. (2011), Wu et al. (2016), and Laukkonen and 
Tangen (2017) show that performance in creative problem solving and perceptual 
switching tasks are related and can even influence each other. However, it is hard to 
accommodate results across tasks and studies that use different measures of diver-
gent thinking and multistable perception. 
In this study, we took images regularly used in divergent thinking and bistable percep-
tion tasks and explored whether the way they were administered affected participants' 
performance. Specifically, we investigated whether the images from the two paradigms 
led to similar temporal measures when administered in divergent thinking and per-
ceptual switching conditions. To explore this hypothesis, we used images from a diver-
gent thinking task, namely the Pattern Meaning task by Wallach and Kogan (1965), and 
compared participants' task performance with ambiguous visual stimuli such as duck–
rabbit, mouse–man, donkey–seal, which are widely used in bistable research (see 
Wimmer, Doherty, & Collins, 2011). Finally, additional temporal measurements were 
extracted from the computerized divergent thinking and bistable perception tasks. 
With this study, we aim to investigate to what extent task instructions and inherent 
stimulus characteristics influence participants' responses. Specifically, we ask 
whether the connection between the two phenomena can be investigated inter-
changeably by observing three experimental manipulations: a) using a shared set of 
images in both tasks, b) giving different task instructions, and c) extracting compa-
rable metrics from both experimental paradigms. We also aim to contribute to the 
growing literature of empirical investigations of the relationship between divergent 
thinking and multistable perception. 
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In the first experiment, we explored whether images taken from bistable perception 
tasks, which are typically considered to have two interpretations, can trigger more 
interpretations, similarly to the images used in the divergent thinking tasks. There-
fore, we presented images from divergent thinking and perceptual switching tasks 
to a group of participants and asked them to generate as many interpretations as 
possible. This is a typical administration of a divergent thinking task in creativity re-
search, for example in Wallach and Kogan (1965). 
In the second experiment, participants were presented with the same set of images 
in a perceptual switching task. In this case, participants were asked for an initial in-
terpretation of one image, then shown two possible interpretations and later asked 
to continuously report their perception for 120 seconds. This is a setup typically em-
ployed in bistability experiments. We examined whether perceptual switching dy-
namics differed depending on the origin of the images. 
In addition, we explored ways of directly comparing results from the two experi-
ments. Besides the measurements which are normally used, we recorded the time 
participants took to generate the first answer in the divergent thinking experiment. 
This is similar to the concept of an initial reaction time, which is often used in the 
analysis of perceptual switching tasks, i.e., the time taken to report the first interpre-
tation by button press. An additional measurement was the first phase duration, 
which denotes the time it took participants to name their first solution in the diver-
gent thinking task and the time until they gave the first interpretation in the percep-
tual switching task. We were interested to see to what extent these two variables 
were similar for the same image between experiments. 
 
Experiment 1: Divergent Thinking 
 
Participants 
Six postgraduate students aged between 25 and 48 years (mean = 37.17, SD = 8.06) 
participated (self-reported gender: 1 female, 3 males, 2 unspecified). 
 
Materials and Procedure 
Six different images were used, three of them taken from the Pattern Meaning task 
by Wallach and Kogan (1965), and three frequently used in bistable perception tasks 
(see Figure 1). 





The setup of the computerized task for each image consisted of the following three 
stages: “instruction,” “task,” and “break.” During the “instruction” stage, participants 
were told that they should give “as many answers as [they] can” for each of the stim-
uli and that there were no correct or incorrect answers. Each of the six images was 
presented for 120 seconds, during which time participants reported their interpre-
tations. This was followed by a self-paced “break.” 
For this exploratory study, fluency was chosen as one of the main measures as used 
in the Pattern Meaning task and other divergent thinking tasks because it can be 
scored objectively for any sample size. Participants’ verbal responses were recorded 
and later transcribed along with the start and end time of each answer. Fluency was 
extracted as the number of responses generated during the 120 seconds of the “task,” 
the initial reaction time (the response time 𝑡1 from the start of the task until a partic-
ipant gave the first answer) and the first phase duration (the time participants main-
tained their first interpretation). 
 
 
Figure 1. Images used in the two experiments; top row: duck–rabbit, man–
mouse, seal–donkey; center row: oven–people, street map–flag pole, spar-
kling magic wand–flower; bottom row: disambiguated image for oven, am-
biguous oven–people, disambiguated image for group of people. 




Fluency as the number of generated ideas is summarized in Figure 2. All participants 
were able to produce two or more distinct interpretations for each stimulus. The av-
erage fluency per participant across all six tasks was between 4.17 and 8.33 and the 
initial answer was produced between 1.67 < 𝑡1 < 8.46 seconds after task start. The 
average fluency for images from divergent thinking tasks across all participants 
(mean = 6.50, SD = 2.31) was very similar to the average for images from perceptual 
switching tasks (mean = 6.44, SD = 3.17). 
 
Experiment 2: Perceptual Switching 
Participants 
Six participants (five females, one male), aged between 27 and 33 years (mean = 30.17, 
SD = 2.32) participated. 
Materials and Procedure 
The same six images used in Experiment 1 were presented in a computerized percep-
tual switching condition (see Figure 1). A sequence of stages was administered for each 
image: “initial interpretation,” “disambiguation,” “training,” “task,” and “break.” 
Figure 2. Number of solutions for each stimulus. The six stimuli are displayed 
on the x-axis and the number of solutions is displayed on the y-axis. Each of 
the boxes span from the first to the third quartile of the distribution of fluency; 
the thick line represents the median. 
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Initially, participants were asked to write down their “initial interpretation" of the im-
age. To disambiguate each line drawing from the Pattern Meaning task, the two most 
frequent interpretations from another study were visualized (see Figure 1). During 
the “disambiguation,” these were used to instruct participants which interpretations 
of the images they should report. For example, participants who saw the image at the 
bottom center of Figure 1 were instructed to switch between the “oven” (bottom left) 
and “people” (bottom right) interpretation. In the self-paced “training,” pressing one 
of the two defined keys on the computer keyboard showed the corresponding disam-
biguation on screen. During the 120 seconds of the “task,” the states of the two keys 
were recorded continuously. The start and end times for each button press served as 
the basis to calculate variables such as phase duration (the length of time during 
which one interpretation is sustained), first phase durations and initial reaction times. 
At the end of each sequence of stages, participants had self-paced “breaks.” 
 
Results 
The first phase durations for each stimulus are displayed in Figure 3. The two interpre-
tations were generally well balanced (Moreno-Bote, Shpiro, Rinzel, & Rubin, 2010) for 
all six images, suggesting that participants perceived equally the two interpretations 
for each image. This shows that perceptual switching can be experienced in response 
to images taken from divergent thinking tasks if participants are instructed to do so.  
 
Results: Shared Measures from Experiment 1 and 2 
Figure 3. The average phase duration for each interpretation of each stimu-
lus. The phase duration (in seconds) is displayed on the y-axis, while the in-
terpretations of the stimuli are displayed on the x-axis. 
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In addition to the separate analysis of the two experiments, we explored a direct ex-
perimental connection between divergent thinking and perceptual switching. For ex-
ample, we extracted the initial reaction time and the first phase durations for each 
image from both experiments. 
The initial reaction times of all participants for each of the six images is shown sepa-
rately for the two experiments in Figure 4. Comparing the same image across the two 
experiments seems to indicate that the instructions influenced the time it took par-
ticipants to generate an answer. Specifically, the initial reaction time in the divergent 
thinking tasks was generally shorter (median = 2.98 s) than in the perceptual switch-
ing task (median = 3.44 s), even though the data collected does not provide enough 
evidence to suggest a significant difference. Moreover, Figure 4 provides no indica-
tion that the initial reaction times for the three images taken from the Pattern Mean-
ing task are different from the images taken from the perceptual switching tasks. 
Nevertheless, Figure 4 seems to show that some images elicit a longer time until the 
first interpretation in both experiments (e.g., pole–street), while other images (e.g., 
oven–group of people) cause shorter reaction times in both experiments. 
 
 
Figure 4. Distributions of the initial reaction times for each of the six images, 
separately for the two experiments. 
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Figure 5 displays the first phase duration for each image across all participants and 
experiments. It also seems to indicate that the first phase duration for some images 
is short for both experiments (e.g., donkey–seal and duck–rabbit) while participants 
maintain the first interpretation for a longer time for line drawings (e.g., street map–
flag pole). Overall, the first phase duration for the divergent thinking task in Experi-
ment 1 is shorter (median = 1.71 s) than for the perceptual switching task in Experi-
ment 2 (median = 2.52 s). 
 
Discussion 
The aim of the current study was to explore the connection between divergent think-
ing and perceptual switching. To investigate this, we collected a set of images previ-
ously used in divergent thinking or perceptual switching tasks. We then observed to 
what extent this combined set of images can be used in each of the original tasks. 
Moreover, we aimed to investigate whether participants' responses could indicate 
whether the original source of the image had an impact on the results. This would 
allow us to identify whether, except for the instructions, there are inherent charac-
teristics that differentiate the two sources of images. 
In the first experiment, images taken from divergent thinking and perceptual switch-
ing paradigms were presented to participants as typically done in divergent thinking 
tasks, while in the second experiment the same images were presented as typically 
done in perceptual switching tasks. The influence of instructions in the two tasks can 
Figure 5. Distribution of the first phase duration for each of the six images, 
separately for the two experiments. 
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be observed, for example, when we compare the initial reaction times and first phase 
durations for the same image from the two experiments. For both measures the re-
sults showed that instructions lead to different results based on the two tasks that 
participants were instructed to complete. These results indicate that instructions 
play a significant role in the way different images are interpreted, a claim that is sup-
ported by previous research on the influence of instructions on divergent production 
(Runco, Illies, & Eisenman, 2005). The role of instructions for perceptual switching 
needs to be addressed more thoroughly by future research. 
In Experiment 1, we found that the number of solutions does not substantially differ 
depending on the source of the image. This suggests that images previously used in 
perceptual switching tasks can have more possible interpretations than usually as-
sumed for bistable perception—at least if instructions require this. 
The phase durations measured in Experiment 2 do not indicate a clear distinction 
between the source of the line drawings; i.e., perceptual switching dynamics cannot 
be used to distinguish between images taken from perceptual switching or divergent 
thinking tasks. This suggests that bistable perception can also occur to some extent 
in response to the images taken from the divergent thinking task. 
The number of participants in each experiment is small and no statistical inferences 
can be drawn. Nevertheless, trends indicate that there are individual differences 
across the selected images, independently of their original source. This result sup-
ports findings from bistable research showing that perceptual switching differs across 
images (see van Ee, van Dam, & Brouwer, 2005). For example, in Experiment 2 the 
first phase duration for image D2 (street map–flag pole, see Figure 5) is longer than 
for other images in the same experiment, suggesting that this image is processed dif-
ferently. Previous studies that examined the connection between creativity and per-
ceptual switching overlooked the role of different types of images (Doherty & Mair, 
2012; Laukkonen & Tangen, 2017; Wiseman et al., 2011; Wu et al., 2016). It is possible 
that the relation between perceptual switching and creativity is found only for some 
images. We suggest further exploration of the origin of these differences, as they might 
unveil common factors affecting the relationship between the two phenomena. 
One challenge in designing the perceptual switching task for Experiment 2 was to 
select images that were previously used in divergent thinking tasks and which could 
be disambiguated. Unlike the disambiguation of images from bistable research which 
had previously been shown to work, the disambiguation of the line drawings from 
Wallach and Kogan's Pattern Meaning task had not been used before. We selected 
the two most common answers from a previously recorded data set for three of the 
images from the Pattern Meaning task. Subsequently we used them to disambiguate 
the line drawings by adding lines (for an example, see Figure 1). The disambiguations 
from perceptual switching tasks, on the other hand, consist of slight changes to the 
position and shape of key elements of the original image. The current results do not 
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allow us to draw any conclusions about whether the interpretations we selected for 
the disambiguation were the easiest to switch between, or whether other interpre-
tations would have worked better. Feedback provided by some participants sug-
gested that they could differentiate between the two types of images based on the 
way they were disambiguated. Participants described this difference in terms of dif-
ficulty to actively imagine additional features for images taken from the divergent 
thinking task, while for the images from perceptual switching tasks this was easier. 
Further differences between the two sets of images are that the images from the Pat-
tern Meaning task are more abstract and are based only on a few geometric shapes 
such as circles, lines and squares. On the other hand, the images from the perceptual 
switching tasks can be described as more complex and organic and are supposed to 
depict real objects (Strüber & Stadler, 1999). Different reaction times to abstract line 
drawings can be explained by the greater difficulty in processing these images as 
compared to content-based depictions of real-world objects. This highlights the im-
portance of the top-down effects of imagery and memory on the perception of im-
ages, as previously summarized in Scocchia, Valsecchi, and Triesch (2014). 
Another limitation of the study comes from the inability to control for participants’ 
prior exposure to the images. Bistable stimuli are well-known images that are often 
referenced in arts and popular culture and participants could have known some of 
them. Therefore, individual prior exposure to these images might have influenced 
the responses in both experiments. For instance, most of the participants reported 
knowing the duck–rabbit image beforehand. This might have biased their responses 
in the divergent thinking condition, particularly if they attempted to overcome the 
initial fixation on the two known interpretations. Previous experience with the im-
ages might also have shortened the time of the first perceptual switch in Experi-
ment 2. Future studies should seek to eliminate the effect of stimuli familiarity, which 
can affect participants’ responses. 
 
Conclusion 
The present study shows that inherent stimuli characteristics and instructions play an 
important role in interpreting ambiguous images. Participants respond to images from 
divergent thinking and perceptual switching tasks according to the instructions. Spe-
cifically, participants are able to provide more than two unique solutions when in-
structed to do so, even for images that are typically considered to have only two 
interpretations. Similarly, they can be instructed to switch back and forth between two 
given interpretations for images that are considered to have several possible interpre-
tations. In addition, shared metrics can be extracted from both paradigms which would 
allow researchers a more direct comparison between the two phenomena. 
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